Putin the Great?
TCS Daily, DC
July 17 2006
By Nathan Smith
In his TCS article, “G7 + 1 Autocracy,” K. Caldwell Harmon voices an
increasingly common view: that “G8 member countries should examine
whether Russia deserves to be represented in a group intended to
represent the developed, free world,” in view of the way “political
freedom under Vladimir Putin has been heavily curtailed.”
Yet despite, or because of, his moves to centralize power and clip
the wings of civil society, Putin now enjoys a 77 percent approval
rating in Russia, which is probably the highest in the G-8. Why don’t
Russians seem to object to the curtailment of their freedoms?
The Russian language has two words for freedom, neither of which
quite corresponds to civic freedom in the Anglo-American sense.
Svoboda is merely not to be a slave, serf, prisoner, or under foreign
occupation. Russians under the tsars were svobodnye. Volia, which also
means “will,” is like the wild freedom of a Cossack on the steppes. For
generations, Russian writers like Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Nicholas
Berdyaev have struggled to articulate a quixotic “Russian Idea,” which
combines a inner freedom, made possible by spiritual transcendence,
with a communitarian ethos. The Russian Idea is believed to inhere
in the Russian people.
Though not illiberal in itself — it implies no clear political
program — the Russian Idea has been a distraction from the gradualist
pursuit of practical freedoms. Worse, it has periodically morphed into
political utopianism, and helps to explain Russia’s attempts at total
societal transformation, in which the past is completely repudiated,
and the country tries to emulate foreign models.
In the 17th century, Czar Peter I the Great decided to recast Russia
in the Western mold. He introduced Western-style fashion, navigation,
education, and even built a new capital, St. Petersburg, on the Baltic
Sea, as Russia’s “window on Europe.” But Peter the Great was ruthlessly
repressive, all the more so because his expensive Westernization
program required heavy taxation, and provoked cultural resistance.
Next, the revolution of 1917 sought to realize the socialist theory
developed by a foreign philosopher, Karl Marx. The Soviets repudiated
Russia’s past, and desperately tried to industrialize the country
and imitate Western technology. Finally, in 1991, Russia attempted
another societal transformation, this time from communism to democratic
capitalism. Like past Russian revolutions, the 1991 revolution was
a time of grand illusions juxtaposed on social breakdown, chaos,
and impoverishment. The forms of Western practices appeared without
the substance.
Today, while Westerners regard the non-violent fall of communism as one
of history’s better moments, Russians regard the Soviet collapse as a
disaster. With the dissolution of the USSR, millions of Russians found
themselves living in foreign countries. There were mass exoduses from
places where Russians had lived for decades or generations. Wars broke
out between Armenia and Azerbaijan; in Tajikistan; and in Chechnya. The
economy unraveled, and by the mid-1990s, Russia’s official GDP, in
current dollars, had sunk by over 40 percent; Ukraine’s, by over 60
percent; Georgia’s, by almost 80 percent. Male life expectancy in
Russia fell from 65 to 58. For a few years, the centrifugal forces
of regionalism put the very survival of the Russian state in doubt.
The year 1991 for Russia was like the Great Depression and the South
losing the Civil War, rolled into one. Like post-Civil War Southerners,
Russians half realize that the West was right in the Cold War, but
nostalgia and romantic nationalism keep enmity with the West alive
in the Russian imagination. At the same time, after the meaningless
suffering of the 1990s, Russians admire Putin for getting their country
out of its Great Depression, just as an older generation of Americans
once admired Franklin D. Roosevelt.
In the aftermath of the 1991 revolution, Russians have become
pragmatic. A Pew poll in January showed that Russians favor a “strong
leader” (66 percent) over a “democratic government” (23 percent),
and also think that a “strong economy” (81 percent) is more important
than a “good democracy” (14 percent). One might object that these
are false dichotomies. “Democracies, both old and new,” Dick Cheney
said in Vilnius last May, “can follow a course to political stability
and economic prosperity.” In the Russian context, this claim has,
to put it mildly, not much empirical support.
Fareed Zakaria, in his recent book, uses Russia to illustrate his
“illiberal democracy” thesis: Putin is an elected leader who has
restricted freedom, with strong public support. Yet in the same book
he calls Putin a “liberal autocrat.” Which is it — is Russia an
illiberal democracy, or a liberal autocracy?
