THE TIME HAS COME TO AGREE ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION – JOINT STATEMENT OF OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIR COUNTRIES
Author: R.Abdullayev
TREND, Azerbaijan
May 24 2006
The time has come for both the sides in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to
reach agreement on basic principles of settlement. Russia, France,
the US underline the international community’s belief in peaceful
settlement of the conflict, Trend reports referring to joint statement
of OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries issued May 24 in Baku.
The statement says Azerbaijan and Armenia shall prepare their people
for peace, for to war.
Daniel Freed, Assistant to US Secretary of State, said the meetings
with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov
have been led during the visit to Baku, discussing important aspects
of future settlement of the conflict and working out the options of
meeting of president of the two countries in the closest future.
“Our discussions in Baku were constructive. We are heading for
Yerevan tomorrow and then we will return to our capitals to brief
our leaders”,- US official said.
In turn, Grigory Karasin, deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, said this
joint mission is an extraordinary event. It must be taken as a sign
of the seriousness with which OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries
approach the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement issue, and belief
that the countries are at the point where a mutually beneficial
agreement is achievable. “What happens now will be up to Azerbaijan
and Armenia”, – Karasin said, outlining the mission is leaving Baku
with hope for progress.

YEREVAN SURPRISED AT MAMMADYAROV’S STATEMENTS
PanARMENIAN.Net
24.05.2006 18:55 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ “We are again surprised by the fact that Azerbaijan
tries to put forth an approach not corresponding to the contents of
the current talks on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Acting Spokesman of
the Armenian Foreign Ministry Vladimir Karapetyan said when commenting
on the statement by Azeri FM Elmar Mammadyarov who said that “the
stepwise resolution of the conflict is the best one.” “We have many
times stated that the achievement of mutual consent first of all
implies the acknowledgement by Azerbaijan of the right of Karabakh
people to self-determination, after what liquidation of consequences
of war may be discussed,” he said, reported the RA MFA press office.

VISIT OF PACE SPEAKER ON MONITORING OF CULTURAL SITES TO ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN TO BE POSTPONED
Regnum, Russia
May 24 2006
Visit of PACE speaker on monitoring of cultural sites, British MP
Edward O’Hara to Azerbaijan and Armenia, planned for May 28, has
been postponed.
The PACE planned to send the mission, headed by O’Hara, on May 28
-June 4 into the region. The mission is to familiarize itself with
the state of Armenian historical sites in Nakhichevan and prepare a
detailed report on it.
It is worth reminding that reports on destroying of Armenian monuments
in Old Julfa (Nakhichevan) by Azerbaijani soldiers were received by
the Armenian Embassy to Iran. On February 16, the European Parliament
adopted resolution, condemning Azerbaijan’s actions, aimed at
destroying of khachkars at Old Julfa Armenian cemetery. Supporters of
the document pointed out inadmissibility of destroying cultural sites,
which have equal importance to all mankind, by Azerbaijan. It was
stressed that detailed requests should be formulated for Azerbaijan,
which committed the crime and which joined EU New Neighborhood
Program. Mentioning statements that destroying of khachkars was caused
by the Karabakh conflict, the European MPs stressed that Nakhichevan
is far from the conflict zone.

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY HALF CLOSED?
By Aghavni Harutyunian
AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006
“I am not desperate about it [Nagorno Karabakh conflict]; I wouldn’t
say I’m optimistic. It depends on the two parties concerned, Armenia
and Azerbaijan.
They have to come to an agreement. We can try to [help] them to do
so, but they need to come to an agreement,” OSCE chairman in office,
Belgian foreign minister Karel De Gucht told RFE/RL. “Sometimes you
have more hope, and sometimes the hope is fading away.
What we must do is continue to the end of the year, to the bitter
end of our chairmanship-in-office, to try to find ways and means to
get out of this frozen conflict,” he said. Among the stambling block
on the way of Nagorno Karabakh regulation Karel De Gucht mentioned
the closed Armenian-Turkish border: “the closure of the border with
Turkey is one of the elements that is complicating the whole conflict.”
Curiously enough the OSCE chairman in office says for the first time
that 2006 will not be a solution year contrary to statements of the
mediating mission. Up to this moment, only the negotiating sides used
to reveal such pessimism. Perhaps, one can assume that the OSCE does
not see the “window of opportunity” on the other side of which “laid”
conflict regulation.

PRIME MINISTER RETURNS FROM ALGERIA WITH ‘STRATEGIC COOPERATION’
By Mustafa Unal, Algeria
Zaman, Turkey
May 24 2006
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the first Turkish prime minister to visit Algeria
after an interval of 21 years, signed a “friendship and cooperation”
agreement with President Abdulaziz Buteflika yesterday.
This agreement, Algeria had previously signed with only Spain,
Portugal and Italy, shows the importance attached to Turkey, and their
relationship that will be based on a more strategic foundation with
this signature.
Erdogan and Buteflika, who met for three hours at Palace Muradiye in
the capital, sent messages of friendship.
Erdogan said the signatures are an investment in the fields of
politics, the military, economy, commerce, and culture between the
two brother countries.
During the sincere talks, Buteflika gave Erdogan the message, “We
consider ourselves as a part of the Ottomans and protect Ottoman
works here.”
Erdogan, reminding that Turkish Minister for Culture and Tourism
Atilla Koc also participated in the visit, emphasized that they would
do everything possible to ensure the restoration of Ottoman works in
the country.
“Let’s make the Mediterranean a peaceful basin again,” Buteflika
said, and stressed, they support Turkey on all issues, including the
Armenian issue.
In the talks, both countries reached a principle agreement in order
to make joint searches for oil, natural gas and metals.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN JET’S BLACK BOXES TO BE ANALYZED IN PARIS
Interfax, Russia
May 24 2006
YEREVAN. May 24 (Interfax) – The flight recorders from the Armenian
Airlines Airbus A320 which crashed off the Russian coast near Sochi
on May 3 will be analyzed in Paris, Armenian Civil Aviation Department
press secretary Gayane Davtian told Interfax on Wednesday.
“Both black boxes will be brought first to Moscow, where they will
probably be examined, and possibly a documentary act will be drawn up,
and then to Paris for decoding,” Davtian said.
“The final decision on decoding the black boxes in Paris has already
been taken,” she said.
Civil Aviation Department flight safety division chief Gagik Galstian
will go to Paris from Yerevan as well, she said.
The analysis of the black boxes might take “two or three days,”
she said.
“However, if the black boxes are damaged, decoding might take much
longer,” Davtian said.

DOCUMENT SENT TO MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND FRENCH CABINET MINISTERS
AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006
Laws against Genocide Denial: Potential Consequences for Human Rights
May 18, 2006: Today the French National Assembly was set to debate a
bill to criminalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide, but has now
postponed the debate to November. The Turkish ambassador to France was
temporarily recalled in protest of this bill. What are the implications
of the French law for Turkish-Armenian relations and freedom of speech?
The International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, of
which I am currently the chair, deals with genocide in a comparative
manner, including its causes, methods, aftermath and denial. Our
research, based on archival sources both in and outside Turkey,
confirms that over a million Armenians perished in an Ottoman
state-sponsored campaign between 1915 and 1923 as victims of genocide.
Kemal Ataturk, the founder the new Turkish Republic, also publicly
disapproved of the wrongs committed against the Armenians, calling
them “a shameful act,” but the true story of other founding fathers
of modern Turkey, many of whom had been intimately involved in the
Armenian Genocide as perpetrators, was suppressed.
This was despite the fact that the Ottoman government itself found
the leaders of the Young Turk party guilty in absentia of crimes
against the Armenians.
Ever since then, successive Turkish governments have denied what they
euphemistically called “the events of 1915.”
In this respect, I wrote to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on May
5, 2005, regarding his proposal for a joint group, consisting of
historians and other experts, to study “the events of 1915.” I found
this proposal insincere, given the Turkish state’s numerous attempts to
stifle open discussion of the Armenian Genocide, including prosecuting
over seventy scholars, writers, journalists and publishers on the
grounds that they were denigrating Turkey. In that letter, I made
the following points.
“…the two sides must listen to and hear each other. As part
of this process, a common body of knowledge needs to be created,
so that established facts can help alleviate the polarization of
opinions. This, in turn, will lead to the “peaceful and friendly
environment in which tolerance and mutual respect shall prevail.”
[Note, quote taken from P.M. Erdogan’s proposal.]
I then urged that his government take some simple steps to allow
for a free and open discussion within Turkish society, such as those
listed below.
1) Facilitate critical scholars educating society about the events of
1915 from different points of view and not only from the government’s
perspective.
2) Allow the broadcast of a series of lectures on this issue by
renowned Armenian, Turkish and/or third party scholars, who do not
necessarily reflect the government’s official position, through
Turkish television networks, without any censorship, and with the
accessibility to the public for questions.
3) Allow Turkish academics and intellectuals, whose point of view
challenges the official version of what happened in 1915, to express
their ideas through public lectures, publications, and translations of
Ottoman archival materials, without fear of persecution by the state.
I also asked the government to make it unequivocally and publicly
clear that Article 305 of the Penal Code should not criminalize ideas
which deviate from those of the state’s defined position, such as
the Armenian Genocide issue, and that individuals who say that the
Armenians suffered a genocide will not be persecuted by the state.
The proposed new legislation is intended to give force to the law
passed in 2001 officially recognizing the Genocide by providing
penalties for those engaged in its denial. One should question how
this law, if adopted, would facilitate dialogue between the Armenians
and Turks, which is a stated objective of the 2001 law, or between
the French and the Turks?
Does not this law inadvertently provide new opportunities for the
reactionary elements of Turkish state and society to radicalize the
masses against the French and the Armenians? By using the French law,
which limits freedom of speech as an example, would the Turkish state
not justify laws that promote its policy of denial and therefore make
it even harder to deviate from the official government position on
history? If so, how does that help Turkish civil society in gaining
any awareness on this issue? Does this law advance the language of
reconciliation or the language of conflict? Can such laws bring
a solution to the problem, or do they become part of the problem
themselves? Does using the penal code in France for any limitation
on the discussion of historical events endanger the prime function
of scholars, writers and journalists-to analyze, question, and
debate issues?
Would it not create a slippery slope that would allow the state to
sanction and impose dogmas as to how society should think? Finally, is
this not the very method of limiting freedom of speech that countries
like Turkey use, as the state attempts to control history in order
to control society?
Of course, we do need laws to protect against such problems as racism
and neo-Nazism, and there are legal limits to freedom of speech, such
as libel, fraud, defamation. Therefore, those who argue that freedom
of speech is not absolute are absolutely right. Some observers have
argued that you can not have a law criminalizing Holocaust denial and
not allow a similar law for denying the Armenian Genocide, which is
officially recognized as genocide in France.
The Holocaust denial policy grew out of two things: many European
countries were complicit in the death of the Jews, and punishing
denial of the Holocaust is seen as a form of atonement; and there
was a fear that neo-Nazi and other fascist groups would try to
vindicate themselves by eliminating the Holocaust, while maintaining
racism. Thus, the idea was that suppression of fascism was in part
a matter of suppressing denial of the Holocaust.
On the level of principle, one could argue either for or against
treating all denial of genocide as equal.
But there is the historical context of the Holocaust denial laws that
is different from Armenia, Rwanda, etc. At the same time, if only
the Holocaust cannot be legally denied, then some will take this to
mean that only the Holocaust was a genocide; others will feel that
the suffering of their people is being slighted.
But if we open this up and list all genocides and criminalize denial
of all of them, then our minds would be enormously constrained by
the State. Freedom of inquiry, expression, thought would be limited
in ways that are totally unnecessary and unintended.
Accordingly, are laws such as this a mistake and contrary to freedom
of speech? Some might argue that governments should eliminate all
cases of prosecution of denial, rather than extend the net.
We know Turkey already requires its students to write essays denying
the Armenian Genocide and uses its penal code to stifle human
rights. As recently as three days ago, an opposition deputy in the
Turkish Grand National Assembly presented a bill stipulating prison
terms of up to three years for those who claim that Turkey committed
genocide against Armenians in 1915. (This bill is not very different
from the current Turkish Penal Code article (301) that criminalizes
“denigrating Turkishness,” which is what claiming there was a genocide
of the Armenians apparently does.) If the bill passes, what would
happen to Turkish intellectuals like Taner Akcam, Murat Belge, Halil
Berktay, Hrant Dink, Fatma Muge Gocek, Orhan Pamuk, Ragip Zarakolu,
and others, who openly challenge the Turkish state’s definition of
the Armenian Genocide? Who then would dare attempt to educate Turkish
civil society? How then would Turkey ever have a chance to become
democratic? How then are the Armenian and Turkish people going to
have any kind of dialogue on this issue? If one supports such a law
in France limiting freedom of speech, then should one not also support
such a law in Turkey?
