US CONGRESSMEN ASK ERDOGAN’S HELP FOR IRAN
Author: À.Mammadov
TREND Information, Azerbaijan
May 31 2006
(zaman.com) – The US House of Representatives asked Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to step in to help solve the Iranian
nuclear crisis without arms.
Steny Hoyer, the second highest Democrat in the House, and Roy Blunt
from the Republican Party visited Erdogan at his office Tuesday
to discuss the isolations imposed on Iran, Iraq, the Middle East,
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and allegations about the
so-called Armenian genocide, reports Trend.
The American representatives expressed their anxiety regarding Iran’s
nuclear program and stressed that the issue should be resolved through
diplomacy. Therefore, they asked Erdogan to play an active role in
the solution process as they also supported Erdogan’s offer to form
a commission of historians to explore the allegations concerning the
so-called genocide.
–Boundary_(ID_aGixCG0Tja3cQ5zWxu3c+w)- –

MOTTO OF SUDETEN GERMAN DAYS’ EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE-HISTORIAN
Czech News Agency
May 29, 2006 Monday
Munich, May 29 (CTK) – The motto of this year’s traditional Sudeten
German Days that will take place in Nuremberg next weekend is extremely
aggressive, the most aggressive in the history of these rallies,
German historian Martin Schulze Wessel says in the daily Sueddeutsche
Zeitung today. The motto, Expulsion is genocide, does not correspond
to historic reality, but it indicates those unclear but wide demands
towards the Czech Republic and clearly harms Czech-German relations,
Wessel says. “The expulsion is genocide – the future belongs to the
right for a homeland.” Even at the time of the Cold War the Sudeten
German Landsmannschaft rallies’ motto had never been so aggressive.
What do they mean by this?” the author asks and points out that it
is no coincidence that the German terms for genocide and expulsion
differ – they both express evil, but describe different kind of
injustice. The scientific research of genocides aroused the question
of where is the line dividing forced transfer and genocide, but only in
the case of the Holocaust of Jews and the extermination of Armenians by
Turks in 1915 it is possible to put the sign of equation between both
terms. Although the expulsion of Germans from the former Czechoslovakia
was accompanied, especially in the initial phase, by atrocities and
the deaths of tens of thousands of people were expected there was no
planned intention of physical extermination of the German-speaking
population, and the Sudeten Germans had a country that admitted them
– Germany to which they have integrated with the remarkable effort,
Wessels says. The fate of the Sudeten Germans was bad enough so why
there are efforts today to exaggerate it and put it on the level of
genocide? he asks. It is a political message, but given that the Nazis
prepared a real genocide of the Czech people since 1940 it can only
harm Czech-German relations, the says. The second part of this year’s
motto – the future belongs to the right for a homeland – can provoke
the impression that the Sudeten Germans are interested in restitution
and compensation. They still have the “return of their homeland back”
put as a goal in their programme. “If it is viewed metaphorically,
it is all right but to perceive it very specifically it can mean a
revisionist goal,”Wessels says. “To put the expulsion on the level
of genocide creates a moral reproach of the greatest calibre towards
Czechs and in connection with the right for a homeland it forms the
basis for the demands of a not quite specified revision,” he says. It
is not therefore surprising that 38 percent of Czechs believe that
it is possible for the German government to once raise the claim for
the regions that were populated by Germans in the past or to demand
the compensation and the same part of the population suspect the
Landsmannschaft of really pursuing these goals. Only four percent
of Czechs believe that the Expellees’ associations pursue friendly
contacts, Wessel says. These findings should alarm politicians
because the image of the nations is also decisive for other decisions,
for instance, about investments or language studies. Many positive
initiatives by the Sudeten Germans in Czech-German relations do not
unfortunately have any chance in this media atmosphere to win over
the persuasive slogans by expellees’ unions’ leaders, Wessel, who
is a deputy chairman of the Czech-German commission of historians
says. Sudeten German Landsmannschaft leader Bernd Posselt had
rejected his statements in an interview with the German news agency
dpa. He described Wessel as a politicising scientist who crosses his
powers. According to Posselt, modern historical science describes any
form of expulsion as genocide. The expellees do not want to lacerate
old wounds but they want to prevent similar events from being repeated
in the future.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION: “COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS LIAISING WITH NK MAY FACE SANCTIONS”
Today, Azerbaijan
May 31 2006
“Northern Cyprus and Nagorno Karabakh conflicts should not be put
into the same position, because these problems are quite different
from each other,” said Emma Udwin, Special Representative of The
European Union (EU) New Neighborhood Policy Programme Commissioner.
