Azerbaijan appreciates attention to Karabakh problem-spokesman
ITAR-TASS News Agency, Russia
July 18, 2006 Tuesday
By Sevindzh Abdullayeva, Viktor Shulman
Official Baku appreciates attention of the world community to
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as reflected in a statement
by G8 leaders at the summit in St. Petersburg, Azerbaijani Foreign
Ministry spokesman Tair Tagizade said.
“This is a positive fact. We always called and we call on the world
community and its leaders to activate actions to resolve the Karabakh
problem,” he told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.
At the same time, the call by the G8 leaders on the parties in the
conflict “to prepare their people for peace, and not for war” causes
“some cautiousness” of Azerbaijan, Tagizade added.
He said he doubted “ethics of putting forward equal demands to both
sides, one of which, namely Azerbaijan, is a victim of aggression”.
“Azerbaijan preserves commitment to a peaceful settlement of the
conflict,” Tagizade said.
He stated that the activity of the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh,
whose co-chairmen are G8 countries Russia, France and the US, “is
a necessary component of successful progress of the peace talks”
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
“At the same time, we cannot afford holding talks for the sake of
talks. If diplomatic efforts do not yield results, our country has the
sovereign right to restore its territorial integrity,” Tagizade said.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Georgian Parliament Adopted Resolution on Withdrawal of All Russian Peacekeepers from Georgia
PanARMENIAN.Net
18.07.2006 17:04 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The Georgian Parliament today adopted a Resolution
on withdrawal of all Russian peacekeeping forces from Georgia
by 144 votes for. According to Georgian Speaker Nino Burjanadze,
it is a historical document and in compliance with it the Georgian
Government is charged to launch procedures necessary for withdrawal
of all Russian peacekeeping forces from the country. The Resolution
notes the Government is charged “to launch procedures necessary for
stopping peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and former autonomous
district of South Ossetia, immediately start work to change the
peacekeeping format, activate works on proper informing of the
population of Abkhazia and former autonomous district of South
Ossetia, to restore confidence maximally, establishment of standards
of peaceful, democratic life on the territory of Georgia.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

War in Lebanon: Hot Line Opened
PanARMENIAN.Net
18.07.2006 18:15 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ At a conference at the Armenian Government today the
question of assisting evacuation of Armenian citizens and Armenians
from Lebanon was discussed. In the words of Armenian PM Andranik
Margaryan, the situation in the region is very serious. Many Armenians
live there, including Armenian citizens, and state support is necessary
in that situation. Armenian Deputy FM Gegham Gharibjanyan briefed the
participants of the session with latest developments in the region,
emphasizing that twenty-four-hour duty at Armenian Embassies in Lebanon
and Syria, as well as Consulate General in Aleppo has been organized
since Monday. Two diplomats are additionally sent there to deal with
evacuation of Armenian citizens and other issues. He also reported
that 160 Armenian citizens have already arrived in Yerevan through
Syria, while the 120-thousand Armenian community of Lebanon involves
1200 Armenian citizens: the numbers need to be checked. Gharibjanyan
also noted that residence permit for 3 months will be provided free
of charge to all those wishing to move to Armenia. There are many
people on the Syrian border, thus Armenian MFA officers are charged
to solve all problems operatively. In his turn Chief of the General
Board of the Civil Aviation of Armenia Artem Movsisyan provided the
table of flights to Syria, which can be increased if necessary. He
said that as Yerevan-Beirut flight is not available, the number of
air flights to Syria can be increased.
Besides, according to Gharibjanyan, from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. (GMT+4) a hot
line is available: (37410) 58-60-17. The Armenian PM ordered to make an
agreement with Armavia Air Company to organize flights to Syria, which
will be partially funded by the Armenian Government if necessary. An
instruction is given to provide medical and psychological assistance to
those arriving, reports the Press Service of the Armenian Government.

NKR PRESIDENT ARKADY GHOUKASYAN MET WITH FRENCH SCIENTIST HENRI CAGAN
DeFacto Agency, Armenia
July 18 2006
Yesterday Nagorno Karabakh Republic President Arkady Ghoukasyan
received a laureate of the European Union award after Decart,
member of Academy of Science of France, Professor Henri Cagan.
According to the information DE FACTO received at the NKR President’s
Administration, Arkady Ghoukasyan noted the establishment of a viable
democratic society and state was impossible without proper development
of educational system. The President expressed hope that the NKR’s
cooperation with outstanding scientists and scientific centers would
promote qualitative changes in the sphere of higher education and
upbringing of a new generation of professionals

Georgia attempts to ease Armenian discontent
ISN, Switzerland
July 18 2006
Language discrimination, the lack of cultural privileges and scarce
economic opportunities are plaguing the Armenian minority in Georgia.
