ARMENIAN ISSUE IN THE 1980S: FROM TERROR TO PARLIAMENTS
by Sedat Laciner
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
June 20 2006
In the first half of 1980s, the Armenian terror was continued, but
the next half was the time when the Armenian terror stopped at once.
However, the problem continued to exist, even more strongly, amongst
the mutual relations of Turkey with especially Western countries. In
addition, in this period of time, the approach of Turkey towards the
Armenian problem seriously changed. In this new era which was shaped
by the coup d’etat and the international attitude towards Turkey,
Turkey began to approach the problem from different perspectives. The
new face of Armenian terror and Turkey’s reaction to this change
determined the developments in this period.
Initially, with effect of the 12 September coup d’etat in Turkey,
Turkey’s policies against Armenian terrorism became sharper. Surely the
reason of this attitude was that the terrorist acts of the Armenians
peaked in the late 1970s and at the beginning of 1980s.
Since the first day of their rule, the military government
placed struggling against Armenian terror in the first line of its
priorities. The method of struggling, however, remained as a matter
of debate for a long time. On the other hand, the coup d’etat that
broke out in Turkey in 1980 gave an impression to the rest of the
world that serious human rights violations are occuring in Turkey,
a situation which were added as negative points in the square of
Turkey. Bringing the mutual relations of Turkey with especially Europe
to a halt, the military government experienced a serious communication
gap with European countries against the Armenian attacks and have
not been able to express its arguments to the rest of the world.
Despite paying special attention to the Armenian problem, the
military government could not achieve a significant progress towards
solution. Being deprived of even fundamental information in those days,
Turkey moved back and forth between two extreme points: One group
were claiming that the toughest reaction must be shown against the
Armenian problem. They were thinking that these acts meant a resurge
for the spirit of Sevres and they were asserting that relations with
the West should be decreased at a minimum level and even Turkey must
cease to be a member of NATO. Whereas another group was advising that
the matter must not be exagerated too much.
According to this group, as it is fact that those who allege should
prove their allegation, it was Armenians themselves who needed to prove
their claims, and by dwelling upon the matter so much, Turkey was
popularising the problem more. The second group also suggested that
the allegations of Armenians should be replied back by scientific
publication both in Turkish and in other languages and the matter
should be left to historians to explain, rather than dealing with it
as a matter of politics. While the second idea found its adherents
in the environs of the Foreign Ministry, the first idea was mainly
pronounced in radical political parties and the army. Both groups
have their cons and pros. However, the experience lived in 1980s
showed that both of these ideas are deficient and both attitudes
caused Turkey to lose a great time in diplomacy. In this period of
time, Turkey suffered a serious disease and could not approach the
Armenian problem from a multi-dimensional perspective by establishing
an institutional coordination. In other words, in those days, different
solution methods and strategies could have been generated for different
aspects of the problem. By defining different strategies for terrorist
acts, historical claims and political side of the problem, we could
have worked for the same goal from diverse directions. Whereas Turkey
have not been able to escape from exhibiting emotional and reactionary
behaviour in a process timing of which was completely determined
by others. Actually this was not a surprising situation. Because,
relating to the Armenian problem, the stage where Turkey reached at
the beginning of 1980s was just the stage of “What is this problem
about?, What do Armenians really mean?” According to what we learnt
from Kamuran Gurun, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry
at the time, Turkey did not follow the books, documents, journals
etc. containing the Armenian allegations and did not even form an
archive related to the subject.
In 1980, the Turkish archives were closed for research, and the
information available in the archives of other countries were not
seriously examined and brought to Turkey.91 All these studies and
works were started only after the assasination of about 40 high Turkish
officials by the Armenian terrorists. However, as we mentioned earlier,
it was both too late and the things that were done were too little. As
if suddenly woken up by the Armenian terrorist attacks or decisions
that are taken in the favour of Armenians, throughout 1980s, Ankara
held headlong meetings, announced messages of condemnation, formed
nonfunctional and ineffective committees and some people were given
the duty of publishing brochures justifying the statements of the
Turkish side, etc. So many Turkish publication was released making
the propaganda to the Turkish community itself showing that Turkish
is on the right side. Documents and materials sent abroad either
rotted in the storerooms of Turkish embassies or eliminated by the
Armenians. In short, the efforts were focused in only one direction
and rather being inspectory, they were not any more than repeating
the same tongue twisters. Because of this, as these efforts did not
contribute anything to the relations of Turkey with other countries,
they neither generated a factual or decent strategy, nor properly
presented the Turkish point of view about the Armenian problem. In
each case, Turkish government returned to the start and met the
problem is if it is being experienced the first time.
Another feature of 1980s related to the Armenian problem is that the
terrorist acts gradually transformed into a “civil fight”. Especially
during 1970s, radical Armenian groups saw terror as the prominent
mean for fighting against Turkey and have been successful in winning
support of many Armenian people. These attacks were sometimes
received with tolerance and the attackers were not punished as they
deserved. The killers of Turkish diplomats were not even qualified as
“terrorists” by the Western media and in a way they supplied support
for terrorism. All these events, however, indirectly happened.
Although they criticised Turkey in this matter and did not spend
necessary effort for catching the attackers, nearly all countries are
of the same idea that Armenian attacks were terrorist acts. Whereas,
responding with empathy towards the Armenian terrorists, they could
understand why the terrorist involve in a terrorist act, and even
some Western press vindicated the terrorists. As we mentioned short
while ago, there seem to be a condemnation from official mouths and
Turkey was not openly opposed. This scenery has radically changed in
1980s with the decisions taken in parliaments and local councils of
foreign countries. Only then other countries began to oppose Turkey.
In many countries like the USA and France offficial decisions
favouring Armenians were negotiated and they came to a certain stage in
their effrots. Despite denying any change in their foreign policies,
government officials and parliament members of these countries openly
blamed and falsely accused Turkey of committing genocide. Hence, the
problem was no longer a problem between Armenians and Turks, but it
became a direct part of Turkey’s relations with other countries. These
both greatly harmed Turkey’s mutual contacts and deepened the Western
antipathy and suspicion towards the outside world felt by the Turks
in those days.
Armenian Strategy in the 1980s
Since an independent Armenian state was not established yet,
the Armenian strategy during the 1980s was mainly focused upon the
diaspora movement. Emotional idealist groups have been successful in
joining the monetary support came from Western countries together
with the radical Armenian youth who came from Lebanon and other
Middle Eastern countries with strong tendency to violence. However,
in the mid-1980s, it was thought that the terror completed its task
and with a sudden occurance as if received a command from a centre,
all Armenian terrorist acts were stopped. This did not mean that the
foundation of the terrorist attacks were demolished. On the contrary,
some radical groups started to take up arms and continued their
training and stockpiling to utilise when necessary. These activities
and effort, however, were mainly directed towards providing support
for other terrorist groups (especially PKK) opposing Turkey and apart
from a few occasions, they deliberately stay away from acts that can
be called Armenian terror.
Forcing governments to recognise the so called genocide has been the
main occupation in the first stage of the strategy followed in the
civilian field. According to this strategy, all Armenian communities
were oblidged to perform acts to convince the highest offices,
councils and parliaments in villages, towns, cities, states and
countries about the Armenian claims. Laws, decisions, condemnations,
shortly anything that will force Turkey to accept Armenian allegations
would be beneficial for the Armenian cause. If they could not
obtain an immediate decision to be taken by the parliaments of
the countries, they concentrated upon local councils and waited
for an appropriate time to take a further step. Thus, all Turkish
fortresses would be destroted one by one and the whole world would
support the Armenian claims and apply pressure over Turkey. Wherever
the biggest deficiency of this strategy is not realising that such
pressures are taken completely negatively in Turkey and perceived
with a severe hostility. Such pressures coming from the West caused
a lack of confidence in these states. Especially those pressures that
are thought to be unjust and biased oppressions have strengthened the
oppression groups. There many cases of this consequence happened in
the process of full membership to the EU and even during the Ottoman
period. The most significant instrument reinforcing the Western
opponents in Turkey has always been the wrong policies of the West.
Especially when, not the interest of the West itself, but the interest
of a third party like the Armenians is under concern, it is extremely
optimist to think that this strategy will effectively work.
When the period of time elapsed during 1980s are examined, it can
be seen that this strategy triggered prejudices and distrust towards
the West in Turkey, and recognising the Armenian
assertions have attracted the attention of the Turkish public more
upon the Armenian problem and raised greater oppositon towards
Armenians. The role played by the Greek Cypriots and Armenians in
the PKK terrorism have caused an automatic rejection of all demands
coming from this ternary collaboration.
The second big stage of the Armenian strategy is to establish a direct
correlation between the Jewish Holocaust and the so called Armenian
genocide and labeling those who do not accept this as deniers. As
it is known that the word “denier” is literally used for those who
do not recognise the mass extermination of Jews in Germany and it is
considered as a big shame in the West and even legally a crime in some
countries. In every place where Armenian assertions are mentioned, they
started to also mention the Jewish genocide and frequently emphasized
that Jewish genocide was actually inspired by the so called Armenian
massacre and claimed that all great mass destructions were always
committed by the Turks in the history. All those who defended the
opposite was accused of being a denier.
In the 1980s, another leg of the big Armenian strategy was to form
a veritable genocide industry amongst the Armenian communties. All
Armenian artists, businessmen, teachers, politicians, etc. were forced
to use their talents somehow for the Armenian cause. This pressuring
which was mainly felt as a social pressure, was sometimes turned
into violence. All film-makers, actors and singers who utilised the
Armenian cause in their dramas, films or songs have been awarded by
the Armenian community and were treated with great respect and honour.
Another leg of the Armenian strategy is standing on the education. In
the field of education in general, they tried to include the
genocide and together with this the so called Armenian genocide in the
curriculums of the Western countries. They gave a special attention to
the primary educational programs and they attained this in many states
of America. They also sought help from Jewish groups for this attempt.
Yet another leg of the strategy is formed by mischievous activities
focused upon destroying the relations between Turkey and the European
Community. Sensing the determination of Turkey in entering the EU,
Armenians claimed this time that Turkey must first admit the so called
Armenian genocide to be a member of the EU and they forced this to
be accepted in some EC committees.
Translated from Turkish
June 2006 USAK – Ankara based ‘International Strategic Research
Organisation’ Author is director of USAK & Davos Economic Forum Young
Global Leader 2006
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT MET ARMENIAN FM VARDAN OSKANYAN
UNIAN , Ukraine
June 20 2006
Victor Yushchenko has met with Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vardan
Oskanyan.
They discussed bilateral relations between the two countries and
both agreed that it was important to activate Ukrainian-Armenian
cooperation, according to the President’s press-office.
Mr. Yushchenko said he was pleased with the dynamics of trade with
Armenia and then invited President Robert Kocharyan to visit Ukraine.
In his turn, Mr. Oskanyan said the two nations had always been good
friends. He added that Ukraine and Armenia had already signed about
sixty bilateral agreements. The minister said the countries both
wanted to join the European Union.
They also discussed ways to ensure stability and security in
the Caucasian region. Victor Yushchenko said Ukraine wanted the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be settled peacefully.
The Head of State said 400, 000 Armenians lived in Ukraine, adding
that it was important to forge closer cultural and humanitarian ties
between the states.