Maybe both. Putin’s apparatus has stifled criticism of the president
on television, and NTV, the last independent TV channel, was shut down
in 2001, though newspapers have sometimes criticize the president,
and the internet remains uncensored. Putin’s main ally in the Duma,
the Unity party, is short on ideas and long on yes-men. But with the
help of a pliant Duma, Putin has passed reforms that, among other
things, allow private ownership of land, introduced trial by jury,
cut corporate taxes, and most importantly, introduced a flat tax
of 13 percent, which has led to increased revenues and a balanced
budget. That Russian GDP per capita has increased at an average 7
percent per year since Putin came into office owes a good deal, of
course, to high oil prices, but smart macroeconomic policies have
also helped.
Daniel Treisman and Andrei Shleifer recently disputed the black legend
about Russia in a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Russia: A Normal
Country,” by which they mean, “a normal middle-income country.” Point
by point — on elections and democracy, on corruption, on economic
inequality, on press freedom — Treisman and Shleifer argue that,
while Russia has its flaws, its problems are not systematically worse
or different than those of other middle-income countries.
Of course, even if Russia is a normal middle-income country (with
nukes of course), its G8 membership is still anomalous, because,
minus Russia, the G8 is a club of high-income countries. But is
the exclusiveness of the G8 club an end in itself? There may be
practical benefits to giving Russia a seat at the table that, in
some sense, it doesn’t “deserve.” The themes that Russia chose for
this G8 summit are energy security and education. What’s the harm
in Russia leading discussions on these topics? Indeed, Russia has a
comparative advantage on these issues, since Russia itself and the
former Soviet Union generally are both large energy exporters, and
unusually well-educated relative to their level of per capita income.
Given Russians’ recent bad experience with trying to import the Western
model, Western “pressure” or “holding Putin accountable” will go down
badly with normal Russians. For now, Russians have the government that
they want, and they’re tired of Western meddling. We should respect
that. If Russia’s G8 membership gives Russia a stake in a Western-led
international order which otherwise it might be inclined to subvert,
it’s an anomaly worth keeping.
Nathan Smith is a writer living in Washington, DC. He blogs here,
and you can e-mail him here. He has lived and traveled extensively
in eastern Europe, Russia, and other post-Soviet countries, and is
married to a Russian national.
"Democratic Armenia" Union urges US Senate to speed up substitution
“DEMOCRATIC ARMENIA” UNION URGES U.S. SENATE TO SPEED UP SUBSTITUTION
OF U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA
Arka News Agency, Armenia
July 17 2006
YEREVAN, July 17. /ARKA/. “Democratic Armenia” union urges the U.S.
Senate to speed up the substitution of the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia,
the union’s representative, President of the National Press Club
Narine Lazarian reported today. The statement particularly says
about a failure in the U.S. policy in establishing the values
of freedom and democratic development. “The American Embassy,
particularly Ambassador John Evans and also the organizations,
called to contribute to the democratic development in Armenia
are responsible for the failure,” Lazarian said. Besides this,
“Democratic Armenia” union calls the U.S. Senate to speed up the
substitution of the Ambassador. The Armenian lobby of the USA also
urges the Senate to be careful in choosing an ambassador, who can
be devoted to democracy in the name of Armenia’s strengthening and
for the good of improvement of the Armenian-American relations.
According to the position of the Armenians of America, the reason
of the pre-term recall of incumbent U.S. Ambassador John Evans is
his statement on recognition of the Armenian Genocide that he made in
February 2005 during his speech to the Armenian Diaspora in California.
Richard Hogland was assigned new Ambassador to Armenia.
Armenia/Andorra ratify Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Armenia ratifies Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Armenia/Andorra ratify Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Tuesday, 18 July 2006, 10:12 am
Vienna, 17 July 2006: Armenia has deposited its instrument of
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
with the United Nations Secretary-General on 12 July 2006, bringing
the total number of ratifications to 133. The number of ratifying
States in the Eastern Europe geographical region now stands at 20.
Armenia hosts one International Monitoring System (IMS) facility,
an auxiliary seismic station at Garni. The station forms part of
the global network of 337 IMS monitoring facilities which is being
established under the terms of the CTBT to verify compliance with
the terms of the Treaty. The monitoring facilities transmit data via
satellite to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, where
the data are used to detect, locate and characterize events. These
data and IDC products are made available to the States Signatories
for final analysis.
The CTBT bans any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and
adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, the Treaty
was opened for signature on 24 September 1996 at the United Nations
headquarters in New York.
To enter into force, the CTBT must be signed and ratified by the
44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. These States formally
participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on
Disarmament and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at that
time. To date, 34 of the Annex 2 States have ratified the Treaty.
Development Aid Can Be Geared Toward Conflict Resolution In Abkhazia
DEVELOPMENT AID CAN BE GEARED TOWARD CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ABKHAZIA
Monday, July 17, 2006
By Vladimir Socor
Georgia is preparing to exercise its sovereign right to demand the
termination of Russian “peacekeeping” operations on its territory and
their replacement with genuine international peacekeeping missions.
Concurrently, Tbilisi is redoubling efforts to unfreeze not the
conflicts as such (these are not and never were “frozen”) but rather
to unfreeze the frozen negotiations toward political settlements
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Within this context, the role of
international donor agencies and the functions of development aid in
the secessionist enclaves requires some overall political rethinking
and adjustment of goals on the ground.
Until now, those agencies and aid programs have basically aimed
to bring at least minimal improvements to living conditions in
the conflict-torn enclaves. Rarely, if ever, was Western-funded
development assistance conceived as a tool for advancing political
resolution of the conflicts, let alone resolution on terms consistent
with Western interests. This approach should and can now begin to
change by correlating development aid programs more directly with
the goals of conflict resolution. Free from Russian influence on
their decisions, donor agencies are potentially valuable vehicles
for promoting those goals.
A new approach along these lines can now be tested in Abkhazia. For
example, international development aid can contribute significantly
to the rebuilding and resumption of operations of the railroad
section between the Psou and Inguri Rivers. A linchpin in the pre-1991
Trans-Caucasus railroad, that section was destroyed in the 1992-93 war
and awaits reconstruction in a package deal that would also provide
for the Georgian refugees’ safe and orderly return to the Gali
district. Russia’s state railways company lays claim to operating
that section once it is restored.
To ensure politically neutral operation of that section, donor
agencies could facilitate the formation of a Georgian-Abkhaz joint
technical group. Georgian managers and personnel who ran that railroad
prior to 1992 were turned into refugees as a result of the conflict,
and the relevant technical documentation is in Tbilisi since those
events. Having the railroad operated by a joint Georgian-Abkhaz
group is clearly preferable to a Russian takeover that would advance
Abkhazia’s de facto incorporation into Russia. Moreover, Russian
operation of that railroad would probably involve deployment of
railway troops — a specifically Russian institution that handles
many aspects of civilian transport — to Abkhazia on the excuse of
protecting that railroad. Meanwhile, an example of Georgian-Abkhaz
technical cooperation exists at the Inguri hydroelectric power plant,
jointly and continuously operated since 1994.
Donor agencies’ strategy to promote small-scale private-sector
projects particularly in farming can also be adjusted to advance the
resolution of this conflict. In the Ochamchire district, for example,
such assistance can be channeled to joint farming projects that would
be undertaken by local Abkhaz residents and Georgian refugees who
would be returning to their homes in that district. Such projects
can promote the goal of reversing the ethnic cleansing of Georgians
— a goal that can be achieved gradually and with proper economic
incentives to both sides and is central to a political resolution
of the conflict. Also in the Ochamchire district there is need for
an inventory of Georgian-owned houses, preparatory to their eventual
rebuilding to accommodate any returning refugees.
In the Gali district, Georgian refugees have returned in fairly
large numbers to their homes in an unorganized movement that the
Abkhaz authorities could not stop. However, Abkhaz authorities
are subjecting those Georgians to various forms of discrimination
and intimidation. Those problems — as well as organized crime
in the Gali and Ochamchire districts — can best be handled by
an international police force of several hundred, not by military
peacekeeping troops, let alone by Russian Army “peacekeepers.” For
their part, donor agencies are well placed to support the provision
of Georgian-language education in Gali for the returnees’ children,
whom the Abkhaz authorities currently deprive of that right. It
is also clearly necessary at this stage to support the creation of
community representation of refugees who returned to Gali.
Ongoing demographic trends in Abkhazia would also seem to warrant an
adjustment in the aid focus and a more direct correlation of assistance
programs to conflict-resolution goals. According to broadly convergent
estimates by all sides involved, the number of resident ethnic Abkhaz
has dropped to between 50,000 and 60,000 (from an estimated 90,000
a decade ago) through social hardships and emigration; the number of
resident Armenians has slowly but steadily increased to some 55,000
and may rise further, mainly through immigration from Russia’s nearby
Krasnodar krai, where the authorities condone harassment of Armenians;
and the number of returning Georgians in Abkhazia has reached some
55,000, most of them in the Gali district.
These numbers and these proportions suggest that the political as
well as the aid dimensions of conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction are eminently manageable at the local level. By
the same token they underscore the need to face up to the Russian
challenge at the international level, first and foremost by pressing
for withdrawal of Russian troops to clear the way for local processes
toward political settlement.
Aussies escape by bus: Armenian Dance troupe now safe in Syria
Aussies escape by bus
Dance troupe now safe in Syria
Border Mail, Australia
July 18 2006
Members of an Armenian dance troupe who had been stranded in Lebanon
were among 86 Australians safely evacuated from the war-torn country
by bus, braving Israeli bombing attacks to cross to safety into Syria.
A Sydney spokesman for the Sevan Dance Group, Archbishop Aghan
Baliozian, said the 45 young performers and 36 parents and supervisors
had been picked up from their Beirut hotel in a three-bus convoy
yesterday morning.
The busloads of Australians fled Beirut, heading north along the
Mediterranean coast road and early last night crossing the Syrian
border and on to the capital Damascus.
“They had an uneventful trip to Syria and I can confirm they are
now in Damascus,” Archbishop Baliozian said.
“We expect them to be taken to Jordan tomorrow, where they will fly
to Bahrain, and to be in Sydney in two days.”
Thousands more Australians remain trapped in Lebanon as Australia
struggles to get them home, but last night’s successful operation
could be repeated in days to come.
“Tomorrow, we will endeavour to try to repeat this exercise,”
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said as he announced the evacuation
in Adelaide last night.
Hundreds more are set to be evacuated by ship later this week, he said.
Mr Downer had earlier warned of the potential danger of evacuating
Australians by road, saying some Italians fleeing Lebanon had almost
been hit by a missile.
The coastal route north from Beirut to Syria has been used by several
other nations to evacuate their citizens, but convoys have been
held up by Israeli bombing attacks as part of their campaign against
Hezbollah guerillas.
While Mr Downer said earlier yesterday that Australia believed it
had found a safe land route out of Lebanon, he warned: “This is a
difficult and hazardous exercise”.
“It’s a war situation and in a war there are high risks – there
are risks trying to get out of the country, there are risks staying
in the country.”
Mr Downer said he had spoken to Israel’s Foreign Minister before the
busload of Australians departed Beirut, but said Israel had given no
assurances about the safety of those on the buses.
However he said Australia’s close relationship with Israel was a
factor in the operation.
“I really appreciate the fact that we gave the information to the
Israelis about what we were doing and the route we were taking,”
he said.
BAKU: "Core principles on peaceful settlement of Armenia-Azerbaijan
G8: “Core principles on peaceful settlement of Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict should be agreed in 2006”
Today, Azerbaijan
July 17 2006
The G8 Summit of heads of states held in the Russian city of St
Petersburg was closed today.
As APA reports, the final Communique drawn up on behalf of Russia
chairing the G8 summit touches on the Nagorno Karabakh, Kosovo and
other regional conflicts.
The G8 leaders stress importance of finding and agreeing on
core principles on peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh,
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in 2006.
“We confirmed that the Eight Group supports mediating efforts of
the OSCE Minsk Group and stresses importance of soonest reaching an
agreement on core principles for peaceful settlement of the conflict in
2006. We call on Azerbaijan and Armenia to demonstrate political will,
reach an agreement and prepare their peoples for peace not for war,”
the Communique underlines.
URL:
RA Ministry Awards Participants of "Golden Apricot" Film Festival wi
RA CULTURE MINISTRY AWARDS PARTICIPANTS OF “GOLDEN APRICOT” FILM FESTIVAL WITH MEDALS
AZG Armenian Daily #133, 18/07/2006
On Satruday, RA Culture Minister Hasmik Poghosian awarded several well
known foreign film directors with golden medals for their cooperation
with the third “Golden Apricot” international film festival and with
the Armenian film directors. In particular, Tonino Guerra (Italy),
Godfrey Regio(USA), Krzsystof Zanussi(Poland), and Kin Don Khoh (North
Korea) received the medals. Mrs. Poghosian stated in her speech that
not everyone can be a genuine man of art, but those who can really
create art and present their art to millions of people make great
contribution to the cultures of their countries and nations.
The film directors awarded with medals gave various estimation to the
gold medals they received. Thus, Mr. Guerra stated that that was the
second award he received in Armenia, as the first one he received for
his friendship and cooperation with Sergey Parajanov, great Armenian
film director. He said as a joke that he is twice happy. In his turn,
Mr. Zanussi, who greatly contributed to popularization of Parajanov’s
“The Colour of Pomegranates” in Europe, expressed hope that he will
never become a persona non grata. Mr. Kin don Khon and Mr. Godfrey
Regio stated that they will continue cooperating with Armenia in the
future too.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Serge Sargsian States Nagorno Karabakh Had Self-Determined Long Ago
SERGE SARGSIAN STATES NAGORNO KARABAKH HAD SELF-DETERMINED LONG AGO
AZG Armenian Daily #133,
18/07/2006
Opinion
RA Defence Minister Serge Sargsian excludes holding of double
referendum in NKR in coming future. He said this at a press
conference. He added that the referendum may take place only in
case OSCE MG co-chairs or other mediators suggest that and the
international organizations are ready to acknowledge the results of
the referendum. At the same time he emphasized that the referendum
political self-determination in NKR took place long ago.
