ARMENIAN ORGANIZATION REMONSTRATES AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY OF POSSIBLE US AMBASSADOR
19:5 3 08/21/2006
The Armenian Aryan Order has expressed its protest against attempts
to appoint Richard Hoagland new US Ambassador to Armenia. The Order
has issued a statement concerning the issue. REGNUM publishes the
statement translated from Russian.
“The excuse for recalling current US Ambassador John Evans looks rather
strange. It has caused great disappointment in the whole Armenian
community, as the main reason for recalling John Evans was the word
‘genocide’ pronounced by him, when he meant the Armenian Genocide
during which over 1.5 million Armenians were slaughtered. It is a
serious signal for us, Armenians, so, deriving form the reason to
exchange the ambassador we change our attitude towards the US policy
as well.
‘The fact that the US administration is going to replace John Evans
with Richard Hoagland, who, according to Armenian and Tajik media,
is a homosexual, is a humiliation, disrespect for the Armenian nation
that holds traditions sacred. Thus, the US administration is trying
to strike two purposeful blows, both political and moral ones. If they
manage to do it, Armenian society will be left nothing but boycotting
activities of the US embassy in order at least by this to disgrace
those who are trying to disgrace us.
‘We call upon the Armenian authorities, the whole Armenian community to
raise a protest wave by all possible means against possible nomination
of the homosexual ambassador. Armenia is not a training ground for
those ill and demented. Messrs Americans, stop immoral games!”

UNHCR: ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA COMPREHEND THE IMPORTANCE OF REFUGEE PROBLEM
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 21, 2006
“Armenia can count for cooperation with the UN in questions of
returning refugees and IDPs,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Antonio Guterres has announced at a news conference in Yerevan on
outcomes of his work visit.
According to him, at present moment the UN has been carrying out a
program of refugee census. “Despite the fact that establishing trust
among people who do not trust each other is a rather difficult task,
returning of refugees to their home places will be a positive result
of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement,”
he notes. According to Guterres, “the UN has been excellently
cooperating with Armenia’s government in this issue.” “Governments
of three countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – comprehend
the whole importance of the refugee problem,” he declared.
He noted that there are two ways in settling the refugee problem:
either returning them legally to their home places or granting them
citizenship of states in the territory of which they are. “Armenia
has chosen the second way,” he said. The UNHCR also informed that UN
assistance in this issue is equally distributed between the states.
“The assistance is rendered to both Armenian and Azerbaijani refugees,”
he noted. “When the process of peaceful settlement is underway, rights
of both parties should be respected. People are important to us, and
not their legal status of a refugee,” the UNHCR stressed. Antonio
Guterres also welcomed the initiative by the Armenian government
in helping the citizens who left Lebanon and Israel because of the
situation in Middle East.
In his turn, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan informed
the Armenian government carried out “enormous work,” particularly,
a national program for refugees integration into society was
implemented. He also informed that during Antonio Guterres’ visit to
Armenia the whole range of refugee problems was discussed.
On August 16-22, Antonio Guterres has visited Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia.

ARMENIAN MASSACRES: NEW RECORDS UNDERCUT OLD BLAME
by Edward J. Erickson
Middle East Forum, PA
Aug. 21, 2006
Reexamining History
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2006
The debate about the World War I deportation and massacre of Armenians
in eastern Anatolia has become more contentious with time.
Opponents of Turkey’s European Union accession treat the Armenian
question as original sin. Yet much of the historical debate upon
which politicians pass judgment is tinged more by polemic than by
fact. Nine decades after hundreds of thousands of Armenians-and
millions of others-died during World War I, it is important to dig
down into the archives to show what the historical record really says.
There is little argument that many Armenians perished during World
War I, but there remains significant historical dispute about whether
Armenian civilians died in the fog of war or were murdered on the
orders of the Ottoman government. More specifically, the debate
about whether or not there was a genocide of Armenians rests upon
three pillars: the record of the Turkish courts-martial of 1919-20
during which the new Turkish government, formed following the defeat
of the Ottoman Empire, tried and hanged some Ottoman officials
for war crimes; documents produced in the Memoirs of Naim Bey, an
account allegedly written by an Ottoman official claiming to have
participated in the deportation of Armenians;[1] and the role of the
“Special Organization” (Teþkilat-ý Mahsusa), somewhat equivalent to
the Ottoman special forces.
Recently, two researchers have debated the nature of the World
War I Armenian massacres and, more specifically, the role in the
massacres by the Special Organization and the group’s relationship to
a Prussian artillery officer known in the records only by his last
name, Stange.[2] The first, Vahakn Dadrian, director of Genocide
Research at the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research
and Documentation, wrote that Stange was the “highest-ranking German
guerilla commander operating in the Turko-Russian border,” one of
several “arch-accomplices in the implementation of the massacres,” and
a Special Organization commander.[3] Dadrian argued that the Ottoman
government diverted the Special Organization units to deportation
duty in rear areas where they became the principal agent in the
Armenian massacres. He bases his claims against Stange on secondhand
German reports of massacres in Stange’s area of operations and uses
controversial testimony from the 1919 Istanbul courts-martial
proceedings to support his claim about Special Organization
redeployments. Since that time, many parties have taken Dadrian’s
assertions at face value. [4]
Last year, however, Guenter Lewy, a professor emeritus of
political science at the University of Massachusetts, challenged
Dadrian’s findings on the grounds that Stange was neither a Special
Organization guerilla leader nor did his unit operate in the area of
the massacres.[5]
In history, details matter. Given the importance that contemporary
officials place on the events of nine decades past, clarifying
Stange’s operations is critical to the current debate. In this
regard, the official 27-volume Turkish military history of the World
War I campaigns, while seldom utilized in Western scholarship, is a
valuable tool.[6] The volumes are not readily accessible to university
researchers; they are only available at a single military bookstore on
a restricted Turkish army compound in Ankara. Far from the politicized
debate surrounding the massacres, these histories shed light on
nitty-gritty details such as which officers and units were deployed
where and when. Within the set, the Third Army histories help flesh
out Stange’s wartime record. [7] They were published simultaneously
to Dadrian’s 1993 article and so should not be dismissed as a Turkish
response to Dadrian’s work. They also provide an important source of
information which Dadrian, genocide scholars, and other historians
of the period have not yet taken into account.