Saying in her interview to APA that the Northern Cyprus conflict is
now at the stage of discussions, Udwin has noted its delicacy and
urgency. “It is not right to parallel these two conflicts”.
Andreas Herdina, EU New Neighborhood Policy Sectors Coordinator, has
stated that the union is not aware of EU member countries’ companies
and organizations business connections with Nagorno Karabakh.
“The European Commission can apply sanctions against those entities
if there is a fact on this case”.
Mr. Herdina has also talked for parallel negotiations with each of
South Caucasian countries in the framework of New Neighborhood Policy.
“We want cooperation to be made with all of the three countries and
we find no reasonable cause for discrimination between Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Armenia.”
URL:
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NEW SPEAKER OF ARMENIAN NA TO BE ELECTED ON MAY 31
ARKA News Agency, Armenia
May 31 2006
Yerevan, May 30. /ARKA/. On May 31, 2006, a special session of the
RA Parliament is to elect the new Speaker as well as Chairmen of two
Parliamentary Commissions.
Vice-Speaker of the RA Parliament has signed a decree convening a
special session of the RA Parliament.
The parliamentary factions Republican Party of Armenia (RPA), ARF
Dashnaktsutyun and United Workers Party, as well as the deputy groups
“People’s Deputy” and “Entrepreneur” are expected to nominate Tigran
Torosyan to the post of Speaker of the RA Parliament.
On May 25, 2006, the RA parliament accepted the resignation of Chairman
of the Parliamentary Commission for Defense, Internal Affairs and
National Security Mher Shahgelsyan and Chairman of the and Commission
for Social Affairs Health and Ecology Gagik Mkheyan.

“GOLOS ARMENII” WEEKLY TO BE PUBLISHED IN ARMENIAN
ARKA News Agency, Armenia
May 30 2006
YEREVAN, May 30. /ARKA/. “Golos Armenii” weekly will be published in
Armenian beginning from tomorrow on, editor-in-chief of “Golos Armenii”
Flora Nakhshkaryan reported.
“Over the 15 years of activity, the editorial staff has received a
pile of letters with the wish to read the newspaper in Armenian. This
was the editorial staff’s desire. However, according to her,
implementation of these was impeded by numerous obstacles, first of
all, the financial one.
“Finally, though some problems have not been solved, we started
implementation of our long-standing goal. From now on the Armenian
reader will get an opportunity to read the newspaper in the native
language,” she said.
According to Nakhsharyan, the weekly will contain materials and
comments on the urgent events of the week, political and economic
life and important dates.
She added that part of the space in the newspaper will be allocated
for foreign press digest with publications reflecting processes that
are immediately related to Armenia and the region on the whole.
“It is symbolic that the first publication of the weekly coincides
with the 15th anniversary of ‘Golos Armenii’,” she said.

THE GAVAR RESIDENTS ARE PREPARING FOR A FESTIVAL
A1+
[08:22 pm] 30 May, 2006
Active rehearsals have started in the Gavar State Dramatic theatre
after Levon Qalantaryan. The staff of the theatre is preparing for
the festival which will be held on July 3.
The festival is devoted to the 80th anniversary of renowned actress
Metaqsya Simonyan and will be held in the State theatre after Gabriel
Sundukyan. The play “Mother Kuraj” will be staged by the Gavar actors.
Chief producer of the theatre Garnik Poghosyan claims that they
attached their attention mainly to the women’s characters. The
performance will be named “The women and the war.” The actors were
concerned with the success of the performance before the rehearsals.
The concern is most likely determined by the fact that we don’t act,”
noted RA renowned actress Anahit Movsesyan with regret and added
they last acted on the stage in 2005. The performance “The women and
the war” will be staged in Gavar on June 10 – 15 before being staged
in Yerevan.
TV Company “Kyavar” of Gavar.

IVANOV DOESN’T RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING PEACEKEEPERS IN KARABAKH CONFLICT REGION
PanARMENIAN.Net
31.05.2006 14:25 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Russian Vice-Premier, Defense Minister Sergey
Ivanov does not rule out the possibility of deploying peacekeepers
in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict region. “I do not exclude that
peacekeeping forces may appear in the region for the fulfillment of
the political agreements that will be achieved sooner or later,”
Ivanov told reporters in Baku. “The current situation cannot last
forever,” he added. The Russian MOD head reminded that the unsteady
armistice in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict region has been maintained
for over 12 years already.
“Unfortunately, the number of hotspots like Nagorno Karabakh increases
year by year,” the Russian Defense Minister said, reported RIA Novosti.

RUSSIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWAL TO ARMENIA NOT TO DESTABILIZE POLITICAL SITUATION IN REGION
Yerkir
31.05.2006 15:25
YEREVAN (YERKIR) – The part of the ammunition being withdrawn to
Armenia from the Russian base in Akhalkalaki (Georgia) cannot lead
to political destabilization in the region, Russian Vice-Premier,
Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated at a news conference in Baku
May 30 when commenting on the outcomes of the sitting of the CIS
Council of Ministers.
“For most part impedimenta but not ammunition is being withdrawn,”
Sergey Ivanov said emphasizing that Russia doesn’t violate the
obligations undertaken within the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty.
The Russian Minister noted that the major part of the equipment is
being withdrawn from Akhalkalaki to Russia via Azerbaijan. “As for the
Batumi base, the terms of its withdrawal will be determined later,”
Ivanov resumed.
From: Baghdasarian

“IRAN’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WITH ITS CASPIAN SEA NEIGHBORS”
Report Drafted By: Andrew Katen
PINR
31 May 2006
Vice President Dick Cheney’s May visit to Kazakhstan and his subsequent
criticism of Russia spotlight the rebirth of a centuries-old “Great
Game” of geopolitical maneuvering by outside powers for control of
Central Asia. Rather than campaigns waged between Russia and Britain
for trade routes to India, however, the current struggle is for access
to Caspian Sea hydrocarbon resources.
While a May 8, 2006 Associated Press article credits Cheney with
lambasting Putin for “reversing democratic reforms and using energy
reserves as blackmail to gain political leverage,” his comments also
served as a warning to other great powers involved in Central Asia:
the Great Game has a new player. More specifically, Cheney’s criticism
of Russia reflects the tension arising from U.S. attempts to secure
Kazakhstan’s cooperation in the construction of a trans-Caspian oil
pipeline from Aktau to Baku that would feed into the newly-created
(and U.S. supported) Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
Such a deal would, in effect, break Russia’s oil export monopoly in
the Caspian Sea region.
The United States’ entry into Central Asia has equally important —
and potentially more dangerous — implications for another veteran
player of the Great Game: Iran. Piled on top of 25 years of hostile
diplomatic relations, economic sanctions, recent U.S. military
action in Iraq and Afghanistan, and threats over a developing nuclear
research program, U.S. involvement in the Caspian Sea region must be
interpreted by Tehran as an attempt by Washington to further isolate
Iran from the international community. Contributing to Iran’s worries
over U.S. encroachment in its backyard are the unresolved issues
it shares with the other four Caspian littoral states regarding the
sea’s legal status and how best to divide its territory.
In July 2001, Iran acted on its frustrations by deploying a warship
and fighter planes to threaten two Azeri research vessels exploring
the Araz-Alov-Sharg oilfields on behalf of British Petroleum.
Ownership of the south Caspian oilfields is a continuing source of
dispute between Azerbaijan and Iran. The Tehran Times described the
presence of research vessels as an “imprudent act of Azerbaijan,
supported by Britain,” and Iran reacted by positioning troops
along its border with Azerbaijan. While territorial matters among
northern Caspian Sea states have largely been settled diplomatically,
this arm-flexing display by Iran indicated that the resolution of
similar issues in the southern Caspian will continue to be marked
by a not-so-delicate balance of economic/diplomatic negotiations and
military action.
The world’s largest inland body of water, the Caspian Sea is
bordered by five states: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and
Turkmenistan. It sits on top of the world’s third largest hydrocarbon
reserves (projected to hold between 17 and 33 billion barrels of
oil), as well as up to 325 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. These
resources are not evenly distributed throughout the sea, however;
the majority of off-shore oil reserves lie closest to Kazakhstan
(the Tengiz and Kashagan Fields) and Azerbaijan (the Baku Fields). In
addition to hydrocarbons, the Caspian has 90 percent of the world’s
sturgeon and is, therefore, home to the caviar industry.
Not surprisingly, the three major issues at the root of Caspian
territorial disputes are hydrocarbon resources, fishing, and the
international waters used to access and transport them. The Russian
Empire/Soviet Union and Persia/Iran signed agreements in 1921 and
1940 recognizing the Caspian Sea as a lake belonging to and divided
between them. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both
Russia and Iran wanted this agreement to continue despite assertions
of independence by the breakaway states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan. Eager to exploit the natural resources off its coast and
establish its economic independence from Russia, Azerbaijan declared
in 1998 that, because the Caspian Sea is an international lake,
its surface and seabed should be divided along a median line into
five sectors (the size of which would be determined by each state’s
respective shoreline length).
Russia and Iran responded by pointing out that, as a member of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), Azerbaijan had agreed
to observe all treaties and agreements reached by the former Soviet
Union. Russia and Iran were aware that if the Caspian Sea were divided
according to Azerbaijan’s proposal, their respective territories
would neither afford them ownership of the majority of Caspian
oil nor access to the surface that is necessary to profit from its
transport. Furthermore, Tehran recognized that any plan allotting
territory to a state based on shoreline length would leave Iran with
the smallest share of the Caspian (between 12 to 16 percent) rather
than an equal fifth.
Despite its objections to Azerbaijan’s plan, Russia could hardly
enforce the C.I.S. agreement in 1998; instead, its main concern
at the time was reaching a solution before the United States could
influence territorial negotiations. Rather than insisting on an equal
division of the sea, Moscow made the best deal it could: an agreement
with Kazakhstan that divided their shared portion of the Caspian by
seabed only. Tehran vehemently opposed this arrangement or any other
that based division on shoreline length; it insisted on “condominium”
use of the sea or, at the very least, division of the Caspian into
five equal sectors. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan continued to advocate
division of both the seabed and the surface, although neither could
agree on which of them owned the Chirag and Azeri oilfields.
While the agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan divided the
littoral states into two camps (one wanted division by seabed only,
and the other by seabed and surface), it also effectively ended the
argument over whether the Caspian Sea should be divided, leaving
instead the issue of how it should be divided. Rather than quarreling
over definitions of a sea or a lake, many experts suggested that
the Caspian could simply be considered a “unique reservoir” that
shares characteristics of both seas and lakes, and whose disputes
should be resolved by nontraditional agreements worked out among the
littoral states.
Apparently, Azerbaijan recognized the unlikelihood that a solution
to the Caspian dispute would ever achieve the consensus of all five
states and entered into a deal with Russia in 2001. Baku also must
have taken into account its reliance on Russia’s oil export monopoly
as well as its ability to influence the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and
it admitted that further protests of the Russia-Kazakhstan agreement
were futile. Rather than continuing to voice objections alongside
intransigent allies such as Turkmenistan and Iran, Baku moved closer
to Moscow’s camp by consenting to a similar deal that divided the
seabed only. A third bilateral negotiation between Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan effectively ended the uncertainty over territory in the
northern Caspian and unfroze exploration of her hydrocarbon reserves.
Iran
The helplessness that Tehran felt watching the northern Caspian Sea
debate unfold undoubtedly contributed to the militaristic actions
than Iran undertook in 2001. While the confrontation occurred over
contested oilfields, however, Tehran’s interests in the Caspian may
be as much geopolitical as they are economic. Since most of Iran’s
oil reserves lie in the Persian Gulf, the dilemma Iran shares with
its Caspian Sea neighbors may be driven by the apprehension that it
is being left out of a regional decision-making process, as well as
the desire by Tehran to check further U.S. involvement in Central Asia.
Iran has, so far, had lukewarm results in its attempts at building
regional cooperation. Designed to improve its image from that of
xenophobic Islamist to engaged neighbor, Iran’s foreign policies
take into account the search for partners to replace the security
deals provided by the Soviet Union, as well as the need to construct
regional arrangements capable of balancing Western forces. However,
Iran’s promotion of Islam and Middle Eastern ties has done little
to overcome the religious and cultural dissimilarities it has with
its northern neighbors. Furthermore, Tehran finds that it cannot
compete with offers by outside powers such as Russia and the United
States to provide economic and security assistance to its neighboring
Caspian states.
One reason for Iran’s predicament, at least in Tehran’s eyes, is the
stranglehold placed on it by the United States — a fear not altogether
unfounded. The U.S.-Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 wounded Iran’s
bargaining position vis-a-vis regional states by prohibiting relations
between U.S. oil companies and Iran. The intention of this act was to
control Caspian oil export routes by prohibiting the involvement of
U.S. oil companies with the construction of a proposed pipeline through
Iran to the Persian Gulf, a project that if completed would diminish
the importance of the more expensive and less efficient U.S.-backed
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Finished in 2005, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline makes possible the export of oil across Georgia and Turkey
to the Mediterranean rather than via Russian pipelines or shipping
through the Dardanelles. Simply put, the new pipeline breaks the oil
export monopoly that Russia previously held and further isolates Iran.
In light of increased involvement by external powers in Baku and
continued disputes with Azerbaijan over southern Caspian oilfields,
Tehran’s relations with its northern neighbor are understandably
poor. Recent offers by the United States to improve the Azeri navy
have reinforced Tehran’s suspicions that Baku may be close to joining
the anti-Iran coalition being put together by Washington in response
to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Contributing to the hostility between Iran and Azerbaijan is the
ongoing ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. This region has been
a constant thorn in the side of Azerbaijan, whose inability to
defeat Armenian-backed insurgents has caused it to rely on outside
powers for assistance. On the one hand, Tehran would like to see
the conflict resolved in order to avoid an independence movement by
Iran’s 15 million Azeris (which has gained momentum since Azerbaijan’s
independence from the Soviet Union) or foreign involvement by the
United States or Turkey. On the other hand, Tehran does not want
a strong Azerbaijan and recognizes the benefit of using Armenian
insurgents to exploit the conflict, render unstable the nearby
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and dissuade Baku from further
cooperation with the United States.
Azerbaijan’s 2001 territorial agreement with Russia may also have
signaled to Tehran that Moscow is attempting to expand its control
of the Caspian and further reduce Iran’s influence there. Meanwhile,
Russia advances its role in the region by continuing to balance
its support between Azerbaijan and Iran, using Armenia to keep Baku
in check, while also providing Tehran with two-thirds of its arms
imports and assistance with the nuclear program. Russia inherited the
majority of the Soviet Caspian fleet and has undertaken efforts to
expand its capabilities, purportedly to affirm its role in the areas
of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and sea rescue. Along these
lines, Russia conducted live-fire naval maneuvers in the Caspian in
October of 2001, followed by the largest joint exercises in post-Soviet
history in August 2002 with Azeri and Kazakh forces.
Additionally, Moscow has moved a land-based missile site from the
Baltic to the Caspian.
Conclusion
Renewed interest in the Caspian Sea region by outside powers, continued
hostility between the United States and Iran, and the perception by
Tehran that it is being left out of the regional decision-making
process renders predicting Iran’s future regional Caspian policy
difficult. However, despite the unstable relationship between Iran
and Azerbaijan, it is not clear if Iran will continue conflict with
its neighbors. Instead, it may pursue increased regionalism through
bilateral and multilateral agreements that address its economic
and security needs. Tehran may strengthen the Economic Cooperation
Organization — which includes Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the six
former-Soviet Muslim states — and initiate analogous arrangements
that increase its regional power status.
Pipeline negotiations with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and even the
possibility of a route from Baku, are certainly possible in the future
given Tehran’s desire for an alternative to the U.S. or Russian-backed
options that currently exist.
As the world demand for oil increases and U.S. influence in the Middle
East remains shaky, Iran will continue to nurture relationships with
emerging outside powers such as China and India — and, in light of
U.S. policy of containment against it, Venezuela — as alternatives
to the U.S.-led international system of market democracy. Non-Western
based organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, may offer Tehran
the political, security, and economic cooperation it recognizes as
necessary for achieving the regional great power status that it covets.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty over south Caspian territorial disputes
and Iran’s perception that its “back is against the wall” will continue
to make military action by Iran a real possibility. As U.S.
threats over Iran’s nuclear program and moves by Russia to
reconsolidate its Central Asian interests increase, the frustration
of Iran’s traditionally xenophobic leadership will likely continue
the country’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well
as gunboat diplomacy on the Caspian Sea.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

UKRAINE SAYS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH ARMENIA NOT TO HARM TIES WITH AZERBAIJAN
UNIAN news agency, Kiev
31 May 06
Baku, 31 May: Ukrainian Defence Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko has said
that cooperation between Ukraine and Armenia will not do any harm to
relations with Azerbaijan. Hrytsenko was speaking at a news conference
in Baku after a session of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers.
“Our cooperation with Armenia does not involve any actions that could
harm other countries which are our partners,” Hrytsenko said.
Hrytsenko also said that Ukraine develops releations of mutually
beneficial partnership with many countries. He also stressed the
necessity to settle the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict [between Azerbaijan
and Armenia].
Azeri press has reported that Ukraine and Armenia signed a protocol
on military and technical cooperation after Ukrainian Chief of the
General Staff Serhiy Kyrychenko visited Armenia [on 24 May].
Armed conflicts have been going on for years at the border betwen
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress