Peninsula On-line, Qatar
Nov 10 2006
Turkish House okays EU-sought religion law
Web posted at: 11/10/2006 4:1:30
Source ::: REUTERS
ANKARA – Turkey’s parliament approved yesterday a law required by the
European Union that will improve property rights of non-Muslim
religious minorities, but it is likely to fall short of EU
expectations.
Parliament approved the `religious foundations law’ by 241 votes for
to 31 against after months of sometimes stormy debate and much
fine-tuning of its wording.
The law was passed a day after the European Commission published a
report on Turkey, which called for greater rights for groups such as
religious minorities, criticised a lack of reform and set a deadline
for it to open its ports to EU member Cyprus or face unspecified
consequences.
The EU had criticised the foundations law draft, saying it failed to
provide for compensation to those whose properties have already been
sold to third parties since being taken over by the state or other
entities.
Brussels has urged Ankara to create a comprehensive legal framework
that allows all religious groups unrestricted freedom to operate in
this overwhelmingly Muslim but secular country.
The main minorities affected by the law are historic Greek Orthodox,
Syriac and Armenian communities and also Protestant and Roman
Catholic congregations. The reform prompted months of debate and
stirred nationalist fears, with opposition parties suggesting it
could increase the influence of the Istanbul-based Orthodox Christian
patriarch, the spiritual head of the world’s Orthodox Christians. The
EU has also expressed concern over restrictions on training of
Christian clergy in Turkey, an issue not tackled in the foundations
law.
Ankara is under EU pressure to reopen a Greek Orthodox seminary, but
has been unable to find a legal formula that both complies with
Turkish secularist principles and is acceptable to Patriarch
Bartholomew.
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, sometimes wary of EU-linked reforms he
fears may weaken the Turkish nation state or its secular structure,
could still block the foundations law, but parliament would be able
to override his veto.

Regnum, Russia
Nov 10 2006
Session of parliaments’ speakers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and
Russia to be carried out in St. Petersburg
Shortly before summit of CIS state heads to be held on November 27 in
Minsk, a CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly session will be held on
November 15-17, 2006, at the Tavrichesky Palace; on November 9, CIS
IPA Council Secretary Mikhail Krotov stated to the press in St.
Petersburg. According to Krotov, perfection and reform of the CIS,
15th anniversary of its foundation, prospects and outcomes of
cooperation in frames of the commonwealth are supposed to be
discussed at the session. Several documents, particularly eight laws
on security, recommendations on problems of migration, several
important legal documents, including environmental, water, and
educational codices are planned to be adopted.
`We expect good attendance, all parliaments including Georgia’s one
will be presented. Attendance of Kyrgyzstan is questionable now;
however I hope that adopted historical solution will defuse situation
in the country, and new parliament’s speaker will be able to attend
the session,’ Krotov stressed adding that Afghan delegation will
participate in the assembly for the first time.
Outcomes of elections to Azerbaijani Majilis, Tajikistan elections
are planned to be discussed during the session of CIS IPA Council to
be held on November 16. Additionally, shortly before summit in Minsk
parliaments’ speakers will discuss possibility of parliament’s
participation in realization of Collective Security Treaty
Organization’s decisions and establishing the CSTO Assembly in frames
of the IPA. Also, sitting of `Caucasian four’ – parliaments’ speakers
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia will be held on November
16 in frames of the assembly. `The meeting will be carried out behind
closed doors in order to discuss acute problems of cooperation,’
Krotov stressed.

Institute for War and Peace Reporting, UK
Nov 10 2006
Armenia: Russia Tightens Economic Grip
Opposition angered by sale of yet another Armenian asset to a Russian
company.
By Naira Melkumian in Yerevan (CRS No. 365 09-Nov-06)
The acquisition by the Russian company Vympelkom of a majority stake
in the Armenian telecoms firm ArmenTel has further strengthened
Russia’s economic hold on Armenia.
Vympelkom last week bought Greek firm OTE’s 90 per cent stake in
ArmenTel, which has a monopoly over the fixed-line and internet
market in Armenia and partly owns the mobile network. The remaining
ten per cent of shares are currently owned by the government.
Vympelkom, which trades under the name BeeLine in Russia, won the
tender on November 3 against two competitors, Russia’s MTS and an
Arab consortium called ETISALAT.
The Russian company may now be on the brink of taking full control of
ArmenTel, as the government has indicated that it might be prepared
to sell its shares on condition that Vympelkom agrees not to hold a
monopoly position in the telecoms industry.
The decision on the sale was made immediately after an official visit
by Armenian president Robert Kocharian to Moscow where his Russian
counterpart Vladimir Putin said that Russia’s position as only the
third largest investor in Armenia after Germany and Greece was
“shameful.”
The sale is the latest in a series of Russian takeovers in key areas
of the Armenian economy, just as public attitudes towards Moscow are
cooling because of the effect of its blockade of Georgia on Armenia
and a rise of xenophobic attacks in Russia towards Caucasians,
including Armenians.
At present, Russian companies own the Sevan-Razdan group of
hydroelectric plants, the Razdan thermoelectric plant and manage the
Armenian nuclear power station at Metsamor, which produces 75 per
cent of the country’s energy. Russian Railways is planning to take a
long-term lease of the railway system, while ArmRosgazprom, the joint
Armenian-Russian company, owns a large share of the Armenian gas
network.
The opposition claims that the sale of key assets to Russian
companies is undermining Armenia.
“Just take a look,” said Aram Manukian, a leading member of Armenia’s
former governing party, the Armenian National Movement. `The energy
sector, communications, and the railway system have all been given to
Russia. All this essentially weakens Armenia’s independence.’
Defence Minister Serzh Sarkisian, the second most powerful figure in
the country, has rejected opposition claims, telling journalists,
“You won’t find to this day any examples of how Russian capital in
Armenia has been used as a tool for political pressure.”
Armenian prime minister Andranik Markarian said briefly, “Russia is
not our enemy.”
OTE had owned ArmenTel since 1997 when it bought it for 142.5 million
US dollars, later investing up to 300 million dollars more in the
company.
If the Armenian government approves the Vympelkom acquisition, the
Russian company will pay 342 million euro for ArmenTel and take on
its debts of over 40 million euro.
Vympelkom’s general director Alexander Izosimov said, `Owning 40 per
cent of the cellular market in Armenia, ArmenTel is in a strong
position, which we intend to strengthen even further.”
According to the Armenian trade ministry, 2005 was the first year
that Russia was not the leading investor in Armenia, having had that
role every year since 1991.
“Russia’s desire to become established in Armenia as the most stable
country in the South Caucasus is understandable, as the attitude
toward Russian business is better here than in Georgia,” said
political analyst Anna Harutyunian.
However, Aram Sarkisian, head of the opposition Democratic Party,
said the government should not have ceded control so easily. “All
power generating operations are effectively in Russia’s hands,’ he
told IWPR. `There are no problems with Russia. That country is our
ally and I am in favour of deepening cooperation with it. But the
government should control our strategic facilities.’
There is also criticism of the way the government has entrusted
management of its ten per cent stake in ArmenTel to the
transport and communications minister Andranik Manukian.
Grigor Konjeian, a parliamentary deputy from the pro-government
United Labour Party, told IWPR that this was a purely technical move.
“There is nothing strange in this, as collective management will lead
to excessive circumlocution,’ he said. ` It was for the sake of
simplicity and transparency that it was decided to delegate the
government’s powers to an official.”
But the leader of the opposition National Democrat bloc Arshak
Sadoyan remains sceptical, “The fact that the shares were transferred
to the transport and communications minister can have only one
meaning. He has been given the right to sell the ten per cent of the
shares that belong to the state. If this takes place, that will be an
act of high treason.”
Many ordinary Armenians, who have often been very critical of
ArmenTel over the last few years, are only interested in how the sale
will affect their telephone service.
“It doesn’t matter to me who the operator will be,’ said Yerevan
resident Suren Minasian. `Ordinary consumers just need easy
high-quality communications.’
Naira Melkumian is a freelance journalist in Yerevan.

Zaman Online, Turkey
Nov 10 2006
Brussels Insistent on Freedom of Speech, Opening Ports to Cyprus
By Selcuk Gultasli
Thursday, November 09, 2006
zaman.com
On Wednesday, the European Union released the progress report and
strategy paper, two extremely critical documents for the future of
the negotiation process between Turkey and the European Union.
The EU Commission, which underlined freedom of expression and the
Cyprus issue, did not make any recommendation on the resolution of
the Cyprus issue at this stage, despite the insistence of some
commissioners. The Commission, which, in an attempt to support the
Finnish Plan on Cyprus, postponed the issuance of the report for a
month, increased the importance of the Finnish Plan and the Dec.
14-15 EU Summit for Turkey.
Replacing the controversial `absorption’ capacity with `adaptation’
capacity, the Commission also clarified its strategy for future
enlargement. At the press conference held after the release of the
report, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn did not respond to
questions over whether membership talks with Turkey would be
suspended if it did not implement the additional protocol. Rehn noted
that both the Commission and the EU strongly supported the Finnish
Plan, and wanted to see what it would achieve. The report, while
noting that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen
Criteria, stressed that the pace of the reform process slowed down.
It also urged Turkey to maintain EU standards with regard to the
issues, such as non-Muslim communities, recognizing the rights of
working women on labor conditions and civil-military relations.
Despite the persistence of the correspondents present at the press
conference, Olli Rehn did not answer the questions on the probable
suspension of membership talks with Turkey in case of its
non-compliance with the additional protocol. Asked whether the EU
gave an ultimatum to Turkey by the report, Rehn said they wanted to
give time to the Finnish Plan, and decided that it would not be wise
to make any recommendation at this stage.
Rehn, implicitly criticizing German, French and Austrian politicians,
who favored Turkey’s privileged partnership rather than its full
membership in the European Union, said, `Instead of such rhetoric
that create a vicious circle, we should try to create a virtuous
circle that would make Turkey more European.’ When asked about the
controversial Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code, Rehn accused Kemal
Kerincsiz without mentioning his name. Welcoming the Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with civil society
organizations to discuss possible amendments to this article, Rehn
recalled that the article should be ameliorated not for Europe, but
for the Turkish people. Rehn also noted that it would wrong to assert
that Turkey had stepped back from the reform process, but its pace
had slowed down.
———————————————– ————————-
Major issues covered by the Progress Report and Strategy Paper:
Freedom of Speech: Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code is
extensively abused. The conviction of Hrant Dink in relation to this
article created a case law that restricts freedom of speech. Hence,
the article is a matter of concern, which might cause
auto-censorship.
Cyprus: If Turkey does not fulfill its obligations under the Ankara
Protocol, the entire negotiations process would be negatively
affected. If Turkey does not proceed with implementing the
aforementioned protocol, the Commission will adopt recommendations
accordingly before the December summit of the Council of European
Union. In addition, Turkey should take concrete steps toward
normalizing its relations with all EU member countries.
Civil-military relations: Senior army officers persist in making
public statements on issues out of their area of competence. Turkish
armed forces still have unusual political influence. Senior military
officers publicly express their views on both domestic and foreign
political issues, such as Cyprus, secularism, the Kurdish question
and the Semdinli indictment.
Religious freedoms: Ratification of the draft laws on religious
minorities has been postponed several times. There is no alleviation
of non-Muslims’ problems. This is also the case with the Alevi
community. To ensure full operation of all religious communities
without any restrictions, framework legislation should be devised in
accordance with the European Court of Human Rights case law. Even
though it refers to religious communities, the report does not make
any mention of Sunni majority’s problems.
The Southeast: Turkey is target of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
terrorism in an increasing scale. The PKK is on the EU’s list of
terrorist groups. The European Union has condemned terrorist
activities. Turkey should resolve the serious economic and social
problems of the Southeast.
Judiciary: The reforms introduced so far presents a blurry picture.
There is strong need for steps that would ensure independence of the
judiciary. Honor killings should be investigated with scrutiny, and
the perpetrators should be sentenced to imprisonment. Corruption is
still commonplace in the public sector and the judiciary. Legislation
on fighting corruption remains weak and unsatisfactory; the
institutions which carry out the fight against corruption should be
empowered. There is a steady decrease in the number of incidents
involving torture and ill treatment. However, the amended articles of
Anti-Terror Law might endanger the fight against torture and ill
treatment.
`Mr. Ocalan Removed
The expression `Mr. Ocalan,’ which caused outrage in Turkey, was
replaced with `Abdullah Ocalan.’
The report also makes reference to the predominantly Roma vicinities
in Ankara and Istanbul. It asserts that nearly two million Turkish
Romas are subjected to discrimination in access to housing, health,
and employment. Unlike the previous report, this year’s progress
report does make any reference to the Armenian allegations over the
1915 incidents.

Kurdish Media, UK
Nov 10 2006
Possibilities of prosecuting Turkish leaders for crimes against
humanity and war crimes – VII

11/9/2006 KurdishMedia.com – By Karim Salih
Part VII:
C) International tribunal:
Since war crimes and crimes against humanity are crimes against
international law, international courts, according to Cassese, `are
the most appropriate bodies to pronounce on them’. [352] The Security
Council which has responsibility to address matters of international
peace and security pursuant to its power under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter may establish, as it has done in both ICTY and ICTR cases, an
international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international law committed in
Turkey (ICTT) as a subsidiary organ of the UN. [353]
While the Security Council is not expected to handle relatively minor
conflicts, it is competent under the UN Charter to deal with
international crises that are likely to threaten international peace
and security. [354] As the establishment of ICTR indicates a conflict
does not have to be of truly international character to trigger the
Security Council action. Though the strife was internal, the Security
Council viewed large scale and brutal human rights violations in
Rwanda as a threat to international peace and security. The alleged
massive indiscriminate use of force against civilians, the burning
and depopulation of almost entire villages of the South-east and
forcible displacement of 2.5 – 3 million persons coupled with
credible accusations of state involvement could be considered as
justifying the need for them to be adjudicated by an international
institution. [355]
The military operations of the Turkish armed forces are not confined
within international borders of Turkey. The alleged atrocities
perpetrated by Turkish army against the Greek population of the
northern part of Cyprus following the 1974 invasion are of purely
international nature where international institutions appear to be
the only appropriate bodies to adjudicate on them. [356]
Due, in particular, to the transnational nature of the Kurdish
question in the Middle East and the failure of Turkish military
solution to that question in Turkey, [357] the armed conflict between
PKK – Turkey has inherently the potential to spill over and endanger
the international peace and security in the whole region, as it
already led Turkey to the brink of war with Syria in 1998. [358] In
order to keep the internal armed conflict in the country under
control, Turkey also consistently threatens the use of force in
breach of Article 2 of the UN Charter against the Iraqi Kurds in case
of dissolution of Iraq, [359] something itself not prohibited by
international law as manifested by the dissolution of former Soviet,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in early 1990s and the independence of
Montenegro from Serbia and Montenegro in May 2006. [360] The Turkish
military incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan since March 2003, [361]
which have been carried out with no formal Iraqi consent and despite
the opposition of Iraqi Kurdish leaders, [362] not only violate
Article 2 of the UN Charter, but also tend to destabilise Iraqi
Kurdistan, the only safe and stable part of Iraq since 2003 which is
seen as a crucial ingredient for the stability of the whole Iraq.
[363]
The Security Council is not only not precluded by the principled idea
of legalism from creating an ICTT but it is its responsibility to
find ways to ensure that `the ongoing serious violations of
international law’ [364] in Turkey are halted and one of the ways, if
not `the only way’, [365] to do this, is by prosecuting persons
responsible for such violations. [366] In addition to contributing to
the restoration of peace in Turkey, a country whose stability is
regarded as a key to peace and security in the Middle East and East
Europe, [367] much like the ICTY and ICTR, an ICTT can play `an
important role in maintaining international peace and security’ in
Turkey `by assisting with the establishment of civil society, under
the rule of law, which is necessary to bring about lasting peace’.
[368]
An ICTT can be permitted by the Security Council pursuant to its
Chapter VII powers to prosecute incumbent Head of State for
international crimes. [369] Its ability to indict, prosecute and
punish all persons, regardless of their former or current political
or military posts, [370] for crimes against international law can
contribute to ending the ongoing conflict. ICTT will be able to bring
to justice Turkish generals suspected of war crimes or sponsoring, or
having implicated in, underworld criminal gangs that allegedly
committed thousands of extra judicial killings of political opponents
since early 1970s, who otherwise practically immune from prosecution
unless by license from the general chief of staff and before military
courts, as manifested by Susurluk affair and Semdinli bookshop
bombing case. The only way to end violence unleashed by `criminal
elements who are claiming leadership’, as John Shattuck strongly
asserts, [371] is `to bring to justice those responsible for
unleashing it’. [372]
Even initiating the process of bringing war criminals to justice –
indicting them with war crimes – would turn them into pariahs within
the international community unable to travel without fear of being
arrested. [373] As ICTT, like ICTY and ICTR, may not hold trials in
abstentia, for indicted defendants who fail to surrender, the
prosecutor could present the indictment to a judicial panel, who may
issue an arrest warrant that if ignored will become an international
arrest warrant. [374] An ICTT, being created by the Security Council,
its arrest warrants will be binding on all member states who will be
obligated to surrender the wanted suspects. [375] Additionally, by
being created under Chapter VII, the Security Council can use
sanctions to enforce the decisions of ICTT. [376] Until the armed
conflict between the army and the PKK is halted, the prospect of
indictment and criminal trials for war crimes before an international
tribunal can have strong deterrent effect on foot soldiers as well as
the commanders of both parties who contemplate violating rules of
humanitarian law.
An impartial international tribunal is also better positioned to help
creating an accurate record of the Turkey’s three year direct
military rule following the 1980 coup and twenty two years of armed
conflict. [377] There are so many unresolved injustices in recent
Turkish history which make existence of a true and credible record
imperative in order to confine blame in guilty individuals rather
than being shifted to entire communities. Criminal trials through
interrogating evidence in a procedurally fair setting and applying
high standards of proof can distinguish guilt from innocence in the
specific cases in question. [378] They can unearth information about
the work of perpetrators and the organisers of brutalities like the
1996 Guclukonak Massacre [379] and establish whether the state or PKK
was involved in the `mystery killings’, disappearances and hiring
death squads.
The scale of the atrocities and their ambiguity merit being
adjudicated by impartial criminal tribunals to both unravel the
mysteries and punish the perpetrators. The Raboteau Massacre trial in
Haiti in 2000 is the case in point here. [380] Only through rigorous
interrogation the criminal trial uncovered the internal organization
and operation of the FRAPH death squad and the fact it is being
sponsored by the state. [381] After lengthy proceedings, in November
2000, a Haitian court found sixteen former soldiers and
paramilitaries guilty of participating in the 1994 Raboteau Massacre,
and convicted further thirty-seven in absentia, including the entire
military high command of the former military regime and the heads of
FRAPH death squad. [382]
Such a record can be most beneficial in the case of Turkey where
appears to be a culture of systematic denial and falsification of the
past as well the ongoing events. [383] Fair criminal trials can help
establishing truth with respect of the identity of those masterminded
and organised the destruction of thousands of villages which subsumed
so many crimes and human sufferings [384] as the government maintains
that most village destruction cases was perpetrated by the PKK. [385]
The responsibility is so obscured that at the height of village
destruction in 1996 Prime Minster Ciller tried to convince others
that the helicopters destroyed villages in the South-east belonged to
the PKK, a guerrilla group not known for having an air force. [386]
Such claims and counter claims if remained unresolved may cause even
greater confusion and tension among future generations of Kurds and
Turks and become obstacle to laying firm foundations of a lasting
peace.
Prosecutorial accountability is indeed a duty equally owed to the
future generations. By creating an accurate and credible record of
past events, fair trials can prevent expansion of their accounts into
exaggerated mythologies exploited by nationalists to instil fear in
the other ethnic groups. [387] The ongoing controversy over the
mass-murder of one and half millions Armenians and the expulsion of
the survivors from their ancestral homeland, should at least serve as
a lesson. In the absence of an authoritative record obtained from
judicial proceedings applying stringent evidential standards, still
recognition of the massacres as genocide risks diplomatic sanctions
[388] or prosecution. [389]
Criminal trials by a truly independent and impartial tribunal may
turn demands for vengeance into `institutionalized and fair
proceedings for assessing guilt’. [390] Dissatisfied and disappointed
communities are more likely to `take justice into their own hands’
and turn to retaliation if victims’ need to see justice and
accountability for gross abuses of their human rights were not
satisfied by fair trials, [391] as it is evident by the events
following World War I in the case of the disappointed Armenians.
[392] In deed, `the only civilised alternative’ to the desire for
revenge, as ICTY articulates `is to render justice: to conduct a fair
trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to punish
those found guilty’. [393] Rather than an obstacle, criminal
accountability may make reconciliation and lasting peace more
achievable. [394] By clearly identifying and punishing the guilty
individuals -generals, police chiefs, leaders and the organisers,
claims of collective guilt that associate crimes committed in
internal conflicts such as in Turkey may be avoided. [395]
In a violence-ridden country where state involvement in hiring
criminal gangs to kill political opponents is spoken of in the
parliament as certain as thing as `we all know it’, [396] criminal
prosecutions by impartial bodies seem essential to re-establish moral
standards and basic criteria of legitimate behaviour. [397]
Punishment of the guilty individuals can serve to end a `culture of
impunity’ [398] and install rule of law in Turkey by making it clear
that violations on human life and dignity are not only criminalised
by law, but subject to punishment. [399]
Accountability also addresses the victims’ needs for recognition and
justice which must not be overlooked. By judicially condemning the
acts perpetrated against the victims, in their millions since 1980,
the international community reaffirms their dignity and value and may
contribute in the recovery of those survived violations of their
human rights. [400]
Arguments against prosecutorial approach may include that criminal
trials could serve to foster resentment among the majority Turkish
population and further civil conflict, and may have the potential to
undermine the legislative and political efforts that otherwise would
gradually resolve the Kurdish question and eliminate human rights
abuses. Exacerbating the civil conflict and EU conditionality effect
arguments may have little validity as the level violence is
increasing [401] and the reforms are practically stalled. [402] The
majority resentment, if assuming that is factually correct despite
some evidence to the contrary, [403] may pose immense practical
challenge to pursuing accountability. [404] However, it will neither
legitimise the wrongs appear to have been committed by the army and
the `deep state’ Kemalists as the German youth’s support did not do
so to the Nazi crimes nor should it thwart any efforts to bring
guilty individuals to justice especially considering accountability’s
educative effects. [405] When in a society `inverted morality’ has
elevated otherwise `deviant crimes’ to the highest expression of
group loyalty, international stigmatization of criminal conduct, as
Akhavan asserts, may have far-reaching influence, changing the rules
of `legitimacy’ and promoting post-conflict reconciliation. [406]
Even if establishing an ICTT could not serve as a model alternative
to controversial military interventions to deal with tyrannical and
authoritarian regimes in the region, it will hopefully have deterrent
effect by demonstrating the consequence for violations of
international law and the variety of international community’s
weapons. Pursuing individual criminal accountability in Turkey and
ensuring that the defendants, the army commanders as well as PKK
leaders, receive fair trial may command popular legitimacy in the
eyes of Middle Eastern and wider Islamic countries and may serve a
valuable lesson for these societies to agree to disagree and to use
non-violent means to accommodate differences. [407]
Given that already ICTY and ICTR together consume nearly a quarter of
a billion dollars each year, [408] operation of another ad hoc
tribunal may prove too expensive for UN. [409] An international
tribunal also may take long time to be operational. [410] These all
may prompt a second possible scenario: expanding the ICTY
jurisdiction, by the Security Council, to cover international crimes
committed in Turkey. The expansion scenario is an attractive option
inasmuch as it saves time and money and retains the advantages of an
ICTT especially being staffed by international experts able to apply
international law and clarify hazy areas of law. [411]
Given the political complications of enforcing international criminal
law in Turkey, [412] an impartial and independent investigatory
commission can be employed to specifically identify perpetrators and
circumstances of the violations that could be a precursor to criminal
trials. Although this approach would not discharge the prosecutorial
duty, it may represent a good first step, especially if created by
the Security Council under Chapter VII similar to the case of former
Yugoslavia. [413] An attractive alternative to UN sponsorship for
Turkey, as a member state of the Council of Europe and a candidate
country of EU, can be an investigatory commission, created by the
Security Council and sponsored by the EU.
While both options are likely to ensure greater neutrality,
credibility, security to witnesses, financial support and
international attention, [414] the latter option which will be the
EU’s first involvement in such type of work, seems more effective
given the potential stick and carrot policy involved.
Notes
352. Cassese, 2001.
353. For a thorough analysis of the work of ICTY since its inception,
see Bassiouni, Cherif M., The Law of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY:
Transnational Publishers, 1996).
354. See Charter of the United Nations, , (last visited 11 September
2006) ; Cassese 2001.
355. See, Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, para. 58; Simon, Jan-Michael,
`State-sponsored mass violence: Criminal Accountability and
Reconciliation’, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law – Freiburg, Germany, September/October 2002; Cassese,
Antonio, `The International Criminal Court: Some preliminary
reflections”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1999,
pp. 144-71, at 164.
356. Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal, para. 58.
357. TDN, Kurdish impasse, supra note 4.
358. Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, `the EU, Turkey and the Kurds’, EU
– Turkey Civic Commission, Brussels 2004, (Second International
Conference on Turkey, the Kurds and the EU – The European Parliament,
Brussels, 22-23 November 2004 – Conference Papers).
359. Office of Prime Minister: Directorate of General of Press and
Information, `Erdogan: `Those Talking about Dividing Iraq are Playing
With Fire’, 15 January 2004 (Erdogan warned that `Iraqi Kurdish
groups are playing with fire. Turkey won’t let them divide Iraq’).
360. Musgrave, Thomas D., Self Determination and National Minorities
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 193.
361. Turkish Daily News, `Turkish army entered and pulled out of
Iraq, say reports’, TDN Ankara, 29 July 2006.
362. Cihan News Agency, `Saddam-era Agreements with Turkey Not
Valid’, Zaman, Ankara, 14 July 2006.
363. Hawley, Caroline, `Iraqi Kurdistan a world away from war’, BBC
News, Baghdad, 12 August 2005.
364. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 on Establishing
an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. res. 827, 48 U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1992).
365. Tenth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 55,
U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (2003), para. 348: (`[ICTY] trials have
sent a powerful message that only through justice can all the peoples
of former Yugoslavia achieve reconciliation and create thriving
societies.’ [Emphasis added.])
366. First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152,
U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007 (1994) , paras. 11-15; also see
subsequent annual reports, 1995 Report para. 199; 1996 Report,
para.5; 1997 Report, para. 4; 1998 Report. para. 5.
367. Çakmak, 2003, pp. 63-90, at 63.
368. Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 53,
U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (1999), para. 212, [emphasis added].
369. Kambanda, supra 324, para. 40.
370. Ibid.
371. Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journals, `Bringing
Violators to Justice: An American View’, An Interview with John
Shattuck, Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No.
3, May 1996, pp. 5-9, at 8.
372. Ibid.; for a relevant report in this contexts, see Human Rights
Association of Turkey (IHD), `What happens if those who should
maintain Democracy, Freedoms and Human Rights make call for
Repression and Violence?’ Press Release, 06 April 2006; Human Rights
Association of Turkey (IHD), `Attacks and Lynching Attempts Occurring
Every Coming Day are Threatening Social Peace and Democracy’, Press
Statement, Ankara, 07 September, 2005.
373. Hildreth, Brian T., `Hunting the Hunters: the United Nations
Unleashes Its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes
Suspects – Rule 61′, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative
Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 499-524.
374. Ibid; this procedure, which is called `super indictment’, is
provided by Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedures of the ICTY has,
since its first use on 20 October 1995, become part of ICTY strategy.
375. Article 25 of the UN Charter.
376. Article 41 of the UN Charter.
377. Kritz, 2002, p. 23.
378. Ibid.
379. AI the Guclukonak Massacre, supra 365.
380. Concannon, Brian. Jr., `Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial’,
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, 2001.
381. Ibid.
382. Ibid.
383. Öktem, Kerem, `Return of the Turkish `State of Exception’,’
Middle East Report Online, 3 June 2006.
384. Ayata, 2005, pp.5-42, at 08, 10, 40-42.
385. United States Department of State, `Report on Allegations of
Human Rights Abuses
by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus’, Bureau of
European Affairs, 01 June 1995 (see the Turkish official response to
the allegations made by the villagers and journalists).
386. AI, No security, supra 91, p. 4 citing Cumhuriyet, 28 October
1994; Kirisci and Winrow, 1998, p. 131 citing Hurriyet, 28 October
1994.
387. One of the few items available at the English version of the
official website of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) is a `documentary’
book on Armenian genocide of the Turks in 1914-18: `Archive Documents
about the Atrocities and Genocide inflicted upon Turks by Armenians’
, compiled by Grand National Assembly of Turkey Board of Culture,
Arts and Publications, – Publication No. 93, Ankara – 2002, , (last
visited 10 September 2006).
388. Shawl, Jeannie, `Turkey threatens sanctions if France adopts
Armenian genocide law’, Jurist – Legal News and Research, 15 May
2006.
389. Human Rights Watch, `Turkey: Pamuk Trial Tests Commitment to
Free Speech’, 08 December 2005.
390. Kritz, 2002, p. 24.
391. Linton, Suzannah, `Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court
of Dili’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, 2001, pp.
414-58, at 458.
392. Cassese, 2001. Probably the most famous revenge case was the
assassination of Talaat Pasha in Berlin in 1922 by a young Armenian
student, on whose trial Raphael Lemkin, the lawyer who later coined
the word `genocide’, commented: `It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill
a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a
million men’; quoted in Cooper, Belinda and Taner Akcam, `Turks,
Armenians, and the `G-Word”, World Policy Journal, Fall 2005, pp.
81-93, at 84.
393. First Annual Report ICTY, supra 432, paras. 11-15.
394. Huyse, Luc, `The Process of Reconciliation’, in David Bloomfield
and others, (Ed.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, (Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
2003), pp. 19-22, at 21.
395. Fatic, Aleksandar, Reconciliation via the War Crimes Tribunal?
(Aldershot: Ashgate, January 2000), p. 2.
396. Supra, note 138 and the accompanying text.
397. Fatic, 2000, p. 2.
398. AI An end to torture and impunity is overdue, supra note 85; US
DOS 1999, supra note 64: (`a climate of impunity’).
399. Kritz, 2002, pp. 31, 35.
400. Kritz, 2002, p. 23.
401. Turkish Daily News, `Turkey unveils tragic toll of mounting PKK
attacks’, TDN Ankara, 11 September 2006; TDN, Kurdish impasse, supra
note 4.
402. Financial Times, Editorial, `Turkey’s penal code’, 22 September
2006 (stating that `the government’s refusal to repeal Article 301 is
not only a failure of leadership but a capitulation to rightwing
nationalists that is expanding their constituency’); Turkish Daily
News, `Reform bill put on hold’, TDN Parliament Bureau, 22 September
2006.
403. CNN, `Landslide win for Islamic party in Turkey’, 4 November
2002. (AKP is subscribed to Kemalism).
404. Mayerfeld, Jamie, `The Mutual Dependence of External and
Internal Justice: The Democratic Achievement of the International
Criminal Court,’ Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, pp.
71-107, at 79.
405. Ibid, pp. 71, 79-80, 92, 107 (outlining the democracy promoting
role of international criminal tribunals and their educative values).
406. Akhavan, Payam, `Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 7-31, at 7.
407. Ahmed, Nafeez, `Routing out the Opposition: The Comprehensive
Repression of Human Rights in Turkish Society’, Islamic Human Rights
Commission, London, 2000, , (last visited 10 September 2006).
408. Schabas, William A., `International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Doing More Good than Harm’ Ethnic Conflict Research Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 2, September 2000.
409. Both ICTY are ICTR are funded out of the UN’s annual budget.
Ibid.
410. Kritz, Neil J., `War Crimes on Trial’ ‘, Issues of Democracy,
USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 3, May 1996, pp. 20-8, at 22.
411. Ibid., p. 24.
412. For a discussion on enforcement of international law, see
Penrose, Mary Margaret, `Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement
in International Criminal Law’, American University International Law
Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2000, pp. 321-94, at 321.
413. The [United Nations] Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674, 27 May 1994;
see supra note162.
414. Ratner, 2001, p. 230.

News of Delaware County, PA
Nov 10 2006
Albert Torcomian
By Phyllis Edwards, STAFF WRITER11/09/2006
Albert Torcomian served on many successful runs with the U.S. Navy
Submarine Corps during World War II but he recalls having three
problems to overcome.
“The first problem to overcome is fear,” Torcomian said during an
interview at his Havertown home.
“It’s a very difficult thing to do. The second thing for me was the
noise of the gunfire. You cannot believe the noise. I never heard
noise like that in my life. I had a very pleasant childhood and to go
through that was just mind-boggling. The third thing was saying
goodbye. You never get used to that,” he said.
Torcomian was 17 and living in Lowell, Mass. when he joined the Navy
in January 1942. “I was going to school at that time and the whole
class decided to go downtown and volunteer as a group. Of course I
went along,” he recalls.
When he returned home, his parents objected to him enlisting because
he was their only son. An Armenian priest was visiting the house and
he convinced Torcomian’s parents to allow him to join up.
“So off I went,” he says. “I wanted to join the Marine Corps but they
were only taking two that day for the Corps.” He was one of the two
chosen but then a “much larger individual” walked in and Torcomian
was passed over. “The sergeant took me out and said you’re in the
Navy,” he says.
He went to boot camp at Newport, R.I. Boot camp lasted 16 to 18
weeks. Torcomian recalls the company commander giving a speech and
asking if anyone had any questions. “I always asked questions. The
chief was Armenian and I asked him a question. I didn’t know you
weren’t allowed to talk to anybody. He put me on the midnight to 4
a.m. watch. I used to walk the shore line in Newport from midnight to
4 a.m.,” he recalls.
He was in the Navy for two weeks when they had a recruiting drive for
the submarine service. The commander volunteered Torcomian’s whole
company.
“Only two of us passed the physical. I spoke with the recruiting
officer and he said it’s an entirely voluntary basis,” he recalls. He
also remembers the officer told him if he signed up he would get out
of boot camp that same day.
He signed and was sent to the submarine base in New London, Conn. for
school. “You have to go into Chief Spritz’s Navy. All the new
recruits line in front of the administration building. Chief Spritz
walks up and down and gives you a real going over. I was told to make
sure my pea coat buttons are tight. I got my mother to reinforce
them. He would come down the line and pull you. If your button came
off you were in Spritz’s Navy. You weren’t allowed to go to school.
All you did was maintenance work until he decided you were to go into
submarine school,” he recalls.
There were a lot of rules on the base and any infraction would cause
you to be sent to Chief Spritz. “He had authority over the whole
base,” he recalls.
After submarine school he was sent to a submarine base at Mare
Island, Cal. “I was put on a boat. We called submarines boats,” he
says.
“We went to Pearl Harbor and made a couple of patrols, a couple of
runs. The run averaged about two or three months. You do your
patrolling and fighting out there then you come in. I was assigned to
a boat in Freemantle, Australia,” he says.
“I was out there for two and a half years. I had a lot of successful
runs. Runs are if you go out and have action and sink tonnage. I was
on seven different boats,” he says.
His battle station was as a bow gunner with a dual 2 mm machine gun.
He recalls the decks were level with the water when they took their
battle stations. They would run down the deck holding onto rails. “I
was the first one up every time. When they opened the hatch it was 90
feet to my battle station. You stand there and shoot. It was spooky.
You had to be a kid to do it because you did what you were told. You
cannot think. The outstanding thing about the service was the
training. They kept training you all the time so no matter what your
personal thoughts were you did things instinctively. It’s not like in
the movies. You were out there in your underwear firing a gun because
it was so hot. You wore your underwear and a helmet,” he says.
He recalls getting left behind a couple of times when the submarine
submerged. “You’re up there eight or nine hours. They teach you
floating. The thing that saved my tail was floating. When you give up
just before you die you float,” he says. “All these God damn fish
came up. They’re curious. If you’re out and floating they’ll come up
and take a bite out of you. If they don’t like it they’ll spit it
out. These schools of fish come up. If each one takes a nip you’re
gone,” he says.
When the submarine returned to base a chaplain would come out 10
miles to meet the boat. He would bring the mail and fresh fruit and
milk.
“When you come in and tie up they’d have a band there playing. The
squadron commanders came down and handed out medals. The commander’s
statement was ‘give me 10 submarine runs and I’ll give you recruiting
duty in your home town.’ So as soon as you came in off that boat you
would try to get another ride right away. You were a kid. You
believed everything,” he says.
The sailors were sent to the hospital for a check up. Then they were
put up in a hotel in town for two weeks while the submarine was
refurbished.
He recalls there were beautiful parks in Freemantle and Perth. “I
would just go there and lie down in the grass and eat fruit – apples,
oranges, pears, tangerines. It was the best fruit I’d ever tasted. I
wasn’t a drinker. That’s what I did,” he recalls.
They would take the submarine for a shake down cruise to be sure
everything was in working order. They’d put the ordinance back on and
load up on provisions and be out to sea again.
“After a couple of days the captain would open the orders. It was
difficult. Submarines operated on their own. You had naval
intelligence would give you certain information about ship movements
here and there. You’d fight in a lot of naval battles. We always
stood air sea rescue. You’d sit about 15 or 30 miles away from the
battle and pick up the pilots as they were ditching their aircraft
coming back,” he says.
He recalls some of the hardships on the boat. “You can’t take a
shower on a submarine. All the water you manufacture was to water the
batteries and for cooking. No showers. We used to hang buckets up for
condensation from water to brush your teeth. The temperature in a
submarine averaged between 110 and 130 degrees all the time. That’s
why they called them pig boats. You smelled those boats. When you
went topside the fresh air stunk. You try to maintain no friends if
you can because you lose so many men. Every run you lose 10 to 15
men. First run, second run you have friends. All of a sudden you
don’t bother with anybody you just do your job,” he says.
His base was moved to Subic Bay in the Philippines. “We were there
about a month or so and they dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. We
loaded our submarine to come from Subic Bay to Japan, drop off
whatever provisions we had to help some of those people,” he says.
They were ordered back to San Diego. He called his mother. Because of
the time difference it was the middle of the night and she thought
she dreamed the phone call. The next morning his sister called the
telephone company and verified that he had indeed called from San
Diego.
He was sent to a naval hospital in Virginia. His boat came around and
up the East Coast. He picked it up in Norfolk. “We went to Navy Day
in New York City on Oct. 29. President Harry Truman was there. All
the ships and boats tied up on the East River,” he says. His entire
family came down to New York. A cousin who lived in the city threw a
party on his roof for the entire crew.
“My mother and father went home. I decided to go home with them. I
figured that’s it. I was home about a month. I went to the movies
with my friends at the Strand Theater. All of a sudden the lights
came on. The shore patrol came in and they announced my name on the
speaker. They put me under arrest for desertion,” he recalls.
They were going to have a formal court martial for Torcomian until
they examined his war record. “I had a terrific war record. Everybody
was getting out of the Navy. Instead they sent me to teach school at
Key West, Florida,” he says. He had been injured twice during his
duty. One a shell hit him in the head. “It spun my helmet around,” he
says. The helmet was compressed and had to be cut off his head.
“On May 3, 1946 they called me in and said you’re going to be
discharged,” he recalls. On May 6 he was formally discharged and went
home.
He became ill following his discharge and was hospitalized in a naval
hospital in Maine for six months.
“That was the end of my experience with the U.S. Navy,” he says.
One of his old commanders worked for International Harvester Co. He
got Torcomian a job as an engineer. He traveled up and down the East
Coast. He met his wife Veronica at an Armenian Christian Youth
Organization meeting in Philadelphia. The Torcomians have three
children: Lynn (Baboujian), Thomas and John and eight grandchildren.
“Submarine sailors had a certain arrogance about them,” he recalls.
“We’ve been around, done a lot of things. It’s a pretty tough life
but you could get off anytime. Just tell them you had enough,” he
says. “You got through things that are totally unnatural.”

America Magazine , NY
Nov 10 2006
Editorial: Pilgrimage to Constantinople
With the exception of his appearance before his old faculty at the
University of Regensburg, Pope Benedict XVI’s travels have been quiet
affairs. Even a trip to Spain last July, which threatened to erupt
into controversy over policy differences with that country’s
Socialist government, transpired so uneventfully that some Vatican
officials were surprised. The pope’s upcoming trip to Turkey, Nov.
28-30, may be a different matter. It will be his first visit to a
Muslim country, where hostility toward Christianity has been growing.
In the last year, one priest has been killed in Turkey and at least
two others attacked. Various individuals have threatened the pope’s
life if he persists in his mission. Earlier this month a gunman was
arrested for firing at the Italian consulate in protest of the visit.
Memories of the pope’s public opposition, when he was a cardinal, to
Turkey’s admission to the European Union on the grounds that it does
not share Europe’s culture are still raw; and his use of a
controversial quote about irrational violence in Islam in his
Regensburg lecture has unfortunately further inflamed those who
oppose the visit. Still, the Turkish government has continued to
extend its invitation, and the pope has bravely held to his
commitment.
A principal purpose of the trip is to strengthen relations with the
Orthodox Church and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I by attending
the celebration of the feast of St. Andrew the Apostle (Nov. 30),
patron of the see of Constantinople. How fraught with difficulty the
journey may be is evident from the tensions between the Turkish
government and the patriarchate over constraints Turkey has imposed
on the religious freedom of the Greek Orthodox Church. Following a
recent meeting, the North American Orthodox Catholic Theological
Consultation identified several of the difficulties faced by the
ecumenical patriarchate.
The group’s statement declared: `By decisions reached in 1923 and
1970, the government imposed significant limitations on the election
of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Even today, the Turkish state does not
recognize the historic role that the Patriarch plays among Orthodox
Christians outside Turkey. The Turkish government closed the
Patriarchate’s Theological School on the island of Halki in 1971 and,
in spite of numerous appeals from governmental and religious
authorities, still does not allow it to reopen, severely limiting the
patriarchate’s ability to train candidates for the ministry.’
Pope Benedict’s pilgrimage offers an opportunity not only to express
solidarity with the Orthodox in their straitened circumstances, but
for all sides to find ways out of these historic difficulties.
The Turkish situation is not, as some wrongly imagine, a
straightforward Islam-versus-the-West scenario. Turkey is a bridge
between Europe and the Middle East – and not just geographically. It is
an Islamic country with a moderate Muslim party now leading the
government, but its constitution, vigorously upheld by the military,
involves an especially stringent form of Turkish secularism that
struggles to hold down religious fundamentalism among the population.
Since the time of Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey’s founder and first
president (1923-38), the country has struggled to modernize – that is
to say, Westernize – by adopting European fashions, technology and
economics as well as the forms of parliamentary government; but it
has often fallen short of adopting the deeper Western values of
respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Among Turkey’s elites there is profound fear of political and
cultural fragmentation, particularly of secession on the part of the
sizable Kurdish population. Intellectual dissent from the standards
of official Turkish identity – by acknowledging, for example, the
Armenian genocide – remains a criminal offense. Though members of the
Greek Orthodox Church make up only a minuscule group, Turkey, as heir
to the Ottoman Empire, clings to a centuries-old enmity toward Greece
and in particular the Greek Orthodox Church, as the custodian of the
Hellenic soul.
The pope deserves credit for supporting the Orthodox Church on such
hostile terrain. In choosing to visit Turkey, he has taken on a
Herculean challenge that combines Turkish-European, Muslim-Christian
and Orthodox-Catholic relations. At the heart of each problematic
relationship lie questions about the status of human rights and
religious liberty. God willing, even if the trip provides no
immediate breakthroughs, the pope’s journey will prepare the way for
peaceful progress on these issues in the future.

Belleville News-Democrat, IL
Nov 10 2006
Armenian Church in Swansea celebrates its 50th anniversary this
weekend
News-Democrat
The Holy Virgin Mary and Shoghagat Armenian Church at 400 Huntwood
Road in Swansea is celebrating its 50th anniversary today and Sunday.
The parish has more than 100 members from across the bi-state region
and includes the children and grandchildren of the church founders,
as well as new Armenian-Americans who have come to the United States
in the last 10 to 20 years.
At 7 p.m. today, members will host a welcome reception and memorial
garden dedication at the church featuring survivors of the Armenian
Genocide, where more than one and a half million Armenians died
between 1915 and 1918 in what is now modern day Turkey.
Sunday at 10 a.m., the Divine Liturgy will be celebrated by His
Eminence, Archbishop Khajag Barsamian, Primate, Diocese of the
Armenian Church of America (Eastern) at the church, followed by a
Golden Anniversary Banquet at the Sheraton Four Points Hotel in
Fairview Heights. The banquet will begin at 1 p.m.
Rep. Jerry Costello, D-Belleville, will offer remarks. Other speakers
will address the church’s impact on the community and on preserving
Armenian culture. A memorial walk ceremony honoring members of the
local Armenian community will also be held at the banquet.
Contact Zabelle Vartanian at 398-4302 or [email protected] for
more event information.

The New Anatolian, Turkey
Nov 10 2006
Armenians see advantage in US Congress shakeup
The New Anatolian / Washington
After the U.S. House of Representatives returned to Democratic
control after Tuesday’s blowout elections, American-Armenians saw
advantages in the Congressional shakeup, which is likely to
strengthen their hand in pressuring for recognition of genocide
claims by the U.S.
The Armenian Assembly of America (ANCA), in a statement yesterday,
cited the likely elevation of Representative Nancy Pelosi, a member
of the Armenian Caucus, to become the first female speaker of the
House.
The statement said that with these elections, the anticipated
leadership of the next Congress will offer new opportunities to pass
an Armenian genocide claims resolution.
Pelosi has regularly called on the administration to acknowledge the
Armenian genocide claims. In a statement to a newspaper, Pelosi had
this to say: “It is imperative that the U.S. recognize this atrocity
and move to renew our commitment to eliminate genocide whenever and
wherever it exists. This effort enjoys strong bipartisan support in
the House, and I will continue to support these efforts in the 110th
Congress.”
The man Pelosi is likely to succeed, Republican Dennis Hastert, on
more than one occasion used his power as speaker to block so-called
Armenian genocide resolutions from reaching the House floor,
sometimes under presidential pressure. However, Pelosi and President
George W. Bush have conflicting and sometimes bitter party
affiliations, and this may blunt the impact of such pressure in the
future.
Tan declines comment on Pelosi
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Namik Tan said on Thursday that the
Congressional elections in the U.S. reflects the American people’s
will but avoided commenting on Pelosi’s stance on the Armenian
genocide claims.
Tan, in a weekly press briefing, asked about the impact of the
Democrats’ victory on Turkish-U.S. relations, stated, “Relations
between the two countries will continue within the framework of
friendship and alliance. We don’t have anything to say about the
elections other than respecting them. The American people chose who
they wanted to see in their Congress.”
Asked about Pelosi as speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Tan stated that it is not a good time to talk on a personal basis. He
underlined the importance of relations between Ankara and Washington,
stressing that developments on specific issues were not foreseeable.
He added that Turkey will continue to have warm relations with the
U.S. in terms of friendship and strategic agreements.

Armenian National Committee of America
1711 N Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel. (202) 775-1918
Fax. (202) 775-5648
Email [email protected]
Internet
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2006
Contact: Elizabeth S. Chouldjian
Tel: (202) 775-1918
ANCA CALLS FOR WHITE HOUSE WITHDRAWAL OF HOAGLAND NOMINATION
— Asks Senators to Urge President Bush to Drop
Controversial Candidate for U.S. Ambassador to Armenia
WASHINGTON, DC – Citing the growing controversy surrounding
Ambassador-designate Dick Hoagland’s denial of the Armenian
Genocide – as reflected by the “hold” placed by Senator Bob
Menendez on his confirmation – the Armenian National Committee of
America (ANCA) has asked members of the U.S. Senate to call on
President Bush to withdraw his nomination for the next U.S.
Ambassador to Armenia.
In letters sent on November 8th to all one hundred Senators, ANCA
Chairman Ken Hachikian stressed that: “Very simply, a genocide
denier cannot effectively promote U.S. interests or American values
in Armenia – a country that rose from the ashes of Turkey’s
genocidal campaign.” He added that, “confirming an Ambassador to
Armenia who denies the Armenian Genocide would dramatically
undermine U.S. diplomacy in Armenia and mark a major retreat from
our nation’s noble commitment to genocide prevention.” Community
activists across the country are echoing this message in thousands
of ANCA WebFaxes being sent to Senate offices from the ANCA website
–
In announcing his decision to block the Hoagland nomination on
September 12, 2006, Senator Menendez (D-NJ) highlighted the
principled stand taken by former U.S. Ambassador John Evans, who,
by all accounts, was fired for speaking truthfully about the
Armenian Genocide. The New Jersey legislator stated that he has
“great concerns that Mr. Hoagland’s confirmation would be a step
backward.”
Neither Ambassador-designate Hoagland, nor the Department of State,
have taken any meaningful steps to address the three concerns
raised by the ANCA in opposition to the Hoagland nomination. In a
September 1st letter to members of the U.S. Senate, the ANCA called
for Senate opposition to the Hoagland nomination until:
1) Ambassador-designate Hoagland provides a responsible and
unambiguous public statement affirming that he does not question
the clear genocidal intent of the Ottoman Turkish government
against its Armenian population.
2) The State Department provides a full, honest, and public
explanation regarding the reasons for the controversial firing of
the current Ambassador, John Marshall Evans.
3) The Administration explains any and all communications, directly
or indirectly, between the U.S. government and the Turkish
government concerning Ambassador Evans.
For an overview of the firing of Ambassador Evans and the Hoagland
controversy, visit:
p
The full text of the November 8, 2006 ANCA letter is provided
below.
#####
Dear Senator __________:
I am writing to respectfully call on you to urge President Bush to
withdraw the deeply flawed and increasingly controversial
nomination of Dick Hoagland as U.S. Ambassador to Armenia.
As we have shared with you on several occasions, Ambassador-
designate Hoagland’s statements denying the Armenian Genocide
disqualify him from serving in an effective capacity as America’s
representative in Yerevan. As you recall, in his written responses
to questions posed to him during his confirmation hearing, he went
far beyond the bounds of the Administration’s already deeply flawed
policy, actually calling into question the Armenian Genocide as a
historical fact. His statements are all the more troubling in
light of the White House’s continued refusal to explain why it
fired the previous U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Evans, or to
reveal the role that Turkey played in his dismissal.
Very simply, a genocide denier cannot effectively promote U.S.’
interests or American values in Armenia – a country that rose from
the ashes of Turkey’s genocidal campaign. Confirming an Ambassador
to Armenia who denies the Armenian Genocide would dramatically
undermine U.S. diplomacy in Armenia and would mark a major retreat
from our nation’s noble commitment to genocide prevention.
Based on these considerations, I respectfully call on you to
publicly support the hold placed by Senator Robert Menendez and to
urge the White House to withdraw the Hoagland nomination.
Thank you for your consideration of the concerns of the Armenian
American community on this matter. We would, of course, be pleased
to meet with you to discuss this matter in person, or to forward to
you additional materials in support of our request. If you have
any questions, please contact the Armenian National Committee of
America at (202) 775-1918 or [email protected].
Sincerely yours,
[signed]
Kenneth V. Hachikian
Chairman