Ottoman Irregular Forces in Eastern Anatolia Analyzing the events of
1915 requires an understanding of the Ottoman military for, too often,
treatments of the period confuse units and muddle Ottoman military
terms.[8] Between 1914-18, there were five groups of Ottoman military
and paramilitary forces engaged on the Caucasian front. The Ottoman
regular army was a uniformed conscript force led by professional
officers who were trained in conventional military tactics and who
responded to military discipline and orders.
It fought on all Ottoman fronts during the war.
Assisting them were the jandarma, a paramilitary gendarmerie or rural
police force trained to military standards and led by professional
officers. Every province had at least one mobile jandarma regiment
and also numbers of static jandarma battalions.[9] The Ministry
of the Interior controlled the jandarma in peacetime but, with the
Ottoman mobilization on August 3, 1914, command passed to the Ministry
of Defense.
In addition, there was the tribal cavalry (aþiret, formerly
the hamidiye). In 1910, the Ministry of Defense integrated the
twenty-nine tribal cavalry regiments into the regular army. Used as
both conventional cavalry and for internal security duties, members
were mostly Kurdish and Circassian, poorly disciplined, and led by
tribal chieftains.[10] However, in the army reorganization of 1913,
these regiments were reclassified as reserve cavalry (ihtiyat suvari)
regiments of the regular Ottoman army.
The gonullu, paramilitary volunteer forces, allowed Turks and Islamic
ethnic groups living outside the Ottoman Empire to join the war
effort and fight together.[11] These were often poorly led and armed
but organized into units so that they could assist the regular army
in both combat and non-combat operations. During World War I, most
volunteers serving in the Caucasus were “Greek Turks,” “Caucasian
Turks,” Laz, or Muslim refugees from the European provinces such as
Macedonia or Epirus lost in 1913.[12] By definition, the volunteers
were not released Ottoman convicts.
The Teþkilat-ý Mahsusa or Special Organization, a multi-purpose special
volunteer force led by professional officers, was equivalent to a
modern special operations force. It sought to foment insurrection
in enemy territory, fight guerillas and insurgents in friendly
territory, conduct espionage and counterespionage, and perform other
tasks unsuited to conventional military forces. While many histories
suggest the Special Organization received orders from the Committee
of Union and Progress or the Ministry of the Interior, the archival
record suggests that the Ministry of Defense commanded the Special
Organization during World War I.[13]
Finally, there were numbers of non-military groups operating in
Anatolia during the war. These non-military ceteler (which may
be translated as bandit, brigand, insurgent, or guerilla groups
depending on context) were local groups not subject to centralized
command and control. Ceteler was a catchall term that was used by
both the Ottomans to describe insurgents and authentic criminal
bands and also by foreign observers to describe groups of killers,
whose origins were often unknown.
The Stange Detachment Where then did Major Stange fit in? Shortly
before the outbreak of World War I, the German Kaiser charged General
Otto Liman von Sanders to lead a military mission to the Ottoman
Empire to assist in rebuilding the Ottoman army after its defeat in
the Balkan wars.
Liman von Sanders assigned Captain Stange, a Prussian artillery
specialist, to command the Erzurum fortress artillery.[14] Stange
was a conventional military officer with no special knowledge of
guerilla operations. His assignment to the Ottoman Third Army in
Erzurum reflected his mainstream skills. He occupied his time working
on the defenses until the outbreak of war offered him the chance to
lead troops against the Russians.
According to the original Ottoman war plan, the Third Army was ordered
to stand on the defensive in the Caucasus while the bulk of the Ottoman
army concentrated in Thrace.[15] However, in early September 1914,
a revised campaign plan directed the Third Army to conduct offensive
operations in the event of war. When war broke out between Russia and
the Ottoman Empire on November 2, the Ottomans were actively planning a
winter offensive in the Caucasus. The plan called for the three army
corps of the Third Army to encircle the Russian army at Sarakamiþ
with a supporting operation on the Black Sea flank between Batum and
Ardahan, in modern day Georgia.[16] There were no regular Ottoman army
combat units on the Turco-Russian frontier from the Black Sea south
for about 100 kilometers for this supporting attack. Nevertheless,
Ottoman border forces pushed across the frontier and, on November 22,
closed in on the Russian town of Artvin.[17] Flushed with success, on
December 6, the general staff ordered the Third Army to push onward
toward Ardahan.[18] It was in this capacity that Stange entered the
scene. Ottoman strategists committed every available Third Army
division to the Sarakamiþ offensive. The Third Army headquarters
ordered Stange to take command of the Eighth Infantry Regiment, two
artillery batteries, and the Coruh Border Security Battalion.[19]
This newly organized force was designated the Stange Detachment
(Þtanke Bey Mufrezesi) and ordered to take Artvin while the rest
of the army moved toward their main objective. None of the troops
were trained in guerilla or unconventional warfare. Against light
opposition, Stange pushed forward and took the town on December 21.
At the same time, other Ottoman forces were operating in the area.
Bahattin Þakir, a high-ranking member of the governing Committee of
Union and Progress, commanded the Special Organization force, which
had infiltrated its forward units near Batum to foment an uprising
among Laz and Turkic peoples inside the Russian Empire. In addition
to this mission, Þakir ordered Ziya Bey, an artillery major commanding
the Special Organization men on the ground in Russia, to encircle and
destroy ceteler that included a number of Armenians.[20] The Special
Organization also attacked regular Russian army units, capturing four
officers and sixty-three Russian soldiers in late November.[21] One
Turkish source also mentions a large force of volunteers operating
in the Coruh River valley under Yakup Cemil Bey.[22] Another Turkish
source asserts that Yakup Cemil’s detachment was a Special Organization
force composed of ceteler.[23] In this bitter internecine fighting,
many civilian Turks, Armenians, and other local ethnic groups were
massacred indiscriminately.[24]
With so many different units and organizations operating in the area,
there was bureaucratic wrangling over how to unify the command as the
Sarakamiþ campaign approached. In the end, Stange took command of
the entire force-regulars, border security battalions, volunteers,
and the Special Organization. However, the Special Organization and
volunteers continued to receive their orders from Þakir, who wanted
to retain control of the operation while Stange answered to the X
Corps commander, in whose sector he operated.[25]
On December 22, the X Corps and Third Army ordered Stange, the Special
Organization, and the volunteers to converge separately on Ardahan. The
Special Organization, now locally commanded by Captain Halit Bey,
cooperated and joined the advance.[26] Despite bad winter weather,
these forces began to encircle the city on December 29.
Because Stange controlled neither the Special Organization nor
the volunteers, he sent coordination copies of his own detachment
orders to Halit, who passed these on to the adjacent volunteers.[27]
This was a clumsy arrangement, and there is no indication that the
Special Organization and volunteers reciprocated. The result was an
uncoordinated attack on Ardahan. Stange’s detachment suffered heavy
casualties[28] while Special Organization and volunteer losses were
light.[29] The Ottomans failed to hold the city for long. In early
January 1915, the Russians retook the city with bayonet assaults.
Over the next month, the Ottomans conducted a fighting retreat back
toward Artvin.
At the end of January 1915, Þakir consolidated some of the Special
Organization units into a Special Organization Regiment (Teþkilat-ý
Mahsusa Alay) commanded by Halit.[30] This regiment was assigned nine
officers and 671 men.[31] Halit also gained control over a group
of volunteers known as the Baha Bey Þakir Force. Subsequently and
because of the deteriorating tactical situation, Þakir ordered the
Special Organization Regiment to cooperate with Stange in defensive
operations along the border. Additionally, a smaller Special
Organization detachment commanded by Riza Bey conducted operations
around Murgal, northwest of Artvin. Istanbul also sent Stange about
1,600 replacements. Fighting was hard, and the Ottomans were pushed
back. On February 16, three Russian infantry and two cavalry regiments,
Cossacks, and an Armenian battalion attacked a rear guard of Halit
Bey’s Special Organization soldiers.[32] The Special Organization
fought well and covered Stange’s regulars as they retreated.
On March 1, 1915, the Russian army launched a major attack to restore
the frontier, pushing back Stange, the Special Organization, and the
volunteers. In reaction to what appeared to be a disastrous retreat, on
March 20, the X Corps reorganized the Ottoman forces on the northeast
frontier, forming the Lazistan Area Command (Lazistan ve Havalisi
Komutanlýgý) [See Table 1].[33] By this time, Þakir had left Erzurum,
and Stange finally received unitary command over the regular army unit
as well as the Special Organization and volunteers. Stange immediately
set about coordinating a defense with a combined force of 4,286 men,
six machine guns, and four cannon.[34]
Table 1 Lazistan Area Command – March 28, 1915
Lazistan Detachment No. of Men 1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt 306 3rd
Btln, 8th Infantry Regt 581 Mountain Btry, 8th Field Artillery 192
Machinegun Company 97 Engineer Company 140 Cavalry Platoon 30
Trabzon Jandarma Regt No. of Men Trabzon Jandarma Btln 400 Rize
Jandarma Btln 450 Giresun Jandarma Btln 330 Hopa Hudut (Border)
Btln 330
Special Organization Regiment (Teþkilat-ý Mahsusa Alay) Zia Bey Btln
Adil Bey Btln Muhsin Btln Salih Aga Btln Ibrahim Bey Btln Veysel
Efendi Detachment 1,430 men (in total)
Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, Kuruluþ 12
(Organizational Chart 12)
The Third Army sent Staff Lieutenant Colonel Vasýf to be Stange’s
chief-of-staff in the expanded command[35] while Stange collected
supplies, engineers, and cavalry from the Third Army Lines of
Communications Command. In addition, the military mobilized all men
in the Trabzon vilayet (province) between the ages of 17-18 and 45-50
while a Special Organization unit from Istanbul joined the Lazistan
area command’s Special Organization regiment.
Stange reorganized his augmented command into field forces and static
forces. The field forces, which held the defensive lines against the
Russians, were composed of the 8th Infantry Regiment, the Trabzon
Jandarma Regiment, and the Special Organization Regiment.[36] The
static forces, which were responsible for rear area security, were
composed of the Riza, the Trabzon, and the Samsun Jandarma regiments.
On April 14, 1915, Stange had over 6,000 men assigned to his
command.[37] Table 2 shows Stange’s revised command arrangements.