CANADIANS BUY GOLD MINER FACING LICENCE TROUBLES
By: John Helmer
Mineweb, South Africa
June 20 2006
Vedanta buys gold licence troubles
MOSCOW (Mineweb.com) — Sterlite Gold, a Canadian registered junior
miner, has been bought out by London-based Vedanta Resources in a
transaction that appears to have been negotiated while the Armenian
government decides whether to revoke the licence for Sterlite’s sole
gold-producing asset in Armenia.
The timing has proved to be controlling shareholder Anil Agarwal’s
lucky day; although just how lucky, or unlucky, Vedanta’s other
shareholders may regard themselves after this deal is not yet clear.
Sterlite’s controlling shareholder, with a 55% stake, is Twin Star
International (TSI), which is fully owned by Volcan Investments,
which in turn is controlled by Anil Agarwal. Thus, he appears to be
on the receiving end of the $34 million (C$37.68 million) Vedanta
agreed earlier this month to pay for its takeover of the TSI stake,
plus $27 million (C$30.8 million) for the other shares in Sterlite.
Vedanta is also controlled by Volcan, with about 54% of Vedanta’s
shares, and thus by Agarwal; his official title at Vedanta’s
headquarters, just off Berkeley Square in London, is Executive
Chairman.
In disclosing the buy-out of Sterlite, Vedanta’s statement of June 13
does not mention Agarwal. But it acknowledges the deal was “a related
party transaction under the Listing Rules of the UK Listing Authority
and an insider bid under Canadian securities laws.” To prepare a
valuation and supervise the deal, “a special committee of directors”
was appointed, “who are independent of Volcan”. In addition, Ernst &
Young “provided Vedanta with written confirmation that the terms of the
TSI acquisition and Sterlite Gold Offer are fair and reasonable as far
as the shareholders of Vedanta are concerned.” The other shareholders,
Vedanta must have meant, since it is obvious that Vedanta is paying
Agarwal handsomely to take the asset off his hands.
Little more than six months ago, Vedanta and Agarwal were at pains to
deny they were even thinking of trading Sterlite. The Finsbury public
relations firm of London, which represents Vedanta, told Mineweb at
the time: “Vedanta Resources PLC does not own Sterlite Gold. It is our
understanding this company is separately owned by Mr. Anil Agarwal,
and therefore it would not be appropriate for us to comment, as we
solely represent Vedanta.” Asked to say whether Vedanta would buy
out Agarwal’s stake in Sterlite, spokesman Alex Pettifer told Mineweb
“we have no comment to make on this.”
Now, according to Vedanta, the buyout represents a price of C$0.258
for each share of Sterlite Gold. This is a 20% premium on the 3-year
high achieved by the share of C$0.215. It is even more generous in
relation to the price of the share just before Agarwal’s sale, when
it was three times lower, at C$0.080.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the famous defender of dealmaking
proprieties, was engaged by Sterlite’s board to value the company:
it came up with a range of C$0.24 to C$0.275 per share.
Did PwC’s valuation, and Ernst & Young’s opinion, report that
Sterlite’s sole source of income, and principal asset, is facing
substantial new capital expenditure costs, and at the same time,
possible revocation of its mining licence?
The Armenian Minister of Nature Protection, Vardan Aivazyan, told
Mineweb, through a spokesman, that at the moment there are no stop-work
or ministry orders against Sterlite’s subsidiary, AGRC.
“The problem,” he said, “is that to continue profitable development
of the Zod deposit, AGRC is asking to build a new refinery close
to the deposit itself, on the shore of Sevan Lake. This violates
ecological restrictions.”
According to Vedanta’s corporate website, “the company aims to reduce
the impact of its activities on the environment wherever feasible.”
For the initial period after Sterlite took over in 1998, AGRC was
able to produce almost 100,000 troy ounces per annum, 330,000 oz.
over five years, from processing tailings accumulated during the Soviet
era. However, as the easy gold was extracted from the tailings stored
close to the refinery, it has proved prohibitively expensive to mine
ore at Zod (also known in Armenia as Sotk) and Meghradzor, and rail
it 268 kilometres to Ararat, in southern Armenia, for processing. In
calendar year 2005, output for AGRC fell to just 44,000 oz. For the
year, Sterlite reports that it gathered revenues of C$20.6 million,
and after meeting costs and paying taxes and royalties, was in the
red by C$12.5 million.
The two AGRC mines, Zod and Meghradzor, could produce about 120,000
oz. of gold per annum, according to a presentation of the transaction
issued by Vedanta last week. But an investment of $80 to $85 million
is now estimated by AGRC’s international consultants to build
a new refining plant close enough to the mine sites to restore
profitability. Just $11 million has been spent on the project to
date. According to Vedanta’s presentation, “the potential exists to
more than double” the mineable resource at Zod. Based on drilling
which is reportedly still ongoing at Zod, gold resources are currently
calculated at 2.1 million oz, according to JORC standards; more than
5 million oz by Russian criteria (C1 + C2).
Just how much lies under the ground has been a sore point for both
Sterlite’s AGRC and the Armenian government. Aivazyan confirmed to
Mineweb that, following a September 28 order last year, his ministry
authorized a review of operations at Zod and Meghradzor. Referring
to Sterlite’s licence for Zod, dated 7 June 2004, the report charged
violations of land allocation; uncertified laboratory work; improper
control of drill samples; and underground mining termed “illegal”.
The report also alleged that Sterlite had under-estimated gold
reserves at Zod “by more than 2 times”. Royalty payment calculations
have allegedly under-counted the amount of precious metal produced,
the report also claimed.
A legal representative of the company, Armen Ter-Tachatyan, told a
local press conference in Armenia recently that it would be impossible
for AGRC to hide either reserves, or current production, and it would
have no economic motive for doing so.
AGRC has filed suit in an Armenian court to challenge the ministry;
and according to Aivazyan’s spokesman, the dispute was resolved by
an out of court agreement on how to count reserves. But the minister
has now launched a fresh review, and that is currently under way,
his spokesman told Mineweb. If it finds violations, then the mining
licence could be withdrawn, he added.
Last December, following Mineweb and other reports in the Armenian
media, Sterlite issued a statement denying that “the Company is in
violation of various requirements in respect of its Armenian mining
operations. The Company wishes to state that it categorically denies
all such suggestions and statements. Many of the allegations cited
are based on unsubstantiated, inaccurate or outdated information.”
Sterlite went on to say that it “is currently in the process of
conducting studies to complete detailed open pit design, plant
engineering, metallurgical test work, and permitting with the aim
of expanding the present mining operations at Zod. These initiatives
are expected to be completed by the first quarter of 2006.”
Neither the Vedanta nor the Sterlite company websites currently
discloses an ongoing problem with the Armenian operations.
Agarwal and Vedanta were asked to say how they calculated the
asset value, ahead of Agarwal’s sale to Vedanta, in light of this
uncertainty. They were also asked to confirm whether the assessments
provided by PwC and Ernst & Young identified this uncertainty as a
factor in their valuation of the asset, or the price at which it is
now changing hands.
Agarwal replied through spokesman, Faeth Birch: “Vedanta is not aware
of any challenge to the license.” Without being specific about the
risks involved, she told Mineweb: “The valuations and assessments
performed were done by independent professionals and with financial
and legal advisers alongside, all of whom were fully cognizant of
the fact that this would be a related party transaction. In addition,
independent board sub committees were involved and the related party
was not a party to the valuation process and appropriate regulatory
processes were complied with. In any such valuation a wide variety of
matters are taken into account including risks and opportunities and
there is no reason as to why this transaction would be an exception.
Sterlite Gold offers good potential and hence the Group’s attraction
to it. “

GAZPROM’S INTEREST IN GEORGIA’S GAS PIPELINE MAY FADE
RosBusinessConsulting, Russia
June 20 2006
RBC, 20.06.2006, Moscow 17:27:15.Gazprom is still interested in the
acquisition of Georgia’s gas transportation system, but this interest
may fade, Gazprom Deputy CEO Alexander Ryazanov declared at a press
conference today. He said Georgian officials were slowing down the
process. According to Ryazanov, the negotiations have been completed,
but the government of Georgia is still thinking the deal over and
hasn’t voiced its final decision yet. “I’m afraid Gazprom’s interest
may fade,” the Deputy CEO of the Russian gas giant reported, adding
that he had no idea what Georgia might need the backbone gas pipeline
for since it was in a terrible condition at present.
Ryazanov also stressed Gazprom still couldn’t ensure a smooth transit
of gas to Armenia via Georgia.

LEGISLATIVE ISSUES CONCERNING MEDIA DISCUSSED
National Assembly of RA, Armenia
June 20 2006
On June 19 Tigran Torosyan, RA NA Speaker met Vladimir Pryakhin,
the OSCE Yerevan Office Head and Ambassador and Miklos Haraszti,
the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.
During the meeting issues concerning the laws and draft laws on mass
media were discussed. Tigran Torosyan, RA NA Speaker noted that the
three laws on freedom of information, television and radio mainly
regulate the activity of the mass media. According to the evaluation
of CE and OSCE, these laws are in conformity with the international
criteria. The forthcoming legislative work in this sphere will include
the reflection of the constitutional amendments in the Armenian
laws. Mr. Torosyan noted also that though any law can be improved
endlessly, the realities of life are not connected with the defects
of the laws. First of all, we have to specify what the mission of
the media is. The prevailing majority of the media see their role
as a reflection of the role of the parties, which are at power and
in opposition, while the mass media have to present the events in an
unbiased manner. The media has to be free and impartial.
The solution of this problem is directly connected with the multiparty
regime and the consolidation of the civil society.
Besides, the RA NA Speaker attached importance to the professionalism
of the reporters and to the presence of knowledge in the sphere that is
being covered. Noting that in the former Soviet territory the Armenian
law on freedom of information is the best and expressing agreement
with the presented approaches, Mr. Haraszti attached importance to
the transparency and multitude of opinions, to the creation of equal
conditions for the work of the media.
During the meeting other issues were also discussed.

STATEMENT BY IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR RODRIGO DE RATO DURING HIS VISIT TO ARMENIA
International Monetary Fund (IMF)

June 20 2006
Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), issued the following statement today in Yerevan during
his visit to Armenia, where he is participating in an IMF/World Bank
Constituency Meeting, as well as holding meetings with the Armenian
authorities:
“I am pleased to be in Armenia for the first time. The purpose of
my visit is to attend the annual meeting of a group of 12 countries,
including Armenia, that work together at the Executive Boards of the
IMF and the World Bank. I have met with the Armenian authorities and
reviewed with them the impressive performance of the economy over
the past five years.
“I have had the privilege to meet the President and Prime Minister,
as well as the government’s economic team. We had very productive
discussions, and I would like to thank the Armenian authorities
for their warm welcome and the excellent arrangements they made for
this event.
“Armenia’s economic performance has been impressive in recent
years: double-digit growth since 2001 in an environment of low
inflation; a strengthened external position; a reduction in poverty
and unemployment; and, more recently, a notable improvement in tax
performance. The IMF has supported the government’s reform programs
under successive concessional arrangements. In May 2005, the IMF’s
Executive Board approved a new three-year program under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility in support of the government’s economic
program through 2008, and just last month completed the second
review under the program. Armenia will be eligible to draw about
US$34 million under this concessional facility through mid-2008.