Georgian government officials and civic activists are taking the
initiative to address the growing discontent among the Armenian
minority and prevent the potential escalation of the growing tensions.
By Florence Mardirossian for Eurasianet (18/07/06)
Officials, academics and nongovernmental organization representatives
are pondering ways to defuse a potential crisis in the Georgian region
of Samtskhe-Javakheti, where discontent is brewing among the area’s
Armenian community.
Some local leaders and civic activists warn of socio-political
trouble if no action is taken to address the demands of the local
Armenian community for expanded language rights and other cultural
privileges. Discontent has already reached the point where one local
Armenian cultural organization – United Javakhk – reportedly adopted
a statement in early July calling on the Georgian government to grant
the region autonomy status.
The language issue is intertwined with other issues, namely a
lack of economic opportunity in the region. Most Armenians in
Samtskhe-Javakheti don’t speak Georgian, and they say the Georgian
government should do more to protect their cultural traditions.
Georgian officials, meanwhile, want Armenians living in the region to
learn Georgian. Some quietly question the sincerity of the Armenian
community’s desire to integrate.
The compulsory use of the Georgian language for education is the
chief source of discontent among Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Ethnic Armenian demands also include an acknowledgment of the Armenian
genocide of 1915, a removal of the ban on teaching Armenian history,
the adoption of new laws covering minority rights and self-governance.
A recent roundtable discussion, held in the regional center of
Akhalkalaki, sought to bring all sides together to discuss problems and
explore possible solutions. Participants – including local politicians,
experts and NGO representatives from Georgia and Armenia, generally
agreed that giving the region autonomous status was not a viable
option, especially given Tbilisi’s experience with separatism in
Abkhazia, Ajara and South Ossetia over the past 15 years.
At the same time, attendees suggested that Tbilisi couldn’t ignore the
complaints of local Armenians. One of the event’s chief organizers,
Sevak Artsruni, head of the Armenian union of NGOs for repatriation
and settlement cautioned that cultural issues, left unaddressed,
could develop into a major headache for Tbilisi.
Samtskhe-Javakheti sits along a trade corridor that is growing in
geopolitical importance. In particular, the recently inaugurated
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline runs through the territory. As a
result, international development funds have been earmarked for
local infrastructure improvement, including over US$100 million in
US assistance made available under the Millennium Challenge program
for local road construction and renovation. The region also figures
prominently in plans to build a rail link connecting the Turkish city
of Kars and the Azerbaijani capital of Baku.
“Socio-economic projects could bring stability if the cultural and
linguistic rights of the Armenian minority were respected,” he said.
“But if ethnic Armenians do not take part in these projects, the
cultural problem could turn political and Javakheti could definitely
[encounter] a crisis.”
Meanwhile, another conference participant, Georgian political scientist
Ghia Nodia, said tension in Samtskhe-Javakheti is a reflection of poor
local governance in Georgia. “Many people are calling for autonomy
because local democracy […] is weak or does not work,” Nodia said.
Mutual suspicion marks relations between ethnic Armenians and
Tbilisi. Last March, tension boiled over and resulted in a prolonged
period of rioting, ignited by the killing of an ethnic Armenian in
a brawl.
The political atmosphere became charged following the Rose Revolution
in November 2003 and has been exacerbated by the decision to withdraw
Russian troops from a permanent base in Akhalkalaki by the end of 2007.
The base was a major source of employment for the Armenian community,
providing well-paying jobs for roughly 10,000 civilians. The Georgian
government has promised to implement programs that diminish the
economic impact of the Russians’ departure, but Armenians remain
skeptical. Many view President Mikheil Saakashvili’s administration
as focused mainly on nationalist concerns, namely reestablishing
Tbilisi’s authority over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Speaking at the Akhalkalaki roundtable in early June, Meka
Elbakidze, an analyst with the Caucasus Institute for Peace,
Development and Democracy (CIPDD), provided a road map for a Georgian
conflict-prevention strategy. Tbilisi should focus on the linguistic
issue and ethic Armenian’s disenfranchisement from local and national
politics, he suggested.
Georgian officials seem interested in exploring solutions to Javakheti
dilemmas. During a mid-July meeting, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab
Noghaideli discussed with his Armenian counterpart Andranik Markarian
the feasibility of opening an Armenian-Georgian university in Tbilisi,
according to news accounts of the meeting. In addition, Markarian
said the Armenian government was prepared to assist in efforts to
improve Samtskhe-Javakheti’s infrastructure.
Eurasianet provides information and analysis about political, economic,
environmental, and social developments in the countries of Central Asia
and the Caucasus, as well as in Russia, the Middle East, and Southwest
Asia. The website presents a variety of perspectives on contemporary
developments, utilizing a network of correspondents based both in the
West and in the region. The aim of Eurasianet is to promote informed
decision making among policy makers, as well as broadening interest
in the region among the general public. Eurasianet is operated by
the Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute.

New Investigation Opened Against Hrant Dink for ‘Insulting Turkish
Identity’
By Cihan News Agency
Tuesday, July 18, 2006
zaman.com
The chief public prosecutor of the Sisli district of Istanbul has
initiated an investigation into ethnic Armenian journalist and writer
Hrant Dink for allegedly insulting and denigrating the Turkish identity
in a statement he made to Reuters news agency on July 14.
Hrant Dink, editor of the Agos newspaper which serves Turkey’s Armenian
community, told Reuters on July 14, “Of course I call this a genocide
because the result defines itself and gives itself the name. You can
see for yourself that a people that have lived on this land for 4000
years no longer exists in that region due to these events.”
The fate of the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during WW1 and
after remains a sensitive issue in Turkey.
Armenians claim that 1.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman
Empire were killed as part of an intentional and systematic campaign
of genocide during World War I.
Turkey denies the allegations claiming that 200,000 Armenians
died during the forced migrations due to cold weather and poor
transportation conditions.
Last week, the Turkish Appeals Court upheld a suspended verdict
against ethnic Armenian editor Hrant Dink. In October last year,
Sisli Court in Istanbul had given Dink a 6-month suspended sentence
on charges of insulting the Turkish identity.
In his column for the Turkish Armenian daily Agos dated February 13,
2004, Dink had likened Turkish nationalism to carcinogenic tumors
and poisoned blood in its responsibility for genocide.
Today’s Appeals Court statement said that there was no doubt that
Dink’s statement ridiculed and insulted ‘Turkishness’.
For further information please visit
–Boundary_(ID_qUO16Bnfw pvx25CoKQ40Iw)
Content-type: message/rfc822; CHARSET=US-ASCII
Content-description:
From: “Katia M. Peltekian”
Subject: ANKARA: New Investigation Opened Against Hrant Dink for ‘Insulting
Turkish Identity’
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-transfer-encoding: 8BIT
Zaman, Turkey
July 18 2006
New Investigation Opened Against Hrant Dink for ‘Insulting Turkish
Identity’
By Cihan News Agency
Published: Tuesday, July 18, 2006
zaman.com
The chief public prosecutor of the Sisli district of Istanbul has
initiated an investigation into ethnic Armenian journalist and writer
Hrant Dink for allegedly insulting and denigrating the Turkish
identity in a statement he made to Reuters news agency on July 14.
Hrant Dink, editor of the Agos newspaper which serves Turkey’s
Armenian community, told Reuters on July 14, “Of course I call this a
genocide because the result defines itself and gives itself the name.
You can see for yourself that a people that have lived on this land
for 4000 years no longer exists in that region due to these events.”
The fate of the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire during WW1 and
after remains a sensitive issue in Turkey.
Armenians claim that 1.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman
Empire were killed as part of an intentional and systematic campaign
of genocide during World War I.
Turkey denies the allegations claiming that 200,000 Armenians died
during the forced migrations due to cold weather and poor
transportation conditions.
Last week, the Turkish Appeals Court upheld a suspended verdict
against ethnic Armenian editor Hrant Dink. In October last year,
Sisli Court in Istanbul had given Dink a 6-month suspended sentence
on charges of insulting the Turkish identity.
In his column for the Turkish Armenian daily Agos dated February 13,
2004, Dink had likened Turkish nationalism to carcinogenic tumors and
poisoned blood in its responsibility for genocide.
Today’s Appeals Court statement said that there was no doubt that
Dink’s statement ridiculed and insulted ?Turkishness?.
For further information please visit
______________________________________________ ____
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around

–Boundary_(ID_qUO16Bnfwpvx25CoKQ40Iw)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Spanish Security Forces Bust Armenian-Bulgarian Ring for Stealing Luxury Cars
Focus, Bulgaria
July 18 2006
Madrid. Spanish security forces have busted an Armenian-Bulgarian
organized criminal group that dealt with stealing luxury cars, the
online agency La Verdad reports.
The group was working on the territory of the Spanish provinces
Valencia and Alikante and also in the region of Madrid. According to
information of police, the thefts were made on request of “customers”
of the organization. The stolen vehicles were re-sold in different
countries with faked documents. The members of the group often used
threats and aggression in their activity.
According to the agency a total of 13 people, citizens of Bulgaria
and Armenia, were held during the police operation. The exact number
of Bulgarians was not reported.

IFC Announces its First Equity Investment in an Armenian Bank
International Finance Corporation (IFC)

July 18 2006
The International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the
World Bank group, has agreed to buy a 10 percent stake in Inecobank
of Armenia. This is IFC’s first equity investment in an Armenian bank.
In June, IFC announced it will provide Inecobank with a $3 million
senior loan to grow its small and medium enterprise and residential
mortgage portfolios.
Edward Nassim, IFC’s director of Central and Eastern Europe, said,
“We are pleased to begin our partnership with Inecobank. With IFC’s
financing, the bank will substantially expand its mortgages financing
program, which will play an important role in raising living standards
of Armenian citizens.”
Armenia became an IFC member in 1995. The Corporation began investing
in the country in 2000. As of July 2006, IFC has invested $17.29
million in five projects. IFC continues to explore the investment
opportunities in partnership with strategic investors in both
the financial and real sectors of the country. In addition to the
investment program, IFC has been providing advisory services on
corporate governance, improvement of the investment climate, and
small and medium enterprise development.
About Inecobank Inecobank is one of the 10 largest Armenian banks
by equity and assets with a market share of about 4 percent. The
bank had net worth of approximately $12 million and total assets of
approximately $40 million equivalent as of the end of 2005. It owns
a network of six commercial offices in Yerevan as well as in the
main Armenian regions (Shirak, Lori, and Armavir). Today the bank
focuses on serving small and medium enterprises and retail clients,
especially in consumer financing, where the bank has been a pioneer
and still is the market leader.
About IFC The mission of IFC, part of the World Bank Group, is to
promote sustainable private sector investment in developing countries
as a way to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives. IFC finances
private sector investments in emerging markets, mobilizes capital
in the international financial markets, helps clients improve social
and environmental sustainability, and provides technical assistance
and advice to governments and businesses. From its founding in 1956
through FY05, IFC has committed more than $49 billion of its own
funds and arranged $24 billion in syndications for 3,319 companies
in 140 developing countries. For more information, visit

Vladimir Kazimirov: Conformism to whims and “creeping” concessions
resulted in a deadlock in Karabakh peace process
Regnum, Russia
July 18 2006
The report on Karabakh presented by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs
to the OSCE Permanent Council and their recent statements have shed
some light on the content of the private consultations between the
Azeri and Armenian presidents and FMs on the sensitive points of the
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict settlement.
The objective of the co-chairs was not only to report on their work and
to press on the leaders of the conflicting parties, but also to start
“making their people ready for peace” instead of them. Now they are
discussing the pluses and minuses of the peace process for each side,
but if they actually want to ensure peace, they should better give
this problem a wider approach.
Some media have presented the texts of the report and the statements
with lots of inaccuracies in translation, which is giving rise to
false rumors. For as long as more Armenians and Azeris know Russian
better than English, such documents should be made in Russian. They
in Vienna translate into English more expertly than they in the South
Caucasus – from English.
I would like to start with seemingly formal cavil at the co-chairs’
texts. They should better abstain from using in vain such significant
terms as “principles” and “agreement.” Here the question is hardly
about “basic principles,” let alone “framework agreement.” The
co-chairs have given just general contours rather than specific –
and by no means new – principles.
True, they are trying to apply two real principles in Karabakh:
non-application of force and threats of force and peaceful resolution
of disputes. Here they must be given all-out support!
It is very early to speak about “framework agreement” yet. Even if the
parties agreed on specific “principles,” it would be just political
arrangement between the two parties rather than final agreement. It
would take a long time to negotiate each element into a full-value
legally-binding agreement.
Another problem is the circle of agreeing parties. It doesn’t befit
the co-chairs to hope that Armenia will talk Karabakh into agreement.
How can one hope to oblige the Karabakh Armenians to withdraw their
troops from the five districts outside NK unless they also sign the
agreement? And what a line they should be withdrawn to? Full agreement
requires consent of all conflicting parties (like was the case during
the May 12, 1994 truce). There is no other way, like it or not.
In this light, it is surprising to see the careless mention of
“two parties,” “both parties” in the Vienna text. Three parties to
the Karabakh conflict is something that has long been recognized in
OSCE documents and by the OSCE MG co-chairs. Who and when has changed
this approach? Where is the decision? Conformism to somebody’s whims,
“creeping” concessions just for continuing, at least, some kind of
talks leads to deadlocks and failures. And we can see the result.
The co-chairs say they are successors just to what has been done in the
last nine years. Strange dating, isn’t it! The US and France joined
in 1997, but Russia had already been both co-chair and independent
mediator by that time. There had been other chairs and co-chairs in
the OSCE MG too. A whole range of settlement ideas was worked out long
ago. And the whole work of the mediators is based on the cease-fire
agreement attained through Russia’ mediation in 1994.
Let’s proceed to the main point – to the gist of the problems. One
can’t start from peace settlement (from withdrawing troops from
occupied territories) and then … come what may. Peace process
sustainability and guarantees are mentioned just casually as
something closing the primary measures, while the first and foremost
“unconditional condition” (sine qua non) must be the absolute refusal
by all the conflicting parties to use force and to make any attempts
to resume war. This may require international affirmation – perhaps,
by the UN Security Council. This must not be left just outlined but
unfinished. This is a kind of “zero cycle” – something to be finished
before the beginning of the “first stage.”
The key source of threat to the Karabakh peace process is Azerbaijan,
who can’t put up with its failures during that war. This is generally
known and can be seen with the naked eye: bellicose statements, calls
for arms race and revenge, encouraged hostility towards Armenians,
breach of contacts with them. In fact, Baku rejects the co-chairs’
proposals more frequently and strongly. That’s why the co-chairs
should closely follow Azerbaijan’s positions and arguments to see
and to show what and why is unacceptable and inappropriate in them.
What the co-chairs propose now is “most of the territories in exchange
for promise of referendum on NK’s status (without saying exactly when
and how). This proposal specifies only the withdrawal of Armenians
from five districts, leaving almost everything substantial from the
rest in total uncertainty. It is naive to expect that the parties
will agree on the referendum later. So, it means there will be no
referendum at all. This would leave unsettled the key problem of the
conflict, the status of NK, the problems of Qalbajar and Lachin and
the selfsame potential danger of new war – but this is exactly what is
inadmissible. The co-chairs should move farther than that in the very
first agreement (by both ensuring the “zero cycle” and elaborating,
at least, some ground terms of the referendum).
This must not be left until later. People’s will is decisive for
determining the status of NK. In a sensitive and conflict-prone region
like the South Caucasus, the international community must discourage
any attempts to settle problems by threats or blood. This is equally
applicable to the recent past – the military success of Armenians in
1992-1994 – and, especially, to the future – the absurd revenge dreams
of some Azeris – even though we know the results of both the pre-war
referendum and the “bullet voting.” This problem needs civilized
approach with no military confrontation. One must not regard Karabakh
as just somebody’s territory and ignore the opinion of its people.
Law rather than force must decide here.
Baku refers to its Constitution saying that referendum in Azerbaijan
is possible only on a nationwide scale. However, they forget that
they adopted this constitution in late 1995 exactly to prevent people
in Karabakh and other regions from expressing their will. The use
of basic law as just a weapon for political propaganda may recoil
in irreversible change of it, particularly, in this point. In fact,
any outcome of the dispute over NK will require drastic changes in
the Azeri Constitution.
If Baku is actually so zealous in observing its Constitution,
then it should also more often remind its people about Article 9 of
the same Constitution saying that war must not be a way to resolve
international conflicts.
One more inaccuracy is the neglect of the succession from the
Azeri SSR – something that is now preventing Baku from asserting its
“legacy.” The authors of the Constitution 1995 were so eager to avoid
any mention of the Azeri SSR that when abrogating the Constitution 1978
they even failed to give their new republic a legally correct name. So,
the trick with the Constitution is not working out. Today, voting on
their own status are only those whom it concerns directly rather than
indirectly (Quebec rather than Canada; Catalonia rather than Spain).
Concerning the referendum itself. Why put off the date of referendum
for as many as 10-15 years (i.e. for the period after the second term
of the Azeri president). Why can’t they hold the referendum 4-5 years
after they start implementing the cherished agreement? Of course,
the Azeris who lived in Karabakh before the war and their children
born there should also be allowed to vote. They should be allowed
to go back to their homes, but also to know under what authorities
they are going back. They may as well vote from distance (the way
they did during the last parliamentary elections) lest there might
be any incidents leading to escalating tensions and failing referendum.
The co-chairs should not avoid these issues (nor keep them secret, or
leave them until later). The remaining problems are not so disputable
even though they too will require persistence from both the parties
and the mediators.
The right to voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to
their former homes is one of the axioms of settlement, but – only
for all sides. If those people refuse to return they should have the
right to compensation. All districts should be deeply demilitarized
before the finalization of NK’s status. The security of the returnees
should be ensured by peacekeepers from outside and sufficient civil
police forces from inside.
In order to make their peacekeeping operation effective and compact,
the mediators should deploy international observers along two lines
(the present contact line and the external line of withdrawal) and 2-3
mobile shock groups in between. The key task of those groups would
be to prevent any attempts to wreck the demilitarization process by
any of the parties and to react to “spontaneous” actions by civilians
(this mechanism is not new). By the time of the agreement signing,
the parties will have to determine the national composition of the
observers and peacekeepers.
By their slyness the parties to the Karabakh conflict hinder the
co-chairs in their search for solutions, but the latter are so tactful
that they are sometimes “ashamed” to call “a spade a spade.” For the
former co-chairs, things are much easier. The parties have created
lots of myths and propaganda tricks about the conflict.
Some people like showing the exterior and hiding the interior: they
cry about occupation but are silent about its origin. Today Azeris
are giving a humanitarian overtone to their demands for eliminating
occupation and repatriating refugees. They are blaming Armenians
for occupation but are covering their own sins: their persistent
reluctance to stop war in 1992-1994 (they broke cease fire agreements
for four times! and shirked peace initiatives) (Armenians also dodged
but never avoided such agreements). Now they face the music: loss of
seven districts and hundreds of thousands of refugees. How it all
began is a taboo subject in Azerbaijan as it casts a big shadow on
Elchibey and an even bigger shadow on the all-national leader.
Today Azerbaijan appeals to the four UN SC resolutions 1993 and
demands their observance, but neither Armenians nor Azeris themselves
have so far observed any single requirement from these resolutions
(except for the cease-fire). It was exactly Baku who for a whole year
ignored the key requirement of all the resolutions by trying to take
upper hand by force (and it was then that the UN SC stopped making
resolutions on Karabakh at all). A few days ago the former advisor of
the Azeri presidents Vafa Guluzade said: “The UN SC resolutions must
be observed, full stop!” Did he advise this to Elchibey and Heydar
Aliyev in 1993-1994? Or, probably, they refused to listen to him?
If it was actually a matter of humanity – the way they in Baku say –
they would have long liberated some of the districts and taken back
hundreds of thousands of refugees, in the meantime, considering the
return of the others, including of 45,000 residents of NK. It might
seem that the gaping discrepancy in figures would urge Baku to show
flexibility.
Nothing of the sort! So, it turns out that their point is not solely
the sufferings of the refugees. In fact, the co-chairs have failed to
get the conflicting parties to directly admit that the status of NK
is the key disputed problem. Everybody in the world understands this,
but not everybody concerned admits: each side says that Karabakh
is “indisputably” its own territory – something only its present
and former residents can say. If they recognized the key subject of
their dispute, this would make a civilized democratic resolution much
easier. Today everybody cares for democracy, don’t they?
Putting the blame for the loss of Karabakh on the People’s Front of
Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev perfectly understood that he could not get
it back and was close to swapping it for the occupied territories. He
just sought some compensation (like corridor via Meghri) and a decent
way to formalize the deal. He stopped when he saw that his supporters
were leaving him.
For the present Azeri president concessions (something that is really
indispensable for resolution) are even more dangerous. Insuring
himself against agreements, Ilham Aliyev is raising the demands: now
he refuses “to yield” even Karabakh but, at the same time, he avoids
normal ways to settle the related dispute. He contradicts his own
self: he first says that his patience is not limitless and then calls
for patience in order to gain strength and to force Armenians into
capitulation. He is also contradictory on peace and war (not mentioning
that war is absolutely incompatible with the Azeri Constitution and
that the relapse of violence may have extremely negative consequences
for both sides). There is also an obvious reluctance to understand
the specificity of the tectonic epoch of collapse of the USSR and
other states in Europe and no less obvious preference of general
wordings about justice, international law and territorial integrity
(something more like spells) to specific discussions and concrete
arguments. Hardly any leader of nation can feed his domestic public
opinion with such products, not mentioning exporting them abroad.
This all makes peace agreement impossible and condemns the co-chairs
to a forced pause and half-truth – and the displaced persons (“over
million”!) to further vegetation.
With all my respect for my co-chair-colleagues, I dare say that
they should more actively engraft the commitment to peace and
non-application of force in the conflicting parties – something they
really should do instead of ramming settlement recipes. Azerbaijan and
Armenia have repeatedly undertaken these commitments – particularly,
before the OSCE – and how are they honoring them? In fact, they are
breaking them directly and repeatedly by continuing mutual threats.
That’s what the mediators should give not only the rest of 2006 but
also the following two years too, if they really want to come as close
as possible to real peace agreement. And this does not obligatorily
require consideration by G8 now and even by UN SC for the time being.
Vladimir Kazimirov – Ambassador; in 1992-1996 head of Russia’s
mediatory mission; plenipotentiary representative of the Russian
President on Nagorno Karabakh; member and co-chair of the OSCE Minsk
Group from Russia; presently, deputy chairman of the Association of
Russian Diplomats.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Georgian-Russian Relations at an All-time Low
Russia Profile, Russia
July 18 2006
TBILISI, Georgia. Since Mikheil Saakashvili and his Rose
revolutionaries came to power in 2003, relations between Georgia and
Russia have plummeted from strained cooperation to mutual distrust
and even hatred; bilateral communication between the two countries is
almost impossible without accusations and insults flying. On taking
the helm, Saakashvili’s government made two key promises, both of
which Moscow found extremely distasteful: Georgian control would be
restored in the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both
currently under Russian influence, and Georgia would be repositioned
internationally, pulling the South Caucasus country firmly away from
Moscow’s sphere of influence and integrating it as quickly as possible
into the “Euro-Atlantic community.” While the first of these promises
has not yet been fulfilled, the second task is well underway.
The first clue to the change of geopolitical orientation in Georgia
comes immediately upon landing at the Tbilisi airport, where Westerners
breeze through passport control with a cursory passport check, while
Russians have their visas studied laboriously. The main route from
the airport is the recently renamed George W. Bush Street, leading to
Freedom Square (formerly Lenin Square) in the heart of the city. Just
off the square stands the newly opened Museum of the Soviet Occupation,
a set of exhibits detailing the “repression of the Georgian people”
between 1921 and 1991. The symbolism and timing of the museum’s opening
irked Russian President Vladimir Putin so much that he complained at
length to Saakashvili at their bilateral meeting in St. Petersburg
in June, pointing out that many of the top figures in the so-called
occupation, such as Joseph Stalin and Lavrenty Beria, were in fact
ethnic Georgians. According to a source in the Georgian government,
Saakashvili’s response was reportedly to suggest offering funds for
Putin to open a Museum of the Georgian Occupation in Moscow.
The tough words between the two countries at the highest levels have
not been restricted to private meetings, however. The spats have a
childish feel to them, with both sides crying that the other started
the hostile moves. Russia bans imports of Georgian wine in a move
that seems overtly political; a Georgian minister responds that the
Russian market is so low-grade that “even feces can be sold.” Putin
calls for referenda in the conflict zones of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia; Georgians accuse Russia of military provocations on
Georgian territory. The list goes on and on. One of the bitterest
clashes came in the heart of winter, when pipeline explosions in
the North Caucasus caused a disruption in gas supplies from Russia
to Georgia for several days in January. When Saakashvili accused
Russia of “sabotage,” the Russian Foreign Ministry responded that
the Georgians were suffering from “hysteria and bacchanalia.” Shota
Utiashvili, head of the Information and Analysis Department at the
Interior Ministry, explained the Georgian suspicions. “Three pipelines
exploded at the same time. Our prime minister repeatedly tried to
call the Russian prime minister, but first they said he was busy,
then he was ill. We offered to send our experts to look at the pipes,
but the Russians refused. Our people were freezing, so we started
importing gas from Azerbaijan. The Russians then decreased the flow
to Azerbaijan.” After this, asked Utiashvili, what conclusions could
the Georgian side draw? “What do they say in Russia when these crises
occur? People say they blame Georgia, but I just can’t understand how,”
he said with seemingly genuine bewilderment.
“Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia-Russia relations have
probably been the most difficult set of relations in the whole
post-Soviet space,” said Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “There was
always a perception in the Georgian elite that Russia is the main
enemy, and with the arrival of Saakashvili, these kinds of sentiments
have become mainstream.”
The overwhelming view in Georgian political circles is that the
problem for Russia is simply Georgia’s aspirations to Western-style
democracy and prosperity. Temuri Yakobashvili, executive vice president
of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies,
a Tbilisi-based think tank, presented the choice facing the Georgian
leadership as simple. “We see countries that were in as difficult
a position as Georgia at the fall of the Soviet Union, but are now
integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. The EU and NATO have
transformed these Central and Eastern European states into viable
democracies,” he said. “It’s obvious that Euro-Atlantic integration is
the solution,” said the analyst. Antonenko, on the other hand, believes
that the equation might not be so simple for the Georgians. “I’m not
sure that Georgia benefits at all from turning away from Russia,” she
said. “It’s na?ve to think that the West will risk its relationship
with Russia over Georgia, and Georgia suffers much more than Russia
does from the worsening in relations.”
Nevertheless, all over the country, the rhetorical shift from a
post-Soviet to a pre-EU society is startling. At official government
buildings, on billboards, even in giant horticultural arrangements,
the four crosses of the Georgian flag appear alongside the yellow stars
of the European Union’s. Flying the flags ahead of actual membership
of the institutions seems aimed at convincing both Georgians and
foreigners that the trajectory chosen by the Saakashvili government
is irreversible. Unlike in other CIS countries, the second language
in official circles has become English, and most ministers and top
government officials speak the language fluently.
The corridors of the Defense Ministry are lined with photographs of
Georgian troops in both peacekeeping and combat action. Georgia, as
a more-willing-than-most member of the “Coalition of the Willing,”
has around 900 troops in Iraq, the highest per-capita number of any
country. Georgian troops are also in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In his
office, Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava sits in front of two
large flags – Georgian and NATO. “Before the Rose Revolution, there
was basically no army and no combat capability,” says Kudava. “Now
our troops are well trained and equipped to NATO standards. Before,
nobody wanted their children to join the army. Now, salaries have
increased by between six and 15 times, and it’s a prestigious job.
There is good morale and a sense of patriotism in the army.”
Yakobashvili believes that the choice to look west is logical.
“There’s nothing that Russia can offer us from a security point of
view,” he says. “What kind of security cooperation might Russia
offer? They would train our officers, but do we really want this
training? The Russian army is riddled with ‘dedovshchina,’ [hazing]
there is inappropriate use of funds, loss of equipment and so on.
It’s not an army that you’d wish to copy.”
“A good way to look at how well Georgia is progressing with European
integration is to look at the statements coming out of the Russian
Foreign Ministry,” said the Interior Ministry’s Utiashvili. “If they
are absolutely livid, it means we are doing well, but if they go
quiet for a while, we realize we must be doing something wrong.”
Utiashvili had just returned from Rome, where a Georgian delegation
was making connections with the new government of Romano Prodi. In
contrast to these closely forged links with EU countries and the United
States, Utiashvili said there was very little routine interaction
between Georgian and Russian ministries. “We have perfectly good
relations and frequent contacts with the governments in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. They have different political systems, but it’s none of
our business, we can still deal with them. The problem with Russia
is that they always want to interfere with our affairs.” Antonenko,
however, feels that there might be more the Georgian side could do
to engage Russia. “It’s very strange that the Georgians have failed
completely to identify any positive agenda with Russia – they are
the only country in the CIS that has failed to do so,” she said.
“Russian-Azeri relations were also strained, and there was also
the issue of meddling in internal affairs over Karabakh. But now
Azerbaijan has managed on the one hand to have friendly relations
with the United States, including discussing U.S. military bases
on Azeri territory, and on the other to retain good relations with
Russia.” She also pointed to the situation in Ukraine, where both
sides have made moderately successful attempts to mend relations in
the aftermath of the Orange Revolution.
Not everyone in Georgia is happy with the course that the Rose
Revolution has taken since the triumphant parliament takeover in
November 2003, when almost every pro-democracy politician in the
country jumped on the Saakashvili bandwagon to rid the country of
the government of Eduard Shevardnadze. Though individual opposition
parties remain marginal, the chorus of discontented voices is
growing. The most frequent accusations are that Saakashvili wheels
out the “freedom and democracy” rhetoric for Western leaders, but
the reality for ordinary Georgians is somewhat different. “Personal
freedoms are still sacrificed to achieve bigger societal objectives,”
said David Usupashvili, chairman of the Republican Party, a moderate
opposition force. “There’s no room for the rule of law, human rights
or other basic principles of democracy,” he continued. A particular
sticking point is a high-profile murder case in which high-level
Interior Ministry officials are implicated in a cover-up.
When it comes to relations with Russia, Usupashvili feels that
Saakashvili’s “childish rhetoric” has inflamed the situation: “We
need to engage with Russia, and to behave as a mature government
that is willing to guarantee its own security, but also doesn’t
pose a threat to anyone.” However, even the opposition leaders feel
that Moscow’s intentions are hostile. “It’s more than clear that the
current Russian government and leadership do not want a civilized and
normal relationship with Georgia, nor do they want to recognize its
territorial integrity,” said Usupashvili. “There would be no talk of
NATO if it weren’t for the security threat coming from Russia. We saw
in the 1990s what it means to be alone facing Russia with its unclear,
unbalanced policies in the Caucasus region.”
A particular thorn in the side of bilateral relations are the “frozen
conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia has recently
been doing its best to thaw out. Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili
recently promised that if he does not celebrate the coming new year in
the South Ossetian capital, he will resign. In Tbilisi, the conflicts
are seen not as independence struggles but as proxy conflicts fought
by Russia to retain influence in the South Caucasus.
“There are two sides in these conflicts,” said Kudava. “But it’s not
like Russia would like us to believe. This is not between Georgians
and Ossetians, or between Georgians and Abkhaz. These are conflicts
between Russia and Georgia.”
Georgians at all levels are adamant that the impetus for improved
relations with Russia has to come from Russia itself. “Russia
should understand that it is in its best interests to have a stable,
prosperous, integrated and unified Georgia,” said Kudava. “We need
Russia to be more flexible and constructive, and have stability on
the southern slopes of the Caucasus.” Even those ordinary Georgians
who fondly eulogize that the standard of living was better in the
Soviet Union seem to have no warm feelings for the current Russian
leadership. Criticism and non-comprehension of the Putin government
is almost universal. But ultimately, it is Georgia that will lose
out the most from the current state of affairs. “Georgia, after all,
is not an island in the Indian Ocean,” said Antonenko. “It’s on the
border with Russia and it cannot afford to have such poor relations
with its northern neighbor.”