Table 2 Lazistan Area Command – 15 April 1915
FIELD FORCE
Lazistan Detachment 1st Btln, 8th Infantry Regt 3rd Btln, 8th Infantry
Regt Machinegun Company Trabzon Jandarma Regt Giresun Jandarma Btln
Amasya Jandarma Btln Hopa Border Btln Machinegun Company Special
Organization Regt Ziya Bey Btln Adil Bey Btln Mehmet Ali Btln Ibrahim
Bey Btln Veysel Bey Btln Machinegun Company Field Force Troops Two
artillery batteries (8th Artillery), Engineer Company, Cavalry Platoon
STATIC FORCE
Rize Jandarma Regt 2 jandarma btlns Trabzon Jandarma Regt 3 jandarma
btlns (probably reconstituted from recalled men) Samsun Jandarma Reg
4 jandarma btlns
Source: TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, Kuruluþ 13
(Organizational Chart 13)
These arrangements solidified the Ottoman defense, which by mid-April
was successfully holding a line about ten kilometers west of the prewar
Ottoman-Russian frontier. They also show a return to a conventional
military organizational architecture, mirroring the organization of
regular Ottoman infantry divisions in 1915, which contained three
regiments each with a machine gun company. A general support element
of artillery, engineers, and cavalry augmented the regiments.[38]
The field force was, practically speaking, staffed and organized
as a regular infantry division. This reflects Stange’s conventional
background and the tactical necessity to put an effective and standard
defense on the empire’s northeast frontier.
The tempo of fighting dropped, and the front remained stationary
until early 1916. Throughout this period the Special Organization
Regiment remained on the line and engaged in conventional defensive
operations.[39] In late January 1916, the recently promoted Major
Halit relieved Stange; he returned to Erzurum.
Early 1916 was a period of disaster for the Ottoman strategic position
in northeastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. The Russians seized Erzurum,
Rize, and Trabzon. Regular army infantry divisions reinforced the
Lazistan Area Command. Several Special Organization battalions in
the sector were transferred to the adjacent Coruh Detachment in May
1916 where they continued to participate in frontline duties.[40]
The remaining Special Organization troops were distributed into two
elements, which were designated as the First and Second Special
Organization regiments and assigned to a newly-formed coastal
detachment.[41]
Other Special Organization units were redeployed to the IX Corps
sector on the Erzincan front near the village of Tuzla.[42] These units
served directly under a provisional corps commanded by Staff Lieutenant
Colonel Þevket and conducted offensive operations in conjunction with
the Ottoman Thirteenth Infantry Division.[43] On June 6, 1916, three
Special Organization companies were assigned to the newly formed
Hackoy Detachment on the line south of Tuzla. The detachment also
had an infantry battalion, two cavalry squadrons, and artillery.[44]
The Special Organization continued to participate in conventional
operations on the Caucasian front for the remainder of the summer. On
July 29, 1916, the First and Second Special Organization regiments
were inactivated and a single regiment reestablished.[45] Major combat
operations in the Ottoman Third Army area began to diminish in the
late summer and, by mid-fall 1916, had almost completely stopped. This
was a result of both combat exhaustion and severe weather.
The published paper trail of the Special Organization formations on the
Caucasian front ends in 1917, and the Special Organization does not
appear in the 1918 Ottoman Caucasian orders of battle. It is unclear
what happened to the Special Organization officers and men assigned
to the units at that time. However, the deportation of Armenians was
completed in 1916, and it appears certain that the Special Organization
formations in this study remained on the front during that period.
Conclusions Many historians find military chronicles dry and difficult
to comprehend. Nevertheless, when it comes to the controversy over
the fate of Armenians in 1915, they are crucial. Many contemporary
historians accuse the Special Organization and Major Stange of
complicity in genocide. The records, though, do not lend such
accusations credence.
The official military histories of the modern Turkish Republic portray
the operations of organized Ottoman Special Organization units on the
Caucasian front from December 1914 through the end of 1916 as largely
conventional. There is little evidence of a cover-up, especially as
these histories are technical, not intended for the public, and predate
the scholarly controversy over allegations of Special Organization
complicity in Armenian genocide. Importantly, the official histories
fully cite archival sources and often reproduce reports and orders.
Early Special Organization operations near Batum were unconventional
and involved guerilla warfare operations. However, the Sarikamiþ
offensive provided the engine that drove the Special Organization
into the arms of regular army commanders like Stange. Subsequent and
perennial manpower shortages kept the Special Organization engaged in
conventional military operations. From the record of unit assignments
and locations on the front, it appears that the Special Organization
units associated with Stange were not redeployed from the Caucasian
front to deport and massacre Armenians.