As for the latest developments is Lebanon, he said that the situation
shaping around the conflict between Lebanon and Israel is dangerous
for the whole region.
“But we can do almost nothing in this case,” he said.
By Nana Petrosian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Armenian Command Is Likely to Wage War Without People
ARMENIAN COMMAND IS LIKELY TO WAGE WAR WITHOUT PEOPLE
Lragir.am
17 July 06
Over the past ten months the U.S. Army has stepped up a single
military operation without reservists. It happened in Grenada, a tiny
island-state. The operation in Iraq required serious mobilization,
including foreign forces. When a military conflict between two states
is prepared, whose troops count several tens of thousand, military
planning cannot overlook the possibility of a lasting and large-scale
war. At the same time, there is information that the Command of Armenia
is likely to resolve all the military problems without reserves. This
stance is devoid of military logic, it is absolutely nonsensical and
is based on the personal and group interests of the Command and the
government. It seems that the possibility of resumption of war is
rather big, and it will be unforgivable to view the upcoming military
operations as a “medium scale” armed conflict. Nobody has the right
to stake the country’s security on obstinate and pointless assertion
of their doubtful views.
It is not a secret that the Armenian Command is hopeful to crush
the rival in a large-scale preventive operation. However, it would
be impossible without increasing significantly the army personnel.
Military experts say the number of reservists and their effectiveness
is sufficient to carry out a successful military operation. However,
it is nevertheless necessary to revive the tradition of Karabakh War
I and create defense squads. Under certain conditions these defense
squads can carry out important military tasks, not only in trenches
but also in offensives. It should be noted that when there was a
scorched smell in the air in spring 1988, 25,500 participants of
the war in Karabakh returned to Armenia within two weeks, including
a number of young people, who had to leave Armenia to look for jobs
abroad. These people, away from the homeland, organized additional and
charter flights and bus trips from the adjacent regions. It was not
the initiative of the government, it was a natural reaction of this
contingent of people. Now it is high time to take up the registration
of volunteers again and implement the project of distributing weapon
to volunteers. If the government in its present state does not trust
these people, who are ready to sacrifice their lives for the Homeland,
how can one trust such a government? However, mobilization after
resumption of military actions seems even more nonsensical. One can
be sure to state that the reason for such a strange behavior of the
Armenian Command is the reluctance to increase the public and political
status of the Armed Forces and the number of people in the society,
who have guns, because it may lead to an attempt of the military
sets to interfere with political matters. Besides a number of reserve
officers most commanders of defense squads in Karabakh War I share this
opinion. Patriots have not forgotten that there are tasks in Karabakh
which have not been fulfilled yet. This contradicts with the concept
of building of the Armenian armed forces and operational plans. No
doubt the stance of the Armenian Command may lead to military success
and may damage the country’s defensive capacity. It is notable that
this stance of the Armenian Command is officially approved by the
Defense Ministry of Nagorno Karabakh Republic.
In this situation the parliaments of Armenia and NKR, political
parties, non-governmental organizations, military experts and the
media must give their evaluation of this stance. In this situation
different views on the country’s security cannot be left out of
debate. Such an important defense potential cannot be allowed to be
used so inefficiently due to personal and group interests of statesmen
and politicians.
If the leadership of the Armenian Ministry of Defense is so generous
as to hope to fulfill military plans with a limited resource,
combatant generals are eventually obliged to express their point
of view, which essentially differs from that of the administration
and the political leadership. The fact that the officer corps and
participants of volunteer organizations are too politicized is a sign
of moral pureness and responsibility of the public rather than internal
threat or non-loyalty to the government. And the idea put forward in
the political sphere that military actions will be sparked if weapon
is distributed to defense squads is nonsense, and nobody believes it.
We Will Not Impose Our Solution on Karabakh Conflict Parties
PUTIN: WE WILL NOT IMPOSE OUR SOLUTION ON KARABAKH CONFLICT PARTIES
Yerevan, July 17. ArmInfo. The G8 leaders will discuss the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem, Rosbalt reports Russian President Vladimir
Putin as saying during a press-conference Sunday.
He said that most of the G8 states, particularly, the US and France,
seek to promote the resolution of this conflict. “We would like Armenia
and Azerbaijan to find acceptable solutions. We will not impose our
solution on either of them,” Putin said.