Eurasia Daily Monitor – 04/06/2006

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, April 6, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 67

IN THIS ISSUE:
*President of Adygeya disappears after conflict with Kremlin
*Moscow targets joint Armenia-Iran energy projects for takeover
*Russia, Kazakhstan ink new deals on energy and military cooperation

KREMLIN PLAN TO MERGE ADYGEYA MEETS UNEXPECTED OBSTACLE

On April 4, the second session of the newly elected parliament of
Adygeya, a region in the western section of the North Caucasus, ended
abruptly when President Khasret Sovmen announced his resignation.

The Adygei leader had come to parliament to observe the process to
select the chairmen of 12 parliament committees. Fierce debate erupted
between members of the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party, which has 30
seats in the Adygei legislature, and the opposition Communist and
Russian United Industrial Parties, which have a total of 13 seats.
Sovmen asked for the floor, presumably to broker a compromise. However,
parliamentary chair Ruslan Khadzhibekov refused to allow the Adygei
leader to speak. Then Sovmen handed the speaker a written statement. But
instead of reading it aloud, Khadzhibekov said that the statement would
first be reviewed by the Political Council of United Russia; both Sovmen
and Khadzhibekov are members of the pro-Kremlin party.

Despite the speaker’s obvious resistance, Sovmen managed to take the
floor following a break. His speech stunned the assembled deputies. “I
have decided to resign,” he declared. “Moscow does not understand me.
Even if I step down from the president office, I will provide the
republic with economic and social help.” Sovmen wished the parliament
good luck and suggested possible successors, including Adam Zhane,
minister of health, and Murad Kudaev, the head of Adygeya’s
Krasnogvardeisk district (Kommersant, April 5).

Sovmen left the parliamentary chamber after his speech, accompanied by
several loyal deputies. According to Kommersant, Sovmen went to the
Government Palace to await a phone call from the Kremlin. He did not
have to wait for long; the phone call from Moscow came within 30 minutes
and radically changed the situation.

Following Sovmen’s conversation with Moscow, the Adygei presidential
office issued a press release. “The deputies and journalists
misunderstood the statement made by the president,” it read. “There are
no grounds for broadcasting information about his resignation.”
According to press secretary Abrek Chich, “The president reacted too
emotionally to what was going on during the session. When he entered the
parliament, some deputies defiantly did not stand up and when Khasret
Sovmen saw that the deputies had no common ground and synergy, he
announced that there was no use trying to work with such an attitude.”

Several hours later the United Russia parliamentary faction held a
special meeting and appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to
extend Sovmen’s authority by another term.

The next day, April 5, the political crisis in Adygeya took a disturbing
turn: Sovmen disappeared. Vedomosti reported that even officials from
Putin’s administration were unable to locate him. An unnamed source in
Putin’s administration described Sovmen’s behavior as “unclear
vacillation that destabilizes the situation in the region.” The source
also said that Sovmen’s resignation might be accepted as early as the
end of this week (Vedomosti, April 5). However, another source in the
Kremlin left open the possibility that Putin would reappoint Sovmen
(Kommersant, April 5).

Russian pundits offered a variety of explanations for Sovmen’s demarche.
Kommersant reported that the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Sovmen’s
economic policy and that he was resisting a proposal to incorporate
Adygeya into Krasnodar Krai, which is dominated by ethnic Russians (see
EDM, April 29, 2005). According to political observer Oksana
Goncharenko, “The danger now is that the local parliament will split
into equal parts, including followers and opponents of Sovmen” (Novye
izvestiya, April 5). The opposition, consisting mostly of ethnic
Russians, advocates holding a referendum in Adygeya on the issue of
unification. This would be the easiest way for the Kremlin to dissolve
Adygeya, as the majority of the population in the republic consists of
Russians who would vote for such unification. According to Alexander
Konovalov from the Institute of Strategic Estimates and Analyses, the
president of Adygeya was called to Moscow where attempts were made to
persuade him to agree to the unification. Instead, he went to parliament
to resign in protest.

The new Adygei parliament, elected on March 12, has only one chamber,
unlike the previous body. It will be much easier to push the referendum
law through a unicameral parliament, which had been blocked by the upper
chamber of the old legislature. Adopting the referendum law opens the
door for unification, which the Kremlin has long tried to engineer.
Parliamentary speaker Khadzhibekov is loyal to the Kremlin and will not
resist Adygeya’s incorporation into Krasnodar Krai. Relations between
Khadzhibekov and Sovmen are strained, because Moscow sees Khadzhibekov
as the region’s next president. This explains why Khadzhibekov did not
let Sovmen speak first at the session and why the Adygei leader
mentioned two regional politicians as his preferred successors.
Understanding that the Kremlin wants to get rid of him to clear the way
for the merger, Sovmen decided to play an all-or-nothing game,
knowing that Moscow has not yet decided what to do with him and with
Adygeya. The Adygei president’s bold move may have been intended to
frighten Putin, who often moves tentatively to avoid making missteps.

Sovmen’s open threat to resign demonstrated that the Adygei leader
continues to be an independent regional political figure, a quite rare
species in Putin’s Russia. But Sovmen must act boldly, as the Adygei
people would not forgive him if he betrays the idea of Adygeyan
autonomy.

–Andrei Smirnov

BLESSING ARMENIA’S DEBT SERVITUDE

On March 31 in Moscow, the Foundation for the Orthodox Peoples’ Unity
bestowed its annual award on Armenian President Robert Kocharian and
Russia’s Gazprom company for their support to Russian spiritual and
religious values (Noyan Tapan, March 31). By fortuitous coincidence,
Gazprom doubled the price of gas to Armenia, effective April 1. The
price hike will deepen Armenia’s economic dependence and structural
indebtedness to Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally announced in December
2005 that the gas price to Armenia would double as of January 1. In
early January, however, Putin granted a reprieve until March 31, so as
not to hit allied Armenia too hard in winter, but also to negotiate
another transfer of Armenian infrastructure and energy-sector assets to
Russia as payment for the higher gas bill after April 1. On April 5,
Kocharian publicly hinted that such an arrangement is in the making
(Armenian Public Television, April 5).

The gas price has now risen from to 0 per one thousand cubic meters
delivered at Armenia’s border. As a result, the price of gas consumed in
Armenia is rising in one fell swoop by 52% to households and by 85% to
industrial and commercial enterprises, effective on April 10. Armenia’s
Public Utilities Regulatory Commission approved the new rates already on
March 10 — an indication that Moscow was not prepared to grant any
further short-term reprieve.

Furthermore, the Russian-controlled, gas-fired Hrazdan electrical power
plant — the largest in Armenia — has announced its intention to raise
the price of electricity by 90% for households and enterprises, in
connection with the price hike on gas. Russia’s Unified Energy Systems
(UES) operates the Hrazdan plant under a 99-year lease, as part of the
debt-for-assets deal that settled Armenia’s debts to Russia in
2002-2003. Six Armenian industrial enterprises were ceded to Russia in
that deal as well.

Previously, Armenia had ceded control of the national gas transport and
distribution system to a mixed company, ArmRosGaz, in which Gazprom
holds a 45% stake, Gazprom’s affiliate Itera another 10%, and Armenia’s
Energy Ministry the remaining 45% stake, which may now be further
eroded. Moscow wants the handover process to continue, so as to render
Armenia’s economic dependence complete and irreversible.

Moscow is now making an offer that, by its reckoning, the destitute
Yerevan can hardly refuse. It proposes either temporary price relief on
gas, or a temporary price-offsetting mechanism to alleviate the social
impact, on the condition that Yerevan transfers additional assets to
Russia. These could include: part of Armenia’s remaining stake in
ArmRosGaz, or Armenia’s stake in the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline under
construction, or the fifth power bloc under construction by Iran at
Hrazdan. That fifth bloc, Hrazdan’s largest and most modern, is co-owned
by Armenia and Iran independently from the four Russian UES-operated
blocs and is valued at some 0 million in the ongoing discussions.

If Yerevan hands over such assets, Moscow could recalculate the price of
gas downward to or per one thousand cubic meters; or, alternatively,
Yerevan can use the proceeds from such handovers in order to compensate
the populace for the doubling of the gas price. According to credible
reports, not denied by Armenian officials and partly corroborated by
some of them, Yerevan and Moscow are now discussing a solution along
those lines, to apply for a two-and-a-half year period. The Hrazdan
plant’s fifth power bloc alone — the largest and most modern, co-owned
by Armenia and Iran separately from Russia’s UES — is valued at some 0
million in these discussions.

Gazprom and Itera supplied Armenia with 1.7 billion cubic meters of gas
in 2005 and intend to deliver 2 billion cubic meters in 2006. This gas
originates in Turkmenistan, reaching Armenia by pipeline via Kazakhstan,
around the northern bend of the Caspian Sea and through the North
Caucasus and Georgia. This is the pipeline that was blown up
(simultaneously with another pipeline and an electricity transmission
line) by never-identified saboteurs on Russian territory in January,
causing severe hardship to Georgia and Armenia.

Until 2005, Gazprom and Itera were buying Turkmen gas at per one
thousand cubic meters and reselling it to Armenia at to . This year,
Turkmenistan sells its gas for per one thousand cubic meters to Russia.
Thus, the Russian price hike to Armenia is highly disproportionate to
the Turkmen hike.

Apparently, Moscow feels free to resort to economic extortion of Armenia
and takes its political loyalty as an ally for granted. Moreover, by
targeting the joint Armenia-Iran energy projects for takeover, Russia
intends to rule out for the long term any alternative to its own
monopoly in Armenia. For its part, the Armenian leadership seems content
to accept the type of short-term price relief that goes together with
long-term insecurity and debt servitude for the country.

(Interfax, Noyan Tapan, Armenpress, Mediamax, PanArmenianNet, March
30-April 6; Haikakan Zhamanak, March 29, 31; see EDM, January 17, 20)

–Vladimir Socor

NAZARBAYEV’S GROWING CONFIDENCE ON VIEW IN VISIT TO MOSCOW

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev received a warm welcome during his
April 3 visit to Moscow. Friendly relations were emphasized when
Nazarbayev dedicated a new monument to the 19th-century Kazakh poet Abai
Kunanbayev, a devoted Russophile. Speaking at the ceremony, Russian
President Vladimir Putin noted that this event, as well as the erection
of a similar monument to Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in Astana,
symbolizes the long tradition of friendship between the two countries.

Nazarbayev and Putin signed seven bilateral agreements covering energy
and fuel cooperation, the use of the Saryshagan test site by the Russian
military, and cooperation between Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Industrial Group
and Russia’s Vneshekonombank, and between the Foreign Ministries of the
two countries. Moscow also pledged to help Astana putting the first
Kazakh satellite — Kazsat — into orbit (Khabar TV, April 5).

The Kremlin is using every pretext to secure a strong military foothold
in Kazakhstan following Tbilisi’s repeated demands for the Russian
military to withdraw from its bases in Georgia. Astana regarded Russia’s
recent ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wines (see EDM, March 28)
as a response to swelling anti-Russian sentiments in these countries.
With an amazing promptness, just before Nazarbayev’s trip to Moscow, the
Sanitary Inspection Department of the Kazakh Ministry of Health ordered
an inspection of imported Georgian and Moldovan wines. The head of the
department, Anatoli Belonog, said that, if the wines pose health
hazards, such imports might be banned in Kazakhstan as well (Megapolis,
April 3).

The current military and political ties between Russia and Kazakhstan
are hardly conducive to fostering friendship among equals. In Astana,
the Kazakh government sporadically comes under fire from nationalists
for granting Russia a 50-year lease on the Baikonur launch site, which
is in the environmentally vulnerable Kyzylorda region. The lease on the
Saryshagan test site is likely to draw additional protests.

But these sacrifices and concessions are inevitable for Kazakhstan,
which is desperately seeking to build up its military force with Russian
help. At a press conference in Astana the chairman of the Committee for
Scientific and Technological Development of the Ministry of Industry and
Trade, Meyram Kazhyken, announced plans to set up a Russian-Kazakh joint
venture to assemble Kazakh Ansat and Aktay helicopters based on the
Russian MI model. Some helicopter parts may be manufactured in the
former munitions plants of Aktobe, Almaty, and Petropavlovsk. But
Kazhyken pointed out that it would take 10-15 years before even 30% of
the production could be relocated to Kazakhstan (Sayasat, April 1).

The price for Russian assistance in modernizing the Kazakh army is
political loyalty to the Kremlin. Aware of this pitfall, Astana seeks to
diversify its military partnerships and avoid relying entirely on Moscow
for sophisticated weapons. For example, Kazakhstan inherited a
well-developed Soviet space-flight monitoring system that could be used
to modernize its air defense system with help from Singapore
Technologies.

Astana has also made significant steps toward greater energy
independence from Moscow by bidding for stakes in the Yukos-owned
Mazeikiu Nafta complex in Lithuania. Ironically, on the eve of the
Nazarbayev-Putin talks in Moscow, the Lithuanian newspaper Lietuvos
Rytas announced that the Lithuanian government was seeking to buy back a
57.3% stake in Mazeikiu Nafta from Yukos and then sell it to
Kazakhstan’s state owned company, KazMunayGaz (Vilnius BNS, March 31;
also see EDM, April 5). Kazakhstan’s closer ties with China also help
counterbalance Russia’s drive to monopolize hydrocarbon transportation
routes through Kazakhstan.

Astana has enthusiastically embraced the idea of a “Greater Central
Asia” region and Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev recently
went to Afghanistan to attend an international conference on
“Partnership, Trade, and Development within Greater Central Asia,”
sponsored by Johns Hopkins University. He also made sure to extend a
personal message of friendship from Nazarbayev to Afghan President Hamid
Karzai. Tokayev said that Greater Central Asia, which includes a
politically and economically diverse grouping of Iran, Afghanistan, and
Azerbaijan, parts of China, Western Siberia and the Urals of Russia,
particularly interests Kazakhstan as a promising energy transportation
route extending from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf via India and
Pakistan. The Kazakh foreign minister stressed that Afghanistan should
be part of Greater Central Asia linked with Almaty, Bishkek, and
Dushanbe
via a Trans-Afghan highway running through Kabul to Kandahar. Kazakhstan
also offered to train Afghan medical workers and engineers
(Kazakhstanskaya pravda, April 4).

Tokayev addressed the conference on behalf of all Central Asian states
without fearing any criticism from Kazakhstan’s neighbors. It is a clear
sign of Astana’s growing confidence in spearheading an alliance of
Central Asian countries. Nazarbayev’s March 19 visit to Tashkent also
contributed much to the rapprochement between Uzbek President Islam
Karimov and Putin, and Karimov spoke in favor of a Kazakh-Uzbek alliance
and putting priority on a partnership with Russia in foreign policy (see
EDM, March 22). However, Astana takes a more cautious approach toward
Moscow and tries to neutralize the Kremlin’s attempts to return the
Central Asian states to the Russian fold. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy
program for 2006 -2008 points out that Kazakhstan “will pursue a
balanced and responsible foreign policy.” The Kremlin should not be
overly optimistic regarding “eternal friendship” with Astana.

–Marat Yermukanov

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
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Eurasia Daily Monitor – 04/04/2006

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, April 4, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 65

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Timetable set for Russian troops to leave Georgia
*Washington rewards Yerevan’s interest in NATO
*Dushanbe considers military help from China, Pakistan

AGREEMENTS SIGNED ON RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM GEORGIA

On Friday, March 31, Georgia’s First Deputy Defense Minister, Mamuka
Kudava, and Russia’s Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General
Alexei Maslov, signed a set of agreements on the withdrawal of Russian
forces from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and other Russian
military installations in Georgia.

The agreements concern the implementation of the May 30, 2005, Joint
Statement, signed by Georgia’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome
Zourabichvili with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the
cessation of functioning of those bases and installations and
withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia by 2008. The Russian side
carried out an initial stage of the withdrawal last August (see EDM,
June 3, August 1, 16, 2005).

The documents just signed in Sochi include an agreement on the
timeframe and modalities of functioning and withdrawal of Russian
forces from Georgia and an agreement on the transit of Russian
military cargoes and personnel through Georgia’s territory.

The Akhalkalaki base is to be emptied of most of its heavy equipment
during 2006 and to be completely closed by October 1, 2007, with a
possible extension until December 31, 2007, subject to weather
conditions. The Batumi base is to ship out most of its heavy equipment
during 2007 and to be completely closed before the end of 2008. The
two garrisons total approximately 3,000 Russian military personnel at
present. The Batumi base will be the last to close because it serves
as an evacuation point for heavy equipment by sea to Russia from
various points in Georgia.

During the withdrawal process, the Russian side shall retain:

a) the Gonio exercise range on the Black Sea shore outside Batumi, to
be used for logistical operations related to the evacuation, not for
exercises;

b) the Russian officers’ hostel in Mtskheta outside Tbilisi, a
way-station on the Russian forces’ evacuation route to North Ossetia;

c) the Soviet-era Kojori communications station also outside Tbilisi,
to be used jointly by Russia and Georgia under Georgian jurisdiction;
and

d) the Tbilisi building of the Headquarters of the Russian Group of
Forces in the Transcaucasus, in order for those headquarters to manage
the withdrawal process.

All of these installations are also to be handed over to Georgia in
2008. The bases shall function during this period “in a withdrawal
mode,” i.e., without conducting firing practice or other combat
exercises, essentially packing up. Russia shall allocate 2.166 billion
rubles from its state budget in 2006 through 2008 to finance the
withdrawal of its forces from Georgia. For its part, Georgia
authorizes the use of its air space, highways, railroads, and ports
for the transport of Russian military equipment and personnel out of
Georgia.

It is informally understood that most of the Russian personnel and
some two-thirds of the hardware shall relocate to Russia’s North
Caucasus Military District, while one-third of the hardware is to be
transferred to Russia’s base at Gyumri in Armenia. The Russian side
undertakes not to transfer that equipment to another party, meaning
Armenian forces.

Russia retains limited, strictly regulated transit rights to supply
its forces in Armenia through Georgian territory in the future. Any
Russian military equipment transported via Georgia to Armenia is not
to be handed over to other forces (i.e., Armenian) and not to be
deployed in any conflict zone (i.e., Karabakh and Armenian-occupied
territories inside Azerbaijan). The content of Russian military
transit cargoes shall be agreed by Russia and Georgia one year in
advance. Cargoes must not include mass-destruction weapons, their
components, or any dual-use nuclear, chemical, or biological
substances. Georgia has the right to refuse the transit of any Russian
cargo that poses a threat to national security or violates any of
those conditions.

The March 31 agreement (like the May 30, 2005, Joint Statement) does
not cover Russia’s Gudauta base, which is located in Abkhaz-controlled
territory. Moscow has claimed since 2003 that it “closed” the base,
but has not allowed international verification at the site. In fact, a
Russian garrison has continued to be stationed at the base all along,
with weapons stockpiles and helicopters. Moscow seeks OSCE approval
for the base to be assigned to Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops in
Abkhazia. Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili noted,
“They’ve been lying for years, telling us that the base was closed
… We will not allow them to kick sand in our face” (Imedi TV,
Rustavi-2 TV, March 31).

On March 28, unidentified Abkhaz gunmen stole arms from the Gudauta
base and some of them were wounded in an exchange of fire with the
Russian garrison during the getaway. The March 31 agreement does not
pertain to Russia’s “peacekeeping” contingents in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Georgian parliament seeks a formula for replacing those
contingents with a genuine, international peacekeeping operation.

(Interfax, Prime-News, March 31)

–Vladimir Socor

U.S. ANNOUNCES MAJOR NEW AID PACKAGE FOR ARMENIA

The United States has officially committed itself to providing 5.65
million in additional economic assistance to Armenia, in a further
indication of its deepening ties with the South Caucasus country. The
sum, substantial by Armenian standards, is to be provided over the
next five years under the Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) program aimed at promoting good governance and economic
reforms around the world.

The administration included Armenia on the list of 16 developing
countries eligible for MCA funding when it unveiled the program two
years ago. The cash-strapped government in Yerevan jumped at the
opportunity to meet some of its pressing socio-economic needs. The MCA
compact that was signed by senior U.S. and Armenian officials in
Washington on March 27 is the product of Yerevan’s lengthy
negotiations with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a
U.S. government agency handling the scheme.

Speaking at the signing ceremony, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice described the agreement as a “testament to the hard work and
dedication of the Armenian people and their elected government.” Rice
stressed that provision of the aid is conditional on the proper
conduct by the Armenian authorities of parliamentary and presidential
elections due in 2007 and 2008 respectively. “These are important
commitments and the United States stands ready to help Armenia to
ensure that its upcoming elections are free and fair,” she said.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian assured her that his
government would do its best to honor those commitments. “Our task
until then is to partner with the United States and European
governments to implement the necessary corrective steps to improve the
conditions necessary for an honest and fair expression of people’s
voices,” he said.

The large-scale aid will be channeled into rural regions of Armenia
that have seen little development despite a decade of nationwide
economic growth. The main segment, worth 6 million, will be spent on
upgrading the country’s malfunctioning irrigation networks, which date
to Soviet times. Another million will be used for capital repairs of
about 1,000 kilometers of battered rural roads. U.S. and Armenian
officials say these two infrastructure projects will directly benefit
75% of the approximately one million Armenians dependent on
farming. The first major installment of the aid is expected to be
disbursed early next year.

Interestingly, Armenia has already been one of the world’s leading
per-capita recipients of U.S. economic assistance, which is approved
by Congress and has totaled <html>.6 billion since 1992. The size of
this “regular” aid is commonly attributed to the strength of the
Armenian-American lobby on Capitol Hill. But finding an explanation
for Armenia’s inclusion in MCA, which is single-handedly decided by
the Bush administration, is a more difficult task. Unlike neighboring
Georgia (the only other former Soviet state covered by MCA), Armenia
has no ambition to join NATO and maintains close military and
political ties with Russia.

Many Armenian observers regard the promised MCA funds as a further
incentive for President Robert Kocharian and his most likely
successor, Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian, to accept a compromise
solution to the Karabakh conflict. U.S. officials say a framework
peace deal may still be achieved this year despite the collapse of a
crucial Armenian-Azerbaijani summit in France last February. In this
regard, local observers consider very significant Rice’s remark that
Armenians have an “elected government.” (The State Department strongly
criticized the 2003 Armenian presidential and parliamentary
elections.) Haykakan Zhamanak, a pro-Western Yerevan daily critical of
the ruling regime, editorialized on April 1 that Washington is thereby
“removing all questions about Robert Kocharian’s legitimacy.” A
commentator for another paper, 168 Zham, went further, speculating
that the Americans are disinterested in Armenia’s democratization
because “our society is overwhelmingly pro-Russian.”

The United States was quite cautious in criticizing reports of serious
fraud during last November’s constitutional referendum in Armenia (and
parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan) — a far cry from its tough
reaction to the disputed presidential ballot in Belarus on March
19. MCC chief executive John Danilovich expressed concern at the
Armenian authorities’ handling of the referendum but promptly lauded
their “commitment to sustaining the democratic reforms” after
receiving relevant assurances from Kocharian last January. In a March
27 speech at a conference organized by the Armenian Assembly of
America, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried said
Washington is “taking at face value assurances from the Armenian
government” that the 2007 and 2008 elections will be democratic. Many
Armenians are far more skeptical on this score.

By providing extra aid to Armenia Washington may also be rewarding the
government’s ongoing efforts to forge closer security links with NATO
and America in particular. “We do support Armenia’s efforts to
strengthen its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community,” Fried
said, commending the Kocharian administration for seeking greater
“balance in its relations with the West and the Russians.” Fried’s
deputy Matthew Bryza welcomed “considerable progress made in this
regard over the past year” after holding talks with Armenian leaders
in Yerevan on March 7. “I don’t think that the government of Armenia
can move at a pace that for us is too quick,” Bryza told a news
conference. “But we are very happy with the level of cooperation. This
has been a significant year for U.S.-Armenian security cooperation.”

(Haykakan Zhamanak, April 1; 168 Zham, March 30-31; RFE/RL Armenia
Report, March 7, 28; Text of Daniel Fried’s address to the Armenian
Assembly of America, )

–Em il Danielyan

TAJIK MILITARY WEARY OF NATO

Tajikistan’s military leadership has expressed public concern over the
country’s recent trend toward closer involvement with the NATO
Alliance as a mechanism through which Dushanbe will gain enhanced
military and security capabilities. The apparent turn in the direction
of Tajikistan’s stated aims in this sphere sends a worrying signal
throughout the region at a difficult time for the evolving and dynamic
relationship formed between the Alliance and the Central Asian
militaries. However, the weak Tajik armed forces are desperately in
need of multiple sources of foreign assistance and thus seek to
diversify these sources beyond traditional security partners to
include Pakistan.

Colonel-General Sherali Khayrulloyev, Tajikistan’s defense minister,
explained in Dushanbe on March 29 that he still considers Russia to be
Tajikistan’s most reliable military and security partner. “The Tajik
armed forces have been set up thanks to Russia’s assistance and
contribution. Military-technical cooperation between our countries is
at a very high level today.” Khayrulloyev pointed to Tajikistan
sending 300 to 400 servicemen annually to Russian military academies
since 1994. These courses of study use a full training curriculum
lasting three to five years. In contrast, programs sending servicemen
to other countries, such as China, India, and the United States,
provide only short-term courses lasting from one to six months, mainly
because of the necessity to teach the servicemen a foreign
language. Most surprisingly, Khayrulloyev weighed the opportunity of
forming closer links with NATO against more typical arrangements with
Moscow, concluding, “Soviet standards are no worse.” Such attitudes
are unsurprising in many ways, given the continued residue of
Soviet-trained servicemen within these structures; as such thinking is
endemic within the Ministry of Defense itself. Indeed, Tajikistan was
slow to join the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which it
finally did in 2000, and a combination of factors has made difficult
its relationship within the PfP process. (Interfax, Moscow, March 29).

Of course, Russian and Tajik servicemen are regularly engaged in joint
combat training. A joint exercise of the 92nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment, part of the 201st Russian Motorized Rifle Division based in
Dushanbe, and cadets from the Tajik Ministry of Defense military
institute will commence exercises at the Lohur training ground on
April 4. The focus will be battalion-level defensive actions, and will
be Russian led, funded, and instill Russian military-thinking
practices on Tajik counterparts. Tajik brigades and Russian motorized
rifle regiments have just concluded a joint exercise at the Mumirak
and Sumbula training grounds in late March.

Joint training is cost effective and the preferred option for the weak
Tajik military, especially when its high-profile exercises with Russia
can project a positive image for its beleaguered armed
forces. Nonetheless, Dushanbe does want to conduct its own training,
though often to advertise its need for additional foreign
assistance. A recent one-day drill was conducted at the Sumbula
military range (Khuroson District of the southern Khatlon Region),
codenamed Masnad-2006 (Position-2006). It involved divisions from the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Border
Protection Committee, and the Interior Ministry’s Directorate for the
Khatlon Region. Carried out in three stages with more than 3,000
servicemen and officers from the relevant agencies participating, the
exercise was intended to display competence in the face of a
theoretical terrorist threat. The scenario rehearsed a response to an
international terrorist group attacking two detachments’ border troops
and taking hostages. The Tajik Ministry of Defense said it expected to
hold similar drills with the involvement of the Chinese armed forces
in Mountainous Badakhshon Autonomous Region in the summer (Asia-Plus
News, March 28).

In addition to looking toward China for extra help with its armed
forces, Dushanbe also envisages closer links with Pakistan. A
Pakistani military delegation led by General Shahid Tirmizey, a
committee chair from the Pakistani Armed Forces General Staff, made a
two-day fact-finding visit to Tajikistan on March 28-29. The
delegation saw the Fakhrobod firing range, where a demonstration
exercise was held. The delegation also held meetings with Salohiddin
Nasriddinov, deputy Tajik minister of foreign affairs, as well as the
leadership of the State Border Protection Committee and the Ministry
of Defense (Avesta, March 28; Itar-Tass, March 29).

Khayrulloyev’s overtly pro-Russian remarks must be seen in context. On
March 28 President Emomali Rahmonov endorsed a single blueprint for
combating terrorism and extremism, aimed at raising the effectiveness
of the fight against modern threats in accordance with Tajikistan’s
international commitments. The blueprint itself therefore aims to
ensure the closest possible collaboration among the power-wielding and
law-enforcement agencies and Tajik state structures responsible for
financial control with their counterparts from regional countries and
other international anti-terrorist organizations in the fight against
terrorism.

If this venture is to avoid being purely another paper effort to prove
that the authorities are attempting to do something about the possible
terrorist threat to the country, then Dushanbe will need help from a
variety of sources. Khayrulloyev, in his efforts to deliver success in
this area, fully understands the risks involved in closer integration
with NATO and the upheaval to the weak Tajik armed forces that could
ensue. He may, in this context alone, want to signal greater readiness
to rely on Russian help, while looking to China and Pakistan for
support that will not prove over-burdening, which some in the Tajik
Ministry of Defense believe NATO’s help would prove in the long term.

–Roger N. McDermott

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/63791.htm
http://www.jamestown.org

ANCA Telethon 2006: ANCA Launches Nationwide Telethon

PRESS RELEASE
ANCA Telethon 2006
Armenian National Committee of America
104 N. Belmont St., Suite 200, Glendale, CA 91206
(818) 500-1918
(818) 246-7353 fax
Email: [email protected]

For more information:
Maral Habeshian
(818) 500-1918

ANCA Launches Nationwide Telethon
Grassroots Advocacy Organization Expanding Operations in Nation’s Capital
and across U.S.

(Washington, DC – March 29, 2006) – The Armenian National Committee of
America (ANCA) announced today that it will launch its first nationwide
telethon on May 21, 2006 with the theme “Securing our roots. Building for
the future.”

The goal of the telethon, which will air around the United States on
television stations in major Armenian communities and via satellite TV, is
to raise funds to expand its work and programs in service to the Armenian
Cause (Hai Tahd). The ANCA has been stepping up its advocacy efforts over
the last decade on many issues important to the Armenian community and the
telethon will raise the additional financial resources necessary to meet the
growing challenges facing the Armenian people.

As a first step in these expansion plans, in early March the ANCA Endowment
made a historic announcement regarding a state-of-the-art building it
purchased from AOL founder Steve Case, which is located in the heart of the
nation’s capital, Washington, DC. The building, which is equipped with the
latest technology, is located blocks from the White House and near Embassy
Row where most embassies representing countries from around the world are
located.

“Now is the time to build on our successes with a national telethon devoted
to “Hai Tahd” – the Armenian Cause,” said Ken Hachikian, Chairman of the
ANCA. “We look forward to generating the increased political power,
influence and respect that the Armenian American community deserves – and
that the Armenian homeland needs. Purchasing a building in the heart of
Washington, DC’s political establishment gives the Armenian Cause a
permanent home in the U.S. and provides a platform to expand our service to
the Armenian nation.”

The ANCA telethon will be broadcast from 6:00pm to midnight Eastern Standard
Time (EST) and 3:00-9:00pm Pacific Standard Time (PST) respectively on May
21st and will feature a wide array of engaging programming including
documentaries, prominent political figures, community representatives and
artistic performances, all with an eye toward raising substantial funds to
support the ANCA’s advocacy programs throughout the United States.

“The launch of the ANCA Telethon represents an historic occasion to both
demonstrate the substantial progress and results the ANCA has achieved for
the Armenian Cause and to outline our plans for the future,” said Zanku
Armenian, spokesperson for the ANCA Telethon. “We are at a defining moment
for Hai Tahd and need to expand our infrastructure to meet the increasing
challenges from the many forces arrayed against our nation, our homeland,
and our struggle for justice. The Telethon will provide a unique forum to
unify our community’s strength, foster greater participation, and generate
the resources we need to advance the Armenian Cause.”

The genesis of the ANCA Telethon theme, “Securing our roots. Building for
the future,” reflects the ANCA’s respect for our roots and our aspirations
for the future. “Securing our roots” represents our enduring historic
roots as a people, our grassroots around the country, and our deep roots in
Washington, DC. At its core, grassroots advocacy is the very soul of the
ANCA. While “Building for the future” represents the ANCA’s constant
efforts to expand its effectiveness as a world-class organization,
recognized internationally as the principled and forceful voice of the
Armenian American community.

www.anca.org

Eurasia Daily Monitory – 03/23/2006

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, March 23, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 57

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Russian troops sweep Dagestan, resulting in widespread anger
*Kyiv now tilts toward Russia on Transnistria issue
*Tbilisi to receive gas deliveries from Azerbaijan

DESECRATION OF KORAN COULD PROVOKE ATTACK IN DAGESTAN

On March 3 Russian security officials swept through several villages in
the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan, North Caucasus.

According to RIA-Dagestan, “Officers of the Ministry of Interior Affairs
[MVD] and the Federal Security Service [FSB] are combing the Khasavyurt
area adjacent to Chechnya with the support of the 102nd Motorized Rifle
Division, helicopters, and armored vehicles.” The Ministry also reported
that a Kalashnikov assault rifle, two hand grenades, and 2,000
ammunition cartridges had been found in the village of Novosasitli in a
house owned by a relative of Rasul Maksharipov, a Dagestani insurgent
leader who was killed last summer (RIA-Dagestan, March 3).

Mopping-up operations, house searches, and arrests of suspected rebel
sympathizers happen daily in Dagestan, but this time Russian military
forces, not local police, took the lead, a tactical decision that
immediately caused trouble.

On March 10, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, a website linked to the Muslims of
Russia organization, posted an open letter from residents of
Novosasitli. The letter revealed the details of the sweep and contained
information not mentioned in the official report. Before they started
the mopping-up operation, residents claimed, Russian soldiers forced all
of the residents to leave their homes. The locals complained that the
servicemen were drunk, stole money and jewels during the sweep, and
broke furniture in many houses. One officer threatened to have his
soldiers rape a female village, adding that the attack would be even
worse than “what the Americans do with Muslims in Guantanamo or Abu
Gharib” (Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, March 10). In addition, people in
Novosasitli insist that all of the weapons found in the village had been
planted by the military to justify their violent raid.

Yet all of these alleged crimes pale in comparison to one specific
incident that might have serious negative consequences not only for
Dagestan, but also for Russia’s reputation before the whole Muslim
world. At the home of Makhach Khabibov, Makhsharipov’s relative, Russian
officers deliberately desecrated a Koran. According to the letter by the
villagers, a Russian officer pulled the holy book from a shelf and
methodically began to rip out its pages. Then he threw it on the floor
and walked over it. Chernovik, a Dagestani newspaper, confirmed this
information. A correspondent from the newspaper saw the desecrated Koran
himself when he visited the village (newsru.com, March 16).

This provocation was so extreme that even some official Muslim leaders
of Russia, who usually look the other way when officials violate the
rights of ordinary Muslims in the country, protested.

At the end of last week, Mufti Mukkadas Bibarsov, head of the Muslim
Spiritual Directorate of the Volga Region, said that this act of
desecration must receive exactly the same strong condemnation from the
government and Russian society as did the recent Danish cartoons
lampooning the Prophet Mohammad (Islam.ru, March 16).

Mufti Nafigulla Ashirov, head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for
the Asian part of Russia, echoed these words, arguing that anyone,
Muslim or non-Muslim, should be angry at such actions and the dangers
they pose to the unity and stability of the Russian Federation
(Islam.ru, March 17).

Leaders of the MVD forces hurried to disavow their involvement in the
incident. A source in the Command called the desecration of the Koran
“a serious case” and said that an investigation into the incident was
underway (Ekho Moskvy, March 16).

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the desecration of the Koran was done
on impulse. The witnesses say that the entire sweep was well organized
and that Russians in civilian clothes (probably FSB officers)
coordinated the actions of the Interior forces. Given the high level of
advance planning, the provocative behavior of the servicemen, as well as
the desecration of the Koran, could have been premeditated. The
residents of Novosasitli said that, before the sweep began, the MVD
troops fired guns in the air and helicopters flew over the village,
which made the locals feel especially nervous and terrified. The
Dagestani police and even the republic’s deputy minister of interior
affairs were forcibly kept away from the settlement during the sweep
(Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, March 10).

The rough manner of the mopping-up operation resembles the massive
sweeps that took place in Chechnya from 2000 through 2003. The aim of
those “zachistkas” was to terrorize the Chechen population in order to
make them stop supporting the insurgency. The result was exactly the
opposite, however, since this brutal strategy only fueled resistance.
The same reaction could happen in Dagestan, where the local insurgency
had already gained significant public support.

“The desecration of the Koran has inspired serious public discontent in
Dagestan,” says Abdurashid Saidov, a respected Dagestani journalist. “No
doubt such blasphemy will stimulate the youth to join the rebels. And it
should be clearly understood that actions such as the desecration of
sacred Muslim items and tormenting unarmed civilians, including women,
will not help security officials to frighten the Dagestanis, but, on the
contrary, this can only lead to a second Nalchik in the largest republic
of the North Caucasus. I do not think the Kremlin will gain anything for
itself if what happened in Nalchik is repeated in Dagestan.” On October
13, 2005, insurgents swept into Nalchik, the capital of
Kabardino-Balkaria, capturing key facilities and fighting local security
forces. The authorities attempted to seal off the town, but the rebels
managed to escape.

The Russian military does not listen to people like Saidov, operating
under a different logic. “Religious fanatics understand only the
language of force,” says General Yuri Nikolaev, a former army commander
in the North Caucasus (see EDM, June 23, 2005).

Time will tell whose arguments are closer to reality.

–Andrei Smirnov

UKRAINE BREAKING RANKS WITH EUROPE AND MOLDOVA ON TRANSNISTRIA

Ukraine’s March 3 decision to cooperate with the European Union and
Moldova on Transnistria is proving short-lived. On that day, at the EU’s
insistence, Ukraine began enforcing a new border and customs regime
agreed with Moldova on the Transnistrian sector of the Ukraine-Moldova
border, thus closing Europe’s largest “black hole” of contraband and
illicit trafficking. However, the March 15 meeting in Moscow of
Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary (NSDC),
Anatoly Kinakh, with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, marked
another turning point in Ukraine’s policy (if decisions reversible every
few weeks amount to a policy).

That meeting’s officially reported agenda included only two items:
preparing the first session of the presidential Putin-Yushchenko
commission (which has never met since its creation on paper more than a
year ago) and Transnistria (Interfax, March 15). The seemingly peculiar
linkage of these two items reflects the Ukrainian presidency’s and
NSDC’s long-standing attempts to elicit positive pre-electoral signals
from Moscow in return for Kyiv’s alignment with Moscow on Transnistria.
Indeed, on the eve of the Ivanov-Kinakh meeting, Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov publicly asked Ukraine to return to the
spirit of the December 15 Putin-Yushchenko declaration on Transnistria
(whereby the Ukrainian president had fallen into line with Putin, hoping
to induce him to visit Yushchenko in Ukraine ahead of the March 26
parliamentary elections). Lavrov further recalled the February
joint “inspection” visit to Transnistria by Igor Ivanov’s and Kinakh’s
deputies, who demonstratively exonerated Transnistria of suspicions
regarding arms production and contraband (Interfax, March 14).

That Lavrov-invoked spirit seems to be back after Kinakh’s Moscow visit.
Moscow’s consent to open the prospect of a Putin-Yushchenko meeting in
the joint communiqué is a modest but real “positive signal” just ahead
of Ukraine’s March 26 vote.

On March 17 and 20, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded two
notes to Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it complained
of economic damage and political complications that Ukraine is
experiencing as a result of the new border and customs regime on the
Transnistria sector. Between the lines, the notes expressed discontent
with Chisinau’s failure to explain the nature of the measures introduced
on March 3 to the public in Ukraine and Transnistria and hinted that
Ukraine cannot be expected to adhere to these measures much longer.
Indeed the Ukrainian Ministry proposes in one of the notes that the new
border and customs regime be “temporarily suspended” after Ukraine’s
March 26 elections. It further proposes that Ukrainian customs clear
Transnistria cargos in situations where the March 3 regime stipulates
Moldovan clearance of those cargos.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is already punching some holes in that regime
politically and physically. Politically, Kyiv is undermining the basic
tenet of the European Union’s initiative to introduce international
legal norms and standards on this border. That tenet holds that all
deliberations and decisions regarding this border are strictly a
bilateral matter between Moldova and Ukraine. The EU’s Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM) is present on the border and actively engaged in
consultation, advisory work, and monitoring, but in no way substitutes
for Ukraine and Moldova, the sovereign states qualified to make policy
decisions on that border under international law. Thus, the EU opposes
any transfer of deliberations and decisions from the Ukraine-Moldova
bilateral framework into a format that would include Transnistria and
Russia as well. By contrast, Moscow and Tiraspol call for a format of
all
“interested parties,” including themselves on an equal footing with
Ukraine and Moldova, to settle the issue.

Kyiv is now inching toward accepting that Russian view. On March 16,
Yushchenko authorized an invitation to Transnistria’s self-styled
“foreign affairs minister,” Valery Litskay, for consultations in Odessa;
and Yushchenko personally invited Transnistria’s leader Igor Smirnov on
March 17 for a meeting in Kyiv. Litskay declined, saying that he would
only attend together with the Russian side. Smirnov accepted in
principle, but only if the agenda and outcome of a meeting with
Yushchenko are well prepared in advance (translation: if Kyiv agrees to
suspend the border and customs regime that were introduced on March 3).
Following this humiliating episode, Kyiv continued consulting with
Moscow.

Beginning with the night of March 16-17, Ukrainian border and customs
authorities, on instructions from Kyiv, are from time to time allowing
road transport to enter Transnistria directly from Ukrainian territory,
bypassing Moldovan customs. Such passage violates the regime introduced
on March 3, which requires such transport to be detoured from Ukrainian
territory to Moldovan customs checkpoints, there to undergo registration
and clearance before proceeding to their destinations in Transnistria.

Some of those cargos are food products, some of which are intended to be
smuggled back into Ukraine or redirected to Moldova; others are scrap
iron for the Rabnita steel plant, Transnistria’s most lucrative official
enterprise; and many of the cargos are imports of the Sheriff
conglomerate, the hub of Transnistria’s shadow economy.

Official statements from Kyiv portray the passage of such transport as a
welcome sign that Transnistria’s authorities are lifting the blockade
they had installed after March 3 on the border with Ukraine. In reality,
Tiraspol relaxed its blockade on the condition that Ukrainian
authorities collude in bypassing Moldovan customs. Tiraspol had stopped
all transport from Ukraine to retaliate economically against Kyiv,
generate political pressure from Ukrainian interest groups on the
government to lift or dilute the new border regime, foster a siege
atmosphere in Transnistria, and furnish a basis for Russian actions to
lift the purported “blockade.” Tiraspol’s move appears to be partly
successful against wavering Ukrainian authorities.

(Interfax-Ukraine, Moldpres, Olvia-Press, March 13-21)

–Vladimir Socor

GEORGIA EXTRICATING FROM GAZPROM’S BEAR HUG

The winter now ending was almost certainly the last one during which
Georgia had to face Gazprom’s commercial blackmail and supply cutoffs.
Within the coming months, Georgia will begin receiving Azerbaijani gas
through the Shah Deniz-Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) transit pipeline
and will also have an opportunity to receive small volumes of Iranian
gas. This new situation should finally end Georgia’s dependence on
Gazprom and constant risk of losing the country’s gas transport and
distribution systems to the Russian state monopoly.

Deliveries from Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz gas field are scheduled
to begin in September 2006, reaching 20 billion cubic meters annually to
several consumer countries by the end of the decade. That figure, almost
double the initial projection, rests on revised estimates of the field’s
recoverable reserves, which turned out to be far richer than initially
estimated. The consortium for extraction and transport consists of:
British Petroleum as technical operator and Norway’s Statoil as
commercial operator, with stakes of 25.5% each; Azerbaijan’s State Oil
Company, Total of France, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),
with 10% each; a partnership of Russia’s Lukoil and Italy’s Agip with
10% between them, and Turkish Petroleum with 9%.

Georgia is to receive 300 million cubic meters of gas annually in
compensation for the transit service and to purchase another 500 million
cubic meters annually for a deeply discounted price fixed at per one
thousand cubic meters. The aggregate volume of 800 million cubic meters
represents 60% of Georgia’s current annual requirement of gas.
Significantly and properly, the arrangement whereby the consortium pays
Georgia with gas, in lieu of cash, for the transit service is deemed
entirely compatible with market economics. Gazprom and the Kremlin
denounced a similar arrangement, whereby Ukraine was receiving under
priced Russian gas in lieu of cash for the transit service until January
1, as “anti-market” and provided an excuse for their predatory move
against Ukraine.

The Georgian government now seeks to increase Georgia’s guaranteed
annual intake of Shah Deniz gas, so as to cover at least part of the
remaining 40% of the country’s current requirement. The requirement will
increase as Georgia’s economic growth accelerates. With Gazprom a risky
option for meeting that requirement, Georgia is looking at the
possibility of importing small volumes of gas from Iran. Georgia began
such imports in late January, following the never-explained bomb blasts
in Russia’s North Caucasus that sabotaged two Russian gas pipelines,
interrupting the supply to Georgia and Armenia. The national gas
companies of Georgia and Iran signed an agreement at that point whereby
Georgia would receive 2 million cubic meters of gas per day from Iran,
priced at 0 per one thousand cubic meters. That gas reached Georgia via
Azerbaijan, through the reconstructed small-capacity pipeline
Astara-Gazi Mahomed-Gazakh. That emergency arrangement opened the way to
exploratory discussions with Iran toward a more stable agreement to help
meet Georgia’s annual requirements. Meanwhile, 10% of the Shah Deniz gas
to reach Georgia will count as “Iranian” (NIOC’s share in that project).

On March 20, Georgia’s Ambassador to Armenia, Revaz Gachechiladze,
declared Georgia’s interest in receiving Iranian gas via Armenia. Both
Armenia and Georgia could benefit by enlarging the diameter of the
Iran-Armenia pipeline currently under construction, Gachechiladze
remarked (Armenian Radio, March 20). The pipeline’s diameter of 700
millimeters barely meets Armenia’s own needs. It was initially projected
at 1,420 millimeters with an eye to markets beyond Armenia, primarily
Georgia; but Moscow prevailed on Yerevan to reduce the scope of the
project so as to maintain Gazprom’s dominance. Under a 2005 bilateral
agreement, Iran will supply Armenia with 36 billion cubic meters of gas
over a 20-year period, with an option to extend the contract period to
25 years and the volume of supplies to 47 billion cubic meters.

Any gas reaching Armenia and Georgia from Iran is almost certainly not
“Iranian,” but rather originating in Turkmenistan and re-exported via
northern Iran. Turkmenistan is supplying northern Iran’s market as well.
Under an agreement signed last month, Iran will import 14 billion cubic
meters of Turkmen gas in 2006, up from 9 billion cubic meters in 2005.
The deliveries in 2006 will for the first time fill the Korpeje-Kurt Kui
pipeline — the sole non-Russian line out of Turkmenistan — to full
capacity. Part of the additional volume is almost certainly intended for
re-export by Iran to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and possibly Georgia. This
year, Turkmen gas costs per one thousand cubic meters at Iran’s border,
up from previously.

Gazprom may well retain some market share in Georgia beyond 2007, but
without the leverage to force Georgia to hand over its worn out trunk
pipeline or distribution systems. At the moment, Gazprom persists with
the offer to supply Georgia with gas at a still “favorable” rate of 0
per one thousand cubic meters (up from ), if Georgia locks itself into
permanent dependence by selling the trunk pipeline to Gazprom for a
deceptively tempting 0 million and throws the main gas distribution
systems into the deal. Some Georgian government officials seriously
considered such a possibility, but three factors have recently doomed
it: Gazprom’s unreliability as demonstrated by the January-February
supply crisis, Georgia’s receipt of U.S. Millennium Challenge Account
funds (partly earmarked for the trunk pipeline’s rehabilitation), and
the Shah Deniz-Erzurum pipeline about to come on stream.

Gazprom was also unsuccessful in targeting Georgia’s largest gas
distribution company, Tbilgazi, for takeover. Insolvent and heavily
indebted, the municipally owned Tbilgazi is being restructured under the
just-appointed General Director Bidzina Chkonia, hitherto the Millennium
Challenge Account’s Georgia coordinator for energy. Tbilisi is
negotiating with Kazakhstan’s gas transport company, KazTransGaz, to
privatize and overhaul Tbilgazi.

(Rustavi-2 Television, March 16, 20; Kavkas-Press, March 15; Interfax,
March 14 &#8211; 17, 20; Imedi TV, March 6; see EDM, January 23, 25)

–Vladimir Socor

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org

Chief Economic Adviser Vahram Nercissiantz Addresses Carnegie

PRESS RELEASE April 10, 2006
Embassy of the Republic of Armenia
2225 R Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20008
Tel: 202-319-1976, x. 348; Fax: 202-319-2982
Email: [email protected] ;Web:

Vahram Nercissiantz Addresses Carnegie Endowment on Armenian Economy

On April 6, 2006, Mr. Vahram Nercissiantz, Chief Economic Adviser to the
President of Armenia, presented the current state and future prospects of
the Armenian economy at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C. In his
address, entitled `Armenian Economic Reforms: Results and Challenges,’ Mr.
Nercissiantz explained the nature of economic reforms implemented in Armenia
since independence and presented its main achievements, such as economic
growth and liberalization. He noted that Armenia was ahead of neighboring
Georgia and Azerbaijan in terms of economic indicators even though Armenia’s
economic growth occurred without the benefit of oil resources or transit
opportunities, and in the presence of economic blockade.

Mr. Nercissiantz also noted that Armenia’s economic progress is acknowledged
by the international financial institutions, as well as in the annual Index
of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.
The latter ranked Armenia considerably higher than that of any CIS country
or any of its neighbors. In the Q&A following his remarks, Mr. Nercissiantz
also addressed issues of energy security, foreign trade, and cooperation
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

The presentation was attended by economic experts from Washington-based
think tanks, representatives from the World Bank, IMF, State Department,
Department of Commerce, MCC, as well as the diplomatic corps.

www.armeniaemb.org

Celebrating a culture

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Coordinator of Information Services
Tel: (212) 686-0710 Ext. 60; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:

April 10, 2006
___________________

ARMENIAN SCHOOL PROGRAM MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF ALPHABET

They took the stage with pride on Saturday, March 18, 2006, celebrating not
just an historic anniversary, but also an entire culture.

Dedicated to the 1,600th anniversary of the creation of the Armenian
alphabet, students from New York’s Khrimian Lyceum program of the Diocese of
the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) performed in “Dagh oo Daghant”, a
showcase of Armenian language, culture, performance, and fine arts.

The Khrimian Lyceum is a monthly educational program for graduates of local
parish Armenian schools. In addition to the program in New York City, the
Diocese offers Khrimian Lyceum sessions in Boston and Chicago. Along with
teaching Armenian language and history, the program also focuses on
expanding the students’ cultural and artistic expression, as well as other
public-speaking and leadership skills.

“These are the young leaders who will be tomorrow’s Armenian community
leaders and professionals, painters and singers, dancers and musicians,”
said Gilda Buchakjian-Kupelian, the Diocese’s coordinator of Armenian
studies who oversees the program. “To see their confidence grow as they go
before a crowd, speaking and singing in Armenian, is wonderful. It shows
their true dedication to the Armenian culture.”

More than 150 friends, family, and community members attended the evening of
poetry, song, dance, music, and theater. Also on display were student
drawings and paintings inspired by the work of Toros Roslin and Ayvazovsky,
thanks to art teacher Susan Kirby.

Two young students, Lori Khrimian and Laurie Dabaghian, were mistresses of
ceremonies for the evening. The program featured a choir of young singers,
conducted by Maro Partamian, and accompanied by Florence Avakian on the
piano, with soloists Anita Apanossian and Markrete Krikorian. Rosine
Ghichlian and Nayad Manukian read poems in Armenian about their living
native tongue. Deanna Gulmezian played “Vagharshabadi bar” on the piano.

The students performed two traditional Armenian dances, under the guidance
of dance instructor Nayra Lazarian and with thanks to the Shushi Dance
Ensemble of St. Vartan Cathedral, which provided costumes.

There was also a theatrical presentation based on Goriun’s “Vark Mashdots,”
directed by Vartan Garniki and featuring performances by Nayad Marukian,
Lori Khrimian, Sareen Jebejian, and Christine Shahian. The story traced the
invention of the alphabet from Mesrob Mashdots to the spread of Christianity
throughout Armenia.

Khrimian Lyceum teachers also performed, with Shakeh Kadehjian reciting
readings in Armenian and Maro Partamian singing songs by Gomidas.

— 4/10/06

E-mail photos available on request. Photos also viewable in the News and
Events section of the Eastern Diocese’s website,

PHOTO CAPTION (1): Students from the Diocesan Khrimian Lyceum in New York
City recite in Armenian during Dagh oo Daghant, the talent show held at the
Diocesan Center on March 18, 2006.

PHOTO CAPTION (2): Maro Partamian, one of the instructors of the Khrimian
Lyceum, leads a chorus of young singers during Dagh oo Daghant.

PHOTO CAPTION (3): The instructors of the Khrimian Lyceum, the Diocesan
educational program for graduates of local Armenian schools.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

www.armenianchurch.net
www.armenianchurch.net.

Eurasia Daily Monitor – 03/15/2006

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, March 15, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 51

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kyiv revisits RosUkrEnergo’s role in Gazprom deal
*Will Russian become a second state language in Ukraine?
*Ethnic conflict flares in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia

ROSUKRENERGO SNEAKING BACK INTO UKRAINE

Pending the March 26 parliamentary elections, official Kyiv has shelved
the deeply damaging gas deals it signed on January 4 and February 2 with
Gazprom and its offshoot RosUkrEnergo. President Viktor Yushchenko and
those close associates who confused him into advocating for these deals
seemed prepared to ignore the widespread criticism, until unpublicized
U.S. intercessions finally caused the presidency to delay any decision
until a new government is formed and to exclude the shadowy RosUkrEnergo
from whatever agreements are eventually reached with the Russian side.
Yushchenko has dropped the subject altogether since mid-February.

However, indirect attempts seem to be under way to keep those deals
alive and set the stage for reactivating them after the elections. On
March 13, Gazprom’s deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev declared that it
will be RosUkrEnergo [not Ukraine] that will pay Gazprom for the gas
consumed by Ukraine in January above the volume stipulated for that
month; and that the price of that gas will be 0 per one thousand cubic
meters — i.e., under the terms of the January 4 agreement. In what
looks like a parallel move, Naftohaz Ukrainy chairman Oleksiy Ivchenko
declared that Kyiv would pay RosUkrEnergo [not Gazprom] for that same
volume of gas, at the price of per one thousand cubic meters — again,
under the January 4 agreement (Inter TV, March 13).

Taken together, these moves seem designed to keep the January 4
agreement alive, implement at least some of its provisions, and cement
RosUkrEnergo’s role as intermediary. If this were done, Kyiv would
severely weaken its case for dropping out of that agreement after the
election.

One week earlier, Ukraine’s National Energy Regulatory Commission
awarded a five-year license to the UkrGazEnergo closed joint-stock
company to deliver gas on Ukraine’s internal market. UkrGazEnergo is a
joint venture of RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz Ukrainy and was created by
the secret February 4 agreement that triggered a storm of criticism when
it was leaked. Thus, Gazprom — acting via RosUkrEnergo/UkrGazEnergo —
is capturing a share of Ukraine’s market and access to the internal
infrastructure. The Regulatory Commission’s move also seems designed to
make certain that RosUkrEnergo via UkrGazEnergo enters Ukraine to stay
(Interfax-Ukraine, March 9).

The Regulatory Commission’s chairman happens to be a candidate for
parliament for the Party of Regions. However, support for RosUkrEnergo
and UkrGazEnergo by a handful of strategically placed officials clearly
cuts across partisan lines, given the fact that Ivchenko is Yushchenko’s
choice for Naftohaz chief and his political ally in the Our Ukraine
bloc.

Kyiv now apparently seeks to regain the chance to buy Turkmen gas
directly, without corrupt intermediaries, possibly in the second half of
2006 or at least in 2007. Ashgabat demands repayment of Ukrainian
arrears as a pre-condition to resuming negotiations on a supply
agreement. Ivchenko and Fuel and Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov lost that
opportunity in the final months of 2005 — the negotiations went down to
the wire until December 28 — by stonewalling on a debt-settlement
agreement or even denying the existence of the debt. Kyiv now seems to
change that negotiating approach and certainly the negotiator.

On March 10-12, a delegation led by Naftohaz Ukrainy commercial director
Anatoly Popadyuk held what appear to be conclusive debt-settlement
negotiations in Ashgabat. The delegation acknowledged that Ukraine owed
9 million, most of it for Turkmen gas delivered in 2005, as Ashgabat had
all along claimed. At the end of Popadyuk’s visit, the Ukrainian side
apparently disbursed .5 million in cash, pledged to pay another million
also in cash, and made a commitment to supply million worth of
Ukrainian goods, including million worth of steel pipes for
Turkmenistan’s oil and gas industry (Turkmen Foreign Ministry press
release, Turkmenistan.ru, March 12).

This result constitutes major progress toward removing an issue that has
poisoned Ukrainian-Turkmen relations, restricting Kyiv’s margin of
maneuver vis-à-vis Gazprom. As recently as February 17-18, Plachkov
and Ivchenko were stonewalling on the debt issue in their talks with
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat. Their stance may have
reflected their role as the main authors on the Ukrainian side of the
January 4 and February 2 agreements with Russia. Back in Kyiv from
Ashgabat, Ivchenko told mass media that the debt “does not exist” and
accused Turkmenistan and its president of “displaying Eastern perfidy,”
“humiliating Ukraine and damaging its image.” Ivchenko urged Ukraine to
“renounce Turkmen gas altogether” and stop holding talks with
Turkmenistan, and he threatened to sue Turkmenistan in the Stockholm
Arbitration Court for breach of contract. He assured the public that
Ukraine would in any case receive gas for per one thousand cubic meters
(RosUkrEnergo’s price), but did not explain the reasons for such
confidence (One Plus One Television [Kyiv], February 20).

Just as Ivchenko’s statements seemed to contradict Yushchenko’s February
14 announcement on shelving the deals with RosUkrEnergo, so the March 13
convergent statements by Medvedev and Ivchenko and the Energy Regulatory
Commission’s licensing of UkrGazEnergo raise questions about who is in
charge of Ukraine’s energy policy and about the authority of the
president’s word with some of his officials (see EDM, February 16, 17,
23).

–Vladimir Socor

UKRAINIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES CAMPAIGN FOR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

The Russian language issue has been employed in the run-up to the March
26 Ukrainian parliamentary election probably more actively than in any
past poll. Unlike in previous elections, where marginal groups and
low-key candidates played the Russian-language card, now such
heavyweights as the frontrunner Party of Regions (PRU) has made
elevating the status of Russian a key promise.

“This issue has a significant conflict potential, that is why it is very
tempting to use it in elections,” Andriy Bychenko of the Razumkov Center
think tank said, presenting the results of a December 2005 nationwide
opinion poll on the attitudes toward the Russian language. The poll
showed that more than 60% of Ukrainians are in favor of raising the
status of Russian, including 37% who believe that Ukrainian and Russian
should have equal status. The 1996 Constitution, however, does not
provide for any status for Russian whatsoever, but stipulates that
Ukrainian is the sole state language. Hence the high conflict potential
and temptation to abuse the issue.

Feelings about the Russian language are especially strong in eastern and
southern Ukraine, including Crimea. In those areas, according to an
April 2005 poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the
Kyiv-based Sociology Institute, support for the idea of making Russian
either a second state language or an official regional language hovers
around 90%. More than half of western Ukrainians are against this,
according to the same poll.

The parties that regard the Russophone eastern and southern areas as
their strongholds have been capitalizing on what they describe as the
authorities’ failure to address the Russian-language issue. In the
current campaign, all those parties represent the opposition, while the
national-minded west and center of Ukraine have stayed loyal to the
parties that used to form the Orange Revolution coalition. Playing the
Russian-language card is nothing new for the radical leftists — the
Communist Party (CPU) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU) of
Natalya Vitrenko. Elevating the status of Russian to a second state
language has always been among their main slogans. In the current
campaign, however, they have at least two very strong rivals playing in
the same field: the United Social Democratic Party (SDPUO) of Viktor
Medvedchuk, who was a key aide to former president Leonid Kuchma, and
the Party of Regions (PRU) of former presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych.

One of the main slogans of the SDPUO’s campaign reads: “Against NATO,
for the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and
for the Russian language.” The text reads more like a communist leaflet.
The appearance of strong rivals playing in the same field is arguably
the main reason behind dwindling popular support for the CPU and the
PSPU. One telling example is the Russophone Donetsk Region, which was
the main electoral base of the CPU a decade ago, but now is the
stronghold of the PRU.

PRU leader Viktor Yanukovych, who routinely spoke Ukrainian when he was
prime minister in 2002-2004, ostensibly speaks Russian on his campaign
trips. The PRU’s campaign brochure “50 questions and answers” promises a
nationwide referendum in order to give Russian “the state status, on par
with Ukrainian,” as “56% of Ukrainian citizens routinely use the Russian
language in everyday life.”

The PRU collected 300,000 signatures for a local referendum on the
status of the Russian language earlier this year in Crimea, which is,
ironically, the only region where Russian actually enjoys a special
status, according to the local constitution. Based on this, on February
22 the Crimean parliament voted to hold a local non-binding referendum
on the status of Russian on March 26, to coincide with the general
elections. The Ukrainian Justice Ministry, however, warned that the
referendum would be illegal.

For the moment, it is not clear whether the referendum will be held at
all. It is clear, however, that it will have no legal consequences,
which its organizers readily admit, saying that their goal is just to
raise public awareness of the problem. The Crimean Tatars, who back the
government in Kyiv, will ignore the Russian language referendum, their
leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, told Glavred web site.

On March 6, the city council of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine voted to
grant Russian the status of a regional language. President Yushchenko’s
legal adviser, Mykola Poludyony, said the council’s decision was
illegal, as the council had acted outside its remit. Kyiv’s official
position is that there is no Russian language problem. “This is
speculation by certain politicians ahead of the election,” Yushchenko
said on a trip to western Ivano-Frankivsk last month. On March 11, in
his regular weekly radio address to the nation, Yushchenko warned
against “provoking conflicts around the language issue in the heat of
the election campaign.”

(LIGABiznesInform, May 5, 2005; proUA.com, February 22;
Interfax-Ukraine, February 24; Glavred.info, March 3; Itar-Tass, UT1,
March 6; UNIAN, February 7, March 7; Ukrainian radio, March 11)

–Oleg Varfolomeyev

KARABAKH CONFLICT HANGS OVER GEORGIA’S ARMENIAN-POPULATED REGIONS

Tensions are running high in Tsalka and Akhalkalaki, two regions of
Georgia that are predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians.

The latest problem began in Tsalka on March 9, when a trivial brawl at a
restaurant between local Armenians and Georgians resulted in the death
of Gevork Gevorkian, a 24-year-old Armenian, and injuries to four other
Armenians. However, Maria Mikoyan of the Armenian Union in Georgia (Nor
Serund) claimed that the fight began because the Georgian young men were
irritated by the Armenian music playing in the restaurant.

Although police have arrested five Georgian suspects, about 500 Armenian
protesters gathered outside the Tsalka administrative building on March
10, calling for prosecution of the suspects. On March 11, the upheaval
spread to Akhalkalaki, a town in the predominately Armenian populated
Samtskhe-Javakheti region in southern Georgia.

About 300 participants in the Akhalkalaki rally were Tsalka Armenians.
They later took their appeal to the Georgian government and demanded
that Tbilisi “stop the policy of pressure by fueling interethnic
tensions” and “stop the settlement of other nationalities in
Armenian-populated regions.” Later, the protesters voiced demands
related to the right to conduct court proceedings and government
business in the Armenian language. Specifically, they want the central
government to make the Armenian language a state language equal to
Georgian in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Reiterating the alleged
threat to the rights of Armenians in Georgia, the appeal also demanded
political autonomy for the region.

The rally soon turned violent. The protesters, mostly youth, left the
government building and raided a local court chamber, ousting a Georgian
judge. They also attacked a building on Tbilisi State University’s
Akhalkalaki campus and a local Georgian Orthodox Church. Later on
Khachatur Stepanian, a representative of the council of Armenian civic
groups in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which organized the rally, attempted to
soften the anxiety and called the incident a “provocation” staged by
“someone else.”

On March 11, leaders of the public movement Multiethnic Georgia and the
Armenian Union in Georgia complained that police had brutally dispersed
the rally in Tsalka where “ethnic confrontation is increasingly becoming
a reason behind crimes.” They said that if tension in Tsalka and
Samtskhe-Javakheti continues, then Tbilisi would be forced to establish
direct presidential rule there.

Although Georgian Public Defender Sozar Subari investigated the Tsalka
incident and ruled it to be a “communal crime,” the majority of the
Armenian communities in these regions consider the incident to be a
demonstration of ethnic hatred towards Armenians, which they believe is
the result of the Georgian government’s misguided policies towards
ethnic minorities. They further alleged that Georgian law-enforcement
agents were working in tandem with those who committed the crime.

United Javakh, a radical Armenian organization in Samtskhe-Javakheti,
issued a statement accusing Tbilisi of “discriminatory policies” against
“the Armenian population of Javakh,” the Armenian nomenclature for the
region. They described the recent dismissal of the region’s ethnic
Armenian judges for ignorance of the Georgian language as “cynically
trampling on the rights of the Armenian-populated region.” Georgian
authorities insist the judges were dismissed for misconduct.

The United Javakh statement warned about “destructive trends in the
Georgian government’s policy” aimed at artificially creating a “climate
of ethnic intolerance” and “crushing the will of Javakh’s Armenian
population to protect its right to live in its motherland.” Finally the
statement demands that Tbilisi show “political prudence” and put an end
to the “infringement” of the Armenian community’s rights.

The content and tone of this and previous statements by United Javakh
and other radical Armenian organizations reportedly have strong backing
from political forces in Armenia. In fact, the statements recall the
language used by the Armenian community in Karabakh in its relations
with the Azerbaijani government before war erupted. Vardan Akopian,
chair of the Javakh Youth organization, argued, “The current situation
in Javakheti is a cross between situations in Nakhichevan and Karabakh.”
Several protestors explicitly cited the Karabakh precedent.

Symptomatically, on October 8, 2005, Garnik Isagulyan, the Armenian
president’s national security advisor, bluntly warned Tbilisi to be
“extremely cautious” with regard to Samtskhe-Javakheti “because any
minor provocation can turn into a large-scale clash” (EDM, October 12,
2005). Various Armenian political parties, officials, and media have
actively discussed the problems of the Armenian community in
Samtskhe-Javakheti. Some Armenian members of the Georgian parliament
linked this activity with the approaching parliamentary elections in
Armenia.

Recently Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian released a paper on
security issues in which he expressed concern over the situation in
Samtskhe-Javakheti. The excessively critical tone of the Armenian
minister towards Tbilisi’s policy in Samtskhe-Javakheti reportedly
alarmed Georgian politicians and analysts, but they preferred to stay
tight-lipped, perhaps to avoid upsetting the already-complex
Georgian-Armenian relationship (EDM, August 3, June 7, May 24, March 23,
2005). Russia has tried to capitalize on the problem by fueling tensions
in Akhalkalaki, location of a Russian military base slated for closure.

Although the Georgian government is continuously downplaying the ethnic
aspects of the disturbances in Armenian-populated regions, this factor
appears to lurk beneath the surface. Georgia remains Armenia’s sole
transport route to Russia and Europe due to the ongoing blockade by
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus an unstable Samtskhe-Javakheti would hardly
be a gain for Yerevan. However, the “Karabakh syndrome” should not be
removed from the agenda.

(Resonance, March 9, 11; Akhali Taoba, Civil Georgia, Rustavi-2, Regnum,
vesti.ru, March 11; Imedi-TV, March 10, 11)

–Zaal Anjaparidze

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
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Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

http://www.jamestown.org

AAA: Amb. John Evans Hails MCC Signing During AAA Pan-Armenian Conf

Armenian Assembly of America
1140 19th Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:

PRESS RELEASE
April 10, 2006
CONTACT: Christine Kojoian
E-mail: [email protected]

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA JOHN EVANS HAILS MCC SIGNING DURING
ASSEMBLY’S PAN-ARMENIAN CONFERENCE

Washington, DC – U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans hailed the
signing of a five-year $235 million Compact between Armenia and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation during the Armenian Assembly’s
National Banquet on March 27 in Washington, DC.

The Ambassador cautioned however that a country that is found eligible
for MCC funding must continue to remain eligible. Evans noted that
one of the criteria is meeting the MCC standard for ruling justly. In
his prepared remarks, the Ambassador urged Conference participants to
join in helping “Armenia achieve democratic elections in 2007 and
2008.”

The National Banquet was part of a major three-day pan-Armenian
Conference hosted by the Assembly, together with the Armenian General
Benevolent Union (AGBU) and the Eastern and Western Dioceses of the
Armenian Church.

Below is the full text of Ambassador Evans’ prepared speech:

This evening I want to explain what the United States is doing in the
Republic of Armenia with regard to the development of genuine
democracy and democratic elections. Under the FREEDOM Support Act,
the U.S. Government has contributed approximately $1.5 billion in
support of democratic and economic transition in Armenia.

Let me begin by reminding you that the United States is pursuing three
overarching goals in the South Caucasus. First, we hope to strengthen
security and stability in the entire region. This includes, most
notably, our efforts to help Armenia and Azerbaijan resolve the
Karabakh dispute, but it also includes assistance to the countries in
strengthening their border regimes so as to prevent the unauthorized
transit of dangerous materials. Second, we are attempting to
strengthen the economies of the countries in the area, all of which
are suffering from under- or maldevelopment. Third, we are attempting
to strengthen the political systems of the three countries by
encouraging the growth of genuine democratic cultures and
institutions. Now to Armenia specifically.

All the basic preconditions for Armenia to be a leading democracy in
the region are present. A mix of cultural, historical, educational
and social factors, including extensive ties with the great Western
democracies, particularly the United States and France, give Armenia
a theoretical advantage; however, some other factors — the legacy of
Soviet misrule, the unsolved Karabakh issue, and too intimate a
relationship between economic and political power — have delayed the
appearance of a vibrant democracy in Armenia. The badly flawed
constitutional referendum in late November was a stark reminder that
important work still has to be done if Armenia is to reach its
potential as a democratic state. Ultimately it will take a
combination of administrative improvements, increased capacity on the
part of elections officials, political parties and civil society, and
political will on the part of the Armenian authorities for elections
that meet international democratic standards to become a reality.
But the lessons of the last few years should be clear: any government
that falsifies elections is taking an enormous risk. We do not think
Armenia can afford another set of bad elections next time. In
addition, the Millennium Challenge Compact that was signed today is
contingent on Armenia’s remaining qualified for that assistance. This
requires that its pattern of actions not be contrary to the
independent, objective criteria used to select it for eligibility.
One of those criteria is meeting standards for “ruling justly.”

Even before the November referendum, those of us working on this issue
at the U.S. Mission in Yerevan had decided there was no time to waste.
Last summer we devised a program of assistance specifically aimed at
helping Armenia achieve democratic elections in 2007 (legislative) and
2008 (presidential). We announced the program in late October, at an
estimated cost of between $6 and $7 million, and it is now underway.

Our program has nine basic elements: 1) cleaning up the voters’ lists;
2) helping build capacity for administering elections properly; 3)
supporting voter education; 4) training judges to adjudicate electoral
disputes; 5) increasing public interest in elections and promoting a
democratic political culture; 6) developing unbiased and professional
polling capacity; 7) working with political parties, especially with
young people and women; 8) supporting domestic monitoring of elections
and the media; and 9) training and technical assistance for
journalists and media professionals covering elections. And let me
stress: our assistance aims to support the democratic process, not
parties or individuals.

In pursuing this program, we are not alone. Many Armenians both in
and out of the government want to see free and fair elections in 2007
and 2008. And we are joined by the European Union, the OSCE and the
Council of Europe in pressing for necessary improvements. Earlier
this month, the ambassadors of most of the OSCE participating states
met in Yerevan and issued a public call for free and fair elections.
Although resistance to change is formidable in some quarters, there
are other parts of the society that desperately want change. The
United States is not a newcomer to the challenge of building
democratic institutions in Armenia. We have been involved in this
process for ten years already. We were actively involved in
encouraging reforms during previous elections…but we believe that a
major push is necessary at this time. We need to build capacity, and
we need also to stiffen the political will of some leading figures.

But this is where you come in. You have made many contributions,
often simply by example. We know that many of you continue to
contribute to building a democratic culture in Armenia in many
different ways. But what I ask of you tonight is that you join with
us over the next fifteen months with a major push to help Armenia
achieve democratic elections in 2007 and 2008, following up on your
efforts in 2003. Many of you interact with Armenians both in and out
of the Government. We hope you will stress to them how important it
is for Armenia to hold elections that meet international
standards. Armenia’s government needs to know that the broad
international community — not only the U.S. Ambassador – is watching
and expects a better process. We invite you to become more deeply
acquainted with our program: a wealth of relevant information is
available on our Embassy website through our new Democracy link. As
appropriate, feel free to direct your Armenian contacts to these
resources, or have them talk to us.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Without hydrocarbons, without great natural resources, and fated to
live in a difficult neighborhood, Armenia has to live by its wits, and
by its ability to build a just and free society based on the rule of
law. The Millennium Challenge Compact that was signed earlier today,
as it is implemented over the next five years, will help. And with
your help, we believe Armenia’s future is bright.

The Armenian Assembly is the largest Washington-based nationwide
organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian
issue. The Armenian General Benevolent Union is the world’s largest
philanthropic organization devoted to education, cultural and
humanitarian efforts. Both are 501(c)(3) tax-exempt membership
organizations.

The Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) is the
spiritual and administrative head of the Armenian Apostolic Church in
the Eastern United States. The Eastern Diocese and its counterpart,
the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of America, exist under the
authority of the ancient Mother See of the Armenian Church in Holy
Etchmiadzin.

####

NR#2006-032

Photograph available on the Assembly Web site at the following link:

/2006-032-1.jpg

Caption: U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans at the Armenian
Assembly’s National Banquet on March 27.

http://www.aaainc.org/images/press/2006-032
www.armenianassembly.org

Prayer power on display at workshop

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Coordinator of Information Services
Tel: (212) 686-0710 Ext. 60; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:

April 10, 2006
___________________

DIOCESE-LED RETREAT FOCUSES ON CONVERSATIONS WITH GOD

How do we know God? How did our faith form into a church? How do we best
treat each other?

These were just a few of the issues raised during a day-long retreat led by
staff from the Eastern Diocese and held at the Holy Ascension Church in
Trumbull, CT, on Saturday, March 25, 2006.

“We must continue to give our people more opportunities to focus on prayer
and learning what it is to be an Armenian Christian,” said participant
Dottie Bengoian.

The lecture was titled, “Where Two or Three are Gathered: The Power of
Praying Together.” It included discussions on the Lord’s Prayer; on the
foundations and feelings created from the Armenian Divine Liturgy; and on
the differences between praying alone and in groups.

“This was a thought-provoking day, which allowed me to personally examine my
beliefs and faith in a quiet setting and also in a group,” said participant
Linda McGann. “I learned a great deal, not only about myself and my fellow
parishioners, but about my Armenian Church.”

Thirty-six people, including parishioners from Trumbull and the nearby St.
Gregory the Enlightener Church of White Plains, NY, attended the session,
led by two members of the Diocese’s Department of Youth and Education: Elise
Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education, and Nancy Basmajian,
executive secretary for the Armenian Church Youth Organization of America
(ACYOA).

Along with parishioners, the attendees included parish council leaders and
Sunday School educators. Also at the session were Fr. Untzag Nalbandian,
pastor of the church in Trumbull; Fr. Karekin Kasparian, pastor of the
church in White Plains; and the visiting Fr. Daniel Karadjian, pastor of the
St. Sarkis Church of Charlotte, NC.

“This retreat created a lot of discussion and provided a deep understanding
of our Christian life,” said participant Hermon Telyan.

The session was part of series of events marking the 75th anniversary of the
Trumbull parish.

“This retreat was one of the most spiritually uplifting events we’ve had as
we continue our celebration,” said Fr. Nalbandian.

Organizers of the event say it was definitely a success because the
participants were obviously moved.

“At one point, after reading the Lord’s Prayer and reflecting on its
meaning, we joined together in a group prayer which was created by the
immediate thoughts of the participants,” Antreassian said. “And in that one
moment, the group connected. Our thoughts blended. As each person spoke
individually to God, our prayers became one call for His guidance and mercy
and love.”

For information on organizing these types of retreats in your parish,
contact Elise Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education, by e-mailing
[email protected].

— 4/10/06

E-mail photos available on request. Photos also viewable in the News and
Events section of the Eastern Diocese’s website,

PHOTO CAPTION (1): Parishioners from two parishes gather at the Church of
the Holy Ascension in Trumbull, CT, for a one-day retreat focused on prayer
on March 25, 2006.

PHOTO CAPTION (2): On March 25, 2006, 36 parishioners and priests gathered
to discuss prayer during a one-day session led by members of the Diocesan
staff.

PHOTO CAPTION (3): Elise Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education
for the Eastern Diocese, along with ACYOA Executive Secretary Nancy
Basmajian, led the workshop on prayer at the Church of the Holy Ascension in
Trumbull, CT, on Saturday, March 25, 2006.

www.armenianchurch.net
www.armenianchurch.net.

AGBU: Agemian Org Establishes Yearly Donation of $10,000 CAD to AGBU

AGBU Press Office
55 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022-1112
Phone: 212.319.6383, x128
Fax: 212.319.6507
Email: [email protected]
Website:

Monday, April 10, 2006

AGEMIAN ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHES YEARLY DONATION OF $10,000 CAD TO AGBU TORONTO

The Agemian Organization recently established a $1 million CAD
philanthropic fund to be administered by the Agemian and Moussakhanian
families in Toronto, Canada, in order to support various national and
international non-profit endeavors, one of which is the AGBU Toronto
Chapter.

Initiated by Souren & Lili Agemian, and administered by their
children, Souren Jr. & Rosemary Agemian, and Eddie & Carol
Moussakhanian, the fund reaches out to a myriad of worthy causes
within Ontario and beyond. Carol Moussakhanian, Executive Director of
the fund, stated, “[I am] pleased to submit our first check to AGBU,
which I am sure you will put to good use.” The three families plan to
send a similar amount every year.

An annual donation of $10,000 from the fund to AGBU Toronto will help
support the numerous activities and programs organized by the Chapter
that keep the community energized. The senior Agemians, who are AGBU
Honor Members, are no strangers to the local Armenian circle. For more
than two decades, they have been very active within both the local
AGBU community and many other worthy Armenian associations abroad.

“It is quite exciting to see that the second generation of Armenian
immigrants realize the importance of organizations like AGBU and the
necessary work being performed to preserve our Armenian heritage,”
said Eugene Karadjian, Secretary-Treasurer & Director of AGBU Toronto.

The AGBU Toronto Chapter is committed to preserving and promoting the
Armenian identity and heritage through educational, cultural and
humanitarian programs. For more information on AGBU Toronto, please
email [email protected].

For more information on AGBU and its worldwide chapters, please visit

www.agbu.org
www.agbu.org.