Nor does it seem possible that Stange was involved in the deaths of
Armenians. The modern Turkish histories show that he commanded regular
army forces engaged in conventional offensive and defensive operations
until late March 1915. Although he technically commanded all Ottoman
forces near Ardahan in 1914, he exercised no real control over the
Special Organization or volunteers. After Stange gained command of the
Lazistan Area Command, he held direct command over Special Organization
forces, which he employed on the defensive line in a conventional
manner. In effect, from December 11, 1914 through March 20, 1915,
Stange can be characterized as a detachment commander who cooperated
with the Special Organization in conventional operations. After
March 20, 1915, Stange was an area commander who commanded Special
Organization forces for conventional defensive operations. The record
demonstrates that Stange was neither a Special Organization commander,
nor was he a guerilla leader. Indeed, Stange was unhappy with the
discipline and training of both the Special Organization and irregular
forces, reflecting his lack of authority over them.[46]
The Turkish histories do reveal an intriguing alternative possibility
concerning who might have been redeployed to deport Armenians. The
reserve cavalry regiments (the former aþiret or tribal cavalry) were
grouped into four reserve cavalry divisions that were mobilized into
the Reserve Cavalry Corps in August 1914. The tactical performance
of this corps was abysmal, and its levels of discipline and combat
effectiveness low.[47] Consequently, the Ottoman General Staff
inactivated the Reserve Cavalry Corps on November 21, 1914,[48]
and only seven of the twenty-nine reserve cavalry regiments remained
with the colors in the Third Army.[49] The remaining regiments were
dissolved, and “10,000 reserve cavalrymen dispersed throughout the
region and returned to their villages.”[50] Most of these men were
tribal Kurds or Circassians and, unemployed following demobilization,
many may have been attracted to the work of deporting the Armenians
in the spring of 1915. Clearly, many Armenians died during World
War I. But accusations of genocide demand authentic proof of an
official policy of ethnic extermination. Vahakn Dadrian has made
high-profile claims that Major Stange and the Special Organization
were the instruments of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Documents not
utilized by Dadrian, though, discount such an allegation.
Edward J. Erickson, Ph.D. is a retired U.S. Army officer at
International Research Associates.
[1] Aram Andonian, comp., The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official
Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians
(Newtown Square, Pa.: Armenian Historical Society, 1965, reprint of
London, 1920 ed).
[2] See Guenter Lewy, “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide,” Middle East
Quarterly, Fall 2005, pp. 3-12; Vahakn Dadrian, “Correspondence,”
Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2006, pp. 77-8.
[3] Vahakn Dadrian, “The Role of the Special Organization in the
Armenian Genocide during the First World War,” Minorities in Wartime:
National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia
in Two World Wars, Panikos Panayi, ed. (Oxford: Berg, 1993), p.
58-63.
[4] For example, see: Taner Akcam, Armenien und der Volkermord:
Die Istanbuler Prozesse und die turkische Nationalbewegung (Hamburg:
Hamburger Edition, 1996), p. 65.
[5] Lewy, “Revisiting the Armenian Genocide”; Guenter Lewy, The
Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, A Disputed Genocide (Salt Lake
City: The University of Utah Press, 2005), pp. 82-8.
[6] See Edward J. Erickson, “The Turkish Official Military Histories of
the First World War: A Bibliographic Essay,” Middle Eastern Studies,
39 (2003): 183-91. No library outside Turkey holds the complete
series. In addition to the 27-volume coverage of World War I, there
are also fourteen volumes on the Balkan wars (1911-13) and eighteen
volumes on the war of independence (1919-23).
[7] These two books are T.C. Genelkurmay Baþkanlýgý, Birinci Dunya
Harbinde, Turk Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, Cilt I ve
Cilt II (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basýmevi, 1993). Hereafter referred to
as TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý and TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi
3ncu Ordu Harekatý II.
[8] For example, “scum” cited in Dadrian, “The Role of the Special
Organization in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War,” p.
58, or “ex-convict killer bands” in Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris,
The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 2003) p. 182-3.
[9] TCGB, Turk Silahlý Kuvvetleri Tarihi, IIIncu Cilt, 6ncý Kýsým,
1908-1920 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basýmevi, 1971) pp. 133-5.
[10] Ibid., pp 129-32.
[11] Ibid., pp. 239-40.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut (ATASE), BDH Koleksýyonu Kataloðu-4
(Ankara: undated). First World War Catalogue, no. 4, of the military
archives lists files of the Special Organization detachments, proving
that these detachments were under Ministry of Defense command.
[14] Ismet Gorgulu, On Yýllýk Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922, Balkan-Birinci
Dunya ve Istiklal Harbi (Ankara: Turk Tarýh Kurum Basýmevi, 1993),
p. 105; Deutsche Offiziere in der Turkei (Bonn: Militar, 1957), p. 10.
[15] TCGB, Birinci Dunya Harbinde, Turk Harbi, Inci Cilt, Osmanlý
Imparatorluðunun Siyasi ve Askeri Hazýrlýklarý ve Harbe Giriþi (Ankara:
Genelkurmay Basýmevi, 1970), pp. 212-38.
[16] Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Turk Harbi, 1914 Yýlý
Hareketleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basýmevi, 1964), p. 96.
[17] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, Kroki 36 (Map 36).
[18] “Ottoman General Staff Orders, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-6,
File 1-267,” reproduced in ibid., pp. 339-40.
[19] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 349.
[20] Ibid., p. 344.
[21] Ibid., p. 293.
[22] Ibid., Kroki 37 (Map 37).
[23] Gorgulu, On Yýllýk Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922, pp. 109, 111.
[24] Muammer Demirel, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Turk Harbinde Erzurum
ve Cevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basýmevi,
1996), pp. 41-5; Dadrian, “The Role of the Special Organization in
the Armenian Genocide during the First World War,” p. 62.
[25] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 602.
[26] Ibid., p. 605.
[27] “Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-1, File 1-10,”
cited in ibid., p. 603.
[28] “Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-1, File 1-12,”
reproduced in TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 603.
[29] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 603.
[30] Ibid., p. 608.
[31] “Strength Report, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-3, File 1-4,”
reproduced in ibid., p. 603.
[32] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 607.
[33] Ibid., p. 614.
[34] “Reports, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-3, File 1-49,” cited in
ibid., p. 614.
[35] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 615.
[36] “Detachment Orders, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-4, File 1-8,”
cited in ibid., p. 615.
[37] “Strength Report, ATASE Archive 5257, Record H-4, File 194,”
reproduced in TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 616.
[38] TCGB, Turk Silahlý Kuvvetleri Tarihi, pp. 199-203, 266-72,
for information on the architecture of Ottoman army infantry divisions.
The Lazistan Detachment was a regimental equivalent.
[39] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý II, p. 86.
[40] “Orders, ATASE Archive 3974, Record H-2, File 1-59 and 73,”
cited in ibid., p. 181.
[41] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý II, p. 251.
[42] Ibid., p. 233.
[43] Ibid., p. 240, Kuruluþ 11 (Organizational Chart 11).
[44] Ibid., p. 247.
[45] “Strength Report, ATASE Archive 2950, Record H-58, File 1-329 &
333,” cited in ibid., pp. 369-70.
[46] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 618.
[47] Belen, 1914 Yýlý Hareketleri, p. 116-24.
[48] TCGB, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekatý, p. 311.
[49] Ibid., Kuruluþ 1 (Chart 1).
[50] Ibid., p. 322.
–Bounda ry_(ID_t1zFfsPBs7U68577vvvOAA)–

UNHCR PRAISES ARMENIA FOR ITS REFUGEE-RELATED POLICIES
By Anna Saghabalian
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Aug. 21, 2006
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has praised
the efforts of the Armenian government to create conditions that
promote the integration of refugees into society.
Antonio Gutierrez, paying his first visit to the region, reiterated
on Monday that granting citizenship is the best tool for protecting
refugees if the ultimate goal of the government is to ensure their
full integration into society.
“I hope it is the ultimate goal both in Armenia and Azerbaijan,”
he told a press conference in Yerevan.
Gutierrez stressed the high level of his agency’s cooperation with
Armenia and expressed his particular satisfaction with the efforts of
the country’s authorities to create a legislative and institutional
framework for immigrants and asylum-seekers, extending special thanks
to the Armenian government for accepting refugees from Lebanon.
For his part, Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian said that
the UNHCR Office has worked in Armenia for years and has been a great
help to the Armenian government to solve different problems connected
with refugees.
“Although we are a non-political agency, we are extremely interested
in the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict,” Gutierrez said.
“We think that the agreements that will allow displaced people to
return to the places of their former residence can become an element
of mutual trust that in turn can promote an ultimate solution to the
problem in the future.”
Regarding the possibility of refugees recovering their lost property
or getting compensation for that, Gutierrez said: “We think that
one of the positive things of the peaceful solution could be the
restoration of property rights on both sides. If we speak about the
return of refugees, it could be the restoration of their ownership
rights. If the return is not on the cards, then it can be solved
through compensation.”
Gutierrez denied the recent Azeri press reports that quoted him as
calling the policy of the Armenian government related to refugees
a failure.
He also denied having made a series of other statements that appeared
in the Azeri press and were ascribed to him.
In particular, the Azeri media quoted Gutierrez as saying that the
situation with forcibly displaced people in Azerbaijan was the gravest
in the world.
“I couldn’t have said such a thing, as it is a common knowledge that
this problem is much bigger in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan or Colombia
than in Azerbaijan,” he said.
Gutierrez said that instead of the word ‘excellent’ he used the
expression ‘more mature’ to describe the UNCHR’s relations with
Azerbaijan and stressed that he was “careful enough never to use the
word ‘Armenia’ in his press conference in Baku.
To a reporter’s question to share his impressions of the refugee
camps in Azerbaijan, Gutierrez said: “The only thing that I can tell
you is that necessary investments are being made in Azerbaijan to
create new homes for refugees. There are still people who live in
very poor conditions in both countries, but I can say for Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia that the governments in these countries take
very seriously the necessity of improving the situation of refugees
living in extreme conditions.”

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SAYS CITIZENS STILL HAVE VAGUE IDEA OF GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
By Karine Kalantarian
Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
Aug. 21, 2006
A senior staffer at the Constitutional Court handling citizen appeals
says citizens in Armenia still have no clear idea on what matters
they can apply to the country’s highest judicial body.
Robert Chobanian told RFE/RL on Monday that only 109 out of 288 appeals
filed since early last month have been registered and accepted by the
Court. The appeals of most visitors turned away did not correspond
to the requirements of the constitution.
Armenia’s Constitutional Court began accepting appeals from ordinary
citizens for the first time in early July following the entry into
force of one of the recently enacted amendments to the Armenian
constitution.
Until recently, only the president of the republic, at least one
third of the members of parliament as well as election candidates had
the legal right to ask Armenia’s highest judicial body to overturn
policies or actions which they believe are unconstitutional. The
constitutional reform extended this prerogative to all citizens and
permanent residents of the country and now the Constitutional Court
also considers the constitutionality of legal provisions applied
against individuals.
According to Chobanian, 13 of the accepted 109 appeals have been
forwarded for further consideration. Two staffs of the court have been
set up to study applications for a month and then appoint specific
dates for review by the Constitutional Court. Twelve of the 13 appeals
were lodged by ordinary citizens. And only one appeal was submitted
by a private company.
Constitutional Court chief of staff Arushan Hakobian announced the
dates for the consideration of six appeals – from September 12 to
November 14.
According to Hakobian, during its September 12 session the Court will,
for example, consider an appeal from a citizen, Manushak Kocharian,
who disputes the constitutionality of the provision of the law that
stipulates that citizens must have social cards to be paid social
pensions.
According to him, a number of appeals concern corresponding articles
of Armenia’s Civil Code, mainly regarding the property right, and
some concern Article 4 of the Constitution dealing with human dignity.
The first appeal submitted to the Constitutional Court was from Artak
Zeynalian, a senior member of the opposition Hanrapetutyun party who
is challenging the legality of a decree signed by President Robert
Kocharian in January. Kocharian set up a caretaker body that briefly
managed the Office of Armenia’s Ombudsman following the resignation
of the first ombudsman Larisa Alaverdian. Alaverdian and Armenian
opposition leaders described the decree as unconstitutional.
Zeynalian’s appeals against it were thrown out by lower courts.
“My appeal was not accepted unanimously. Therefore it was discussed at
a meeting of the whole staff of the Constitutional Court,” Zeynalian
told RFE/RL.
The Constitutional Court will gather to hear Zeynalian’s appeal on
November 14.

KATZ: “WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ARMENIA, NONE OF AZERBAIJAN’S RIVALS ARE ALWAYS RIVALS AND NONE OF ITS FRIENDS ARE ALWAYS FRIENDS EITHER”
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
A country’s geopolitics can be different with regard to
different issues. This applies to Azerbaijan, where there are five
important geopolitical issues: pipelines, division of the Caspian,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Azerbaijan, democratization, Mark N. Katz,
a professor of government and politics at George Mason University said.
The author proves in the article spread by United Press International
that the geopolitics of Azerbaijan are very complex.
The first issue- Pipelines. When first proposed, it was uncertain
whether the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan’s oil fields through
Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean coast would ever be built,
or whether Azeri oil would continue to be exported via the existing
pipeline through Russia — with all it implied for continued Russian
predominance in Azerbaijan. But Baku-Ceyhan was built, is functioning,
and Azerbaijan is less dependent on Russia.
On the pipeline issue, Azerbaijan’s allies are the U.S., EU, Turkey,
and Georgia, while its rivals are Russia and Iran (both of which
would have preferred Azeri oil to transit their territory).
The issue now is: Can a pipeline under the Caspian be built so that
Kazakhstan can export oil via Azerbaijan, thus also reducing its
dependence on exporting via Russia? Russia could block this project if
it wanted. But this would be self-defeating since Kazakhstan can also
export its oil eastward to China. Azerbaijan is in a good position
regarding its own oil exports.
Possible side effect?
A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement: Azeri oil could then also be exported
via Iran since the U.S. would no longer object. But a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement does not seem likely any time soon.
Turmoil in Turkey and/or Georgia: Either would shut down Baku-Ceyhan.
Both are possible. Indeed, Russia seems to be working for this in
Georgia. Azerbaijan would then have to export oil either via Russia
or Iran. Absent a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, its oil would probably
have to go through Russia — and be subject to Russian obstruction.
The second issue:-Caspian Delimitation: Ever since the collapse of the
USSR, the maritime border in the Caspian between Iran and Azerbaijan
has been in dispute. Further, significant oil deposits are believed
to be in the disputed area. Since July 2001 when Iran successfully
employed gunboat diplomacy to halt British Petroleum exploring in
the disputed area on Azerbaijan’s behalf, no further exploration has
been possible.
On the Caspian delimitation issue, Azerbaijan’s allies are Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the U.S., while its rivals are Iran and
Turkmenistan (which also has a boundary dispute with Azerbaijan in the
Caspian). Neutral (or more accurately, neutralized) parties include
EU countries with oil interests in Iran that they do not wish to risk
by supporting Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s allies here, though, are not all allied with each other.
Russia in particular does not want “outside” powers (the U.S. and
Turkey) to be involved. Azerbaijan is nervous about depending solely
on Russia for support against Iran. It is possible that Azerbaijan and
Iran could reach a compromise on this issue. Until then, stalemate
is likely to continue. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would probably
result in the U.S. being less an ally of Azerbaijan on this and more
of a neutral.
Mark N. Katz particularly highlights the third issue, occupation of
Azerbaijani territories by Armenia.
Nagorno-Garabagh: Azerbaijan lost this region as well as other
territory to Armenia in fighting that took place in the years just
before and after the breakup of the USSR. A cold peace has lasted up
to the present with Azerbaijan unable to get back any of the territory
occupied by Armenia.
On the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan’s only real ally is Turkey,
while its rivals are Armenia, Russia, and (because of the Southern
Azerbaijan issue that will be discussed next) Iran. Torn between the
desire both to please their influential Armenian diaspora communities
and to obtain Azeri oil, the U.S. and the EU have made efforts to
resolve this conflict, but so far without success.
Azerbaijan might hope one day to use its increasing oil wealth to
build up its forces vis-a-vis Armenia, but Azerbaijan’s unfavorable
geopolitical position vis-a-vis Armenia casts doubt on its ability
to regain any territory from Armenia by force.
One possible change that could affect this calculation would be
the rise to power of a nationalist or Islamist government in Turkey
alienated from America and the EU — which is something that might
well occur if Turkish aspirations to join the EU are spurned. Such
a Turkey might threaten the use of force against Armenia unless it
relinquishes the territory it captured from Azerbaijan. Under these
circumstances, Russia, the U.S., and even Iran might support Armenia.
A regional war could develop.
The fourth issue-Southern Azerbaijan: There are more Azeris living
in Iran than in independent, former Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku has been
extremely self-restrained about the “Southern Azerbaijan” issue. But
unrest among Azeris in Iran has been increasing.
If the situation worsens, Tehran is unlikely to blame itself for
this state of affairs but to blame Azerbaijan. If Tehran believes
(whether accurately or not) that Baku is seeking the breakup of Iran,
it might well behave threateningly toward Azerbaijan.
