FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY CREEPS AMONG JAVAKHETI ARMENIANS
Armenpres
Jun 14 2006
YEREVAN, JUNE 14, ARMENPRESS: Shirak Torosian, chairman of Javakhk
non-governmental organization, made up of natives of the southern
Georgian Armenian-populated region of Javakheti, said to a news
conference in Yerevan that the withdrawal of the Russian military
base from Akhalkalaki, the region’s biggest town, has actually zeroed
security guarantees of the local population.
He said it was meaningless to oppose the base’s pullout as the decision
was taken by the government of Georgia, but the major concern of local
Armenians, he said, is not lost of 4,000 jobs offered by the base,
but the feeling of uncertainty and vague future that is creeping among
local Armenians. He said Armenians wonder who is going to replace the
Russians. They fear that clashes would be imminent if Georgians troops
come to replace Russians and if they are replaced by NATO troops they
may include Turkish servicemen.
“The Russian base gave Armenians the guarantees of stability and
security, now they have gone together with Russians,’ Torosian
said. Torosian said Armenians of Javakheti are against construction
of Kars-Akhalkalaki railway, although they realize that it would
create new jobs for the region plagued with unemployment, open new
avenues for business but they are against it because this railroad,
if built, would further isolate Armenia from the regional projects.
He said local Armenians hope that a major road reconstruction project
funded by the Millennium Challenges Account program would make their
region attractive for businesses, though channeling part of a huge
US government extra aide to Georgia to the Armenian-populated region
is opposed by some opposition forces of Georgia.

TOBACCO TYCOON THREATENS TO CLOSE SHOP IN ARMENIA
By Atom Markarian
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
June 15 2006
Hrant Vartanian, a wealthy businessman who owns Armenia’s two main
tobacco companies, warned on Thursday that he will close down his
factories and move them abroad if the Armenian dram continues to
appreciate against the dollar.
“We are now making plans to move some of our manufacturing operations
to Georgia and Russia in order to produce things there and import
them to Armenia,” he told RFE/RL. “If the dollar continues to fall
at this pace, we will resort to that step in the next four or five
months in order to save our business.”
The dram has gained more than 30 percent in value against the dollar
in the last two and a half years, significantly raising production
costs of local firms dependent on exports. Vartanian’s Grand Tobacco
and International Masis Tobacco firms not only account for much
of cigarette sales in Armenia but also sell a large part of their
products, notably fermented tobacco leafs, abroad. They employ more
than a thousand people and but raw tobacco from hundreds of Armenian
farmers.
Vartanian, who already co-owns a cigarette plant in Georgia, agreed
with the widely held belief that the dram’s strengthening has benefited
a handful of large-scale importers of fuel and foodstuffs that have
close ties with Armenia’s leadership. “For local manufactures the
effects [of the dram appreciation] will be very negative, while for
importers it is a source of huge profits,” he said.
“Those companies that are mainly involved in exports and generate the
bulk of their revenues in hard currency are experiencing difficulties
and failing to meet their profit targets,” agreed Tigran Khachatrian,
commercial director of the ACP copper giant, one of Armenia’s largest
exporters.
Khachatrian complained that ACP is not only unable to raise its
workers’ wages but is increasingly having trouble paying them. “Even
if there are no pay increases, our expenditures on wages are constantly
going up,” he said.
The Armenian Central Bank, which sets the dram’s exchange rate, argues
that its main mission is to suppress inflation, rather than protect
local exporters and jobs. It has said all along that the dram’s
appreciation, which resumed last month, is a natural phenomenon
stemming from an increased influx of dollars, most of them cash
remittances from Armenians working abroad.
Opposition leaders and other government critics insist, however,
the Armenian authorities have artificially boosted the national
currency’s value in order to further enrich “oligarchs” involved
in lucrative imports. The Central Bank, backed by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, has repeatedly dismissed such claims.

HOUSE PANEL BLOCKS U.S. FUNDING FOR ‘ANTI-ARMENIAN’ RAIL LINK
By Emil Danielyan
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
June 15 2006
A key committee of the U.S. House of Representatives has voted to
ban any U.S. government funding for plans by Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey to build a regional railway that would bypass Armenia and add
to its economic isolation.
A legal amendment, unanimously approved by the House Financial
Services Committee late Wednesday, makes it impossible for the
U.S. Export-Import Bank to “develop or promote any rail connections or
railway-related connections that traverse or connect Baku, Azerbaijan;
Tbilisi, Georgia; and Kars, Turkey, and that specifically exclude
cities in Armenia.” The influential Armenian-American lobbying
organizations were apparently instrumental in its passage.
The $400 million project has yet to get off the drawing board but
has already prompted serious concern from the authorities in Yerevan.
They fear that it would prevent Armenia from becoming a regional
transport hub after a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
a normalization of its relations with Turkey. Reports from Washington
quoted pro-Armenian members of the congressional panel as echoing
these concerns.
“With this amendment, we are sending a message to the governments
of Turkey and Azerbaijan that continually excluding Armenia in
regional projects fosters instability,” said its main sponsor,
Congressman Joseph Crowley of New York. “Bypassing Armenia is just
another attempt to further suffocate this republic, which has made
great strides in democratic and economic reforms notwithstanding its
neighbors’ hostility.”
Another New York Democrat, Carolyn Maloney, referred to Armenia as a
victim of Turkish-Azerbaijani “aggression.” “Allowing the exclusion
of Armenia from important transportation routes would stymie the
emergence of this region as an important East-West trade corridor,”
she told the House committee.
Not surprisingly, the two main Armenian-American advocacy groups were
quick to welcome the measure. “Passage of this amendment protects
U.S. goals and interests in the region and ensures that attempts by
Turkey and Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia will not go unanswered,”
Bryan Ardouny, executive director of the Armenian Assembly of America,
said in a statement. Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian
National Committee of America, similarly praised the U.S. legislators
for “protecting American taxpayers from subsidizing an ill-advised
and over-priced railroad project.”
The measure will most probably be endorsed by the full House later
this year. The U.S. Senate is expected to discuss a similar bill
and may well follow suit. That would be a major blow to efforts
by Ankara, Baku and Tbilisi to attract external financing for the
proposed rail link. The Export-Import Bank could help to raise much
of that funding. Its credit guarantees have already been essential
for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that
was completed earlier this year.
The U.S. administration, which has been pushing for the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian ties, seems to disapprove of the
controversial railway project. The Armenian Assembly quoted the
U.S. ambassador-designate to Azerbaijan, Anne Derse, as telling
congressional hearings last month that it “would not be beneficial
to regional integration.”
The European Union also opposes the construction of the Kars-
Tbilisi-Baku railroad. “A railway project that is not including Armenia
will not get our financial support,” EU External Relations Commissioner
Benita Ferrero-Waldner said during a visit to Yerevan last February.
Armenian officials argue that there already exists a railroad
connecting Turkey to the South Caucasus via Armenia and that the
regional countries should reactivate it instead of spending hundreds
of millions of dollars on building a new one. The Kars-Gyumri rail
link has stood idle more than a decade as part of the continuing
Turkish economic blockade of Armenia.
That there are geopolitical motives behind the controversial rail
project was admitted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev last year.
“If we succeed with this project, the Armenians will end in complete
isolation, which would create an additional problem for their already
bleak future,” Aliev reportedly declared.
Still, Georgia’s Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli insisted after talks
with Armenian leaders in Yerevan last September that his country is
only looking to further capitalize on its geographical position and
is solely concerned with economic benefits that would stem from the
Kars-Tbilisi-Baku route.
The existence of such benefits was called into question last week
by the director general of Georgia’s state-run rail network, Irakli
Ezugbaya, though. In particular, Ezugbaya cast doubt on the credibility
of a feasibility study on the project that was conducted by Turkish
company recently.
According to Georgian press reports, the study failed to predict the
anticipated volume of traffic and freight along the would-be railway.
The transport ministers of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are expected
to discuss the issue when they meet in Tbilisi later this month.

“EITHER LEARN GEORGIAN OR SELL POTATO”: CHAIRMAN OF JAVAKHK ASSOCIATION ABOUT THE REGION’S PROBLEMS
Regnum, Russia
June 15 2006
“Javakhk should become a link rather than a gap between Georgia and
Armenia,” the chairman of the Javakhk association Shirak Torossyan
said at a news conference in Yerevan on June 14. He says that all
the region’s problems will be resolved if “the status of local
self-government is raised.” “We must not go to extremes and claim
independence, we must claim powers that will allow us to independently
solve our problems,” says Torossyan. Special attention must be given
to solving financial-economic problems, preserving the region’s
historical-cultural legacy, attaining the recognition of the Armenian
language.
Financial and economic problems can be solved if the region forms
its own budget non-dependent on governmental transfers. “When a
regional budget depends on governmental transfers, this means that
the government follows its own purposes. A region cannot solve its
problems if it is in financial dependence from the central government,”
says Torossyan.
As regards the status of the Armenian language, Torossyan says
that his association is supporting the Javakheti Armenians in their
struggle for having Armenian recognized as the second state language
in the region. “Of course, the Georgian authorities are trying to
oppose this, but they can’t reasonably explain why they don’t want to
recognize Armenian as the second state language,” says Torossyan. He
says that there are almost 100 Armenian schools in Javakhk. “We
oppose the demand of the Georgian authorities that all subjects,
except Armenian language and Armenian history, should be taught in
Georgian. We have taught our children in Armenian for centuries,
and this tradition must be continued,” says Torossyan. Of course,
he who does not want to sell potato in Javakhk should learn Georgian
to be able to integrate into Georgian society and to work in Georgian
governmental structures. “However, when they put a ban on the Armenian
language people’s natural reaction is to oppose the introduction of
the Georgian language,” says Torossyan.
The association is also concerned for the fate of the
historical-cultural legacy of Javakhk. “The Georgian side has
recently begun to very often doubt if this is Armenian or Georgian
legacy. They have not so far officially acknowledged the Armenian
Apostolic Church.” “So, we have decided to make a kind of inventory of
the monuments to decide what belongs to whom,” says Torossyan. He says
that his association is doing its best to prevent tensions and to find
fair solution – “so that we honestly say: this is Georgian and this
is Armenian.” “Javakhk is now on the crossroads of the geo-political
interests of various states, and this is the key source of problems
for the local Armenians,” says Torossyan.

STATE TO CONSIDER RESURRECTING TRADE OFFICES
By Judy Lin — Bee Capitol Bureau
Sacramento Bee,CA
June 15 2006
Sen. Jack Scott, D-Altadena, salvaged a California Armenia Trade
Office. It’s funded through private donations.
Sacramento Bee file, 2000/Randy Pench
California’s foreign trade offices — taxpayer-funded enterprises
disbanded three years ago amid scandal and budget woes — are staging
a comeback despite lingering questions about their usefulness.
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and some legislators are once again
trumpeting the value of trade promotion for the sixth-largest economy
in the world. In recent months, the governor has established an
undersecretary for international trade, while lawmakers have proposed
resurrecting outposts in Seoul, South Korea, and Johannesburg,
South Africa.
In coming weeks, the Legislature is expected to take up bills that
call for developing a comprehensive trade strategy and moving the
state back into the business of operating trade offices.
Such a move has raised eyebrows among trade experts who believe former
state offices were mismanaged. Some have questioned whether the state
should even have trade offices.
“Historically, they have not been very successful. In fact, they have
been somewhat disastrous,” said trade consultant Jock O’Connell.
“There’s this feeling in the state Capitol that California needs to
be represented by the state. The real California is superbly well
represented in the form of 57,000 exporting companies.”
California’s 12 trade offices were shut down in 2003 — along with the
rest of the Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency — after critical
news reports and damaging audits appeared.
At the time the state had more than 90 workers spanning the globe,
from Hong Kong to London. Their charge was simple: Help California
businesses sell their products abroad while luring foreign investment
to the state. Last year, the state exported $116.8 billion worth
of goods.
But the legislative analyst’s office and the state auditor’s office
questioned the effectiveness of such offices.
The offices were accused of taking credit regardless of how much
involvement they had in facilitating a deal.
“For instance, an office may only have provided a list of foreign
companies potentially interested in a product developed by a California
business. However, the agency counted the total value of a subsequent
export agreement,” according to one legislative analyst report.
The Orange County Register quantified the overstated benefits at
$44.2 million for one year.
In the end, only one trade office survived. The California Armenia
Trade Office was subsequently transferred to the authority of the
Business, Housing and Transportation Agency, where it remains today.
Sen. Jack Scott, D-Altadena, salvaged the trade office by requiring
that it thrive on private donations. Scott’s district is home to the
largest Armenian community in America.
Scott considers the Armenia office a pilot project that could, perhaps,
become a model for future trade offices. Unlike its predecessors,
the office is funded through $75,000 in private donations, must
file evaluation reports, and will automatically close in 2008 unless
reauthorized by the Legislature.
“We’re learning from mistakes of the past,” Scott said.
But experts say accepting private donations is bad public policy.
Jeffrey Gersick, former managing director of the state’s trade offices
in London, Frankfurt, Germany, Johannesburg, and Jerusalem, said the
state’s priorities can be muddled by those who “pay to play.”
Rather than putting offices where there’s growth potential, Gersick
and others say, the practice could hold the state hostage to special
interests looking to leverage the state’s seal for their own cause,
creating a case of “country du jour.”
The director of the Armenian Trade Office, Arthur Khachatryan, said
he reports to the Foundation for Economic Development, a nonprofit
Armenian group based in Glendale handling the state contract.
However, the trade office keeps the state abreast of its work through
biweekly phone calls and progress reports.
“The ultimate responsibility rests with the state,” Khachatryan said.
“But on day-to-day questions, of course, we work with the foundation.”
Critics also question the reliability of private money. Already Scott
had to seek an extension when the Armenian community failed to raise
$75,000 in time to launch the office. Donor restrictions may have
been blurred, too.
When the Armenian National Committee, an Armenian lobbying group, sent
two $10,000 checks on Feb. 22, 2005, it exceeded a $10,000-per-quarter
fundraising restriction in the law.
Undersecretary Garrett Ashley, who was appointed by Schwarzenegger
four months ago, said it was a clerical error because the checks were
not sequential and had different dates.
Sen. Kevin Murray, D-Culver City, said he believes private donations
are the way to go. He is carrying two bills to install trade offices
in Seoul and Johannesburg, both of which are modeled after the Armenia
trade office.
Murray and Scott argue that the private-funding model deserves a
chance before being tossed out.
“If you can generate far more business than the cost of the trade
office, I can’t see how you’d lose,” Scott said.
Lawmakers are trying to consolidate all trade office bills, and they
hope to develop an overall trade strategy for the state.
Assemblyman Juan Arambula, D-Fresno, chair of the jobs committee,
has written a bill that would give Schwarzenegger’s Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency $140,000 to develop an overall
state policy on trade. Assembly Bill 2601 is being supported by
the Republican governor after another bill to give the agency legal
control of trade offices failed.
Concerned that there won’t be enough oversight, Sen. Gloria Romero,
D-Los Angeles, has written a bill that would also develop a strategy
for the state. However, Senate Bill 1513 allows the Legislature to
decide where to put trade offices and requires them to be funded
through private donations.
Both bills require public disclosure of donations, but Romero’s
requires them to be posted on the Internet.
Business, Transportation and Housing Secretary Sunne Wright McPeak
said the governor has made trade promotion a priority, citing his
trade missions to Baja California, Japan and China. However, she said
the agency will be reluctant to spend taxpayer dollars.
Instead, McPeak said the agency has begun coordinating with trade
associations and the U.S. Commerce Department as a cost-effective
approach to trade promotion.
Agency officials say that even if the Legislature fails to pass a bill,
the administration intends to develop a trade strategy for the state.
Howard Shatz, a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of
California, a nonpartisan think tank, said lawmakers will have to be
careful in formulating a plan with reliable performance measures.
Trade experts say the state should take advantage of existing resources
like the Commerce Department, look to countries with the most growth
potential, and assign trade offices clear mandates, then measure
their achievements accordingly.
“It needs to be done right because they are going to be scrutinized
given the history of trade offices,” Shatz said. “The last thing you
want is another scandal.”

NOT A PRECEDENT, BUT AN OPPORTUNITY
By Oksana Antonenko
Special to Russia Profile
Russia Profile, Russia
June 15 2006
What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States
Over the course of this year, the international community aims to
complete negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which has
remained in flux since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Since that time,
Kosovo has remained territorially a part of Serbia and Montenegro,
but has been governed by the United Nations Interim Administration for
Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo remains a politically dysfunctional and
economically devastated region, where unemployment runs at over 40
percent and relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are still
defined by hostility. This situation provides the most powerful
argument for granting Kosovo new internationally recognized status.
In its current form, Kosovo has no prospects for progressing
towards greater stability, democracy and prosperity. A new,
internationally recognized status will allow the people of Kosovo to
take responsibility for their own future, while introducing clear and
strict conditions that will guide future international engagement and
assistance. These conditions include the development of democratic
institutions, including respect for minority rights.
While the United States and the EU have pushed for international
recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia has traditionally
supported Serbia’s territorial integrity, with Kosovo as an integral
part. Recently, however, Moscow has indicated a change in its
policy, opening a path towards conditional recognition of Kosovo’s
independence. These conditions were advanced by President Vladimir
Putin in January, when he said that any future recognition of Kosovo’s
independence will create a precedent which could be universally
applied to other unrecognized de facto states, particularly those
that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.
Frozen conflicts
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ignited a number of violent
ethnic clashes across its territory, and in the South Caucasus in
particular. As a result of these conflicts, four self-declared
states emerged in the early 1990s – the republics of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr. Abkhazia and South
Ossetia seek independence from Georgia, Transdnestr from Moldova and
Nagorno-Karabakh is torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of these
have now existed under such conditions for more than a decade, defying
international isolation and economic, political and humanitarian
constraints emanating from their unrecognized status.
All of them have developed some form of functioning economy and
security systems and have conducted referenda on independence and
held several rounds of elections, none of which were recognized or
properly observed by the international community. This situation has
created a generation of “citizens” who are committed to preserving
and defending their independence.
These republics see the Kosovo precedent as possible means to advance
their aims of gaining recognition. The president of Abkhazia, Sergei
Bagapsh, has said that the recognition of an independent Kosovo
could accelerate the recognition of an independent Abkhazia. Eduard
Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has described the change
in Russia’s position as a symbol of the end of a “double standard”
approach towards the plight of all unrecognized states.
However, Russia’s plea for universality, backed by heightened
expectations from the unrecognized states themselves, is unlikely to
be endorsed by the international community. The EU and the United
States have already responded with statements that any decision on
Kosovo’s status should be treated on its own merits, and not as
a precedent for other conflicts, which must be resolved based on
their unique characteristics and on existing international legal
strictures. This response takes into account a number of pragmatic,
strategic and geopolitical factors.
The pragmatists contend that there are major differences between the
Kosovo case and those of the unrecognized post-Soviet entities.
Indeed, while there are some clear similarities between Balkan
conflicts and those of the former Soviet states, there are also major
differences, mainly deriving from how the entities were formed.
Post-1999 Kosovo was shaped by a broad international consensus,
with major powers playing an active role in the development of its
political institutions, as well as in guaranteeing security and order
on the ground.
In contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr developed
in isolation from the wider international community, with Russia
playing the role of key mediator and sole guarantor of security and
economic survival. Moreover, each of the entities differs in terms of
demographic characteristics, political aspirations, degree of “real”
independence, viability of government institutions and attitudes
towards refugees and ethnic minorities. Finally, unlike Kosovo,
where the international community seeks Serbia’s acquiescence to its
independence and offers the prospect of European integration as an
incentive, Europe and the United States both support the territorial
integrity of Georgia and Moldova.
Strategic arguments focus on the fact that any recognition of
Kosovo as a “precedent” could have strategic implications not only
for Eurasia, but also for other parts of the world where ethnic,
separatist conflicts have occurred and might be reignited. The
integration of a new state into the international community requires
significant political and financial resources – the case of East Timor
proves the point – and, in the cases of a number of such states,
the entire post-Cold war political landscape of a wider Europe has
to be revisited.
Geopolitically, Russia and the West are increasingly engaged in a new
rivalry in Eurasia that is particularly evident in the case of the
“frozen” conflicts. Both Russia and the West include the resolution
of these conflicts among their important foreign and security policy
priorities. The Western stance is based not only on the principle
of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but
also on the assumption that the restoration of territorial integrity
by peaceful means is possible.
Many Russian policy makers and experts neither support the practical
reintegration of unrecognized entities into states nor believe that
such an reintegration can be achieved at all, even by military force.
Europe and the United States have provided military assistance and
political backing to the governments of Georgia and Moldova. Both seek
to distance themselves from Russia and aspire to integrate themselves
into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia, in turn, provides significant
economic assistance to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr and
maintains a military presence in these areas.
Additionally, Russia has granted citizenship to the majority of the
population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The more tension between Russia and the West, the less likely it
is that a Kosovo resolution could offer even a slim opportunity
to devise a more realistic and co-operative approach towards the
“frozen conflicts.” Any new approach should address a few core issues.
First, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that these
unrecognized entities exist. Kosovo helped to put them on the
international agenda, and a review is now required to develop a new
international policy towards each. This policy should combine new
efforts at conflict resolution with a renewed dialogue that could be
pursued until the issue of status is resolved through negotiations.
Another challenge could be finding a way to grant these entities some
voice within international organizations without legitimizing their
unilateral political aspirations.
Secondly, it is important to lower expectations and to develop
assurances that the “Kosovo precedent” does not rekindle prior
tensions, particularly in South Ossetia.
Thirdly, it is important to develop a set of principles that can
determine the degree of international engagement. These should
be derived from the Kosovo standards and relate to democratic
institutions, civil and minority rights and security.
Genuine international recognition cannot come without international
consensus. While the United States and the EU are likely to secure
such consensus with regard to Kosovo, Russia has little or no chance
of doing the same for Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdnestr. Any
attempt by Russia to declare unilateral recognition for some or
all of these entities is bound to postpone their integration into
the international community further. However, it is precisely this
integration, rather than recognition, that the unrecognized entities
should hope to achieve.
Oksana Antonenko is a Senior Fellow at the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies, and has set up meetings between
high-level Georgian and South Ossetian officials with the aim of
promoting conflict resolution in South Ossetia.
al/2006/6/15/3874.wbp

ICTSD MEMBERS DRAFT ARTICLES FOR FUTURE AGREEMENT ON TRADE FACILITATION
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, UK
June 15 2006
The outlines of a future WTO draft agreement on trade facilitation are
starting to take shape, as Members proposed text for several potential
articles during the 6-7 June meeting of the negotiating group.
The trade facilitation negotiations aim to simplify customs
procedures and cut commerce-related red tape, as well as to enhance
developing countries’ ability to participate in international goods
trade. The July 2004 Framework (WT/L/579) specified that developing
and least-developed countries would not have to implement future
trade facilitation obligations unless they received the technical
assistance necessary to do so. During the recent meeting, a loose group
of developed and developing countries responded to this unprecedented
link by outlining a possible mechanism through which developing
countries could seek and receive technical assistance before having
to comply with new commitments.
Members are specifically mandated to clarify three articles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994: freedom of transit
for goods from other Member states (Article V), trade-related fees
and formalities (Article VIII), and transparency in the regulation
and administration of trade regulations (Article X).
Proposals suggest text for future agreement
Many of the papers tabled during the meeting built upon already-revised
submissions to propose specific wording for different sections of a
future agreement on trade facilitation. Several of them emphasised that
general exceptions to WTO rules would also apply to the disciplines
proposed.
For instance, the EU, Korea, and Switzerland (TN/TF/W/107) tabled
a series of prospective rules governing the type and amount of
trade-related fees and charges governments could levy, specifying
that they must not exceed the approximate cost of the import- or
export-related service they ostensibly pay for.
In an attempt to get countries to speed up customs clearance times,
EU, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan proposed rules that would
require them to periodically calculate and publish the length of their
average periods for releasing goods, and commit to trying to reduce
them. This provoked a response particularly from Australia and India,
which said that they did not want any such commitment to be mandatory.
Japan, Mongolia, and Switzerland (TN/TF/W/114) tabled a series of
potential disciplines that would require Members to clearly publish all
trade-related laws and regulations. Their proposal lists the precise
kinds of information that governments would be required to provide,
and calls for the establishment of enquiry points where traders from
any country would be able to find out about documentation and other
requirements. Along with Korea, they also put forward draft articles
(TN/TF/W/115) that would require Members to allow traders and other
governments to comment on new or amended trade-related procedures, and
publish adopted rules well in advance of their entry into force. The
four countries jointly submitted another textual proposal (TN/TF/W/115)
on ‘pre-arrival processing,’ which provides for customs and other
border agencies to accept and examine import-related documentation
submitted by traders before the goods arrive, in order to expedite
their eventual clearance.
With regard to the transit of goods from other WTO Members —
a key problem for landlocked countries — Armenia, the EU, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, and Moldova (TN/TF/W/113) put forward
comprehensive disciplines to regulate how governments treat such
goods. Specifically, they wanted countries to treat goods from all
Members equally for transit purposes. Many Members were uncomfortable
with the notion of according traders who would likely be from
other countries the freedom to choose transit routes. They also
criticised the proposal’s call for goods in transit to be treated
identically to domestic merchandise. One delegate told Bridges that
locally-manufactured products might not require the sort of mandatory
inspections which could be necessary for foreign goods.
Other potential rules proposed included disciplines from the EU,
Switzerland, and Taiwan (TN/TF/W/109) that would oblige countries
to provide expedited inspection clearance to “authorised traders”
that meet certain criteria for past compliance. The EU and Taiwan
(TN/TF/W/108) outlined a procedure for the progressive elimination of
‘pre-shipment inspections,’ which refers to requirements that the
quality, quantity, or price of goods be verified before they can
be exported.
New Zealand (TN/TF/W/111) tabled a provision that Members would
have to apply objective criteria for the tariff classification of
goods to ensure that they are not “arbitrary or unjustifiable,” and
“do not constitute a disguised restriction” to trade. It suggested
that classifying all tariffs on the basis of the World Customs
Organisations’ HS Convention would achieve this.
Mechanism proposed for implementation
An informal group of developed and developing countries co-sponsored
an informal ‘non-paper’ that spelled out a multi-stage process for
the implementation of a future agreement on trade facilitation,
specifically with regard to commitments that some Members might be
unable to put into place on their own.
Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Mexico,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay proposed that developing
countries should, as soon as the agreement enters into force, formally
commit to obligations conforming to measures that they already had
in place and implement any minimal set of ‘core’ disciplines that
might arise from the new rules.
The paper provides for developing countries to notify the WTO of
any obligations that would require additional time or technical
assistance to implement, after identifying them through a ‘capacity
self-assessment.’
Developing countries would not have to implement obligations
requiring additional time until the end of the period specified in
their notification.
For measures that would be impossible to implement without technical
assistance, the paper would have developing countries formulate a
‘capacity-building plan’ in cooperation with donors and international
organisations, and notify it along with specific implementation
periods. At the end of the implementation period for such a plan, a
developing country would have to verify whether it had indeed acquired
the capacity to implement a particular obligation, and, if so, notify
its newly-acquired ability to the WTO. Following this, it would become
subject to legal challenge on the basis of the commitments in question.
In cases where Members disagree with another’s assessment of its
capacity to implement an obligation, the paper specifies that
“a mechanism is to be developed” to resolve their differences. It
also provides for ‘multilateral dialogue’ on countries’ initial
notifications of specific needs.
Sources report that interventions on the proposed mechanism were
largely positive, with Barbados, Bolivia, India, New Zealand, and
the US welcoming the proposal.
Comprehensive text likely in July
One trade diplomat described prospects for a comprehensive text on
trade facilitation by July as good, since text-based proposals have
now been made on roughly half the issues in the negotiations. The
delegate suggested that Members are aware that they need to bring
all of the text-based proposals together in a single document; some
have wondered aloud whether the WTO Secretariat could do so, as it
did for an earlier compilation of Members’ less-evolved submissions
(now TN/TF/W/43/Rev.7).
One delegate expressed doubt that all delegations were in a position
to submit proposals in the form of draft legal text, but suggested
that the simple fact that Members had already started text-based
discussions was notable. The negotiator acknowledged the concern
among some developing and least-developed countries that trade
facilitation negotiations were almost proceeding ‘too speedily,’ and
said that an agreement would have to wait for a deal on agriculture
and industrial tariffs. Another trade diplomat said that if ministers
and senior trade officials scheduled to meet at the end of June made
a breakthrough in these two areas, Members would probably call upon
the Secretariat to draft a comprehensive trade facilitation text
based on their submissions.
Sources report that Chair Tony Miller (Hong Kong) suggested that he
was not planning to come forward with a comprehensive text of his
own, as some of his counterparts in other negotiating areas have been
asked to do. He urged Members to keep producing text-based proposals
until the end of June, ahead of an informal meeting of the negotiating
group scheduled for 10-11 July.
ICTSD reporting.
tory3.htm

EU, GEORGIA TO SIGN ENP ACTION PLAN IN A ‘COUPLE OF MONTHS’
Civil Georgia, Georgia
June 15 2006
EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby told
RFE/RL on June 14 that the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans
with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be signed “in a couple of
months’ time.”
He said only minor issues remain to be negotiated with Georgia,
but he added that talks with Azerbaijan are more difficult, as
differences persist between the EU and Azerbaijan on how to address
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
“But the slowing [down] of one will not affect [the negotiation
process with] others,” Semneby added.

4TH TRAIN WITH MILITARY HARDWARE LEAVES RUSSIAN BASE IN GEORGIA
RIA Novosti, Russia
June 15 2006
TBILISI, June 15 (RIA Novosti) – Another train with Russian military
hardware from a Soviet-era military base in Georgia has left the
former Soviet republic according to schedule, the Georgian Defense
Ministry said Thursday.
The ministry said the train had departed from the Black Sea base of
Batumi carrying combat support vehicles and trucks.
Under an agreement Russia and Georgia signed March 31, Russian troops
and hardware are to leave Georgia’s two Soviet-era bases in Akhalkalaki
and Batumi by 2008. The pullout from Akhalkalaki, about 30 kilometers
(19 miles) from the border with NATO member Turkey, is to be completed
by December 2006.
The withdrawal is being monitored by a joint Georgian-Russian
commission set up under the March agreement.
The bulk of Russia’s weapons will return to Russia and the rest of
it will be delivered to a Russian base in Armenia.

ARMENIA IS NOT READY FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP: DEPUTY SPEAKER OF ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT
Regnum, Russia
June 15 2006
“NATO membership means rebuilding relations with that organization –
something Armenia is not ready for today,” the vice speaker of the
Armenian parliament Vahan Hovhannissyan said during a roundtable with
NATO representatives. The press service of the Armenian parliament
has told REGNUM that, when asked about the future development of
Armenia’s relations with NATO and the EU and, in this context, with
Russia, Hovhannissyan said that since the Soviet times Armenia has
regarded NATO as some military organization – some alliance formed for
protecting the European democratic values. “It later turned out that
many countries join NATO not so much for adopting these values as for
feeling more protected, for gaining some cover,” Hovhannissyan said.
“Obviously, the new NATO and EU members from Eastern Europe were not
ready for that. Unlike its neighbors, Armenia believes that the key
goal of NATO membership is to attain conformity with the European
standards so that this membership be natural rather than artificial.”
Hovhannissyan noted that Armenia is signatory to the Collective
Security Treaty – an anti-terrorist rather than military organization,
whose key goal is to ensure security. Nevertheless, membership in
NATO means rebuilding relations with that organization – something
Armenia is not ready to do yet.
Asked by British delegate Franck Cook what challenges Armenia is
faced with today, Hovhanissyan said that for many years already
Turkey has been keeping Armenia in blockade and laying pre-conditions
for establishing diplomatic relations with it, which makes mutual
improvement impossible. “Turkey demands that Armenia should stop
efforts towards the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide,
that Armenian forces should be withdrawn from Nagorno Karabakh – which,
in fact, means that the whole Armenian population should leave Nagorno
Karabakh – and, finally, that Armenia should recognize the territorial
integrity of Turkey – something Armenia does not deny officially as
there is Kars Treaty, a document nobody disputes,” Hovhannissyan said.
“Meanwhile, Turkey keeps violating Kars Treaty, particularly, its
points 17 and 19 saying that railroads and other routes should be
protected and free transit of people and goods should be ensured.
When Armenia proclaimed independence, Turkey refused to establish
diplomatic relations with our country and violated one more point
of the treaty saying that the two countries should have consular
conventions,” Hovhannissyan said. He noted that by constantly demanding
compliance with Kars Treaty from Armenia Turkey is involuntarily making
more visible its own doubts concerning the treaty. Hovhannissyan said
that Turkey’s membership in NATO is not a guarantee for its neighbors
that they will not become victims of its aggression as there is a
vivid proof they may – the fate of Cyprus.