PURPOSE OF HRAZDAN TPP 5th UNIT’S DEAL IS TO MITIGATE SOCIAL SITUATION UNTIL UPCOMING ELECTIONS, AAM BOARD STATES
Noyan Tapan
Apr 10 2006
YEREVAN, APRIL 10, NOYAN TAPAN. Under the name of measures aimed at
mitigating the gas price increase consequences, the ruling regime is
taking a next in turn step that seems to please the people, while
actually endangers the RA national security and has the purpose
of maintaining and reproducing its own power.” This is said in a
statement issued by the board of the Armenian All-National Movement
(AAM) in connection with alienation of the 5th power unit of the
Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant (TPP) to a Russian state company. It
is noted in the statement that conceding the whole energy sector of
the country to another state constitutes a loss of one of the most
importrant foundations of the country’s political independence and
pursues a “purely transient consumer” goal, as a result of which
the real loss incurred by the whole people will exceed multifold the
seeming economic benefit. The AAM board pointed out that no social
problem is solved by this deal, since the compensated sum will mainly
go to the well-off sections of the society – the owners of the gas
consuming production, the oligarchs making the entourage of the ruling
regime.”This shameful deal has one goal – to allay a possible social
indignation until the upcoming elections,” the statement reads. It
is notheworthy that the board of the Human Rights 96 Party also
expressed its concern over the 5th unit’s deal. According to it,
“since there is no information about the normative legal act, under
which this decision was made, it remains to hope that these are not
provisions of the RA Law on State Property Privatization as they were
completely violated by the coaltion ministers.”

NO HOUSE NO PROBLEMS
A1+
[04:19 pm] 11 April, 2006
There are no more dwelling houses in the adjacent part of Amiryan
and Buzand streets. Some of the former dwellers could get flats;
others found a shelter at their relatives’ and acquaintances’. And
what about the Buzand residents? They informed us that they are
waiting for the answer of the Constitutional Court.
“If they don’t start the trial next week we shall continue
our hunger-strike. But this time we shall do it in front of the
Constitutional Court instead of the Human Rights Protector’s Office. We
don’t organize strikes in front of the Government premises as we
find it senseless. Our matter can be solved only by the court,” says
the former inhabitant of Buzand Nuneh Varduni. Another inhabitant of
the same street Sedrak Baghdasaryan assumes that they will establish
justice due to the Constitutional Court, “And why not; one day our
country will become a country of law.”
The majority if the residents still continue their strikes and will
continue, as they say, “Our officials declare without pondering that
90% of the dwellers are interested in the compensation. But it is
not true.
Judging from their words one can say we are ready to sell the country
if we are given more money. Money is not vital, it is secondary. If
there is no law in the country and the law is only for ordinary people
that country is doomed to fall.”
Let us remind you that the Human Rights Protector Armen Harutyunyan
lodged a claim to the Constitutional Court on the issue of Northern
and Main Avenues inhabitants but so far his claim hasn’t been upheld.

PM REMINDS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON REELECTION
Lragir.am
10 April 06
During the meeting of the presidium of the NAS Academician Emil
Gabrielyan, member of the presidium of the National Academy of
Sciences, proposed that the right of the president of the NAS for
reelection to be restricted.
“The head of state can be reelected once, but there is not such a
restriction for the president of the NAS,” says Emil Gabrielyan,
proposing two five-year terms of office for the president of the NAS.
Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan approved this proposal. It is
especially notable that Andranik Margaryan reminded about the
corresponding article of the constitution referring to government
offices only. “Under the Constitution the right of members of
parliament and members of community councils for reelection is not
restricted, there is restriction on all the others,” Andranik Margaryan
considered it necessary to remind.

275 LIBRARIES CLOSED DOWN SINCE 1990
Lragir.am
10 April 06
However, the existing libraries fail to operate normally. The Library
Week held by the Armenian Association of Libraries for five years
now helps to have a closer look at the problems of libraries. Visits
to the regions revealed that besides bad conditions of premises,
shortage of books and low salary many libraries do not open for days
because there are no readers. Davit Sargsyan, President of the AAL,
Director of the National Library, thinks the solution of the problem
is government care. There is no law on libraries, which would raise
the problems of libraries.
The deputy director of the National Library Rafik Ghazaryan suggests
that the government should allocate funds from the state budget to
solve the problems of libraries.
The purpose of the library week is to return readers to books, and
make the library a place of civilized communication. The initiators
are satisfied with this year’s Library Week. About 18 events were held
at Khenko Apor Children’s Library, 200 events were held in the regions.

WILL NEW PRESIDENT TACKLE OLD ABUSES?
Lragir.am
10 April 06
On April 10 Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan told news reporters
that he agreed to the conclusion of the commission that monitored
financial management of the National Academy of Sciences. The
commission investigated the accusations of abuse put forward by
Academician Henry Nersisyan, Director of the Fundamental Library of
the NAS, against the leadership of the NAS.
“I read the conclusion, I agree to the conclusion, because a commission
worked, there was a meeting of the presidium, and the academicians
expressed their attitude towards the presidium, to which I agree. Again
there are drawbacks, which are mentioned in the evaluation of the
commission. The new president and the leadership of the Academy will
try to eliminate these drawbacks,” stated Andranik Margaryan. He also
added that Fadey Sargsyan’s removal from office was not determined
by accusations of financial abuse.

PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ARMENIA
ArmRadio.am
10.04.2006 17:14
Late April or early May President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas
Adamkus will pay an official visit to Armenia. President’s Spokesman
Viktor Soghomonyan informs that the exact date of the visit is still
being corrected.

KARABAKH CONFLICT MADE YEREVAN STRIKE GAS DEAL WITH RUSSIA – ARMENIAN AGENCY
Mediamax news agency, Yerevan
10 Apr 06
The Armenian government had little choice when it decided to sell
important energy sector assets to Russia, Armenian news agency
has reported. After listing several drawbacks of the deal on the
purchase of Russian gas, the agency went on to say that Armenia has
only two potential suppliers of gas and the ongoing controversy
over Iran’s nuclear programme makes Russia seem a more reliable
partner. The situation is unlikely to change because the Nagornyy
Karabakh conflict means that the Armenian borders with Turkey and
Azerbaijan will remain closed, the report said. The following is
the text of report in English by Armenian news agency Mediamax;
subheadings have been inserted editorially:
The “compensatory mechanisms” called to soften the consequences of gas
price increase for Armenia have been eventually revealed. On April
6, Gazprom issued a press release saying the company has signed a
“long-term agreement with the government of Armenia for 25 years
setting out strategic principles of cooperation”.
Gazprom announced that in accordance with the signed agreement,
ArmRosGazprom (the Russian giant owns 45% share of ArmRosGazprom) is
going to buy the fifth unfinished unit of Razdan Thermal Power plant
(Razdan-5) and the first, 40 kilometre-long section of Iran-Armenia
gas pipeline from the Armenian government. In accordance with the
agreement, ArmRosGazprom takes commitment to rebuild and modernize
Razdan-5. “After the conclusion of the deal Gazprom becomes the owner
the major part of ArmRosGazprom’s share,” the press release said.
The gas price for Armenia fixed in the Armenian-Russian agreement
remains 110 dollars per 1,000 cu.m. till 1 January 2009.
On April 6, the government of Armenia issued a press release informing
that Razdan-5 will be sold for 248.8m dollars. The sum will be paid
off according to the following schedule: 58.8m dollars in 2006,
70m dollars in 2007 and 120m dollars in 2008. Besides, Gazprom will
invest 140m dollars in the modernization of Razdan-5. Thus, the deal
might finally total nearly 400m dollars.
The official report of the Armenian government said nothing about
selling the section of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline. As Mediamax learned
from its sources in one of the biggest Russian newspapers, 2 hours
after the first press release Gazprom asked the media not to use it
and wait for the new one. As our sources reported, Gazprom’s press
service explained this decision by the dissatisfaction of the Armenian
government with the content of the press release.
Some time later, Gazprom placed a new version of the press release on
its web site not mentioning the Iran-Armenia pipeline. Gazprom would
hardly announce about buying the part of the pipeline “by a mistake”
or without sufficient reasons. Almost certainly, the parties agreed
not to unveil this part of the deal, but the agreement was breached
for some technical reasons. The sources of the Russian Vedomosti
newspaper in Gazprom claim the agreement on buying the pipeline
“has been reached but is not formulated yet”.
We would like to dwell on the main advantages and disadvantages of
the deal. Let’s recall, that still this January, commenting on the
reports of Russian media about Yerevan’s readiness to sell Razdan-5
and the stocks of Iran-Armenia pipeline, spokesman for the Armenian
president described them as “inconsistent with reality”. Sources in
the Armenian government declared then that the Russian side’s proposal
on handing over these two facilities “was and is unacceptable”.
Advantages
The fundamental and, probably, the only advantage is that the Armenian
population will be guaranteed from gas price fluctuations within the
coming three years. Most of the money gained from selling Razdan-5 will
be paid to ArmRosGazprom as a subsidy to cover the difference between
the old (54 dollars for 1,000 cu.m.) and the new (110 dollars for 1,000
cu.m.) prices. That means that the increase in gas prices for ordinary
Armenian consumers is insignificant: they are going to pay 65 drams for
one cubic meter instead of the previous 58. For industrial consumers
the growth is also very insignificant. Taking this into consideration,
the Armenian population will hardly dislike the decision taken by
the Armenian authorities to sell strategically important facilities,
as its majority lives under difficult social conditions and any
rise in prices would throw them into poverty. Moreover, the deal
suggests that in the coming three years the price for electricity,
which is too high in Armenia as compared to other countries on the
post Soviet space, also remains unchanged.
Considering the problem from the point of view of Armenian authorities’
interests, the deal makes them more confident ahead of the 2007
parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections, since a rise in gas
and electricity prices would provoke a total growth of prices which
would be extremely inauspicious on the eve of the elections.
Disadvantages
Let us be bold enough to assume that the basic disadvantage bears
a psychological character. In spite of the statements voiced
early this year about the need to reconsider the Armenian-Russian
energy cooperation, Russia became the owner of other Armenian energy
assets. The Razdan thermal power plant (without the unfinished fifth
unit) and four other enterprises were handed over to the Russian side
in 2003 to pay off Armenia’s 93m dollars debt to this country. The
manager of the plant is the subsidiary of RAO UES Company (United
Energy Systems of Russia) – “INTER RAO UES”, which also owns 100%
share of “Electricity Network of Armenia” grid and Sevan-Razdan
hydroelectric power station cascade, as well as manages the financial
flows of the Armenian nuclear power plant. Thus, Russia owns almost
all Armenian energy.
The price for Russian gas fixed for three years is a three-year
guarantee of Armenia’s loyalty to Moscow. The Kremlin has acquired
a new lever to exert pressure on Armenia – if Moscow doesn’t like
Yerevan’s policy, the signed agreement may be repudiated at any time
and Moscow may argue this decision by “changes on the world market”.
Iran will not be happy to learn about the decision to sell Razdan-5
and some part of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, though it’s hard to
believe that Yerevan took it without relevant consultations with
Iran. Until most recent, it was almost resolved that Iran will
modernize Razdan-5. Tehran was supposed to allocate a 150m-dollar
credit to Armenia and receive the money back through electricity
produced from the Iranian gas at Razdan-5.
According to our sources in the Armenian Foreign Ministry, Tehran
nervously reacted on January reports about Armenia’s decision to
sell Razdan-5 and part of stocks of the pipeline to Russia. Armenian
diplomats took a lot of efforts at that time to calm down their
southern neighbour.
It’s strange, however, what new arguments Yerevan found for Tehran and
how persuasive they were. Besides, in the light of recent developments
around Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran too suspiciously reacts to any
external irritants. This, consequently, may affect Armenian-Iranian
relations.
The deal will, most likely, arouse disappointment in Washington as
well, as the latter has recently shown keen interest in the provision
of Armenia’s energy security. This was one of the most important
US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Daniel Fried and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza focused on during their talks in
Yerevan this March.
Speaking at a news conference in Yerevan, Bryza said, “Armenia has a
huge experience of a positive cooperation with Russian gas suppliers,
which should be certainly continued”. However, he hardly meant the
news deal between Yerevan and Moscow.
We are not quite sure that Russia will completely fulfil its
obligations envisaged by the agreement in due time. 3 years ago,
5 enterprises were handed over to Russia to pay off Armenia’s
debt. Russia was obliged to modernize them and ensure orders. Only
Razdan Thermal Power plant is normally functioning today. As for
the rest of enterprises, they have received neither investments,
nor orders yet.
Realties
The list of disadvantages could be continued. It should be noted
that these assessments are emotional, whereas the politics is the
“science of the possible”. We have frequently reported that Armenia
possesses limited possibilities to provide its energy security.
Armenia possesses no finances to modernize the Razdan-5. (The capacity
of this unit after the modernization is expected to equal the capacity
of the Armenian nuclear power plant, which provides 40 per cent of
the republic’s electricity). Two countries – Iran and Russia – are
striving to modernize the plant. It’s difficult to say which variant
is more preferable given such a small choice.
Speaking about gas supplies to Armenia, in this respect Yerevan
doesn’t have choice either and the only possible suppliers are the
same countries – Iran and Russia. If Iran-Armenia pipeline were for
transit it would certainly change the regional situation. But it
should be finally admitted that the transit of Iranian gas through
the territory of Armenia to Ukraine and further to Europe is a myth,
at least in the foreseeable perspective. This myth has been emerging
and then disappearing in recent 10 years. The potential seller – Iran –
and the potential buyers – Georgia, Ukraine and European countries are
not interested in the talks and no one expresses hypothetical readiness
to finance this multi-billion project. It seems, Armenia became tired
of keeping the myth about the possibility to build a transit pipeline.
Judging from a conceptual point of view, are there reasons to believe
that Iran is a more reliable energy supplier than Russia? The growing
tensions over Iran’s nuclear program might entail harsh economic
sanctions, which will make any economic cooperation with Tehran
almost impossible.
Last week, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said “Armenia
is going to become part of the new Euro-Atlantic vision for energy
security provision,” noting that “the USA and the European Union are
working on it”. According to him, the work on the new conception
of energy security provision means “new nuclear power plants, the
construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, and Armenia is greatly
interested in all these discussions.”
The construction of a new nuclear power plant in Armenia (which arouses
USA’s interest) is a long and expensive project. Under favourable
circumstances it will be realized not earlier than in 8-10 years. The
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline Vardan Oskanyan spoke about is another
expensive and ambitious project. Even if we suppose that it will be
realized in the shortest possible time, the perspective of Armenia’s
involvement in it looks doubtful – if Yerevan and Baku fail to resolve
the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict by that time, Azerbaijan will do its
best to exclude Armenia from this project.
Now we are drawing near to the key conclusion – the full provision
of Armenia’s energy security and independence is impossible without
resolution of regional conflicts, the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict
in particular. Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey will
remain closed without resolution of the conflict and Armenia
will have restricted possibilities to withstand Russia and Iran’s
pressure. This is the reality. It would be at least wrong not to take
it into consideration analysing the latest Armenian-Russian deal. On
the other hand, there is an impression that the unsettled conflict
already became a justification for these or those controversial steps.

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, April 6, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 67
IN THIS ISSUE:
*President of Adygeya disappears after conflict with Kremlin
*Moscow targets joint Armenia-Iran energy projects for takeover
*Russia, Kazakhstan ink new deals on energy and military cooperation
KREMLIN PLAN TO MERGE ADYGEYA MEETS UNEXPECTED OBSTACLE
On April 4, the second session of the newly elected parliament of
Adygeya, a region in the western section of the North Caucasus, ended
abruptly when President Khasret Sovmen announced his resignation.
The Adygei leader had come to parliament to observe the process to
select the chairmen of 12 parliament committees. Fierce debate erupted
between members of the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party, which has 30
seats in the Adygei legislature, and the opposition Communist and
Russian United Industrial Parties, which have a total of 13 seats.
Sovmen asked for the floor, presumably to broker a compromise. However,
parliamentary chair Ruslan Khadzhibekov refused to allow the Adygei
leader to speak. Then Sovmen handed the speaker a written statement. But
instead of reading it aloud, Khadzhibekov said that the statement would
first be reviewed by the Political Council of United Russia; both Sovmen
and Khadzhibekov are members of the pro-Kremlin party.
Despite the speaker’s obvious resistance, Sovmen managed to take the
floor following a break. His speech stunned the assembled deputies. “I
have decided to resign,” he declared. “Moscow does not understand me.
Even if I step down from the president office, I will provide the
republic with economic and social help.” Sovmen wished the parliament
good luck and suggested possible successors, including Adam Zhane,
minister of health, and Murad Kudaev, the head of Adygeya’s
Krasnogvardeisk district (Kommersant, April 5).
Sovmen left the parliamentary chamber after his speech, accompanied by
several loyal deputies. According to Kommersant, Sovmen went to the
Government Palace to await a phone call from the Kremlin. He did not
have to wait for long; the phone call from Moscow came within 30 minutes
and radically changed the situation.
Following Sovmen’s conversation with Moscow, the Adygei presidential
office issued a press release. “The deputies and journalists
misunderstood the statement made by the president,” it read. “There are
no grounds for broadcasting information about his resignation.”
According to press secretary Abrek Chich, “The president reacted too
emotionally to what was going on during the session. When he entered the
parliament, some deputies defiantly did not stand up and when Khasret
Sovmen saw that the deputies had no common ground and synergy, he
announced that there was no use trying to work with such an attitude.”
Several hours later the United Russia parliamentary faction held a
special meeting and appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to
extend Sovmen’s authority by another term.
The next day, April 5, the political crisis in Adygeya took a disturbing
turn: Sovmen disappeared. Vedomosti reported that even officials from
Putin’s administration were unable to locate him. An unnamed source in
Putin’s administration described Sovmen’s behavior as “unclear
vacillation that destabilizes the situation in the region.” The source
also said that Sovmen’s resignation might be accepted as early as the
end of this week (Vedomosti, April 5). However, another source in the
Kremlin left open the possibility that Putin would reappoint Sovmen
(Kommersant, April 5).
Russian pundits offered a variety of explanations for Sovmen’s demarche.
Kommersant reported that the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Sovmen’s
economic policy and that he was resisting a proposal to incorporate
Adygeya into Krasnodar Krai, which is dominated by ethnic Russians (see
EDM, April 29, 2005). According to political observer Oksana
Goncharenko, “The danger now is that the local parliament will split
into equal parts, including followers and opponents of Sovmen” (Novye
izvestiya, April 5). The opposition, consisting mostly of ethnic
Russians, advocates holding a referendum in Adygeya on the issue of
unification. This would be the easiest way for the Kremlin to dissolve
Adygeya, as the majority of the population in the republic consists of
Russians who would vote for such unification. According to Alexander
Konovalov from the Institute of Strategic Estimates and Analyses, the
president of Adygeya was called to Moscow where attempts were made to
persuade him to agree to the unification. Instead, he went to parliament
to resign in protest.
The new Adygei parliament, elected on March 12, has only one chamber,
unlike the previous body. It will be much easier to push the referendum
law through a unicameral parliament, which had been blocked by the upper
chamber of the old legislature. Adopting the referendum law opens the
door for unification, which the Kremlin has long tried to engineer.
Parliamentary speaker Khadzhibekov is loyal to the Kremlin and will not
resist Adygeya’s incorporation into Krasnodar Krai. Relations between
Khadzhibekov and Sovmen are strained, because Moscow sees Khadzhibekov
as the region’s next president. This explains why Khadzhibekov did not
let Sovmen speak first at the session and why the Adygei leader
mentioned two regional politicians as his preferred successors.
Understanding that the Kremlin wants to get rid of him to clear the way
for the merger, Sovmen decided to play an all-or-nothing game,
knowing that Moscow has not yet decided what to do with him and with
Adygeya. The Adygei president’s bold move may have been intended to
frighten Putin, who often moves tentatively to avoid making missteps.
Sovmen’s open threat to resign demonstrated that the Adygei leader
continues to be an independent regional political figure, a quite rare
species in Putin’s Russia. But Sovmen must act boldly, as the Adygei
people would not forgive him if he betrays the idea of Adygeyan
autonomy.
–Andrei Smirnov
BLESSING ARMENIA’S DEBT SERVITUDE
On March 31 in Moscow, the Foundation for the Orthodox Peoples’ Unity
bestowed its annual award on Armenian President Robert Kocharian and
Russia’s Gazprom company for their support to Russian spiritual and
religious values (Noyan Tapan, March 31). By fortuitous coincidence,
Gazprom doubled the price of gas to Armenia, effective April 1. The
price hike will deepen Armenia’s economic dependence and structural
indebtedness to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally announced in December
2005 that the gas price to Armenia would double as of January 1. In
early January, however, Putin granted a reprieve until March 31, so as
not to hit allied Armenia too hard in winter, but also to negotiate
another transfer of Armenian infrastructure and energy-sector assets to
Russia as payment for the higher gas bill after April 1. On April 5,
Kocharian publicly hinted that such an arrangement is in the making
(Armenian Public Television, April 5).
The gas price has now risen from to 0 per one thousand cubic meters
delivered at Armenia’s border. As a result, the price of gas consumed in
Armenia is rising in one fell swoop by 52% to households and by 85% to
industrial and commercial enterprises, effective on April 10. Armenia’s
Public Utilities Regulatory Commission approved the new rates already on
March 10 — an indication that Moscow was not prepared to grant any
further short-term reprieve.
Furthermore, the Russian-controlled, gas-fired Hrazdan electrical power
plant — the largest in Armenia — has announced its intention to raise
the price of electricity by 90% for households and enterprises, in
connection with the price hike on gas. Russia’s Unified Energy Systems
(UES) operates the Hrazdan plant under a 99-year lease, as part of the
debt-for-assets deal that settled Armenia’s debts to Russia in
2002-2003. Six Armenian industrial enterprises were ceded to Russia in
that deal as well.
Previously, Armenia had ceded control of the national gas transport and
distribution system to a mixed company, ArmRosGaz, in which Gazprom
holds a 45% stake, Gazprom’s affiliate Itera another 10%, and Armenia’s
Energy Ministry the remaining 45% stake, which may now be further
eroded. Moscow wants the handover process to continue, so as to render
Armenia’s economic dependence complete and irreversible.
Moscow is now making an offer that, by its reckoning, the destitute
Yerevan can hardly refuse. It proposes either temporary price relief on
gas, or a temporary price-offsetting mechanism to alleviate the social
impact, on the condition that Yerevan transfers additional assets to
Russia. These could include: part of Armenia’s remaining stake in
ArmRosGaz, or Armenia’s stake in the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline under
construction, or the fifth power bloc under construction by Iran at
Hrazdan. That fifth bloc, Hrazdan’s largest and most modern, is co-owned
by Armenia and Iran independently from the four Russian UES-operated
blocs and is valued at some 0 million in the ongoing discussions.
If Yerevan hands over such assets, Moscow could recalculate the price of
gas downward to or per one thousand cubic meters; or, alternatively,
Yerevan can use the proceeds from such handovers in order to compensate
the populace for the doubling of the gas price. According to credible
reports, not denied by Armenian officials and partly corroborated by
some of them, Yerevan and Moscow are now discussing a solution along
those lines, to apply for a two-and-a-half year period. The Hrazdan
plant’s fifth power bloc alone — the largest and most modern, co-owned
by Armenia and Iran separately from Russia’s UES — is valued at some 0
million in these discussions.
Gazprom and Itera supplied Armenia with 1.7 billion cubic meters of gas
in 2005 and intend to deliver 2 billion cubic meters in 2006. This gas
originates in Turkmenistan, reaching Armenia by pipeline via Kazakhstan,
around the northern bend of the Caspian Sea and through the North
Caucasus and Georgia. This is the pipeline that was blown up
(simultaneously with another pipeline and an electricity transmission
line) by never-identified saboteurs on Russian territory in January,
causing severe hardship to Georgia and Armenia.
Until 2005, Gazprom and Itera were buying Turkmen gas at per one
thousand cubic meters and reselling it to Armenia at to . This year,
Turkmenistan sells its gas for per one thousand cubic meters to Russia.
Thus, the Russian price hike to Armenia is highly disproportionate to
the Turkmen hike.
Apparently, Moscow feels free to resort to economic extortion of Armenia
and takes its political loyalty as an ally for granted. Moreover, by
targeting the joint Armenia-Iran energy projects for takeover, Russia
intends to rule out for the long term any alternative to its own
monopoly in Armenia. For its part, the Armenian leadership seems content
to accept the type of short-term price relief that goes together with
long-term insecurity and debt servitude for the country.
(Interfax, Noyan Tapan, Armenpress, Mediamax, PanArmenianNet, March
30-April 6; Haikakan Zhamanak, March 29, 31; see EDM, January 17, 20)
–Vladimir Socor
NAZARBAYEV’S GROWING CONFIDENCE ON VIEW IN VISIT TO MOSCOW
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev received a warm welcome during his
April 3 visit to Moscow. Friendly relations were emphasized when
Nazarbayev dedicated a new monument to the 19th-century Kazakh poet Abai
Kunanbayev, a devoted Russophile. Speaking at the ceremony, Russian
President Vladimir Putin noted that this event, as well as the erection
of a similar monument to Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in Astana,
symbolizes the long tradition of friendship between the two countries.
Nazarbayev and Putin signed seven bilateral agreements covering energy
and fuel cooperation, the use of the Saryshagan test site by the Russian
military, and cooperation between Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Industrial Group
and Russia’s Vneshekonombank, and between the Foreign Ministries of the
two countries. Moscow also pledged to help Astana putting the first
Kazakh satellite — Kazsat — into orbit (Khabar TV, April 5).
The Kremlin is using every pretext to secure a strong military foothold
in Kazakhstan following Tbilisi’s repeated demands for the Russian
military to withdraw from its bases in Georgia. Astana regarded Russia’s
recent ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines (see EDM, March 28)
as a response to swelling anti-Russian sentiments in these countries.
With an amazing promptness, just before Nazarbayev’s trip to Moscow, the
Sanitary Inspection Department of the Kazakh Ministry of Health ordered
an inspection of imported Georgian and Moldovan wines. The head of the
department, Anatoli Belonog, said that, if the wines pose health
hazards, such imports might be banned in Kazakhstan as well (Megapolis,
April 3).
The current military and political ties between Russia and Kazakhstan
are hardly conducive to fostering friendship among equals. In Astana,
the Kazakh government sporadically comes under fire from nationalists
for granting Russia a 50-year lease on the Baikonur launch site, which
is in the environmentally vulnerable Kyzylorda region. The lease on the
Saryshagan test site is likely to draw additional protests.
But these sacrifices and concessions are inevitable for Kazakhstan,
which is desperately seeking to build up its military force with Russian
help. At a press conference in Astana the chairman of the Committee for
Scientific and Technological Development of the Ministry of Industry and
Trade, Meyram Kazhyken, announced plans to set up a Russian-Kazakh joint
venture to assemble Kazakh Ansat and Aktay helicopters based on the
Russian MI model. Some helicopter parts may be manufactured in the
former munitions plants of Aktobe, Almaty, and Petropavlovsk. But
Kazhyken pointed out that it would take 10-15 years before even 30% of
the production could be relocated to Kazakhstan (Sayasat, April 1).
The price for Russian assistance in modernizing the Kazakh army is
political loyalty to the Kremlin. Aware of this pitfall, Astana seeks to
diversify its military partnerships and avoid relying entirely on Moscow
for sophisticated weapons. For example, Kazakhstan inherited a
well-developed Soviet space-flight monitoring system that could be used
to modernize its air defense system with help from Singapore
Technologies.
Astana has also made significant steps toward greater energy
independence from Moscow by bidding for stakes in the Yukos-owned
Mazeikiu Nafta complex in Lithuania. Ironically, on the eve of the
Nazarbayev-Putin talks in Moscow, the Lithuanian newspaper Lietuvos
Rytas announced that the Lithuanian government was seeking to buy back a
57.3% stake in Mazeikiu Nafta from Yukos and then sell it to
Kazakhstan’s state owned company, KazMunayGaz (Vilnius BNS, March 31;
also see EDM, April 5). Kazakhstan’s closer ties with China also help
counterbalance Russia’s drive to monopolize hydrocarbon transportation
routes through Kazakhstan.
Astana has enthusiastically embraced the idea of a “Greater Central
Asia” region and Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev recently
went to Afghanistan to attend an international conference on
“Partnership, Trade, and Development within Greater Central Asia,”
sponsored by Johns Hopkins University. He also made sure to extend a
personal message of friendship from Nazarbayev to Afghan President Hamid
Karzai. Tokayev said that Greater Central Asia, which includes a
politically and economically diverse grouping of Iran, Afghanistan, and
Azerbaijan, parts of China, Western Siberia and the Urals of Russia,
particularly interests Kazakhstan as a promising energy transportation
route extending from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf via India and
Pakistan. The Kazakh foreign minister stressed that Afghanistan should
be part of Greater Central Asia linked with Almaty, Bishkek, and
Dushanbe
via a Trans-Afghan highway running through Kabul to Kandahar. Kazakhstan
also offered to train Afghan medical workers and engineers
(Kazakhstanskaya pravda, April 4).
Tokayev addressed the conference on behalf of all Central Asian states
without fearing any criticism from Kazakhstan’s neighbors. It is a clear
sign of Astana’s growing confidence in spearheading an alliance of
Central Asian countries. Nazarbayev’s March 19 visit to Tashkent also
contributed much to the rapprochement between Uzbek President Islam
Karimov and Putin, and Karimov spoke in favor of a Kazakh-Uzbek alliance
and putting priority on a partnership with Russia in foreign policy (see
EDM, March 22). However, Astana takes a more cautious approach toward
Moscow and tries to neutralize the Kremlin’s attempts to return the
Central Asian states to the Russian fold. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy
program for 2006 -2008 points out that Kazakhstan “will pursue a
balanced and responsible foreign policy.” The Kremlin should not be
overly optimistic regarding “eternal friendship” with Astana.
–Marat Yermukanov
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, April 4, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 65
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Timetable set for Russian troops to leave Georgia
*Washington rewards Yerevan’s interest in NATO
*Dushanbe considers military help from China, Pakistan
AGREEMENTS SIGNED ON RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM GEORGIA
On Friday, March 31, Georgia’s First Deputy Defense Minister, Mamuka
Kudava, and Russia’s Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General
Alexei Maslov, signed a set of agreements on the withdrawal of Russian
forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and other Russian
military installations in Georgia.
The agreements concern the implementation of the May 30, 2005, Joint
Statement, signed by Georgia’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome
Zourabichvili with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the
cessation of functioning of those bases and installations and
withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia by 2008. The Russian side
carried out an initial stage of the withdrawal last August (see EDM,
June 3, August 1, 16, 2005).
The documents just signed in Sochi include an agreement on the
timeframe and modalities of functioning and withdrawal of Russian
forces from Georgia and an agreement on the transit of Russian
military cargoes and personnel through Georgia’s territory.
The Akhalkalaki base is to be emptied of most of its heavy equipment
during 2006 and to be completely closed by October 1, 2007, with a
possible extension until December 31, 2007, subject to weather
conditions. The Batumi base is to ship out most of its heavy equipment
during 2007 and to be completely closed before the end of 2008. The
two garrisons total approximately 3,000 Russian military personnel at
present. The Batumi base will be the last to close because it serves
as an evacuation point for heavy equipment by sea to Russia from
various points in Georgia.
During the withdrawal process, the Russian side shall retain:

a) the Gonio exercise range on the Black Sea shore outside Batumi, to
be used for logistical operations related to the evacuation, not for
exercises;

b) the Russian officers’ hostel in Mtskheta outside Tbilisi, a
way-station on the Russian forces’ evacuation route to North Ossetia;

c) the Soviet-era Kojori communications station also outside Tbilisi,
to be used jointly by Russia and Georgia under Georgian jurisdiction;
and

d) the Tbilisi building of the Headquarters of the Russian Group of
Forces in the Transcaucasus, in order for those headquarters to manage
the withdrawal process.
All of these installations are also to be handed over to Georgia in
2008. The bases shall function during this period “in a withdrawal
mode,” i.e., without conducting firing practice or other combat
exercises, essentially packing up. Russia shall allocate 2.166 billion
rubles from its state budget in 2006 through 2008 to finance the
withdrawal of its forces from Georgia. For its part, Georgia
authorizes the use of its air space, highways, railroads, and ports
for the transport of Russian military equipment and personnel out of
Georgia.
It is informally understood that most of the Russian personnel and
some two-thirds of the hardware shall relocate to Russia’s North
Caucasus Military District, while one-third of the hardware is to be
transferred to Russia’s base at Gyumri in Armenia. The Russian side
undertakes not to transfer that equipment to another party, meaning
Armenian forces.
Russia retains limited, strictly regulated transit rights to supply
its forces in Armenia through Georgian territory in the future. Any
Russian military equipment transported via Georgia to Armenia is not
to be handed over to other forces (i.e., Armenian) and not to be
deployed in any conflict zone (i.e., Karabakh and Armenian-occupied
territories inside Azerbaijan). The content of Russian military
transit cargoes shall be agreed by Russia and Georgia one year in
advance. Cargoes must not include mass-destruction weapons, their
components, or any dual-use nuclear, chemical, or biological
substances. Georgia has the right to refuse the transit of any Russian
cargo that poses a threat to national security or violates any of
those conditions.
The March 31 agreement (like the May 30, 2005, Joint Statement) does
not cover Russia’s Gudauta base, which is located in Abkhaz-controlled
territory. Moscow has claimed since 2003 that it “closed” the base,
but has not allowed international verification at the site. In fact, a
Russian garrison has continued to be stationed at the base all along,
with weapons stockpiles and helicopters. Moscow seeks OSCE approval
for the base to be assigned to Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops in
Abkhazia. Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili noted,
“They’ve been lying for years, telling us that the base was closed
… We will not allow them to kick sand in our face” (Imedi TV,
Rustavi-2 TV, March 31).
On March 28, unidentified Abkhaz gunmen stole arms from the Gudauta
base and some of them were wounded in an exchange of fire with the
Russian garrison during the getaway. The March 31 agreement does not
pertain to Russia’s “peacekeeping” contingents in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Georgian parliament seeks a formula for replacing those
contingents with a genuine, international peacekeeping operation.
(Interfax, Prime-News, March 31)
–Vladimir Socor
U.S. ANNOUNCES MAJOR NEW AID PACKAGE FOR ARMENIA
The United States has officially committed itself to providing 5.65
million in additional economic assistance to Armenia, in a further
indication of its deepening ties with the South Caucasus country. The
sum, substantial by Armenian standards, is to be provided over the
next five years under the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) program aimed at promoting good governance and economic
reforms around the world.
The administration included Armenia on the list of 16 developing
countries eligible for MCA funding when it unveiled the program two
years ago. The cash-strapped government in Yerevan jumped at the
opportunity to meet some of its pressing socio-economic needs. The MCA
compact that was signed by senior U.S. and Armenian officials in
Washington on March 27 is the product of Yerevan’s lengthy
negotiations with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a
U.S. government agency handling the scheme.
Speaking at the signing ceremony, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice described the agreement as a “testament to the hard work and
dedication of the Armenian people and their elected government.” Rice
stressed that provision of the aid is conditional on the proper
conduct by the Armenian authorities of parliamentary and presidential
elections due in 2007 and 2008 respectively. “These are important
commitments and the United States stands ready to help Armenia to
ensure that its upcoming elections are free and fair,” she said.
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian assured her that his
government would do its best to honor those commitments. “Our task
until then is to partner with the United States and European
governments to implement the necessary corrective steps to improve the
conditions necessary for an honest and fair expression of people’s
voices,” he said.
The large-scale aid will be channeled into rural regions of Armenia
that have seen little development despite a decade of nationwide
economic growth. The main segment, worth 6 million, will be spent on
upgrading the country’s malfunctioning irrigation networks, which date
to Soviet times. Another million will be used for capital repairs of
about 1,000 kilometers of battered rural roads. U.S. and Armenian
officials say these two infrastructure projects will directly benefit
75% of the approximately one million Armenians dependent on
farming. The first major installment of the aid is expected to be
disbursed early next year.
Interestingly, Armenia has already been one of the world’s leading
per-capita recipients of U.S. economic assistance, which is approved
by Congress and has totaled .6 billion since 1992. The size of
this “regular” aid is commonly attributed to the strength of the
Armenian-American lobby on Capitol Hill. But finding an explanation
for Armenia’s inclusion in MCA, which is single-handedly decided by
the Bush administration, is a more difficult task. Unlike neighboring
Georgia (the only other former Soviet state covered by MCA), Armenia
has no ambition to join NATO and maintains close military and
political ties with Russia.
Many Armenian observers regard the promised MCA funds as a further
incentive for President Robert Kocharian and his most likely
successor, Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian, to accept a compromise
solution to the Karabakh conflict. U.S. officials say a framework
peace deal may still be achieved this year despite the collapse of a
crucial Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in France last February. In this
regard, local observers consider very significant Rice’s remark that
Armenians have an “elected government.” (The State Department strongly
criticized the 2003 Armenian presidential and parliamentary
elections.) Haykakan Zhamanak, a pro-Western Yerevan daily critical of
the ruling regime, editorialized on April 1 that Washington is thereby
“removing all questions about Robert Kocharian’s legitimacy.” A
commentator for another paper, 168 Zham, went further, speculating
that the Americans are disinterested in Armenia’s democratization
because “our society is overwhelmingly pro-Russian.”
The United States was quite cautious in criticizing reports of serious
fraud during last November’s constitutional referendum in Armenia (and
parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan) — a far cry from its tough
reaction to the disputed presidential ballot in Belarus on March
19. MCC chief executive John Danilovich expressed concern at the
Armenian authorities’ handling of the referendum but promptly lauded
their “commitment to sustaining the democratic reforms” after
receiving relevant assurances from Kocharian last January. In a March
27 speech at a conference organized by the Armenian Assembly of
America, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said
Washington is “taking at face value assurances from the Armenian
government” that the 2007 and 2008 elections will be democratic. Many
Armenians are far more skeptical on this score.
By providing extra aid to Armenia Washington may also be rewarding the
government’s ongoing efforts to forge closer security links with NATO
and America in particular. “We do support Armenia’s efforts to
strengthen its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community,” Fried
said, commending the Kocharian administration for seeking greater
“balance in its relations with the West and the Russians.” Fried’s
deputy Matthew Bryza welcomed “considerable progress made in this
regard over the past year” after holding talks with Armenian leaders
in Yerevan on March 7. “I don’t think that the government of Armenia
can move at a pace that for us is too quick,” Bryza told a news
conference. “But we are very happy with the level of cooperation. This
has been a significant year for U.S.-Armenian security cooperation.”
(Haykakan Zhamanak, April 1; 168 Zham, March 30-31; RFE/RL Armenia
Report, March 7, 28; Text of Daniel Fried’s address to the Armenian
Assembly of America, )
–Em il Danielyan
TAJIK MILITARY WEARY OF NATO
Tajikistan’s military leadership has expressed public concern over the
country’s recent trend toward closer involvement with the NATO
Alliance as a mechanism through which Dushanbe will gain enhanced
military and security capabilities. The apparent turn in the direction
of Tajikistan’s stated aims in this sphere sends a worrying signal
throughout the region at a difficult time for the evolving and dynamic
relationship formed between the Alliance and the Central Asian
militaries. However, the weak Tajik armed forces are desperately in
need of multiple sources of foreign assistance and thus seek to
diversify these sources beyond traditional security partners to
include Pakistan.
Colonel-General Sherali Khayrulloyev, Tajikistan’s defense minister,
explained in Dushanbe on March 29 that he still considers Russia to be
Tajikistan’s most reliable military and security partner. “The Tajik
armed forces have been set up thanks to Russia’s assistance and
contribution. Military-technical cooperation between our countries is
at a very high level today.” Khayrulloyev pointed to Tajikistan
sending 300 to 400 servicemen annually to Russian military academies
since 1994. These courses of study use a full training curriculum
lasting three to five years. In contrast, programs sending servicemen
to other countries, such as China, India, and the United States,
provide only short-term courses lasting from one to six months, mainly
because of the necessity to teach the servicemen a foreign
language. Most surprisingly, Khayrulloyev weighed the opportunity of
forming closer links with NATO against more typical arrangements with
Moscow, concluding, “Soviet standards are no worse.” Such attitudes
are unsurprising in many ways, given the continued residue of
Soviet-trained servicemen within these structures; as such thinking is
endemic within the Ministry of Defense itself. Indeed, Tajikistan was
slow to join the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which it
finally did in 2000, and a combination of factors has made difficult
its relationship within the PfP process. (Interfax, Moscow, March 29).
Of course, Russian and Tajik servicemen are regularly engaged in joint
combat training. A joint exercise of the 92nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment, part of the 201st Russian Motorized Rifle Division based in
Dushanbe, and cadets from the Tajik Ministry of Defense military
institute will commence exercises at the Lohur training ground on
April 4. The focus will be battalion-level defensive actions, and will
be Russian led, funded, and instill Russian military-thinking
practices on Tajik counterparts. Tajik brigades and Russian motorized
rifle regiments have just concluded a joint exercise at the Mumirak
and Sumbula training grounds in late March.
Joint training is cost effective and the preferred option for the weak
Tajik military, especially when its high-profile exercises with Russia
can project a positive image for its beleaguered armed
forces. Nonetheless, Dushanbe does want to conduct its own training,
though often to advertise its need for additional foreign
assistance. A recent one-day drill was conducted at the Sumbula
military range (Khuroson District of the southern Khatlon Region),
codenamed Masnad-2006 (Position-2006). It involved divisions from the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Border
Protection Committee, and the Interior Ministry’s Directorate for the
Khatlon Region. Carried out in three stages with more than 3,000
servicemen and officers from the relevant agencies participating, the
exercise was intended to display competence in the face of a
theoretical terrorist threat. The scenario rehearsed a response to an
international terrorist group attacking two detachments’ border troops
and taking hostages. The Tajik Ministry of Defense said it expected to
hold similar drills with the involvement of the Chinese armed forces
in Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region in the summer (Asia-Plus
News, March 28).
In addition to looking toward China for extra help with its armed
forces, Dushanbe also envisages closer links with Pakistan. A
Pakistani military delegation led by General Shahid Tirmizey, a
committee chair from the Pakistani Armed Forces General Staff, made a
two-day fact-finding visit to Tajikistan on March 28-29. The
delegation saw the Fakhrobod firing range, where a demonstration
exercise was held. The delegation also held meetings with Salohiddin
Nasriddinov, deputy Tajik minister of foreign affairs, as well as the
leadership of the State Border Protection Committee and the Ministry
of Defense (Avesta, March 28; Itar-Tass, March 29).
Khayrulloyev’s overtly pro-Russian remarks must be seen in context. On
March 28 President Emomali Rahmonov endorsed a single blueprint for
combating terrorism and extremism, aimed at raising the effectiveness
of the fight against modern threats in accordance with Tajikistan’s
international commitments. The blueprint itself therefore aims to
ensure the closest possible collaboration among the power-wielding and
law-enforcement agencies and Tajik state structures responsible for
financial control with their counterparts from regional countries and
other international anti-terrorist organizations in the fight against
terrorism.
If this venture is to avoid being purely another paper effort to prove
that the authorities are attempting to do something about the possible
terrorist threat to the country, then Dushanbe will need help from a
variety of sources. Khayrulloyev, in his efforts to deliver success in
this area, fully understands the risks involved in closer integration
with NATO and the upheaval to the weak Tajik armed forces that could
ensue. He may, in this context alone, want to signal greater readiness
to rely on Russian help, while looking to China and Pakistan for
support that will not prove over-burdening, which some in the Tajik
Ministry of Defense believe NATO’s help would prove in the long term.
–Roger N. McDermott

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

PRESS RELEASE
ANCA Telethon 2006
Armenian National Committee of America
104 N. Belmont St., Suite 200, Glendale, CA 91206
(818) 500-1918
(818) 246-7353 fax
Email: [email protected]
For more information:
Maral Habeshian
(818) 500-1918
ANCA Launches Nationwide Telethon
Grassroots Advocacy Organization Expanding Operations in Nation’s Capital
and across U.S.
(Washington, DC – March 29, 2006) – The Armenian National Committee of
America (ANCA) announced today that it will launch its first nationwide
telethon on May 21, 2006 with the theme “Securing our roots. Building for
the future.”
The goal of the telethon, which will air around the United States on
television stations in major Armenian communities and via satellite TV, is
to raise funds to expand its work and programs in service to the Armenian
Cause (Hai Tahd). The ANCA has been stepping up its advocacy efforts over
the last decade on many issues important to the Armenian community and the
telethon will raise the additional financial resources necessary to meet the
growing challenges facing the Armenian people.
As a first step in these expansion plans, in early March the ANCA Endowment
made a historic announcement regarding a state-of-the-art building it
purchased from AOL founder Steve Case, which is located in the heart of the
nation’s capital, Washington, DC. The building, which is equipped with the
latest technology, is located blocks from the White House and near Embassy
Row where most embassies representing countries from around the world are
located.
“Now is the time to build on our successes with a national telethon devoted
to “Hai Tahd” – the Armenian Cause,” said Ken Hachikian, Chairman of the
ANCA. “We look forward to generating the increased political power,
influence and respect that the Armenian American community deserves – and
that the Armenian homeland needs. Purchasing a building in the heart of
Washington, DC’s political establishment gives the Armenian Cause a
permanent home in the U.S. and provides a platform to expand our service to
the Armenian nation.”
The ANCA telethon will be broadcast from 6:00pm to midnight Eastern Standard
Time (EST) and 3:00-9:00pm Pacific Standard Time (PST) respectively on May
21st and will feature a wide array of engaging programming including
documentaries, prominent political figures, community representatives and
artistic performances, all with an eye toward raising substantial funds to
support the ANCA’s advocacy programs throughout the United States.
“The launch of the ANCA Telethon represents an historic occasion to both
demonstrate the substantial progress and results the ANCA has achieved for
the Armenian Cause and to outline our plans for the future,” said Zanku
Armenian, spokesperson for the ANCA Telethon. “We are at a defining moment
for Hai Tahd and need to expand our infrastructure to meet the increasing
challenges from the many forces arrayed against our nation, our homeland,
and our struggle for justice. The Telethon will provide a unique forum to
unify our community’s strength, foster greater participation, and generate
the resources we need to advance the Armenian Cause.”
The genesis of the ANCA Telethon theme, “Securing our roots. Building for
the future,” reflects the ANCA’s respect for our roots and our aspirations
for the future. “Securing our roots” represents our enduring historic
roots as a people, our grassroots around the country, and our deep roots in
Washington, DC. At its core, grassroots advocacy is the very soul of the
ANCA. While “Building for the future” represents the ANCA’s constant
efforts to expand its effectiveness as a world-class organization,
recognized internationally as the principled and forceful voice of the
Armenian American community.