Although no other country supports Azeri secession from Iran,
Azerbaijan’s allies in any Iranian-Azeri confrontation would be the
U.S. and Turkey, while its principal rival would, by definition, be
Iran. Russia would oppose both Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan and an
American presence there too The fifth issue-Democratization: Here it
is necessary to focus on the perceptions of the current authoritarian
Azeri government — which has already demonstrated its disinclination
toward democratization as well as its inclination to halt meaningful
progress toward it.
On the democratization issue, the Azeri government’s main allies
are Russia and Iran (which equate democratization with the spread of
American influence), while it perceives as rivals the U.S., neighboring
Georgia (where the “Rose Revolution” ushered in democratic government
in 2003), and the EU.
Strong U.S. support for an Azeri democratic movement (or even the
perception of it) could lead Azerbaijan to move closer to Russia
and even make concessions to it in other areas in exchange for
protection. The U.S. might even be pushed out of Azerbaijan.
What this analysis shows is that, with the exception of Armenia, none
of Azerbaijan’s rivals are always rivals. And the Azeri government
undoubtedly feels that none of its friends are always friends either,
Mark N. Katz underscores.

OSKANYAN: NG IS READY TO COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AZERBAIJAN TO PUT OUT THE FIRES
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
“I think the authorities of Nagorno Garabagh are prepared to cooperate
with international organizations and Azerbaijan as well to put out
the fires in the regions along the border,” Armenian foreign minister
Vardan Osknayan said, APA reports.
Commenting on his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov’s
statement, Oskanyan said the Armenian side does not avoid any
cooperation regarding this matter.
“I find it difficult to understand Azerbaijan’s speculative steps
concerning the fires. These fires break out every summer due to hot
weather. Simply, the fires have caught large areas this year. This
was also said in the report drawn up by personal representative of
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Andrzei Kasprzyk,” Oskanyan said.
Armenian minister also commented on official Baku’s appeal to the UN
for ensuring its participation in extinguishing the fires, “I cannot
understand why this issue should concern the UN.”

NEXT MONITORING TO TAKE PLACE ALONG THE AZERI-ARMENIAN INTERFACE
Author: E.Huseynov
TREND Information, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
The next monitoring along the Azerbaijani-Armenian forces interface is
scheduled to August 22. Officials of press service with the Ministry
of Defense of Azerbaijan familiar with the situation told Trend the
monitoring would take place 8 km southwest of town of Terter.
>From Azerbaijani side, the monitoring will be lead by Gunter Volk and
Peter Kee, field assistants to special envoy of OSCE acting chairman.
>From Armenian side, this task will undertake Andzhey Kaspsik, special
envoy of OSCE acting chairman, and his field assistant Irzhi Aberle.

CHILDREN’S THEATRE RAISES AWARENESS ABOUT THE HEALTH RISKS OF SMOKING
Source: World Vision Middle East/Eastern Europe office (MEERO)
Reuters AlertNet, UK
Aug. 21, 2006
Children’s theatre performances raised awareness of the dangers
of smoking to other children during World Vision summer camps in
different resort towns throughout Armenia this summer.
‘The Harm of smoking’ was not only performed by children of the Lori
Theatre Group, but they also wrote the script, designed the costumes
and composed songs to spread the message amongst their peers.
‘Theatre performance is an effective and interesting way to convey the
message to the young audience of different age groups,’ said Larissa
Gabrielyan, the music teacher who assisted with the song compositions.
The performance began with the famous slogan “Healthy Soul in a Healthy
Body”. It depicted a 14-year-old boy who fell into a habit of smoking
and was teaching his peers how to smoke. During the imaginary trial,
he had to stand the accusations of his own lungs, heart, stomach,
and brain that suffered as a result of smoking.
‘This performance gives a deeper understanding of the heath risk that
smoking causes. For each person health is a priority. Smoking is one
of the factors that damages health,’ said 14-year-old Anna Babajanyan,
the young actress from Lori.
Smoking is a worldwide problem, and a real disaster for Armenia which
is 6th in the world due to the number of smokers. In the country where
two in three people smoke, and the number increases very quickly,
especially among teenagers and even children under ten, urgent measures
need to be taken.
‘Being healthy is very important to preserve the nation,’ added
15-year-old Khachik Nazaryan, who played the role of a decent boy
who tried to explain the negative effects of smoking to his peers.
Young actors were very enthusiastic and willing to participate in
the performance. They do believe through these presentations they
can make a change.
‘Smoking damages stomach, I didn’t know that before,’ said 10-year-old
Lianna after the performance. ‘It causes cancer, and shortens life!’,
exclaimed 11-year-old Hamazasp.
The actors’ efforts were much appreciated. Loud applause accompanied
them everywhere they performed.
The performances were staged with the information and material
support of World Vision’s Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition
(MCHN) programme.
After the performance within the frame of MCHN project WV Armenia
conducted trainings for children on Healthy Life Style that included
personal hygiene, healthy nutrition, physical activity, smoking,
alcohol and drug abuse. At the end of the training, books “Eat Healthy,
Act Healthy, Stay Healthy” were distributed among the children.
[ Any views expressed in this article are those of the writer and
not of Reuters. ]

ARMENIANS SET FIRE TO FOREST BELTS IN OCCUPIED AZERBAIJANI REGION
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
Armenian Armed Forces began to set fire to forest belts in the
occupied mountain ranges of the Azerbaijani region of Agdam from
yesterday evening.
APA’s Garabagh bureau reports the arsons were observed from the
dwelling places along the front.
Internally displaced persons from these areas said the enemy is
damaging the rare trees realizing that it cannot cut and use them.
Armenians committed arson in the occupied Khojavend region of
Azerbaijan last day too.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress