BAKU CALLED BSECO TO “APPLY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS” AGAINST ARMENIA
Pan Armenian
12.10.2005 19:28 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Azerbaijan called upon the member-states of the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to apply sanctions against
Armenia. During the 16th sitting of the BSECO PA committee on cultural,
educational and social affairs held October 5-8 in Thessaloniki,
Greece, Azerbaijani parliamentarian Shaitdin Aliyev stated that “9
member-states of the Organization and the European Union should not
be indifferent on Armenia’s annexing the Azeri territories.”

STILL DOGGING US!
Tamer Korkmaz
Zaman, Turkey
Oct 12 2005
Turkey waited 42 years in order to start membership talks with the
European Union (EU). Ankara had squandered a huge opportunity by
not applying to the Community during the [Bulent] Ecevit government
in 1978.
In fact, even if we had not wasted that opportunity, not much would
have changed. The coup on September 12, 1980 would have rendered our
EU application meaningless!
Our application for candidacy dragged on until the era of former
Turkish Prime Minister and President Turgut Ozal in 1987. “Our joining
the EU will take up to 20 years,” public opinion was made to believe
at that time.
We crossed the most critical threshold ever during the wee hours of
Tuesday morning. However, remarks like “We have to wait 15 or 20 more
years,” are still dogging us.
If Turkey had “rebounded from the [goal] post” on October 3, this
would have been a very great loss. Had we had abandoned the negotiating
table, this would have hurt the prestige of both Turkey and the EU.
An introverted Turkey then would have been forgotten by the outside
world. And from the inside, we would have been surrounded by an
atmosphere that is more suitable for the Twilight Zone series.
Well, all right then…
Yet, at this point, we have to make a distinction between two events.
Our starting membership negotiations is a vital step; however, we
have to meticulously examine the mines on our negotiation path.
Underestimating or excluding the negotiating framework document mines
from the discussions, would be mere legerdemain. Not only the Cyprus
issue, which is still unsolved, but also the so-called Armenian issue,
are issues we will have to face. In future, Turkey will be told,
“If you want full membership, you must recognize the genocide!”
It is enough to be able to read the expressions with a special status
aroma in the negotiating framework document to see how the EU is
discriminating against Turkey!
The Croatia issue on October 3 once again proved that the EU does
not treat all candidate countries equally.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that Austria made the start of
negotiations with Zagreb a condition for EU members to say “yes”
to Turkey. The criteria set for candidate countries so far were
immediately frozen when Croatia became a bone of contention!
The EU has sent a very dangerous message to countries hiding war
criminals (Serbia in particular) by giving Croatia the green light.
Let’s assume, for a moment, that Turkey was in Croatia’s position.
They wouldn’t have even allowed us to utter the letter “n” for
negotiations!
***
This is one side of the medallion. On the other side, there is the
“mangal (barbecue) issue” of the Turks!
Rauf Tamer says: “Bottled gas will not explode, houses will not remain
unplastered, cars will not swerve into sidewalks, and our children
will not attend classes with 80 pupils anymore. This is the meaning
of our negotiation process!”
I wonder whether we will be able to overcome these “seemingly small”
problems during the negotiations.
Do you think guns fired in the air during weddings in certain
neighborhoods will stop during the negotiation process? Or will Turkey
organize the biggest armed celebrations in its history on the night
it is admitted as a full EU member? (I hope the day will come).
Or will barbecues at parks in several German cities be extinguished
during negotiations?
Will the Austrian businessman, who went crazy after seeing pickled
anchovies floating in the cabin luggage of a THY (Turkish Airlines)
plane that landed in Vienna in the beginning of 2000, forget this
moment of insanity and say “yes” to Turkey’s full membership in a
referendum that will be held years later?
Or how many times will a Turkish worker, who voted for Angela Merkel
in the last general elections in Germany, abandon his attempts to
build a squatter house somewhere in Berlin?
Will the Higher Education Council (YOK) in Turkey really abandon its
attitude of challenging the political party in power during the EU
process? Will negotiations save our 2,500 school buildings without
toilets?
Let’s wait and see!

NOBEL JUDGE QUITS IN DISGUST – A YEAR AFTER ‘PORN’ WINNER
>>From Charles Bremner in Paris
The Times, UK
Oct 12 2005
MYSTERY surrounded the resignation of a member of the Nobel Academy
yesterday, 48 hours before the prize for literature is due to
be awarded, amid speculation of a split over whether to honour a
dissident Turkish writer.
Knut Ahnlund said that he had resigned in protest over the award
last year to the little-known Elfriede Jelinek, of Austria, whose
work he described as “violent pornography”. Mr Ahnlund, 82, did not
explain why he had waited almost a year before lodging his protest,
increasing talk of a rift among members over the award for this year.
The announcement of this year’s literary honours had been delayed for
a week after the academy was reported to have disagreed on whether
to anoint Orhan Pamuk, 53, who has upset authorities in his country
by campaigning for official recognition that Turkey had carried
out genocide against the Armenians after the First World War. He
has been charged with “public denigration of the Turkish identity”,
and a prize for him would be certain to anger Turkey.
Mr Ahnlund wrote in the Svenska Dagbladet newspaper that Jelinek’s
work was “a mass of text that appears shovelled together without
trace of artistic structure”. The 2004 prize, he said, “has not
only caused irreparable damage to all progressive forces, it has
(also) confused the general view of literature as art. After this
I cannot even formally remain in the Swedish Academy.” Jelinek is
known to the right-wing Austrian media and political parties as
“the red pornographer”. The conservative US Weekly Standard said
that the academy had given the prize to “an unknown, undistinguished,
leftist fanatic”. In making last year’s decision, the academy cited
the “musical flow of voices and counter-voices” in her writing,
which draws heavily on sexuality and violence.
The Nobel Academy will announce this year’s winner tomorrow. In
addition to Pamuk, other writers tipped for the £760,000 prize
include Philip Roth and Joyce Carol Oates, of the United States,
Margaret Atwood, of Canada, and Nuruddin Farah, of Somalia. Some
Swedish insiders believe that the academy may award the prize to a
non-fiction writer. Two British precedents for this exist: Winston
Churchill, in 1953, and Bertrand Russell, in 1950.
Yesterday Horace Engdahl, permanent secretary of the academy, played
down Mr Ahnlund’s resignation, saying that he had not taken part in
the academy’s work since 1996.
The debate over the 2004 award has been in keeping with the disputes
that have often erupted around the sometimes quirky and politically
correct choices of the academy, whose 18 members are appointed for
life. Mr Ahnlund’s withdrawal reduces the active membership to 15.
Two other members, Kerstin Ekman and Lars Gyllensten, left in 1989
in protest at the academy’s failure to express support for Salman
Rushdie after the fatwa against him by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
the late Iranian leader.
The academy, which has been awarding the prize since 1901, has often
honoured mainstream authors such as Gabriel García Marquez and Rudyard
Kipling. It has also courted disfavour with governments by elevating
anti-establishment writers, and perplexity by anointing figures
little-known in their own countries. Boris Pasternak, the author of
Dr Zhivago, was forced by the Kremlin in 1959 to reject the prize,
which it deemed to have been motivated by anti-Soviet intentions.
Mr Engdahl said that criticism of the academy came largely from the
Englishspeaking publishing world. “A French or a German reader, or
writer or critic, is more likely to have access to the great dialogue
of literatures that Goethe called Weltliteratur,” he said.
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TEST FOR EAST AND WEST
Salman Rushdie
Calcutta Telegraph, India
Oct 12 2005
– On both sides of the Bosphorus, Orhan Pamuk’s case matters
The work room of the writer Orhan Pamuk looks out over the Bosphorus,
that fabled strip of water which, depending on how you see these
things, separates or unites – or, perhaps, separates and unites –
the worlds of Europe and Asia.
There could be no more appropriate setting for a novelist whose work
does much the same thing. In many books, most recently the acclaimed
novel Snow (Knopf, 2004) and the haunting memoir/portrait of his
home town, Istanbul: Memories and the City (Knopf, 2005), Pamuk has
laid claim to the title, formerly held by Yashar Kemal, of “Greatest
Turkish Writer”.
He is also an outspoken man. In 1999, for example, he refused the
title of “state artist”.
“For years I have been criticizing the state for putting authors in
jail, for only trying to solve the Kurdish problem by force and for
its narrow-minded nationalism…,” he said. “I don’t know why they
tried to give me the prize.”
He has described Turkey as having “two souls”, and has criticized
its human-rights abuses.
“Geographically we are part of Europe,” he says, “but politically?”
I spent some days with Pamuk in July, at a literary festival in the
pretty Brazilian seaside town of Parati. For those few days he seemed
free of his cares, even though, earlier in the year, death threats
made against him by Turkish ultranationalists – “He shouldn’t be
allowed to breathe,” one said – had forced him to spend two months
out of his country.
But the clouds were gathering. The statement he made to the Swiss
newspaper Tages Anzeiger on February 6, 2005, which had been the
cause of the ultranationalists’ wrath, was about to become a serious
problem once again.
“Thirty thousand Kurds and one million Armenians were killed in
Turkey,” he told the Swiss paper. “Almost no one dares to speak out
on this but me.”
He was referring to the killings by Ottoman forces of thousands of
Armenians between 1915 and 1917. Turkey does not contest the deaths,
but denies that they amounted to genocide. Pamuk’s reference to
“30,000” Kurdish deaths refers to those killed since 1984 in the
conflict between Turkish forces and Kurdish separatists.
Debate on these issues has been stifled by stringent laws, some
leading to lengthy lawsuits, fines and, in some cases, prison terms.
On September 1 Pamuk was indicted by a district prosecutor for the
crime of having “blatantly belittled Turkishness” by his remarks. If
convicted he faces as long as three years in jail.
Article 301/1 of the Turkish penal code, under which Pamuk is to be
tried, states that “A person who explicitly insults being a Turk,
the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be sentenced
to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years…
Where insulting being a Turk is committed by a Turkish citizen in a
foreign country, the penalty shall be increased by one third.” So,
if Pamuk is found guilty, he faces an additional penalty for having
made the statement abroad.
You would think that the Turkish authorities might have avoided so
blatant an assault on their most internationally celebrated writer’s
fundamental freedoms at the very moment that their application for full
membership of the European Union – an extremely unpopular application
in many EU countries – was being considered at the EU summit.
However, in spite of being a state that has ratified both the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights, both of which see freedom
of expression as central, Turkey continues to enforce a penal code
that is clearly contrary to these same principles and, in spite of
widespread global protests, has set the date for Pamuk’s trial. It
will begin, unless there is a change of heart, on December 16.
That Pamuk is criticized by Turkish Islamists and radical nationalists
is no surprise. That the attackers frequently disparage his works as
obscure and self-absorbed, accusing him of having sold out to the
West, is no surprise either. It is, however, disappointing to read
intellectuals such as Soli Ozel, a newspaper columnist and a professor
of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi University, criticizing
“those, especially in the West, who would use the indictment against
Pamuk to denigrate Turkey’s progress toward greater civil rights –
and toward European Union membership.”
Ozel wants the charges against Pamuk thrown out at the trial, and
accepts that they represent an “affront” to free speech, but he
prefers to stress “the distance that the country has covered in the
past decade”.
This seems altogether too weak. The number of convictions and prison
sentences under the laws that penalize free speech in Turkey has
indeed declined in the past decade, but International PEN’s records
show that more than 50 writers, journalists and publishers currently
face trial. Turkish journalists continue to protest against the
revised penal code, and the International Publishers Association,
in a deposition to the UN, has described this revised code as being
“deeply flawed”.
EU commissioner Jose Manuel Barroso says that Turkey’s entry into the
EU is by no means assured, that it will have to win over the hearts
and minds of the deeply sceptical EU citizenry.
The Turkish application is being presented, most vociferously by
Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair and foreign secretary Jack Straw,
as a test case for the EU. To reject it, we are told, would be a
catastrophe, widening the gulf between Islam and the West. There is
an element of Blairite poppycock in this, a disturbingly communalist
willingness to sacrifice Turkish secularism on the altar of faith-based
politics.
But the Turkish application is indeed a test case for the EU: a
test of whether the EU has any principles at all. If it has, then its
leaders will insist that the charges against Pamuk be dropped at once –
there is no need to keep him waiting for justice until December – and
further insist on rapid revisions to Turkey’s repressive penal code.
An unprincipled Europe, which turned its back on great artists and
fighters for freedom, would continue to alienate its citizens, whose
disenchantment has already been widely demonstrated by the votes
against the proposed new constitution.
So the West is being tested as well as the East. On both sides of
the Bosphorus, the Pamuk case matters.
DISTRIBUTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES SYNDICATE
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

“IRAN SYMPHONY” TO BE PERFORMED
IranMania
Wednesday, October 12, 2005 – ©2005 IranMania.com
LONDON, October 12 (IranMania) – The Iranian composer of “Iran
Symphony”, Shahin Farhat, said that Honar Academy of Culture is
commissioned to perform the “Iran Symphony”.
The symphony represents the national glory, history and folk music,
while old melodies have been included in the piece in a modern way.
He told IRNA that the symphony has been written based on Iranian
themes.
Not making any reference to the expected date the piece will be
played , he said, “Following the successful performance of Persian
Gulf and Damavand symphonies in Armenia, which was hailed warmly,
I decided to repeat the concert on the domestic scene due to its
purely Iranian themes.”
The musician referred to the performance of the symphony in Iran as
a privilege and expressed his constant interest in presenting his
works on the domestic scene.
Farhat also pointed out that one of his musical pieces will be
performed by Ali Rahbari in the near future.
Turning to the difficulties facing the performance of orchestral works
in Iran, he said, “Lack of proper musical instruments and equipment
as well as secondary facilities such as synchronous recording make
the conductor of the orchestra unable to arrange the rhythms.
“Nowhere in the world are classical musical pieces played in such an
order as to start with string instruments, proceed with recording
percussion instruments and eventually mix the resulting tunes,”
concluded Farhat.
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ARMENIA HONORS IRANIAN POET, AHMAD NOURIZADEH
IranMania
Wednesday, October 12, 2005 – ©2005 IranMania.com
LONDON, October 12 (IranMania) – A ceremony to honor the Iranian poet
and translator, Ahmad Nourizadeh and to release his recent books was
held at the Center for Armenian Writers in Yerevan.
Head of the Center for Armenian Writers Leon Ananian spoke at the
ceremony, reported Fars news agency on Sunday quoting Islamic Culture
and Communications Organization.
In his speech, Ananian referred to the historical and cultural ties
between the two nations and described Nourizadeh as among the evident
manifestations of bilateral friendship.
?Few countries can boast of such a personality who has made every
endeavor to promote Armenian culture, literature and civilization,?
he stated.
Addressing the same gathering, Iran?s cultural attache in Armenia,
Reza Atoufi thanked the center for holding the ceremony, describing it
as an indication of the high-level bilateral relations in all fields,
particularly in the cultural sector.
Pointing to the two countries? great cultural heritage and
capabilities, he also said that great world civilizations have been
influenced by the Iranian and Armenian cultures and civilizations.
At the ceremony, a number of writers and poets also discussed the
literary status of Nourizadeh and significance of his works in
promoting Armenian literature among Iranians.
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THE FOOD SNOOPBY MASHA GUTKIN
San Francisco Bay Guardian
Oct 12 2005
SOME OF BEULAH’S friends call her “Grandma,” “because at Grandma’s
house, you get to have anything you want, like chocolate, pot, and
booze.” (Quote from an anonymous, chocolate-smeared guest.) I’d like,
though, to call her “Den-Ma.” Sounds like “Grandma,” and this title
more nearly captures the heart of Beulah’s role: consummate hostess,
purveyor of decadence, provider of almost miraculously endless bottles
of easy-down rioja for a motley crew comprising students, memoirists,
filmmakers, archivists, and at least one newly minted American pro dom.
Beulah’s equally adept at serving straight-up Bailey’s in lieu of
coffee to the unexpected morning visitor (Jo-Jo, a flaming queen
in town for Fashion Week and a last hurrah pre-rehab) as she is at
talking Mandelshtam while simultaneously smoking and sauteing for a
dinner group of 10 assembled round her multitasking coffee table. Her
shower’s also blessed with perfect water pressure, another sign that
she’s a favorite with the gods of hospitality.
Beulah grew up in Yerevan, Armenia, followed by Glendale, Calif. The
other night she made a lamb stew from the mother country. Now,
depending on whom you ask, this stew belongs to a number of Caucasian
(as in the mountain range, the Caucasus) peoples. In Georgian it’s
called chanakhi and can also feature rice. Called chanakh in Armenian,
this stew shares its moniker with a feta-like cheese.
Beulah’s grandmother speculates that the shared name likely refers
to the type of clay pot, also known as chanakh, in which both stew
and cheese are made.
Traditionally, chanakh is slow-baked in its namesake pot, with a
layer of lavash (flat bread) at the top, in a tonir – a traditional
Armenian (also Turkish, also Iranian) pit oven. Beulah, lacking a
tonir, eschews the oven entirely for her version. In keeping with
Beulah’s role as the Benevolent BoHostess, she’s found the perfect
(albeit carnivore-centric) meal. This satiating stew’s a meal-in-one,
and its long, untended cooking time allows for leisurely anticipatory
intoxication for guests and host alike.
Stovetop chanakh/chanakhi (serves four to six)
You will need a cast-iron or otherwise thick pot that holds four quarts
and has a lid. Beulah cooks chanakh while chain-smoking illegally
imported duty-free cigarettes from Switzerland. You may skip this step.
2 1/2 to 3 lbs. lamb (any cut that has some bone and fat, such as
shoulder chop)
4 medium-size potatoes (peeled if the skin is rough) sliced into
1/4-inch rounds
2 medium sweet and/or hot peppers, seeded and chopped into chunks
2 medium onions, roughly diced
1 large eggplant, peeled in stripes (i.e., some of the skin left on),
cut into 1/2-inch cubes, salted and sweated
1/5 bunch purple basil (green basil may be substituted)
1/3 bunch cilantro, roughly chopped
1/3 lb. trimmed string beans or whole, tender, young okra
2 to 3 large cloves garlic, roughly diced
2 to 3 (peeled) tomatoes, chopped into chunks
1/2 Tbs. butter
Salt and pepper
Salt the lamb to taste (but generously), add pepper (go light if
you’re including hot peppers), and let it rest for 5 minutes. Heat
the butter and brown the lamb on high heat. This takes about 10 to
15 minutes and may be done in batches for optimum browning. When the
lamb is browned, set it aside. You should have a nice reservoir of
juices from the browned lamb remaining in the pot.
Turn down the heat to medium-low, and toss in the onions. Saute them
till they’re at least translucent. Add the tomatoes, and let them
simmer. In a few minutes, move the onion-tomato mix to the side of
the pot, and layer a third of the browned lamb on the pot bottom.
Then progressively arrange single layers of the other ingredients
(e.g., potato, topped by eggplant, then tomato, peppers, green beans,
lamb again, etc.). Try to include some of the onion-tomato mix in the
successive layers. NB: Sprinkle cilantro, basil, and garlic between
each layer.
Cover the pot. Keep the heat medium-low. In a half hour or so, use a
long-handled spoon to make a couple of little wells in the stew to help
the flavors meld. When possible – likely around 45 minutes to an hour
into the cooking time – use a spoon or spatula to gently press down on
the top of the stew so that all the layers are submerged in the stew’s
juices. Once all the ingredients are submerged, let the stew simmer
gently for about another 15 minutes. Take a component-comprehensive
taste. If everything is tender and luscious, the chanakh is set to
be served. Garnish it with fresh herbs, such as a twig of purple
basil and a sprinkling of chopped cilantro. If you have lavash on
hand, serve it alongside. Some enjoy chanakh with a side of Greek
(a.k.a. Armenian) salad.

LOGICAL IDEA THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED STRIFE
Michael Binyon
Kurdistan Regional Government, Iraq
Oct 12 2005
HAD Lawrence’s plan been accepted, much of the anti-Western bitterness
of Arab nationalism might have been avoided. There would have been no
quasi-colonial rule over Syria and Jordan; a state between Iraq and
Turkey might have become a homeland for the Kurds; and the Armenians
might have found refuge in a state north of Syria.
The plan would probably have done little to forestall the partition
of Palestine. Lawrence knew of the Balfour Declaration, which offered
the Jews a national homeland. On his map Palestine is marked as a
separate entity not awarded to any Arab ruler.
His map was drawn up at the height of his influence, when he was
attending the Versailles conference as an aide of Prince Feisal,
the leader of the Arab delegation. It is unclear whether it was an
attempt to sabotage the Anglo-French plan for Middle East “mandates”,
or a genuine attempt to reward the sons of Sherif Hussein of Mecca
with kingdoms of their own.
Lawrence proposes a Frenchcontrolled state in the mountains inland
from Beirut, the traditional Christian enclave around Mount Lebanon.
This later was enlarged by France to include an equal number of
Muslims and separated from Syria to form Lebanon.
Lawrence did not specify that the kingdom awarded to Zaid, the youngest
son of Sherif Hussein, would be a Kurdish state, but its boundaries
are very close to the area now populated by Kurds, who resent the
failure to award them a homeland after the First World War.
Since the map does not split Ottoman Syria into northern, French and
British zones, the state awarded to Feisal would have had geographic
and historical coherence. Iraq is placed under British administration,
but unites only two of the three Ottoman provinces, comprising the
Shia region in the south and the Sunnis around Baghdad. This would
not have prevented anti-British uprisings and Shia-Sunni tensions.
;RubricNr=&ArticleNr=6643&LNNr=28&RNNr=70

IT TAKES TWO TO SING ‘NORMA’
By Mark Stryker
Free Press Music Critic
Detroit Free Press
Oct 12 2005
One soprano has the voice, the other acting
All the buzz surrounding Michigan Opera Theatre’s production of
Bellini’s bel canto masterpiece “Norma,” which opened the company’s
fall season last weekend, centers on Armenian soprano Hasmik Papian
in the title role. She portrays the larger-than-life druid priestess
whose affair with the Roman proconsul, a rapscallion as well as the
sworn enemy of her people, ends badly for all. (Now, really, who saw
that coming?)
Bellini’s ‘Norma’ THREE STARS out four stars Michigan Opera Theatre
7:30 tonight
8 p.m. Fri.-Sat.
Detroit Opera House, 1526 Broadway
313-237-7464,
$28-$113
Hasmik Papian sings the title role tonight and Sat.; Brenda Harris
on Fri.
Papian has been making an international splash in the role, and since
great Normas appear as often as Halley’s Comet, Papian has begun
to generate enormous and perhaps unreasonable expectations. That’s
the price of admission with Norma, which demands Herculean stamina,
the agility and support to sing long-breathed melodies and a rush of
coloratura fireworks, and the acting skills to create a warrior and
woman of outsize passions and complexities.
Vocally, Papian delivered the goods Saturday, spinning Bellini’s
glorious melodies into a web of lyricism. Her tone was pure and
golden. Her alluring high notes floated as if on clouds, shaped by
diminuendos of exquisite control. Her coloratura was accurate, lovely,
legato and feminine. She sounded fresh enough at the end to sing the
opera again.
Her “Casta Diva,” Norma’s famous prayer, was to die for, and her
duets with romantic rival Adalgisa — sung with grand eloquence by
mezzo soprano (and Detroiter) Irina Mishura — were as thrilling as
anything I’ve heard in 10 years at the Detroit Opera House. Yet long
stretches fell curiously flat, and had I not returned Sunday to hear
American soprano Brenda Harris replace Papian at the matinee, I might
have chalked it up to the dramatic inertness built into the opera.
Harris’ voice is weightier, her coloratura more earthbound and
her pitch less secure. She produced some sweet vocal moments but
no magic. Yet she conveyed the mercurial temperament that Papian,
for all her vocal splendor, rarely reveals. When Norma shifts into
Medea-mode and nearly kills the children she has borne with the
proconsul Pollione, I never believed that Papian might use the dagger;
but I feared for those kids when Harris stood over them.
Harris stalks the stage, exploring the political and personal
dimensions of the tragedy, and she is not afraid to twist her voice
into expressions of pain, anguish or ambivalence; Papian favors
minimalist gestures, which is a reasonable choice, but she also seems
wary of making anything other than a beautiful sound, even when the
drama calls for it.
When push comes to shove, “Norma” is an opera in which pure vocalism
probably trumps all-around stagecraft, but critics are a greedy lot:
If you could merge Papian and Harris into a single soprano, you’d
have an unimpeachable Norma.
Elsewhere, MOT’s “Norma” is less complicated. Tenor Julian Gavin
sang with firm focus and ardor as Pollione on Saturday and looked
good in tights and a ripped shirt. Dongwon Shins’ barking tenor was
less compelling Sunday. Bass Arutjun Kotchinian is an impressively
stentorian Oroveso. The chorus sings with distinction.
Mario Corradi’s efficient direction does no harm, and conductor
Stephen Lord leads an enthusiastic if sometimes untidy orchestra.
John Pascoe’s sets and costumes, created for MOT’s 1989 production
starring an autumnal Joan Sutherland, eschew Stonehenge cliches in
favor of an early 19th-Century vision of ancient times. The sets are
disappointingly dingy, but they don’t detract from the irresistible
sport of hearing Papian and Harris try to scale Mt. Everest.

TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
Forum 18, Norway
Oct 12 2005
The European Union (EU) must make full religious freedom for all a
core demand in the EU membership negotiations with Turkey which have
just begun, argues Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio
in this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service
Dr Oehring also calls for people inside and
outside Turkey who believe in religious freedom for all to honestly
and openly raise the continuing obstructions to the religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities. He analyses
the limited, complex and changing state of religious freedom in the
country. In particular, he notes that Christians of all confessions,
devout Muslim women, Muslim minorities, and other minority religions
face official obstacles in practicing their faith and (in the case
of non-Muslims) strong social hostility.
Go to any mosque or church in Turkey and you will see people
worshipping. So clearly some religious freedom exists. Yet serious
problems persist. Religious communities are not allowed to organise
themselves as they choose. Individual religious freedom exists up to
a point. For example, you are entitled by law to change your religion
and to have the change recorded on your identity documents, but people
who have done so have faced hostility from fellow-citizens. As soon as
a religious community wants to organise itself, problems arise. This
holds just as much for Muslims as for communities of other faiths.
Although many Turks dislike the term “State Islam”, it has to be
stated that Islam is organised by the state. Sunnis who consider
this an unacceptable innovation are not allowed to organise. Although
Sufi orders exist, some even with a vast membership, they have been
officially forbidden banned since the 1920s.
The main problem religious communities identify is their lack of
legal status as religious communities. In the late Ottoman period
some religious minorities had legal status under the millet system,
but the Islamic community had no separate legal status as the state
was considered to be Islamic. But since the founding of the Turkish
republic, any such status has disappeared. Some Muslims are concerned
about this lack of legal status, especially minority Muslim groups
within the dominant Sunni majority, as well as the Alevis, Shias and
the Sufi orders. But few Muslims are prepared to voice their demands
for legal status openly, for fear of imprisonment, although in recent
years the Alevis have become more vocal. This has led to their gaining
some recognition as associations, though not as religious bodies.
Religious meetings and services without authorisation remain illegal,
though it remains unclear in law what constitutes legal and illegal
worship. The Ottoman millet system recognised some religious
minorities and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty spoke vaguely of religious
minority rights without naming them, but the Turkish authorities
interpret this to exclude communities such as the Roman Catholics,
Syriac Orthodox and Lutherans, even though these communities have
found ways to function. Protestant Christian churches functioning
quietly in non-recognised buildings are generally tolerated, but
Muslims gathering outside an approved mosque are viewed as a threat
to the state and police will raid them.
It is not possible for most Protestant Christian churches to be
recognised as churches under current Turkish law. But in one bizarre
case, a German Christian church was recognised in Antalya, but
only by calling itself a “chapel” not a “church.” Most Evangelical
Protestant churches in Turkey do not meet in private homes, but in
rented facilities such as office buildings or other non-residential
buildings. These can be fairly large.
The Law on Associations – adopted by Parliament in October 2004 –
does not allow the founding of associations with a religious purpose,
so founding a religious discussion group or even a religious freedom
group is impossible, even if some religious communities do try to
register as associations. Some Sufi orders and new Islamic movements
have registered as businesses, even with religious names.
However, the government has changed the building planning laws,
replacing the word “mosque” with “place of worship”. The government
indicated to Protestant churches that individuals cannot ask for
buildings to be designated as a place of worship, but individual
congregations should try to get recognition as a legal personality
first (as a “Dernek” or society) and then try to get their meeting
place designated as a place of worship. At least two Protestant
churches are now trying this route.
There are currently two Protestant churches that are legally recognised
by the Turkish state, one of which is in Istanbul. It was recognised
as a “Vakf” (charitable foundation) several years ago, after a
long court battle, making it a legal entity. Several weeks ago,
they finally had their building officially designated as a place of
worship. The second example is the Protestant church in Diyarbakir,
which has legal recognition as a house of worship under the Ministry
of Culture, as a heritage site.
Religious education remains tightly controlled. In law such education
must be carried out by the state, although in practice Christian
churches – Armenian Apostolic, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant – have
been able to provide catechetical training to their children on church
premises. The state turns a blind eye to this. But Koranic courses are
different. Officially they should take place only under the guidance of
the state, yet some 6,000 such courses are widely spoken of as existing
clandestinely. Many officials and police officers have good contacts
with them, while many senior officials and parliamentarians have been
members of Sufi orders which officially do not exist or are forbidden.
It is generally impossible to found higher education establishments
for Muslims, Christians and others. The Armenian Apostolic and the
Greek Orthodox seminaries were closed down in the 1970s and the
government has resisted all attempts to reopen them. Protestants
cannot normally establish Bible colleges. However, an Evangelical
Bible college functions in Selcuk; it is not government recognised and
accredited, but it has been providing theological training for several
years. Christian clergy and pastors mostly have to train abroad. Alevi
Muslims do not tend to demand religious colleges, as they are led
not by imams but by elders who are initiated by other elders.
The Law on Construction – which came into force into July 2003 –
makes it possible to “establish” places of worship. But the law –
probably deliberately – does not define if this means “build”, “rent”
or “buy”. Protestant churches face problems trying to build. Any
community wishing to build a place of worship officially can do so in
an area with a minimum number of adherents of their faith – but the
state decides if the community has enough members to get the land it
needs. There is no authoritative definition of how the law should
be interpreted. The Justice Minister said recently that religious
communities intending to establish a place of worship should apply, but
how can religious communities apply if officially they cannot exist?
Government officials do not want to acknowledge that Alevi Muslims
cannot officially establish places of worship. The government is
building Sunni mosques in many Alevi villages, but Alevis will not
go to them. Instead they meet openly for worship in cemevis (meeting
houses), not only in central Anatolia but even in Istanbul. The
government stated in parliament in 2004 that such Alevi cemevis are
not to be considered as places of worship. Although many of them
still function unimpeded, some have been closed down in recent years.
Conversion from one faith to another is possible, even from Islam,
under the law on personal status (though you cannot be listed
officially as an atheist or agnostic). If you convert from Islam
you can change your faith on your identity papers, but being Muslim
on your identity card makes day-to-day life easier. Christians,
Baha’is or Jehovah’s Witnesses are often unable to find employment,
especially in rural areas. So many who have converted from Islam
to another faith prefer to leave their religious designation on
their identity papers unchanged. According to information given by
the Minister of State in charge of Religious Affairs this autumn,
during the last ten years fewer than 400 people officially converted
to Christianity and only about 10 to Judaism.
Islam is controlled by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, or
Diyanet , which
is directed from the Prime Minister’s office. This was deliberately
established not as a government ministry, as Turkey claims to be a
secular state. Some Muslims do object to this state control, especially
those from newer groups, such as the Nurcu movement, the Suleymanci,
followers of Fethullah Gulen, and members of Sufi orders.
Some religious communities can officially invite foreign religious
workers. The Catholics can under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty invite
foreign priests up to a certain number, though even then the
government makes this difficult, asking why the Church needs so many
priests when there are so few Catholics. It is more difficult for
Protestant communities, as officially they do not exist as religious
communities. Foreign religious workers who come to Turkey under
some other guise can face problems, if the government finds out
about them. As long as the state does not have to know about their
activity they can function, but as soon as the state is forced to take
official notice of them, they can face problems. The government knows
about most, if not all, Protestant missionaries, because these made a
conscious decision to be open about what they are doing. Occasionally
they experience some problems but – with occasional exceptions –
the government merely monitors what they do, leaving them otherwise
undisturbed.
All religious communities are under state surveillance, with religious
minorities facing the closest scrutiny. Christian leaders know they
are listened in to and their telephones are tapped. The Ecumenical
Patriarch states that “walls have ears,” even when speaking within
his own Patriarchate in the Fener district of Istanbul. Police visit
individual Christian churches to ask who attends, which foreigners
have visited, what they discussed. They are particularly interested
in which Turkish citizens attend.
Are such visits a threat, or do the intelligence agencies just want
to know what is going on? When the police attend Catholic services
in Ankara, they say they are there to protect Christians. From my
conversations with church members, I’m sure this is not true.
When secularism was proclaimed as a guiding state principle in line
with French laïcite it was sincerely meant. Kemal Ataturk and his
followers aimed to crush Islam. Later on, officials understood that
society was not willing to follow this line. Slowly, Islam returned
to schools and other areas of life. Now Turkey is a Sunni Muslim
state. All those whose mother tongue is Turkish and are Sunni
Muslims are considered Turks. Alevis, Kurds, Christians and all
other minorities are not considered Turks – they are considered
as foreigners.
The furore over headscarves – a genuine concern to devout Muslim women
– was exploited as a political issue by Islamist parties, eager to
demonstrate their opposition to the military authorities which had
banned Islamic dress after the 1980 coup. Had there been no headscarf
ban, there would have been no problem. This point was illustrated by
the case of a non-political devout Muslim, Leyla Sahin. She was barred
from wearing a headscarf in Istanbul University in her fifth year
of medical studies and subsequently successfully completed medical
studies at Vienna University in Austria. This disturbing ban – which
de jure bars devout Muslim women from universities – is currently
under consideration by a Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). (See for more on
this and other ECHR cases.)
In rural Sunni areas women have always worn headscarves – though not
the type seen in Iran or Saudi Arabia – which some women have tried to
wear in towns. In some cases, supporters of the Refah (Welfare) party
and others have paid women to wear such scarves. Even nationalist
politicians say that if women are free to choose whether to wear a
headscarf or not, many who have worn them for political reasons would
no longer wish to do so.
Societal opposition to minorities of all sorts does impact on
religious freedom. Such social pressure is felt most keenly among
the poor. Members of the urban middle class who convert from Islam to
other faiths can freely practise their new faith. In Izmir a Christian
church exists where many young converts of university background
attend unchallenged. But openly converting to and practising a
non-Islamic faith is often impossible in poor neighbourhoods. In former
Armenian-populated areas of Anatolia – where there are also people of
Syriac descent – many families changed their formal identification to
Muslims, but did not convert in reality. Their attempts to practise
Christianity face enormous obstacles unless they move to Istanbul or
even to Ankara. Back in these towns and villages are no Christian
churches, so anyone wanting to meet for Christian worship could be
dragged off to the police or suffer beatings.
One former Interior Minister stated that Christians should only
conduct missionary activity among such people of Christian descent.
He estimated the numbers of such people at between 800,000 and three
million people.
You have to be very courageous to set up a Protestant church in remote
areas, as pastor Ahmet Guvener found in Diyarbakir. Problems can come
from neighbours and from the authorities. Even if not working hand
in hand, neighbours and officials share the same hostility. They
cannot understand why anyone would convert to Christianity. People
are not upset seeing old Christian churches – Syriac Orthodox and
other Christian churches have always existed in Anatolia – but seeing
a new Protestant church, even when housed in a shop or private flat,
arouses hostility.
Officials vary in their attitudes. The Kemalist bureaucracy follows
Ataturk’s secularist line and is against anything religious. There
is a nationalist, chauvinistic wing of officialdom which believes
that anything not Turkish is a threat to be countered. The security
and intelligence services, including the powerful military, are both
Kemalist and nationalist. Anyone considered not to be Turkish and not
Sunni Muslim faces problems. Even Sunni Muslim Kurds are excluded,
while Alevi Kurds are regarded as even worse.
It is very difficult to imagine that in the next decade or so Turkish
society will change to allow full religious freedom. To take one
example, for the change to be conceivable the chauvinistic content of
primary and secondary school education – constant praise of Ataturk,
Turkey and all things Turkish – will have to change. Unless this
happens, it is very hard to imagine Turkey evolving into an open
society that is truly ready to accept European Union (EU) human rights
requirements. One non-religious illustration of the lack of openness
in Turkish society is the near impossibility of free discussion of
the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians and Assyrians in the last years
of the Ottoman empire, along with continued official denial that the
genocide took place.
Christian churches have welcomed the prospect of Turkish EU accession,
often due to their own communities’ experience and hopes.
If negotiations last for more than a few years some improvements
for religious minorities – including Islamic minorities – might
be possible.
Sadly, there appears to be not enough interest among diplomats in
Ankara from EU member states – or in their foreign ministries back
home – in promoting religious freedom in Turkey. The EU has forced the
Turkish government to change the Law on Foundations. This law governs
inter alia community foundations (cemaat vakiflar) that act as the
owners of the real estate of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews,
who are treated by the government as minorities within the meaning
of the Treaty of Lausanne as well as some of the properties of the
Chaldean Catholic, Syrian Catholic and Syrian Orthodox Christians,
who are not treated by the government as minorities within the meaning
of the Treaty of Lausanne. But reforms will have to go much deeper
for Turkey to meet the EU’s stated ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of being “a
stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the
protection of minorities.” The EU must make full religious freedom
for all, including for Muslims, a core demand.
Full religious freedom would bring with it an increase in the
influence of Islam, which some think would endanger the western
orientation of Turkey. Possibly this is the reason that the EU has
not pushed Turkey harder on religious freedom. However, it is unwise
to see the relationship with Turkey through such “war-against-terror
spectacles.” It is vital for the future of Turkey that full religious
freedom be a core demand, so that Turkish democracy can be strengthened
to the point that it can in democratic ways cope with the hostility
of some Islamic groups.
With so little apparent interest in pushing for full religious freedom
from within the EU, local religious communities within Turkey will have
to take the lead. They are starting to challenge the denial of their
rights through the courts. Protestant Christians have been doing this
for almost 10 years, usually with success. The Ecumenical Patriarchate,
however, has failed to regain a former orphanage it ran on an island
near Istanbul through the High Court in Ankara. It is now taking
the case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg,
to which Turkey is subject as a member of the Council of Europe. I
believe this is the right way for such communities to defend their
rights and others are already following. The Alevi Muslims have told
the government that, if they continue to be denied religious education
in state schools to their children according to their own teaching,
they too will go to the ECHR. Denial of legal status to religious
communities is another possible ECHR case.
The most important thing is to put religious freedom on the agenda
and talk openly of the problems with full knowledge of the nuances
and complexities of the situation.
It is important to challenge Turkey’s restrictions on religious freedom
using Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
Turkey signed in 1954. This article guarantees “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”
This should be the basis for all discussion of religious freedom,
not the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, with its highly restrictive approach
to religious freedom.
Turkish religious communities will have to speak more on the importance
of religious freedom to the outside world, though they will have to
be wise in the way they do this. Religious minority leaders are in a
difficult situation: they believe that they have to argue in favour
of negotiations on EU membership, however sceptical they might be
about how ready Turkish society is to make the necessary changes.
Foreign churches and religious communities should be talking to
their own governments, to press them to promote religious freedom in
Turkey. They will have to convince them they are not simply advocating
greater rights for their co-religionists but truly advocate religious
freedom for all in Turkey, including Muslims.
The big question remains: do the Turkish government and people have
the will to allow full religious freedom for all? The Turkish media
speculates that the current government might not be in favour of EU
membership, but is merely using this as a way to introduce domestic
developments to achieve Islamist aims. The suggestion put forward
in the media is that, if democracy develops, the military will be
prevented from mounting a coup and so there will no longer be any
obstacle to Islamist aims.
Whether or not this media speculation reflects reality, all those who
believe in religious freedom in Turkey – both within the country and
abroad – must keep the issue on the domestic and international agenda –
and be honest about the continuing obstructions to religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities.
(END)
Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office at Missio
,
a Catholic mission based in the German city of Aachen, contributed
this comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views
and do not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.
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