We must do all we can to overcome denial of genocide, by raising
awareness, employing scholarship, applying reason, and means other
than state sanction, to defend truth, justice and human rights. We
must demand that Turkey reform its penal code. The French, German and
other governments of Europe who were bystanders or even participants
in the crime should provide resources in order to bring the parties
together, and give incentives to solve the problem, not widen the
divide. Denial should be against the law only if it is in the context
of a hate or racist argument.
One wonders if these developments can contribute to the peaceful
solution of the problem. Rather than employ the language of conflict,
which exacerbates the problem, the parties should be more dispassionate
and rational, in order to be open to developing other means and
tools that will help with establishing dialogue, and hopefully lead
to normalization of relations.
France, for its part, has an option, as well. Instead of criminalizing
Armenian Genocide denial, which serves to stifle freedom of speech,
it could use its positive influence to support efforts within Turkey
for democratization there.
Freedom of speech and debate on the issue of the Armenian Genocide
in Turkey is the best hope for eliminating government control of this
history. By allowing such debate, Turkey can become open, democratic
and pluralistic. There is no guarantee that Turkey will follow suit,
but France, with its legacy of “freedom, equality and brotherhood,”
and as one of the world’s leaders in democracy and human rights,
must show the way by not itself imposing laws that penalize freedom
of speech on the Armenian Genocide or any historical event.
By Roger W. Smith, Professor Emeritus of Government, College of William
and Mary and Chairman, International Institute for Genocide and Human
Rights Studies.

OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIRS ISSUED STATEMENT
Today, Azerbaijan
May 24 2006
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, being on a visit in Azerbaijan, issued
joint statement.
According to APA, the statement reads that co-chairs coming together
with OSCE chairman in- office personal representative, in diplomatic
mission is to support the necessity of Nagorno Karabakh conflict
in peaceful way, and stressing the time of solving the problem for
the sides.
“We were received by President Ilham Aliyev, and before that we
met with foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov. We had discussed the
significant aspects of future regulation. We tried to provide condition
for two Presidents’ meeting. Besides it, both countries should prepare
its community to peace not war.
“Our talks in Baku are of constructive character. Tomorrow we will
visit Yerevan, meet with President Robert Kocharian and foreign
minister Vardan Oskanian and hold of the same character talks and
return to the states we represent and inform our leader.”
Co-chairs will also inform the OSCE and international community of
their visit to the region. “At present, it depends on Azerbaijan
and Armenia what will happen. We leave the country in hopes
for development. We are pleased to be in Baku, and we express our
gratitude to President Ilham Aliyev and Azerbaijani people for their
receiving us.”
URL:

YUGOSLAVIA R.I.P.
By Gwynne Dyer
AZG Armenian Daily
25/05/2006
Within days of Montenegro’s successful referendum on independence on
Sunday, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic will be arriving in Brussels
to open talks on joining the European Union, while other Montenegrin
diplomats arrive in New York to seek admission as the 193rd member
of the United Nations. A country that was extinguished 88 years ago
has risen from its grave — and the mini-empire that absorbed it has
finally come to an end.
With Montenegro’s independence, the last vestige of former Yugoslavia
is gone: Serbia has lost its seacoast and reverted to its land-locked
borders of 1918. Yugoslavia was a project that was bloody at the start,
bloody again in the middle, and exceedingly bloody in its last years
in the 1990s. The lesson we should draw from this is: no more shotgun
marriages in the name of tidiness.
As the Ottoman (Turkish) empire retreated down the western side of the
Balkans during the 19th century, half a dozen Christian ethnic groups
who spoke closely related South Slavic dialects were candidates for
nationhood, but not all of them got it. The Slovenes and Croatians
became part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, which eventually absorbed
the Bosnians as well. Serbia and Montenegro became independent states
in 1878, but after the Balkan wars of 1911-12 the Macedonians were
just handed over to Serbia (which almost doubled in size).
As early as the mid-19th century, many Serbs believed that all the
western Balkans should eventually be ruled from Belgrade. In his famous
Nacertanije (Programme) of 1844, Ilija Garasanin, Minister of Internal
Affairs in a Serbia that was still technically under Ottoman rule,
outlined the stages by which Serbian control might gradually extend
to include the whole of the region, and generations of Serbs were
taught to dream of that Greater Serbia.
Their opportunity came with the First World War, which destroyed the
Austro-Hungarian empire and left the Slovenes, Croatians and Bosnians
free to seek their own destinies.
Where they all ended up, however, was in the new, Serb-dominated
state of Yugoslavia. The victorious great powers let the Serbs
have their way in part because they owed Serbia a favour (since it
had fought on the winning side), but mainly because it was a tidier
arrangement than cluttering up the western Balkans with half a dozen
small countries. They even bundled long-independent Montenegro into
the new Yugoslavia (although some Montenegrins immediately revolted
against rule from Belgrade).
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbia from the start: all
of its prime ministers were Serbs, as were 161 of its 165 generals. So
it fell apart at once when Nazi Germany invaded in 1941, and a Croatian
fascist regime set out to take revenge on Serbians and assert its own
independence: over half a million people died in Croatian concentration
camps. Then Communist guerillas took power after the Second World
War and reestablished Serbian domination, killing all those (mostly
Croatians and Bosnians) who had collaborated with the Germans.
Communist Yugoslavia lasted almost half a century, but when it started
to break apart in 1992 the Serbs would not let go, and it took four
wars and a quarter-million deaths before Serbia finally accepted the
loss of its South Slav empire. Even after that the European Union tried
to hold Serbia and Montenegro together, bullying the Montenegrins into
accepting a lopsided two-country federation (Serbia has twelve times
as many people as Montenegro) in 2003. But the Montenegrins insisted
on the right to a referendum on breaking up that union after three
years, and last Sunday they exercised that right.
Kosovo will almost certainly also get official independence from
Serbia by the end of this year, and there will then be seven countries
where fifteen years ago there was only one. It is very untidy, and you
could certainly accuse some of these countries of being driven by the
“narcissism of small differences.”
But THEY cared about these small differences, and bad things happened
when they were ignored.
Serbia wanted to rule the western Balkans, but it never conquered
the other ethnic groups. They were pushed into Serbia’s arms by great
powers that wanted to keep things simple, and the result was almost
a century of resentment and intermittent murder. Now it’s over, and
they have to learn to live alongside one another again. It will be
much easier if they have some larger context in which to submerge
their differences, and there is one at hand: the European Union.
Slovenia is already an EU member, and Croatia and Macedonia are
candidates. Montenegro is applying now, and Serbia would open talks
tomorrow if it could get around the EU’s insistence that it hand over
the worst Serbian war criminals first. Bosnia will take much longer,
as it remains deeply divided between its Serbian, Croatian and Muslim
“Bosniak” communities, and Kosovo isn’t even officially a country yet.
Will the EU actually take them all in? For the sake of peace in
Europe, it should, but it will be up to 27 governments when Romania
and Bulgaria join next year.
Adding the western Balkans would increase the number of EU member
states with full voting rights by another 20 percent while increasing
the total population by only 5 percent. It’s a lot to ask, and we
won’t know the answer for years.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE EU’S ROLE
Reuters Alert, UK
May 24 2006
Source: Crisis Group
Georgia, Abkhazia, S. Ossetia
Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006: To guarantee its own security,
the EU must become more engaged in resolving the conflicts in the
South Caucasus lest they ignite into full-fledged wars in Europe’s
neighbourhood.
Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role,* the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines the EU’s efforts
to address tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and points out how the EU can do more.
“Greater engagement is a challenge Brussels has only just begun
to address”, says Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project
Director. “There have been a few promising steps, but there is a long
way to go”.
Thus far, others have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement
in the region, but over a decade of negotiations led by the UN in
Abkhazia, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have not produced
comprehensive peace agreements. With its reputation as an “honest
broker”, access to a range of soft and hard power tools, and the lure
of greater integration into Europe, the EU has a greater role to play,
and offers added value to compliment the UN and the OSCE.
To avoid instability on its borders, the EU seeks a ring of
well-governed countries around it. It is further interested in the
South Caucasus to ensure access to Caspian oil and gas, develop
transport and communication corridors between Europe and Asia, and
contain such threats as smuggling, trafficking and environmental
degradation.
As the EU is unlikely to offer membership to Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan any time soon, it must identify innovative means to
impose conditionality on its aid and exercise influence. European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans are being finalised. These offer
a chance for the EU to enhance its role especially if the peaceful
resolution of the conflicts are defined as commitments.
The new EU Special Representative should observe ongoing negotiations
for the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The
Commission has allocated significant funding to rehabilitation in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It should assess how it can start doing
more in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
“The EU is trying to define its role in a new neighbourhood which is
neither at war nor at peace”, says Nicholas Whyte, Director of Crisis
Group’s Europe Program. “If the EU fails to implement its strategic
vision for a secure neighbourhood, its credibility in the region, and
generally vis-a-vis Russia and the U.S., will suffer. More troublingly,
if the South Caucasus conflicts continue to deteriorate, the EU may
find itself unprepared for responding to wars among its neighbours”.
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601 To contact Crisis Group media
please click here *Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:
————- ————————————————– ——
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Instability in the South Caucasus is a threat to European Union (EU)
security. Geographic proximity, energy resources, pipelines and the
challenges of international crime and trafficking make stability in
the region a clear EU interest. Yet, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have the potential to ignite
into full-fledged wars in Europe’s neighbourhood. To guarantee its own
security, the EU should become more engaged in efforts to resolve the
three disputes. It can do so by strengthening the conflict resolution
dimension of the instruments it applies. As the EU is unlikely to offer
membership to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan even in the medium term,
it must identify innovative means to impose conditionality on its aid
and demonstrate influence. This is a challenge that Brussels has only
begun to address.
Since 2003 the EU has become more of a security actor in the South
Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. It has appointed a Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, launched a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, and employed the Commission’s Rapid
Reaction Mechanism to support post “Rose Revolution” democratisation
processes. It has included Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and started Action Plan
negotiations due to end mid-2006. The Commission has allocated some
~@32 million for economic development confidence building programs in
Georgia, and it has cooperated closely with the UN and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Nevertheless, the EU can do more to help resolve conflict in the
region, in particular through the Action Plans currently being
negotiated with each country. For the EU, these are a chance to
enhance and reposition itself in the South Caucasus if they can be
tied to conflict resolution and include specific democratisation,
governance and human rights benchmarks. For the region they may be
an opportunity to map out the reform process concretely. But there
is a long way to go. The EU’s relations are not strong with either
Azerbaijan or, to a lesser extent, Armenia. It does not participate
directly in negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. In and around Nagorno-Karabakh, it has done little for
conflict resolution. It has rarely raised the South Caucasus conflicts
in its high-level discussions with partners and has employed few
sanctions or incentives to advance peace.
To become more effective, the EU must increase its political
visibility. Compared with Russia, the U.S., the UN and the OSCE,
its financial and political engagement in the region has been minimal.
However, as it gives more aid through new and old instruments, its
ability to provide incentives and apply conditionality should grow.
Compared with other actors, the EU can offer added value, with its
image as an “honest broker” free from traditional US/Russia rivalries;
access to a range of soft and hard-power tools; and the lure of
greater integration into Europe.
The arrival of a new Special Representative (EUSR) is an opportune
moment for the EU to strengthen its political presence. The EUSR should
try to become an observer in the three conflict negotiation forums. In
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the Commission has already allocated
significant funding, efficient and well-targeted assistance can give
weight and credibility to the EU’s diplomatic and political efforts.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, rather then wait for an agreement on the
principles of resolution mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU
should begin contingency planning to assist peace implementation now.
Sending military and civilian assessment missions to the region could
give new impetus to a negotiation process which seems to be dangerously
running out of steam. Whether or not a peace agreement is eventually
signed, the EU should be prepared to implement confidence building
programs or – in a worst case – to consider a range of options in
case of an outbreak of fighting. Otherwise, having remained out
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts for over a
decade, either war or peace will find it struggling to catch up in
its own neighbourhood.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the European Union and its Member States:
To increase the EU’s visibility and effectiveness as a political actor
1. Open fully-staffed European Commission Delegations in Baku and
Yerevan.
2. Strengthen the EUSR’s regional presence by at a minimum appointing
a EUSR political analyst in each of the three South Caucasus capitals.
3. Start a public awareness campaign in the region about the EU, its
values, institutions, programs and conflict resolution capabilities.
To take full advantage of the negotiating process for European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans
4. Define the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
as an Action Plan priority for Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the Plan
aimed specifically at ensuring that:
(a) Azerbaijan and Armenia should commit to resolving the conflict
through peaceful negotiations without delay, defining the principles of
an agreement as renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes;
incremental withdrawal of occupied districts; return of displaced
persons; opening of transport and trade routes; and determination of
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a referendum;
(b) Armenia should pledge to encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh
authorities to agree to a peace settlement according to the principles
defined above; and
(c) both states should commit to foster reconciliation, confidence
building and mutual understanding through governmental and
non-governmental channels.
5. Action Plan elements should include clear benchmarking to measure
progress in the development of genuine democracy, good governance,
respect for human rights, the rule of law and free and fair elections;
and the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, whose
reports are made public.
6. Increase public ownership and awareness by engaging civil society in
Action Plan preparation and monitoring (particularly in Azerbaijan),
organising conferences, seminars, and media events, and strengthening
the involvement of parliaments and local authorities.
7. Coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral players to ensure
consistency between the Action Plans and the commitments made to the
Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE, NATO and the UN.
To increase the impact of crisis management and conflict prevention
actions
8. Strengthen the capacity of Commission staff in the region to carry
out post-conflict rehabilitation by offering training in security
sector reform, mediation and reconciliation, confidence building,
and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).
9. Develop more initiatives focused on confidence building across
ceasefire lines and the soft side of conflict-resolution, such as
working with civil society, media, women, youth and former combatants,
and apply community participation to project planning, implementation,
monitoring and follow-up.
10. Increase engagement with non-recognized entities (Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and promote democratisation,
civil society development and the rule of law, not as recognition of
status but as a means to break their isolation, build confidence and
avoid exclusion from broad EU integration processes.
11. Promote European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
funding opportunities, especially in Azerbaijan, and develop an
interim mechanism to distribute funds to local civil society groups,
possibly through a member state embassy or the Europa House, before
an EU delegation opens in Baku.
12. Support new regional programs in particular for students, teachers,
professors and other professional groups including police, judges,
lawyers and journalists.
To prepare for an eventual Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement and
encourage the parties to compromise
13. Seek agreement for the EUSR to participate in the OSCE Minsk
Group as an observer.
14. In the case of the Commission, carry out a needs assessment study
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied territories (including
places where IDPs have settled) even before a framework agreement
on the principles of a settlement is agreed between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
15. In the case of the Council, request the Secretariat to develop
ESDP options in support of peace implementation, send assessment
missions in close cooperation with the OSCE and begin contingency
planning so as to prepare for:
(a) deployment of peacekeepers around Nagorno-Karabakh; and
(b) deployment of a civilian crisis management advisory team to
engage in DDR, security sector reform, mediation, political affairs,
human rights and media issues in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
To support the peaceful resolution of the Georgian-South Ossetian
and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts
16. Expand the Commission’s role in addressing the Georgian-South
Ossetian conflict and finance another tranche of aid to support
projects identified in the OSCE needs assessment.
17. Once Georgia passes the appropriate law and designates a budget
line for its implementation, make funding available to its new property
commission and property restitution fund.
18. Agree a Joint Action to provide financial support for the Joint
Control Commission (JCC) mechanism in April 2006.
19. Request the JCC and the parties to the Geneva process to invite
the EUSR to observe their meetings and activities.
20. Raise the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazia conflicts
at EU-Russia summits and other high-level dialogue forums.
21. Continue the border management assistance mission and facilitate
communication and cooperation between Georgian and Russian border
guards.
22. Agree a Joint Action to support a Georgian-South Ossetian Special
Coordination Centre and joint policing.
Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006
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