“My discussions focused on how to sustain strong economic growth and
poverty reduction over the medium term, in particular the need for
continued prudent macroeconomic policies; strong revenue performance
to fund infrastructure development and expand public services targeted
at poverty alleviation; and financial sector development.
These reforms will require a broad social consensus and strong
program ownership.
“The authorities have done a commendable job in maintaining sound
macroeconomic policies. I am pleased that the authorities are committed
to continued prudent macroeconomic policies, including in the run-up
to next year’s parliamentary elections.
“A good deal of my discussions focused on moving ahead forcefully
with reforms in tax and customs administrations intended to raise
revenues in a transparent and non-discretionary manner. I very much
welcome the tax and customs reforms already implemented, which have
resulted in a notable increase in revenue collection in 2005 and
thus far in 2006. We agreed on the need to reduce tax exemptions as
well as strengthen tax and customs administrations. Such steps could
significantly improve the business climate, which is necessary to
spur investment, and reduce the size of the shadow economy.
“Armenia has taken important steps to modernize its financial system.
I support the monetary authorities’ efforts to consolidate these
gains, especially by continuing to strengthen financial sector
supervision, fostering a competitive environment in the sector, and
deepening and broadening financial markets. I was pleased to hear
about the central bank’s proposal to improve corporate governance
in the financial sector. These initiatives will reduce borrowing
rates, increase financial intermediation, and encourage savings and
investment. Financial sector development also hinges on integrating
the shadow economy into the official one.
“In conclusion, I am encouraged by the meetings held with the Armenian
authorities. I sensed strong ownership of reforms, as evidenced by
the consultative process in designing Armenia’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy, which bodes well for continued economic success.
The IMF stands ready to continue to assist Armenia with policy and
technical advice, as well as financial support in implementing its
reform agenda.
“We are also happy to support greater outreach to encourage a better
understanding of macroeconomic and financial issues and the IMF’s
role in this area. Indeed, I understand that there was a very well
attended event yesterday with parliamentarians and others in which
my colleagues participated. I wish the authorities success in their
endeavor and I look forward to your questions.”
Contacts -MF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT Public Affairs Media
Relations Phone: 202-623-7300 Phone: 202-623-7100 Fax: 202-623-6278
Fax: 202-623-6772

ARMAVIA’S AIRBUS 320 TO CRASH IN SIMULATOR
Kommersant, Russia
June 20 2006
The deciphering of both black boxes of Armavia’s Airbus A320 was
announced yesterday. On May 3, A320 crashed into the Black Sea near
the resort city of Sochi en route from the Armenian capital Yerevan.
According to the black boxes, all systems of the aircraft were running
normally but it couldn’t be said about the actions of pilots.
The next move of the experts will be to independently attempt to pull
A320 out of the dive. But they will do it on land, not in the air.
The experts have managed to collect and match all data on the last
flight of A320 during a month and a half, news service of Interstate
Aviation Committee announced Monday.
Even though no final conclusion has been reached so far, the experts
disproved some assumptions already. It is clear now that A320 had
fuel enough for around an hour and a half, it was not breaking during
the flight and its engines were functioning properly up to the water
collision.
But the actions of pilots didn’t appear very adequate. In an effort
to justify or deny the suspicion, the experts will model the last
flight of the airbus in the aircraft simulator at Gromov Flight
Test Institute.
The black boxes of A320 showed Captain Grigory Grigoryan and another
pilot were very nervous and the denial of air traffic controller to
accept A320 broke them completely.
The flight wasn’t easy even without that denial. Before reaching
Adler, the pilots were told about bad weather conditions and even
turned back. Then, they headed for Adler again.
So, the pilots were rattled when nearing the Black Sea’s coast. The
landing clearance calmed them down a bit but another command followed
once they descended to 280m: “The weather sharply got bad.
Meteo-minimum doesn’t correspond to announced earlier. Stop
descending. Go by the right turn to the second round, take the 600m
altitude.”
Grigoryan lost the nerve, the experts suppose. He was to make a
standard maneuver of four turns, 90 degrees each and four short direct
space intervals between them. He started by using the autopilot,
but, for some reason, shifted to the hand control when completing
the second turn. And failed to handle the aircraft in this mode.

ARMENIA BRINGS MEDICAL SERVICES TO SHEPHERDS AND FAMILIES IN HIGHLANDS
Reuters, UK
June 20 2006
Source: World Vision Middle East/Eastern Europe office (MEERO)
Previous | Next 11-year-old Serine with MOT doctor in
front of the World Vision medical truck World Vision MEERO,
For the first time, doctors visited
shepherds and their families in the pastures of Armenia’s northern
Lori region thanks to World Vision Medical Outreach Teams (MOT)
project and local polyclinic doctors.
A fully equipped truck with a medical team – general doctor, laboratory
technician, gynaecologist, and paediatrician – drove through almost
impassable mountain paths to provide important primary healthcare to
the highland families.
‘During the summer months, people in the pastures are too far from
villages and health posts, so they can’t see doctors for months. Our
goal is to take doctors close to them,’ explains Marat Manoukian,
Lori ADP Health Coordinator.
Animal breeding is the main source of income for many rural populations
in Lori. The shepherds take the cows or sheep to far-off mountains with
rich pastures and live with their families in small temporary dwellings
usually made of old wooden panels or rusted plates. Staying for far
away from their native villages, for four to five months, they suffer
many hardships such as no access to even the simplest health services.
‘This is the only way for me to earn a living for my family nowadays:
in winters I have no work to do,’ confesses Mukuchyan Saro from Odzun
village, a specialist in the energy industry who has worked as a
shepherd for the last four years.
[lquotbebox]I’m happy that my children will be examined by specialists:
the conditions here are far from being ideal for children, so I
constantly worry about their health[/lquotebox]In summer, Saro stays
in a pasture of Garakhach mountain with three other shepherds, milking
some 80 cows a day. This backbreaking work caused him severe pain
in his arms. After a medical examination, MOT doctors found certain
problems with his joints, prescribed medicines and referred him for
future treatment to the local polyclinic.
‘I’m happy that my children will be examined by specialists: the
conditions here are far from being ideal for children, so I constantly
worry about their health,’ said a surprised Shushan Sargsyan, mother
to 11-year-old Serine and 13-year-old Sargis. Serine helps her mother
with cooking and washing dishes, while her brother helps the men to
tend the herd.
Seventy-five-year-old Mhoyan Syomka helps his younger counterparts
look after the herds. He is short of breath and speaks with
difficulty. Syomka says it’s the first time he has been examined by
a physician in his life: ‘If it were not World Vision, I would never
see a doctor.’
The doctors concluded that Syomka’s condition is quite serious and
decided to hospitalize him.
‘Ultimately, World Vision’s assistance contributes to the expanded
role of local health care providers and strengthens the community-based
health system,’ said Robert Dilbaryan, Head of Lori Health Department,
commenting that the regular monthly visits of MOTs serve as a basis
for the Health Ministry to develop new regulations, to ensure health
services are made available to rural population at least once a month.
World Vision’s MOT project funded by USAID started in Lori in
July 2004. MOT team regularly visits remote and needy communities,
and provides free medical services that include laboratory tests,
ultrasound examinations and referrals to district doctors.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICE HEAD CONFLICTS WITH DM
Today, Azerbaijan
June 20 2006
Armenian Armed Forces intelligence office head, Major-General
Basenchi Azoyan became victim of conflict with the Defense Minister
Serj Sarkisyan.
This is stated on a forum section in an Armenian internet site. The
author of the story writes that there are mysterious nuances in the
death of Azoyan, who died suddenly at the age of 59, APA reports.
Stating that Major-General Azoyan served in the Armenian Defense
Ministry for a long time, the author said Azoyan pointed out shortfalls
in Armenia, especially in the Defense Ministry.
“Azoyan got furious by the immoral way of live of the Defense Minister
Serj Sarkisyan, who has opportunities to significantly influence in
adoption of political decisions in the country and his embezzling
great deal of money allocated to the Army. Knowing that Serkisyan
ordered to tap the conversations of Armenian military men attending
international organizations, Azoyan said Russia ordered the Defense
Minister to do it.
Azoyan used to tell his close surrounding that Serkisyan, who informed
Azerbaijanis of the plans of his companion-in-arms in the Shusha
prison once and was released by Russians’ interference failing to
protect his dignity, would not be an honorable man, and he had no
moral right to rule the state,” the author writes.
Armenian officer in his heartfelt words in the forum says that Basenchu
Azoyan wanted President Robert Khochariyan to receive him regarding
the miserable situation in the Defense Ministry. He appealed to
former parliament speaker, leader of the Orinats Erkir Party Arthur
Bagdasaryan for conveying his request to the President.
“Bagdasaryan did not implement his request. Serj Sarkisyan threatened
Azoyan obviously. He even told him to leave the post if he wanted
his family to be safe and sound. After that Basenchi Azoyan died
mysteriously,” the author concluded.
URL:

CYPRUS AND TURKEY’S EU PROCESS
By Sedat Laciner
Translated By: Abdi Noyan Ozkaya
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
June 20 2006
The Republic of Cyprus was not founded as a Greek state or a Turkish
state. It was founded as a state based on the equal partnership of
two ethnic communities and with the guarantorship of Turkey, Greece
and Britain. In other words, the Turkish Cypriots, though less in
number, were not a minority but a founder of the Republic with equal
status. However, the Greek Cypriots considered the Republic as a
‘transitory stage’, a ‘temporary period’ which would eventually lead
to an independent Greek state on the island. It was this ambition
which caused the state to disfunction in Cyprus. First of all, the
Turkish Cypriots were de facto deprived of all their government posts
granted to them by the constitution. The Greeks were placed to all
Turkish contingencies in security forces, and the ultra-nationalist
Greeks made it impossible for Turks to fill their posts in politics
and bureaucracy. As a result, the Cypriot state was usurped by the
Greeks through the violation of the constitution. The Turks were
unable to participate in the executive and legislative bodies.
Moreover, many Greeks from Greece were brought to the island for
settlement. During the course of the events, the international
community as well as Greece and Britain, which were the guarantors
of the Cypriot State and held rights and responsibilities including
military intervention in case of disruption in constitutional order,
only preferred to watch. As the Greek policy of deporting Turks out
of the island occasionally turned into massacres, the UN Peace Force
(UNFICYP) was deployed in the island in 1964. This was the beginning
of the never-ending adventure of the UN in the island.
Though the UN arrived at the island, it neither managed to stop the
violence nor was it able to put the rights granted to Turks into
practice. In the meantime, the armament of the Greeks continued apace.
The military coup in Greece on 21 April 1967 had negative effects on
the Cyprus issue. Although Turkey wanted to intervene in Cyprus as a
guarantor state in these years, this action was prevented by the US
and Britain.
The intercommunal talks failed many times, and the UN and the
international community clearly proved their inability to save
the Turkish Cypriots, who were forced to live in enclaves. But the
Turkish public felt very disturbed upon the release of the photos of
massacred Turks in the international media. Among the photos was a
photo of a child killed in a bathroom. The final event that caused
Turkish frustration took place in 1974. The radical nationalist
Greek Cypriots considered unacceptable even the policies of Makarios
that caused the exclusion of the Turks from the system as moderate
and ousted the Makarios government. As Makarios hardly survived,
more uneasy days were ahead for the Turks. The constitutional order,
which had already ended practically, was now being wiped off by use
of armed force and violence, and the island was being transformed
into a Greek homeland. Turkey called Greece and Britain to stop the
violence and take necessary measures to save the Cyprus Republic,
but she was turned down. The international organizations and great
powers did nothing but released statements of regret for the Greek
coup on the island. Consequently, Turkey, upon the rights granted
to her by international agreements, intervened in the island. Turkey
had two goals with this intervention:
1) To protect the Turkish Cypriots who were facing the threat of
annihilation,
2) To revive the Republic of Cyprus, within the framework of the
international agreements and the constitution.
Turkish troops – though able to seize the entire island – only
seized the north of the island, where Turks were densely populated,
and stopped there. During the 1970s, Turkey permanently defended
that the island be reunited on the basis of the constitution and the
international agreements. In the South, the coup attempt failed and
the Greek Cypriots maintained the Republic of Cyprus unilaterally. On
the other hand, the Greeks did not allow the Turks to cross to
the southern part and to assume posts in any of the government
institutions. However, even the flag of the Republic was designed by
a Turkish Cypriot (Ismet Guney) and the constitution allocated seats
to Turks in every institution including government.
As the Turks were unable to cross to the South, they formed their
own administration in the North. As the Turkish hopes for unification
continued, they did not declare independence; but there were now two
separate states on the island practically.
Unfortunately, the international community has never been neutral
enough in the Cyprus issue. Particularly the Western organizations and
states gave notable support to the Greek side and this support has been
viewed as a ‘Christian solidarity’ by Turkey. The US, which was unable
to protect the Turkish Cypriots and to assist them in regaining their
rights in the state, even resolved on an arms embargo against Turkey,
thanks to the influence of the Greek lobby in the Congress. This may
be the first time that an arms embargo was imposed against a military
ally. By the same token, the then-European Community (EC) strictly
warned Turkey as the Greek Diaspora managed to get support of ‘its
fellows in Europe’. Despite these events, both the US and the EC were
aware of Turkey’s status of guarantorship during the 1970s. Both the
US and the EC admitted that the Cypriot state was unable to join any
international organization without the approval of its guarantors as
it was written down in the international agreements. As Greece was
progressing on the way to the EC (that is, the European Union, EU)
and as Turkey was lagging behind in this process due to the economic
problems and internal political instability, Brussels assured Turkey
that Greece’s membership would not affect the EU’s stance on the
Cyprus and Aegean disputes. In other words, the EU would not act
partial on the Cyprus issue in case Greece is admitted. Naturally,
the promises were broken. As Turkey remained outside, the EU neutrality
was seriously damaged on the Cyprus question.
On the Turkish side, the Turkish Cypriots formed their own
administration on the north of the island in 1975. Though its name
was not a “state”, this structure was a state in fact. In terms of
elections and parliament, it was a more democratic state than those of
Turkey and Greece. On one hand, the Turkish Cypriots tried to overcome
their state needs by practical solutions, while on the other hand
they strived to be included in the state, which was closed to them by
the Greeks in the South, within the limits of the constitution. The
UN’s efforts, expectedly, failed again. The Vienna Rounds could only
produce more distrust. While the Greeks did not admit that Turks were
the constituent community in the Cypriot state, the Turks disavowed
to depend on the mercy of the Greeks. The initiatives followed
initiatives. As the Canadian, English and American proposals were
presented, the Turks were unable to cross to the Greek side even for
negotiations. When the negotiations stalled, the Turkish Cypriots
unilaterally founded their own state in the North on November 15,
1983. However, the Turkish hopes for the unification of the island
continued. Both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) maintained that the two communities could unify under a single
entity, be it federalism or another solution.
During the 1980s, the TRNC was only recognized by Turkey, and the
Greeks acted as if they were the only representatives of the island.
Not only the flag of the Republic of Cyprus, which was founded
collectively by the Turks and the Greeks, but also all posts in the
ministries, military, police etc. were occupied by the Greeks.
The problem faced by the Turkish Cypriots was not only
non-recognition. Initially, they were barred from exporting potato and
citrus to the EU countries. They were even unable to send a letter. You
needed to write an address in Turkey in order to send a letter to TRNC
from the US or Europe. The world, so to say, ignored the TRNC. The
Turkish Cypriots were even unable to play matches against teams of
other nations. It was impossible to take a direct flight to Northern
Cyprus. The UN efforts, definitely, continued in the 1980s as it did
in 1960s and 1970s. England, the US and other powers continued their
roles as mediators, though useless…
The scene continued with no change in the 1990s. Negotiations,
failures, mediations, and endless plans…
In 1994, the European Court of Justice, with the lobbying of Greeks
and Greek Cypriots, outlawed any trade with the north of the island.
Strangely, the Court decided that the export of potatoes and oranges
from the North was illegal. As the parties on the island were trying
to agree on confidence-building measures, this event cast doubts on
the neutrality of the ‘Europe’. The Turkish Cypriots were isolated
in the EU and the Greek Cypriots were made the sole possessor of the
island. The EU support encouraged the Greeks and the Greek militants
attacked on the Turkish border posts.
The EU, in 1998, listed Cyprus (that is, only the Greek part) among
“the potential countries” to join the EU. As a matter of fact,
this resolution was in violation of the international agreements
in two aspects. First of all, it was impossible for a country with
border disputes to be a member of the EU. Secondly, it was impossible
for the Republic of Cyprus to enter any international organization
without the approval of Greece and Turkey, based upon the agreements
and documents that established the Republic of Cyprus. As Turkey did
not approve the Cyprus’ membership under these conditions, the EU
was defying both its laws and the international agreements.
The UN had to renew its 36-year mission to Cyprus in 2001. The
same year, after failed efforts to convince the EU, Turkey and
TRNC collectively announced that they might consider unification
of the North with Turkey. For Turkey, the EU was, unilaterally
and in violation of all international law documents, preparing to
admit the Greek Cypriots as a member as if they were the only legal
representatives of Cyprus.
The Greek and Turkish leaders, Clerides and Denktaº, started
negotiations with the UN’s good offices in 2002. Same year, the
UN General-Secretary Annan presented a comprehensive plan to the
parties. The plan seemed to be in favor of the Greeks. However,
the lack of a settlement was more to the disadvantage of Turkish
Cypriots. Hence, the Turkish side seemed to be more in favor of
unification on the basis of a federation. As the UN was pressuring the
both sides for a settlement, the US and the EU could have assisted the
UN’s efforts. Especially the EU could have easily pressured the Greek
Cypriots, who were on the accession process, for a solution. However,
instead of this option, the EU called for the full membership of Cyprus
(that is, the Greek side) in the Copenhagen Summit in 2004. So, the
Greek Cypriots were able to obtain whatever they hoped for, that is,
the EU membership and the guarantee of full membership. As a result,
the Greeks had no more expectations from the negotiations.
A few weeks before the submission of the Annan Plan to the sides,
Tassos Papadopoulos defeated Clerides, who were on the negotiation
table by then, in the parliamentary elections in the South. As a
result, a leader who was opposing the Annan plan became the president
in the Greek side and the prospect for the approval of the plan was
in jeopardy. On the eve of the plan’s referendum in both sides of
the island, the EU and the US announced that the party which voted
in favor of the plan would be rewarded whereas the one which voted
negatively would face the consequences. Significant promises were
given especially to the Turkish side. It was promised that direct
talks would be initiated with the TRNC and the isolation on the
Turkish side would be lifted, provided that the TRNC voted in favor.
The Turkish side overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Annan Plan. The
situation was exactly the opposite in the Greek part. The Greeks
overwhelmingly voted against the plan. TRNC and Turkey were hopeful
about the results. It was hoped that the Greek side, which voted
“no”, would face the consequences whereas the promises given to the
Turkish side would be realized.
To demonstrate their goodwill, Turkish Cypriots not only voted “yes”
in the referendum but also opened the borders with the South. They
allowed the passage of all Greek Cypriots to the North. So, the Greeks
personally saw that there were people in the North and that Turks were
human beings just like Greeks. But the promises were soon forgotten and
it was the party who refused the plan, not the one with the goodwill,
which was rewarded. The Greek Cypriot Administration was admitted
in the EU as the representative of the Republic of Cyprus on May 1,
2004. The Turkish Cypriots were left outside. Thus, the confidence
crisis between Turks and the EU peaked.
It has been more than two years since the referendum was carried out.
The isolation of the Turkish Cypriots still continues. However, the
Greek Cypriots do not even attempt to negotiate with the Turkish
side. Because the Greek side is an EU member and the problem has
become an issue between the EU and the Turkish Cypriots. The EU,
which was an “arbitrator”, has suddenly become “the other party” in
the problem. Likewise, the UN General-Secretary clearly stated that the
Cyprus’ membership to the EU caused a deadlock in the peace process.
Honestly, the EU’s admission of Cyprus, that is the Greek Cypriots
unilaterally, was madness. The admission caused deadlock on the
issue. This policy made it causeless for the Greeks to negotiate with
the Turkish side. However, much more madly and incomprehensible is
to condition Turkey’s membership on the Cyprus issue. To condition
Turkey’s membership on a problem that the UN was unable to settle for
42 years, that is, the Cyprus problem, is to never let Turkey into
the EU. It is to have no goodwill. It is to come up with reasons to
procrastinate Turkey. To demand new concessions from Turkey, though
Turkey has given all, still not stepping forward even an inch is to
act unjustly against Turkey. It is even mocking with Turkey. But
this isn’t surprising. There are countries which oppose Turkey’s
membership due to cultural reasons, and France and Austria are the
leading countries of this position. These countries can not prevent
Turkey’s membership on the basis of economic and political criteria.
Both the December 15 (2004) and October 3 (2005) summits have proved
that Turkey’s economy and democracy easily met the minimum requirements
of the EU. In this case, there is no reason left to impede Turkey’s
membership. There are only few obstacles left against Turkey as it
is evident that Turkish economy, the world’s 17th largest, performs
far better than Romanian and Bulgarian economies.
One of these obstacles is the Cyprus issue, and the other is the
Armenian problem. The Cyprus issue hasn’t been resolved for half a
century and the Armenian problem hasn’t been resolved for a century.
It seems that a solution is impossible with these conditions because
Turkey is told to “shut up and accept what is said”. Given that it is
almost impossible for Turkey to accept this situation, to condition
Turkey’s membership on the Cyprus and Armenian issues means that the
EU doesn’t want Turkey’s full membership.
The EU should be more sincere within this context. The procrastination
policy no more works. The EU violates its own rules one by one. It
makes up new criteria to leave Turkey outside and this harms EU more
than it harms Turkey. There is very little Turkey can lose at the end
of this process because Turkey has reached this level without the EU,
or even despite the EU. Hence, Turkey will not face much difficulty
if she proceeds without the EU from now on. But how easily can the EU
without Turkey proceed? We will cover this topic in our next comments.
–Boundary_(ID_HNMF68pV8P1JAOD2N/om0g)- –
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress