Azat Artsakh, NKR
Sept 13 2006
COMPUTERS TO SCHOOLS OF ARTSAKH
Shen NGO has a great contribution to the schools of Artsakh, namely
it provides schools with computers. Karen Aramian, the representative
of Shen to NKR, says about 250 computers were distributed to the
schools of the republic. The aim of the project Computers to NKR
Schools was the use of computers in teaching. A group of programmers
in Armenia is now designing school programs for Armenian schools,
funded by an international foundation supporting modern teaching
methods at schools. The programmers promised to provide the disks to
Shen, which will publish the programs. Besides, this summer some
teachers of chemistry and biology were trained to use these programs
in teaching. There are also programs for informatics and ecology.
This is a useful method, however, the schools already encounter
problems, for computers in some schools are too old, and teachers are
not competent. Karen Aramian is hopeful that the programs will be
provided to all the schools within this academic year. He also said
it will be necessary to replace the old computers with new ones.
However, Karen Aramian says, computers and software is not enough to
solve the problem of schools. The image of teacher is very important.
If the teacher is discontent with his salary, his life, his work
cannot be effective.
S. KHACHATRIAN.
13-09-2006
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azat Artsakh, NKR
Sept 15 2006
FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGY PETROSYAN COMMENTS ON FIRES
Considering the outcome, namely the intention to send an OSCE mission
assisted by UN experts to study the short-term and long-term impact
of fires on the environment, the resolution is acceptable for NKR.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that this is the logical
continuation of the initiative of the Nagorno-Karabakh government.
The NKR government is worried by fires, which inflicted considerable
damage on the agriculture and threatened to grow into an ecological
disaster. In this connection, on June 15 the NKR foreign ministry
addressed a note to the office of the Personal Representative of the
OSCE CiO calling to conduct a crisis monitoring at the border with
Azerbaijan. The OSCE mission conducted a series of monitoring two
weeks late, and the findings underlay the report of the Personal
Representative of the OSCE CiO, which rebutted the accusations of the
Azerbaijani side on arson in the settlements of the security area of
NKR. Hence, the NKR government was the first to invite the OSCE to
send a monitoring mission to the region, which was ignored in the
statement of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in the meeting of the
General Assembly. Generally, if the report of the OSCE senior officer
needs additional confirmation, we are ready to accept a new OSCE
mission to dispel the Azerbaijani myths once again. The reporting of
the question to the UN and the wording in the OSCE resolution is
unacceptable. The attempts to report the questions that are attended
to by the OSCE to the UN do not favor progress in the settlement, but
impede the prospect of settlement of the Karabakh conflict. It should
be noted that the resolution, namely its content is the result of
agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is a rare thing,
considering the absence of means of confidence between the parties
over the recent years and is, therefore, commendable. We think that
similar projects should be discussed by all the three parties of the
conflict to prevent problems that may occur in applying decisions,
especially that these decisions basically refer to the territories
controlled by NKR. The stance of NKR is the same: we are likely to
continue cooperation with the international organizations and will
assist the OSCE task force consisting of experts of only neutral
countries. September 11, 2006, NKR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
AA.
15-09-2006

All American Patriots (press release), Sweden
World : Azerbaijan: International Religious Freedom
Report 2006
Posted by Patriot on 2006/9/17 7:23:36
Released by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in
compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the secretary of state, with
the assistance of the ambassador at large for international religious
freedom, shall transmit to Congress “an Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports
by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters
involving international religious freedom.”
Azerbaijan: The constitution provides that persons of all faiths may
choose and practice their religion without restrictions; however,
there were some abuses and restrictions.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom
during the reporting period. Some religious groups reported delays in
and denials of registration while others indicated that they either
received or expect to receive their registration. There continued to
be some limitations upon the ability of groups to import religious
literature than in previous years. Most religious groups met without
government interference. However, local authorities monitored
religious services, and officials at times harassed nontraditional
religious groups.
The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society
contributed to religious freedom; however, there was popular prejudice
against Muslims who convert to non-Islamic faiths and hostility
towards groups that proselytize, particularly evangelical Christian
and missionary groups.
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The
embassy is engaged actively in monitoring religious freedom and
maintains contact with the Government and a wide range of religious
groups.
Section I. Religious Demography
According to official figures, the country has a total area of 33,774
square miles, and its population was approximately 7.9 million. There
were no reliable statistics on memberships in various religious
groups; however, according to official figures approximately 96
percent of the population was Muslim. The rest of the population
adhered to other faiths or consisted of nonbelievers. Among the Muslim
majority, religious observance was relatively low, and Muslim identity
tended to be based more on culture and ethnicity than
religion. According to the State Committee on Work with Religious
Associations (SCWRA), the Muslim population was approximately 65
percent Shi’a and 35 percent Sunni; differences traditionally have not
been defined sharply.
The vast majority of Christians were Russian Orthodox whose identity,
like that of Muslims, tended to be based as much on culture and
ethnicity as religion. Christians were concentrated in the urban
areas of Baku and Sumgayit.
An estimated 15,000 Jews, constituting the vast majority of the
country’s Jewish community, lived in Baku. Smaller communities also
existed in and around Guba and elsewhere. Most of the country’s Jews
belonged to one of two groups: the “Mountain Jews,” descendents of
Jews who sought refuge in the northern part of the country more than
two thousand years ago, and a smaller group of “Ashkenazi” Jews,
descendents of European Jews who migrated to the country during
Russian and Soviet rule.
These four groups (Shi’a, Sunni, Russian Orthodoxy, and Jews) were
considered traditional religious groups. There also have been small
congregations of Evangelical Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Baptists,
Molokans (Russian Orthodox Old-Believers), Seventh-day Adventists, and
Baha’is in the country for more than one hundred years. In the last
ten years, a number of new religious groups considered foreign or
nontraditional have been established, including “Wahhabi” Muslims,
Pentecostal and evangelical Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Hare
Krishnas.
There were fairly sizeable expatriate Christian and Muslim communities
in the capital city of Baku; authorities generally permitted these
groups to worship freely.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
The constitution provides that persons of all faiths may choose and
practice their religion without restriction; however, there were some
abuses and restrictions. Under the constitution, each person has the
right to choose and change his or her own religious affiliation and
belief including atheism, to join or form the religious group of his
or her choice, and to practice his or her religion. The law on
religious freedom expressly prohibits the Government from interfering
in the religious activities of any individual or group; however, there
are exceptions, including cases where the activity of a religious
group “threatens public order and stability.” In January 2006 the
Government announced its intention to amend the law on religious
freedom to restrict the political activities of religious groups.
A number of legal provisions enable the Government to regulate
religious groups, including a requirement in the law on religious
freedom that religious organizations be registered by the
Government. The State Committee for Work with Religious Associations
(SCWRA), which replaced the Department of Religious Affairs in 2001,
assumed responsibility for the registration of religious groups from
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Government authorities gave the SCWRA
and its chairman broad powers over registration; control over the
publication, import, and distribution of religious literature; and the
ability to suspend the activities of religious groups violating the
law. In addition, Muslim religious groups must receive a letter of
approval from the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) before they can be
registered by the SCWRA. On June 27, 2006, the president of the
country dismissed the chairman of the SCWRA. No public reason was
given for the dismissal; at the end of the reporting period the
Government had not announced a new SCWRA chairman.
Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank
account, rent property, and generally act as a legal
entity. Unregistered organizations are exposed to allegations that
they are illegal and find it difficult, but not impossible, to
function. Unregistered groups were more vulnerable to attacks and
closures by local authorities. In 2001 religious groups were called
upon to re-register with the SCWRA; however, the registration process
is burdensome, and there are frequent, sometimes lengthy delays in
obtaining registration
To register, religious groups must complete a seven-step application
process that is arbitrary and restrictive. In 2004 groups reported
that SCWRA employees charged with handling registration-related
paperwork repeatedly argued over the language in statutes and also
instructed some groups on how to organize themselves. Religious groups
are permitted to appeal registration denials to the courts. However,
appellate court records for the period of this report cannot verify
whether any appeals were adjudicated.
During the reporting period, the Government registered twenty-seven
religious groups and rejected the applications of six religious
groups, five of which the SCWRA identified as non-Muslim applicant
groups. Since the call for re-registration, 347 groups have
successfully registered, compared with 406 that were registered under
the previous law. The majority of the registered groups were
Muslim. The SCWRA estimated that two thousand religious groups are in
operation; many have not filed for registration or
re-registration. One of the minority religious communities that has
faced re-registration problems in the past is the Baptist
denomination. Of its five main churches, three have successfully
re-registered; however, in 2005 the SCWRA again rejected the
applications of the Baptist churches in Aliabad and Neftchala, which
remained unregistered.
Under the law on religious freedom, political parties cannot engage in
religious activity, and religious leaders are forbidden from seeking
public office. Religious facilities may not be used for political
purposes. In the aftermath of the November 2005 parliamentary
elections, the SCWRA announced plans to amend the law on religious
freedom to further tighten restrictions the political activities of
religious leaders. The drafting of the amendments remained in its
preliminary stage as of the end of the reporting period.
The law on religious freedom, which the Government enforces, prohibits
foreigners from proselytizing. In July 2005 the Government did not
renew the visa of the Swedish pastor of the Cathedral of Praise church
in Baku, although there were no other reported visa denials during the
reporting period. The law permits the production and dissemination of
religious literature with the approval of the SCWRA; however, the
authorities also appeared to selectively restrict individuals from
importing and distributing religious materials. The procedure for
obtaining permission to import religious literature remained
burdensome, but religious organizations reported that the process had
improved in the past year and that the SCWRA appeared to be handling
requests more effectively.
Registered Muslim organizations are subordinate to the CMB, a
Soviet-era Muftiate, which appoints Muslim clerics to mosques,
periodically monitors sermons, and organizes annual pilgrimages to
Mecca for the Hajj. Although it remains the first point of control
for Muslim groups wanting to register with the SCWRA according to the
law on religious freedom, it also has been subject to interference by
the SCWRA. It has attempted to share control with the CMB over the
appointment and certification of clerics and internal financial
control of the country’s mosques. Some Muslim religious leaders
objected to interference from both the CMB and SCWRA.
Religious instruction is not mandatory in public schools. State
education is separate from religion, but there is no restriction on
teaching religion in schools
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
The Government restricted some religious freedoms during the reporting
period. The SCWRA continued to delay or deny registration to a number
of Protestant Christian groups but registered one Baptist church whose
application was previously denied or delayed.
In addition, in 2005 the Justice Ministry denied registration to a
religious nongovernmental organization (NGO), the Azerbaijan Centre
for Religion and Democracy. Human rights activists alleged that the
ministry denied the registration of this group because of its
criticism of the official religious structures and to obstruct its
activities.
Unregistered religious groups continued to function, and there were
fewer incidents than in previous years of official harassment,
break-ups of religious services, or police intimidation and
fines. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of beatings
during police raids.
For example, on April 16, 2006, Baku police interrupted the Easter
services of the Protestant Community of Greater Grace purportedly to
ascertain the legality of the group’s religious activities. However,
when the group complained to the Government, local officials
apologized for the incident.
Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses reported that local authorities,
particularly outside of Baku, occasionally interfered with their
ability to rent public halls for religious assemblies and fined or
detained overnight some of the group’s members for meeting in private
homes. For example, on June 12, 2005, police raided a gathering of
approximately 200 Jehovah’s Witnesses in Baku, detaining 29 members of
the group and then releasing them after several hours in police
custody.
Authorities raided Baku’s Mehebet Baptist Church summer camp in July
2005 in the town of Gakh, and in November 2005 they raided the Baptist
congregation in Ali-Bayramli.
In 2004, police reportedly harassed and occasionally raided the
meetings of other religious minorities including Seventh day
Adventists in Ganja.
MOJ officials and police forcibly evicted the Juma Mosque community
from its premises in 2004, following protracted litigation. The mosque
remained closed as of the end of the reporting period.
Government officials cited the political activity of the mosque’s
imam, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu as one reason for seeking the eviction of the
Juma Mosque community. Ibrahimoglu supported the opposition political
party leader Isa Gambar’s 2003 election movement, and in 2005 he
campaigned on behalf of opposition party parliamentary candidates in
the November parliamentary election.
Since his 2004 conviction for participating in post election
demonstrations in 2003, Ibrahimoglu has not been allowed to travel
outside the country, including to several meetings of the UN and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, where he was to
be an official NGO participant.
On June 30, 2005, the first anniversary of the Juma community’s
eviction from the mosque, police briefly detained and released
Ibrahimoglu for leading a group of worshippers into the Juma Mosque to
conduct prayers, although the mosque remained officially closed.
Local law enforcement authorities occasionally monitored religious
services, and some observant Christians and Muslims were penalized for
their religious affiliations. The law on religious freedom expressly
prohibits religious proselytizing by foreigners, and this was enforced
strictly. Government authorities have deported several Iranian and
other foreign clerics operating independently of the organized Muslim
community for alleged violations of the law. The Government was
concerned about Islamic missionary groups (predominately Iranian and
Wahhabis) that operated in the country, whose activities have been
restricted in recent years. In May 2005 the Government closed a Saudi
Arabian-sponsored Sunni mosque in the city of Sumgayit.
Various religious groups previously reported some restrictions and
delays in the import of religious literature by some government
ministries. However, the SCWRA has also facilitated the import of such
literature, and few religious groups reported difficulty importing
literature through the SCWRA.
The Government regulates travel for the purpose of religious
training. Prospective travelers must obtain permission from, or
register with the SCWRA or the Ministry of Education in order to go
abroad for religious studies.
No religious identification is required in passports or other identity
documents. In 1999 a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim women
who sued for the right to wear headscarves in passport photos;
however, the Center for Protection of Conscience and Religious
Persuasion Freedom (DEVAMM) reported that authorities prohibited
Muslim women from wearing headscarves in passport photos. In 2004 a
group of women appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
to protest the ban.
Some local officials continued to discourage Muslim women from wearing
headscarves in schools. However, in June 2005, a court in Sumgayit
upheld a school teacher’s right to wear a headscarf while teaching and
ordered the school to pay her back wages for the two months she was
not allowed to teach.
Following months of repeated refusals, local officials in the Zaqatala
region finally issued a birth certificate to Baptist parents who
wished to give their son a Christian name. Members of the ethnic
Georgian minority reported that difficulty in registering children
with non-Azeri names was particularly acute in this region.
On April 28, 2006, police arrested Mushfiq Mammedov, a member of
Jehovah’s Witnesses, for refusing to fulfill the country’s mandatory
military service requirement, due to his religious beliefs. Mammedov
appealed his arrest in court on grounds that he had a constitutional
right to alternative military service as a conscientious
objector. Mammedov remained in pretrial detention. In a previous case,
the Supreme Court ruled that a member of a religious minority must
fulfill compulsory military service despite his constitutional
entitlement to alternative military service because of his religious
beliefs. After seven months of litigation in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court held that while the country remained in a “state of war”
with Armenia, the military’s service requirement superseded the
individual’s alternative service right. The court further agreed with
the military’s argument that absent implementing regulations, the
military was not obligated to provide any alternative service
option. The individual and his family subsequently left the country.
The Baptist community reported that the authorities have not returned
a building of historic significance previously confiscated under the
Soviet regime that is used as a central Baku cinema. The Baha’i
community reported that the Government has not responded to its August
2005 request that the authorities return a Baku house of historic
value to the community. The Government claimed that the country does
not have a law on the restitution of seized property, rendering it
impossible to return the buildings.
Press reports indicate that in the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region,
a predominantly ethnic Armenian area over which the authorities have
no control, the Armenian Apostolic Church enjoys a special status. The
largely Muslim ethnic Azeri population in Nagorno-Karabakh and the
seven occupied territories, which fled the region during the conflict
with Armenia in the 1990s, was not able to return to these areas.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
Sporadic violations of religious freedom by some officials
continued. In many instances, abuses reflected the popular antipathy
towards ethnic Azeri converts to non-Russian Orthodox Christianity and
other nontraditional religious groups.
In March 2005 the head of the CMB appeared in a television expose
describing nontraditional religious groups as subversive sects. The
chairman of the SCWRA spoke on television claiming that Adventists
used financial bribes to recruit new adherents. On June 21, 2006, a
representative of the SCWRA criticized Adventists and other
nontraditional religious groups in an expose aired on a leading
television channel. In the same broadcast representatives of the Ganja
orthodox church described nontraditional religious groups as
“brainwashing” their members.
Nontraditional religious groups faced particularly acute problems
operating in remote regions of the country, including the exclave of
Nakhchivan. For example, in December 2004 the leader of the small
Baha’i community in Nakhchivan was briefly detained and released,
reportedly because of his religious activity and teachings.
Government authorities took various actions to restrict what they
claimed were political and terrorist activities by Iranian and other
clerics operating independently of the organized Muslim community. The
Government outlawed several Islamic humanitarian organizations because
of credible reports about connections to terrorist activities. The
Government also deported foreign Muslim clerics it suspected of
engaging in political activities. There also were reports that the
Government harassed Muslim groups due to security concerns. For
example, the Human Rights Resource Center in Khachmaz reported that
Wahhabis in Khachmaz were harassed because the authorities suspect
that all Wahhabists have links to terrorism. On April 18, 2006, the
authorities announced the conviction of a Wahabbist group called the
Jammat-al-Mujahiddin on charges of plotting terrorist actions.
There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the
country. Sunni Imam Kazim Aliyev, who appealed his 2002 arrest in
Ganja to the ECHR, was released from prison in January 2006 by
presidential pardon. In the northern city of Khachmaz, community
members reported that on several occasions, police harassed and
detained some Muslims who had disrupted public order. The police
allegedly shaved the detainee’s’ beards; however, police officials
denied detaining anyone for religious reasons.
Forced Religious Conversion
There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of
minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from
the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States.
Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom
Some religious groups in the country report improvements in their
ability to function freely. Several churches indicated that they
either received or expected to receive their registration, they were
able to import religious literature, and they met without government
interference.
When minority religious communities outside of Baku reported that
local authorities illegally denied their registration, the SCWRA
intervened on their behalf and rectified the situation. In previous
years, the SCWRA had taken a particularly strict approach to the
registration of minority religious communities and had failed to
prevent local authorities from banning such communities.
During the reporting period, the Government worked actively to promote
interfaith understanding. SCWRA convened leaders of various religious
communities on several occasions to resolve disputes in private, and
has provided forums for visiting officials to discuss religious issues
with religious figures. During the reporting period the SCWRA
organized several seminars, conferences, and regional meetings on
religious freedom and tolerance.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
The generally amicable relationship among religious groups in society
contributed to religious freedom; however, there is popular prejudice
against Muslims who convert to non-Islamic faiths and hostility
towards groups that proselytize, particularly evangelical Christian
and missionary groups. This has been accentuated by the unresolved
conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
As in previous reporting periods, newspapers and television broadcasts
depicted small, vulnerable religious groups as a threat to the
identity of the nation and undermining the country’s traditions of
interfaith harmony, which led to local harassment. In addition, the
head of the SCWRA has made remarks at times during these broadcasts,
which contributed to the climate of hostility these broadcasts
generate.
During the reporting period, articles critical of Wahhabism and
Christian missionaries appeared in many newspapers and one television
channel aired “exposes” of Christian church services. Religious
proselytizing by foreigners is against the law, and there is vocal
opposition to it.
Hostility also existed toward foreign (mostly Iranian and Wahhabist)
Muslim missionary activity, which was viewed in part as seeking to
spread political Islam, and therefore as a threat to stability and
peace. The media targeted some Muslim communities that the Government
claimed were involved in illegal activities.
Hostility between Armenians and Azeris, intensified by the unresolved
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, remained strong. In those areas of the
country controlled by Armenians, all ethnic Azeris have fled, and the
mosques that have not been destroyed are not functioning. Animosity
toward ethnic Armenians elsewhere in the country forced most of them
to depart between 1988 and 1990, and all Armenian churches, many of
which were damaged in ethnic riots that took place more than a decade
ago, remained closed. As a consequence, the estimated ten thousand to
thirty thousand ethnic Armenians who remained were unable to attend
services in their traditional places of worship.
There were few cases of prejudice and discrimination against Jews in
the country, and in the few instances of anti-Semitic activity, the
Government was quick to respond. Jewish community leaders consistently
remarked on the positive relationship they have with the Government
and leaders of other religious communities. In 2004, a new Jewish
community center was opened in Baku with high-level government
participation. Authorities also reserved one wing of a Baku school for
secular and religious classes for 200 Jewish students.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human
rights. During the reporting period, embassy officers conveyed
U.S. concerns about the registration process and the overall attitude
towards nontraditional religious groups to the chairman of the
SCWRA. Embassy officers also expressed concerns about the Government’s
commitment to religious freedom with other members of the Government
and publicly in the press. The U.S. embassy repeatedly conveyed
objections to the censorship of religious literature, and concern that
proposed amendments to the law on religious freedom respect the rights
of religious believers.
The ambassador and embassy officers maintain close contacts with
leading Muslim, Russian Orthodox, and Jewish religious officials, and
regularly meet with members of nonofficial religious groups in order
to monitor religious freedom. The ambassador and embassy officers also
maintain close contact with NGOs that address issues of religious
freedom.
Released on September 15, 2006
Source: US State Dept.

Arutz Sheva, Israel
Poll: Muscovites Hostile to Skinheads, Jews & Migrants
11:35 Sep 17, ’06 / 24 Elul 5766

(IsraelNN.com) Though 76% of Muscovites have expressed hostility
toward skinheads, a large number of them still share the neo-Nazis’
view of certain non-Russian ethnic groups, according to the national
newspaper `Trud’ published on August 31. Citing a poll of Moscow
residents’ attitudes toward non-Russians, the paper reported that one
third of residents feel antipathy toward Jews and Tatars, slightly
higher numbers feel the same way about Armenians and Georgians, and
over half of residents are hostile toward Azeris and Chechens.
The article lists possible reasons for these attitudes: a large influx
of migrants who tend to cluster together in certain neighborhoods;
negative perceptions of the allegedly ill-gotten wealth of some
migrants; and, paradoxically, the extreme poverty of others, along
with the observation that most migrants are working-age men perceived
by some as competitors for the affections of Russian women.
`Trud’ also reported that this fall, the Moscow City Duma will
consider a bill that envisions the creation of a commission to prevent
ethnic discrimination by fining violators from five to 30 times their
monthly minimum wage. The fines are to be doubled for any racist
agitation on school grounds. (Bigotry Monitor — UCSJ’s weekly newsletter)

All American Patriots (press release), Sweden
World : Georgia: International Religious Freedom Report 2006
Posted by Patriot on 2006/9/17 7:34:02 (24 reads)

Released by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in
compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the secretary of state, with
the assistance of the ambassador at large for international religious
freedom, shall transmit to Congress “an Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports
by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters
involving international religious freedom.”
Georgia: The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government generally respected this right in practice.
During the period covered by this report, the status of religious
freedom continued to improve. Beginning in July 2005 the Government
approved the registration applications of previously unregistered
religious groups, pursuant to a new law enabling religious groups to
operate more freely. A total of fourteen organizations subsequently
registered under the law. Police were generally more responsive to
the needs of minority religious groups but failed at times to
adequately protect them. In December 2005 numerous members of
Parliament (MPs) objected strongly to a report by the government
ombudsman calling for equal recognition under the law of all religious
groups. The MPs stated that the historical role of the Georgian
Orthodox Church justified its privileged position.
Citizens generally did not interfere with religious groups considered
to be “traditional”; however, there was widespread suspicion of
“nontraditional” ones. Attacks on religious minorities, including
violence, verbal harassment, and disruption of services and meetings,
continued to decrease. While the Prosecutor General’s Office
increasingly initiated investigations of religious-based violence,
past complaints remained unresolved.
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.
Section I. Religious Demography
The country has an area of approximately 25,900 square miles, and its
population is an estimated 4.4 million. Most ethnic Georgians (who
constituted more than 80 percent of the population, according to the
2002 census) at least nominally associated themselves with the
Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). According to common Orthodox practice,
Orthodox churches serving non-Georgian ethnic groups, such as
Russians, Armenians, and Greeks, are under the territorial
jurisdiction of the GOC. Non-Georgian Orthodox churches generally use
the language of their communicants. There remained a small number of
mostly ethnic Russian adherents from three dissident Orthodox
schools–the Molokani, Staroveriy (Old Believers), and Dukhoboriy
(Spirit Wrestlers). Under Soviet rule, the number of active churches
and priests declined sharply, and religious education was nearly
nonexistent. Membership in the GOC has continued to increase since
independence in 1991. The Church maintained four theological
seminaries, two academies, several schools, and twenty-seven dioceses;
it had approximately 700 priests, 250 monks, and 150 nuns. The Church
was headed by Catholicos Patriarch Ilia II; the patriarchate was
located in the capital, Tbilisi.
The Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), Roman Catholicism, Judaism, and
Islam traditionally coexisted with Georgian Orthodoxy. Some religious
groups were correlated with ethnicity. Azeris comprised the second
largest ethnic group (approximately 285 thousand, 7 percent of the
population) and were largely Muslim; most lived in the southeastern
region of Kvemo-Kartli, where they constituted a majority. Armenians
were the third largest ethnic group (estimated at 249 thousand, 6
percent of the population), comprising the majority in the southern
Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Armenians largely belonged to the AAC.
Approximately 9.9 percent of the population was at least nominally
Muslim. There were three main Muslim populations: ethnic Azeris,
ethnic Georgian Muslims of Ajara, and ethnic Chechen Kists in the
northeastern region. There were four large madrassahs (Muslim
religious schools) attached to mosques in the eastern region, two of
which were Shi’ite and financed by Iranian religious groups, and two
of which, financed by Turkish religious groups, were Sunni. There were
also several smaller madrassahs in Ajara that were financed by private
groups in Turkey.
The Armenian Apostolic Church comprised the third largest religious
group, with members constituting an estimated 3.9 percent of the
population. Each of the other religious groups constituted less than 1
percent of the population.
There were approximately thirty-five thousand Catholics, largely
ethnic Georgians or Assyrians. A small number of Kurdish Yezidis–an
estimated eighteen thousand–have lived in the country for
centuries. The ethnic Greek Orthodox community used to number more
than one hundred thousand, but emigration waves since independence
reduced its numbers to approximately fifteen thousand.
Judaism, which has been present since ancient times, was practiced in
a number of communities throughout the country, particularly in the
largest cities, Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Approximately ten thousand Jews
remained in the country following two large waves of emigration, the
first in the early 1970s and the second during perestroyka in the late
1980s. Before then, officials estimate that there were approximately
forty thousand Jews.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Protestant and other
nontraditional denominations have become more active and
prominent. Local Jehovah’s Witnesses’ representatives stated that the
group had approximately 16 thousand adherents locally and had been in
the country since 1953. Pentecostals, both ethnic Georgian and
Russian, were estimated to number nine thousand. Baptists–composed of
ethnic Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Ossetian, and Kurdish
groups–totaled an estimated eight thousand adherents.
There were fewer than one thousand Lutherans, mostly descendents of
German communities that settled in the country several hundred years
ago. Seventh-day Adventists claimed approximately 350 members, and the
New Apostolic Church was also present. Membership in the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was small. There also were a few
Baha’is, Hare Krishnas, and Buddhists. The membership of all these
groups combined was officially estimated at thirty-four thousand
persons. The number of atheists who openly declare themselves as such
was less than 1 percent of the population.
Section II. Status of Freedom of Religion
Legal/Policy Framework
The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, local officials
and police sometimes denied this right or protection to religious
minorities. The constitution recognizes the special role of the GOC in
the country’s history but also stipulates the independence of the
church from the state. In 2002 a constitutional agreement (concordat)
between the Government and the GOC was signed and ratified by
Parliament. The concordat recognizes the special role of the GOC and
devolves authority over all religious matters to it, including matters
outside the church including public education topics.
The criminal code specifically prohibits interference with worship
services, persecution of a person based on religious faith or belief,
and interference with the establishment of a religious organization.
Violations of these prohibitions are punishable by fine and/or
imprisonment. Violations committed by a public officer or official are
considered abuse of power and are punishable by higher fines and/or
longer terms of imprisonment.
The president and government ombudsman have been effective advocates
for religious freedom and have made numerous public speeches and
appearances in support of minority religious groups. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) have become
more active in the protection of religious freedom but sometimes have
failed to pursue criminal cases against Orthodox extremists for
previous attacks against religious minorities. The human rights unit
in the legal department of the PGO is charged with protecting human
rights, including religious freedom. Since the beginning of 2005 the
PGO has initiated twenty-eight investigations of religious-based
violence, which have resulted in the trial and conviction of seven
individuals.
The GOC remains very active in the restoration of religious
facilities, and it lobbies the Government for the return of properties
that were held by the Church before the country’s incorporation into
the Soviet Union (church authorities have claimed that 20 to 30
percent of the country’s land area at one time belonged to the
church). In September 2005 the Government returned three additional
properties to the GOC.
In November 2005 President Saakashvili ordered the return of a mosque
in the Kvemo-Kartli region, which had been seized earlier and
converted into a community hall.
The country celebrates all Orthodox holy days. In March 2006 President
Saakashvili attended the celebration of the Muslim holy day Navrus
Bairam in Marneuli, and in November 2005 he participated in a
celebration of the Muslim holy day Bairam at a mosque in Tbilisi.
Before a registration process was established by Parliament in April
2005, religious groups were required to register as public entities,
even though the law provided no mechanism to do so yet stipulated a
fine for any unregistered religious group. Religious groups may now
register as local associations or foundations. An association is based
on membership (a minimum of five members is required), while a
foundation involves one or more founders establishing a fund for
furtherance of a certain cause for the benefit of the particular group
or the general public. In both cases registration is a function of
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Registration must be granted or denied
within fifteen days of application; a refusal may be appealed in
court.
In July 2005 the MOJ approved the first applications filed under the
new registration process. Both the Foundation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints in Georgia (Mormons) and the
Representation of the International Agency of Adventist Development
and Assistance in Georgia (which is affiliated with the Seventh-day
Adventist Church) received approval in less time than the fifteen days
allowed by law. An additional twelve organizations subsequently
registered under the law. The MOJ suspended a notary public for one
year after she refused to notarize documents of a Pentecostal church
that the church needed for registration; the congregation was seeking
registration at the end of the reporting period. Officials at the MOJ
were responsive in providing advice to religious organizations on
preparing registration applications and supporting documentation.
Some religious communities expressed dissatisfaction with the status
that registration provided. The Catholic Church (RCC) and the AAC
opposed registering themselves as civil organizations. Other churches
such as the Baptists expressed concern that transfers of property to
their churches would then be taxable.
In November 2005 Jehovah’s Witnesses rented a hall in Rustavi to
conduct meetings. On November 3, 2005, Paata Bluashvili, the leader of
the Orthodox group Jvari, and members of the group threatened the
owner of the meeting hall, who then cancelled the contract with the
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Bluashvili was convicted in 2004 of interfering
with a religious service and given a two-year suspended
sentence. Pending investigation of the November incident, Bluashvili
was sentenced to pretrial detention. Upon Bluashvili’s appeal of the
three-month detention, a court of appeals overturned the sentence and
released him, pending trial. In April 2006 a Rustavi court reinstated
the three-month sentence. Bluashvili failed to appear at the April
hearing and was wanted by the authorities.
While Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer believed it necessary to hold
services in private homes for security reasons, they often continued
to do so, due to delays in obtaining permits to build and occupy
Kingdom Halls.
Despite a law on education passed in April 2005 that forbids religious
indoctrination, proselytizing, forced assimilation, or the teaching of
theology in public schools during school hours, in practice students
routinely received instruction in Orthodox Christian
theology. Teachers often began most courses, including mathematics and
science, by leading the class in a recitation of Orthodox
prayers. Those students who did not participate were sometimes
punished. The law also forbids the display of religious symbols on a
public school’s grounds unless the purpose is academic. In many
classrooms, however, teachers hung orthodox icons or pictures of GOC
religious figures. Some schools have Orthodox chapels where students
were encouraged to pray.
Public schools offered an elective course, “Religion in Society.” This
course, however, dealt exclusively with the theology of Orthodox
Christianity. Moreover, while the course was an elective, there was
societal pressure for students to take it. The primary textbook
approved for use in the course focused on Orthodox Christianity to the
exclusion of other faiths. The Ministry of Education (MOE) continued
to work on curriculum development for this course.
Students are allowed to study religion and conduct religious rituals
after school hours; neither a teacher nor any other outside party,
such as a priest, may participate unless invited by the students.
Prayers and other rituals may no longer be conducted during school
hours.
The GOC routinely reviews religious and other textbooks used in
schools for consistency with Orthodox beliefs. By law the church has a
consultative role in curriculum development but no veto power.
Pursuant to a memorandum signed by the GOC patriarchate and the MOE in
January 2005, a joint working group began reviewing options for the
elective course on religion in society and other matters related to
religion in the curriculum. In the memorandum, the ministry also
agreed to financially assist the church in its education projects and
institutions and to include the Church in the development of new
material for religious education. No other religious groups were
afforded these privileges.
Senior government officials, including the speaker of Parliament, and
opposition party leaders intervened when the public television station
declined to broadcast live a Christmas Eve church service. The service
was broadcast following the intervention.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
The 2002 concordat between the GOC and the state defines relations
between the two. The GOC enjoys tax-exempt status not available to
other religious groups. The concordat contained several controversial
articles: giving the patriarch immunity, granting the Church the
exclusive right to staff the military chaplaincy, exempting GOC
clergymen from military service, and giving the Church a unique
consultative role in government, especially in the sphere of
education. Many of these controversial articles, however, required
Parliament to adopt implementing legislation, which it had not done at
the end of the reporting period. For example, despite the concordat
granting the GOC the right to establish a military chaplaincy, no
legislation had been adopted and there were no chaplains in military
units.
The Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, and Armenian Apostolic churches, as
well as representatives of the Jewish and Muslim faiths, signed formal
documents with the GOC patriarchate agreeing to the concordat but
stated after the document was published that several of these
controversial articles were not in the original that they had
signed. Representatives of nontraditional minority religious groups,
such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostals, were not included in the
concordat process. The AAC raised concerns about the authority the GOC
enjoys over decisions regarding the return of historically AAC church
property.
While most citizens practiced their religion without restriction, the
worship of some, particularly adherents of nontraditional faiths, was
restricted by threats and intimidation from some local Orthodox
priests and congregations. On some occasions during the reporting
period, local police were slow to prevent the harassment of
non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses and
Pentecostals.
On February 14, 2006, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses requested
permission to use the privately owned sports palace in Tbilisi for a
two-day religious convention for up to five thousand persons. On
February 22, 2006, the management of the sports palace responded that
they would be willing to accommodate such a convention only if
Jehovah’s Witnesses obtained a guarantee from the state to provide
security. An identical request they made in April 2005 had received a
similar response from the management. The 2005 incident prompted an
investigation by the PGO; results were pending at the end of the
reporting period.
A 2001 Supreme Court ruling revoked the registration of Jehovah’s
Witnesses as a foreign branch of the U.S.-based Jehovah’s Witnesses on
the grounds that the law does not allow registration of religious
organizations. The revocation resulted from a 1999 court case brought
by a former MP seeking to ban the group on the grounds that it
presented a threat to the state and the GOC. A case brought by
Jehovah’s Witnesses before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
in 2001 challenging this annulment was pending at the end of the
period covered by this report. It was unclear how the acknowledgement
by the Government of the lawfulness of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
registration and four subsequent registrations by other religious
organizations as branches of foreign noncommercial legal entities
would affect the case before the ECHR.
The Catholic and Armenian Apostolic churches have been unable to
secure the return of churches and other facilities closed during the
Soviet period, many of which later were given to the GOC by the
state. The prominent AAC church in Tbilisi, Norashen, remained closed,
as did four smaller AAC churches in Tbilisi and one in Akhaltsikhe. In
addition, the RCC and AAC, like Protestant denominations, have had
difficulty obtaining permission to construct new churches.
De facto authorities in the separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia
regions remained outside the control of the central Government, and
reliable information from those regions was difficult to obtain. A
1995 decree issued by the de facto leader of Abkhazia banning
Jehovah’s Witnesses in the region remained in effect but was not
enforced. During the reporting period Jehovah’s Witnesses reported no
problems in Abkhazia, where membership was approximately
1,500. Although Baptists, Lutherans, and Catholics also reported that
they were allowed to operate in the region, the GOC reported it was
unable to do so. The patriarch expressed concern over Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC) support of separatism in the region, specifically
subsidizing websites that encouraged secessionist sentiments. The GOC
also complained that the ROC’s Moscow Theological Seminary was
training Abkhaz priests. Despite the fact that the ROC recognizes the
country’s territorial integrity, the GOC patriarchate claimed that the
ROC was sending in priests loyal to the ROC patriarchate in Moscow,
under the pretext of setting up indigenous Abkhaz churches.
Orthodox believers were not able to conduct services in GOC churches
located near the villages of Nuli, Eredvi, Monasteri, and Gera because
these areas were under the control of Ossetian authorities.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
While there were fewer physical attacks on religious minority groups
during the reporting period, harassment continued. Although police
rarely facilitated harassment of religious minority groups, they
sometimes failed to protect them.
There was sporadic harassment of members of nontraditional religious
groups. Occasionally local Orthodox priests and their congregation
members verbally and physically threatened members of minority groups
and prevented them from constructing places of worship and from
holding worship services. Representatives of the affected groups
regularly filed complaints with the PGO and the ombudsman.
Within the PGO, the Human Rights Protection Unit monitors the progress
of investigations and prosecution of cases involving abuses of
religious freedom. During the reporting period, twenty instances of
interference, threats, intimidation, or violence were investigated. In
five instances, cases were awaiting trial; in eleven instances, the
investigations were ongoing; and in four instances, the investigation
did not find sufficient evidence to support charges. In October 2005 a
case against J. Megenishvili, for interfering in the performance of a
religious service, was forwarded to the Tbilisi city court for
trial. In August 2005 the prosecutor general initiated an
investigation related to an attack on two members of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Lamara Tskhovrebadze and Guliko Palivashvili. That
investigation was ongoing at the end of the reporting period.
In Rustavi on August 28, September 1, and October 18, 2005, Jehovah’s
Witnesses alleged that thirty persons blocked the road leading to a
home used for services. At the request of the public defender, an
investigation was launched. The investigation found that the
congregation had not been subjected to threats or violence.
There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the
country.
Forced Religious Conversion
There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of
minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from
the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States.
Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom
Pursuant to a new registration law adopted in April 2005, religious
groups can obtain legal status, which provides benefits such as the
ability to enter into contracts, open bank accounts, and own
property. While many religious groups praised the legislation, more
traditional religious groups continued to push for special legal
status that would set them apart from nontraditional religious
groups. Some religious groups also complained that the amendment did
not provide for registering property that they already owned under
personal title. While the parliamentary legal committee agreed to hold
consultations to help religious groups overcome this hurdle, the law
was not amended before the end of the reporting period.
Nontraditional religious groups reported that they were able to import
literature without seizure or delay. The AAC stated, however, that
imports of religious items such as candles were sometimes delayed due
to ambiguities about the Church’s legal status in the country.
While Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer believed it was necessary, for
security reasons, to hold their services in private homes, due to
delays in obtaining permits to build and occupy Kingdom Halls,
congregations often continued to meet in private homes.
In an effort to implement a 2001 Supreme Court ruling, the Jewish
community reached an agreement with a theater group whereby the
theater group vacated a hall in a Tbilisi building seized from the
Jewish community during Soviet rule. While the Jewish community was
able to use the hall, the situation was not fully resolved, because
the community could not use the hall as a synagogue.
In July 2005 the GOC patriarch and the ombudsman established religious
councils as forums to discuss ecumenical approaches to addressing
social problems such as poverty and drug addiction.
On November 2, 2005, the appeals court upheld a trial court decision
sentencing excommunicated Orthodox priest Basil Mkalavishvili to six
years’ imprisonment for engaging in numerous attacks on nontraditional
religious minorities including Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and
Jehovah’s Witnesses. The four-year sentence of his accomplice Petre
Ivanidze was also upheld.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
The public’s attitude towards religion was ambivalent. Although many
residents were not particularly observant, the link between the
country’s Orthodoxy and ethnic and national identity was strong.
The Jewish communities reported that they encountered few societal
problems. Anti-Semitism has not been a significant problem in recent
years, and there were no reported incidents during the period covered
by this report.
Relations between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims were very good; Sunni and
Shi’a worshipped together in Tbilisi’s mosque. Relations between
Muslims and Christians were also quite good. There were occasional
media reports of minor incidents of violence between ethnic Azeris and
ethnic Georgians or ethnic Armenians; however, these incidents did not
appear to be motivated by religious differences.
Despite their historical tolerance toward minority religious groups
traditional to the country–including Catholics, Armenian Apostolic
Christians, Jews, and Muslims–many citizens remained apprehensive
about Protestants and other nontraditional religious groups, which
they often viewed as taking advantage of the populace’s economic
hardship by gaining membership through economic assistance to
converts. Many members of the GOC and the public viewed religious
minorities, especially nontraditional groups of evangelical
Protestants or so-called “sects,” as a threat to the national church
and the country’s cultural values.
Local Orthodox priests and public school teachers vocally criticized
minority religious groups and interfaith marriages. Some also
discouraged Orthodox followers from any interaction with students who
belonged to Protestant churches. Sometimes teachers ridiculed students
who had converted to Protestant faiths, claiming the students
converted because they were offered financial benefits.
In 1997 the GOC withdrew from the World Council of Churches to appease
clerics strongly opposed to ecumenism. Some Orthodox Church officials
had ties to the Jvari organization that was involved in physical
attacks on nontraditional religious organizations and to two
fundamentalist Orthodox groups, the Society of Saint David the Builder
and the Union of Orthodox Parents, which denounced activities of
non-Orthodox churches or organizations.
GOC authorities accused AAC believers of purposely altering some
existing Georgian Orthodox churches so that they would be mistaken for
AAC churches. AAC representatives accused GOC believers of similar
activities. On July 14, 2005, in the village of Samsara in the
Samtskhe-Javakheti Region, a group of ethnic Georgian students and GOC
nuns were attacked by ethnic Armenian villagers as they were cleaning
up a church whose ownership is in dispute. The villagers accused the
students and nuns of trying to erase crosses symbolic of the AAC from
the building and of placing Orthodox icons in the church. After the
ombudsman intervened, representatives from both the GOC and the AAC
issued a joint statement denouncing the violence and calling for
forgiveness of those who had used force.
Following a series of physical and verbal threats in April and May
2005 against a group of Russian Pentecostals attempting to hold
services in a private home in Tbilisi, the ombudsman helped the
congregation obtain a plot of land on which to construct a new
building for services. While plans for the building were being drawn
up, the congregation conducted services in undisclosed private homes
or in outdoor areas. Police routinely provided protection in the
latter case. No charges were filed in connection with the April and
May 2005 incidents.
Following a series of incidents which began in June 2005 in Kutaisi
during which local residents repeatedly attacked members of Jehovah’s
Witnesses in an effort to stop renovations to a meeting house,
numerous investigations were launched into the attacks as well as into
reports that the police had been slow to respond to the violence and
then themselves threatened the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Two individuals
who were detained in connection with the attack publicly apologized to
the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In April 2006, at the request of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, the criminal charges against the two persons were dropped.
The meetinghouse in Kutaisi operated freely afterwards.
In August 2005 a large and vocal protest continued for two days at the
Nunciature of the Holy See in Tbilisi. A GOC parents group, objecting
to perceived proselytizing by the Catholic Church, carried out the
protest. The group also included Orthodox clergy. Police did not
disperse the protesters even when objects were thrown at the
Nunciature.
In September 2005 an ecumenical memorial service was held for the
victims of Hurricane Katrina and the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. Representatives from most Protestant denominations and of the
Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish faiths participated.
Between November 24 and 26, 2005, the Christian Research Center, a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the GOC, held a
symposium to promote dialogue and tolerance. Representatives from the
AAC, the RCC, and other denominations participated. During a
presentation by the bishop of the Lutheran Evangelical Church,
however, hecklers verbally abused him.
In December 2005 in the village of Tsinubani in the predominantly
ethnic Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, a local AAC priest
denounced a local Pentecostal congregation and urged villagers to
prevent the latter from burying its members in the local cemetery. The
ombudsman called for an investigation which is still pending.
Acts of religious violence between 2000 and 2004 went unpunished,
sometimes despite the filing of numerous criminal complaints. For
example, no criminal cases were expected to be opened for the
following incidents: the October 2004 incident in the village of
Velistsikhe, where local Orthodox priests and congregation members
used verbal and physical threats to block Baptists from constructing a
church; the June 2003 arson attack on a Baptist church in
Akhalsopheli; the July 2004 incident in Ozurgeti during which an
employee of the mayor’s office verbally and physically threatened two
members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who were proselytizing door-to-door;
the November 2004 incident during which a member of Jehovah’s
Witnesses was threatened several times for using his house in Kareli
to hold worship services; or the November 2004 assault by members of
the conservative Orthodox group, “The Society of Saint David the
Builder,” on several more liberal GOC seminary students.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The
U.S. government repeatedly raised its concerns regarding harassment of
and attacks against nontraditional religious minorities with senior
government officials, including the president, speaker of Parliament,
the ministers of internal affairs and justice, and the prosecutor
general. Embassy officials, including the ambassador, frequently met
with representatives of the Government, Parliament, various religious
confessions, and NGOs concerned with religious freedom issues.
An embassy official advocated with the Ministry of Justice on behalf
of religious organizations seeking recognition under the registration
law adopted in April 2005.
Released on September 15, 2006
Source: US State Dept.

All American Patriots (press release), Sweden
World : Iraq: International Religious Freedom Report 2006
Posted by Patriot on 2006/9/17 8:01:16 (22 reads)
Released by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in
compliance with Section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law provides that the secretary of state, with
the assistance of the ambassador at large for international religious
freedom, shall transmit to Congress “an Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom supplementing the most recent Human Rights Reports
by providing additional detailed information with respect to matters
involving international religious freedom.”
Iraq: During the reporting period, unsettled conditions prevented
effective governance in parts of the country, and the Government’s
ability to protect religious freedoms was handicapped by insurgency,
terrorism, and sectarian violence. Following the U.S.-led coalition’s
removal of the Ba’athist regime in April 2003, the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council
administered the country pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions
1483, 1500, and 1511, until the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) was
appointed on June 28, 2004. In January 2005, the country held its
first free election, leading to the transitional government led by
former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari in May 2005. During the
October 15, 2005 referendum, voters adopted a constitution and, in a
first step toward establishing a permanent government, elected members
of the country’s new legislature on December 15, 2005. The permanent
government, led by Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki and the
constitution, came into office May 20, 2006.
The Law for the Administration of the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period (TAL) was adopted on March 8, 2004, and was the
operative law in the country until May 20, 2006 when the constitution
came into effect. The TAL and the constitution established a
republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic system with powers
shared among the federal and regional governments, including eighteen
governorates. The TAL and constitution also guarantee freedom of
thought, conscience, religious belief and practice.
Both the TAL and the constitution recognize Islam as the official
religion and state that no law may be enacted that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam. While the Government generally
endorsed these rights, its efforts to prevent or remedy violations
were hampered by substantial political and religious violence between
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and by harassment of non-Muslims.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom
during the period covered by this report. Since 2003, the Government
has not engaged in the persecution of any religious group, calling
instead for tolerance and acceptance of all religious
minorities. However, long-standing discriminatory practices against
the Baha’i and Wahabbi Sunni Muslims continued by some government
institutions.
While the Government generally respected the right of the individual
to worship according to thought, conscience, and belief, private
conservative and radical Islamic elements continued to exert
tremendous pressure on other groups to conform to extremist
interpretations of Islam’s precepts. In addition, frequent attacks on
religious places of worship, as well as sectarian violence, hampered
the ability to freely practice religion. This sectarian violence was
heightened by the February 22, 2006, attack on the al-Askariya Mosque
in Samarra, one of the most significant Shi’a mosques in the world
containing the mausoleums of the tenth and eleventh imams.
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom problems with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human
rights. Senior U.S. administration and embassy officials called for
unity in the face of sectarian violence, supported the inclusion of
religious minorities in the political and constitution drafting
processes, and facilitated interfaith discussion with all members of
the country’s diverse religious communities.
Section I. Religious Demography
The country has an area of 437,072 square miles and a population of 26
million. An estimated 97 percent of the population is Muslim. Shi’a
Muslims–predominantly Arab, but also including Turkmen, Faili Kurds,
and other groups–constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority. Sunni
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent of the population, of whom
approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 16 percent Sunni
Arabs, and the remainder Sunni Turkmen. The remaining 3 percent
comprises Chaldean (an eastern rite of the Catholic Church), Assyrian
(Church of the East), Syriac (Eastern Orthodox), Armenian (Roman
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox), and Protestant Christians, as well as
Yazidi, Sabean, Baha’i, Kaka’i (a small, syncretic religious group
located in and around Kirkuk), and a small number of Jewish
believers. Shi’a, although predominantly located in the south, were
also a majority in Baghdad and had communities in most parts of the
country. Sunnis formed the majority in the center and the north of the
country.
According to official estimates, the number of Christians decreased
from 1.4 million in 1987 to fewer than 1 million, with Catholics
(Chaldeans) comprising the majority. Christian leaders estimated that
approximately 700,000 Iraqi Christians lived abroad.
Four of the five largest Christian communities were located in Mosul
(150,000), Erbil (20,000-25,000), Dohuk (13,000), and Kirkuk
(12,000). According to church leaders in Erbil and Mosul, Christians
in the north accounted for roughly 30 percent of the country’s
Christian population.
The Primate of the Armenian Diocese reported that approximately 20,000
Armenian Christians remained in the country, primarily in the cities
of Baghdad (12,000), Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul.
There were approximately 225,000 Assyrian Christians and an estimated
750,000 Chaldeans (Eastern Rite Catholics). The Chaldean and Assyrian
Christians are descendants of the earliest Christian communities, and
they share a similar cultural and linguistic background. Both
communities speak the same ancient language (Syriac); however, they
are considered by many to be distinct ethnic groups. Chaldeans
recognize the primacy of the Roman Catholic Pope, while the Assyrians,
who are not Catholic, do not. While some Chaldeans and Assyrians
considered themselves Arab, the majority, as well as the Government,
considered both groups as ethnically distinct from Arabs and Kurds.
The Yazidi are a religious group with ancient origins that encompass
several different religious traditions comprising elements of
Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Gnostic
beliefs and traditions. Yazidi do not intermarry with outsiders or
accept converts. Defined by the former regime as Arabs, some Yazidi
considered themselves to be Kurds, while others defined themselves as
both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. Most of
the 650,000 Yazidi resided in the North.
Sabeans are an ancient religious group dating from the first three
centuries and reflect numerous religious influences, including ancient
Gnostic, Jewish, and Christian beliefs. The Sabean community continued
to decline; according to Sabean leaders, an estimated 10,000 remained
in the country. While some Sabeans fled the tyranny of the former
regime, this decline could also be attributed to the fact that
converts are not accepted, and those Sabeans who marry Christians or
Muslims are no longer regarded as Sabean. The Kaka’i, sometimes
referred to as Ahl-e-Haqq, resided primarily in Kirkuk, Mosul, and
Kankeen in the Diyala Province. Most are ethnic Kurds.
There was no data available on active participation in religious
services or rituals; however, terrorist attacks rendered many mosques,
churches, and other holy sites unusable. Many worshippers reportedly
did not attend religious services or participate in religious events
because of the threat of violence. There were numerous reports of
places of worship closing due to those threats.
The Government provided significant support for the Hajj. The Sunni
and Shi’a waqfs, or religious endowments, accepted applications from
the public and submitted them to the Supreme Council for the Hajj.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
The constitution mirrors many of the same religious freedoms provided
when the TAL was in effect. Both provide for freedom of religion, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice. While the
Government endorsed this right, its efforts to prevent or remedy
violations were hampered by substantial political and religious
violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and by harassment of
non-Muslims.
It is the Government’s policy to protect the right of all religious
groups to gather and worship freely; however, in practice, the ongoing
insurgency impeded the ability of many citizens to exercise that
right. Article 43 states that the followers of all religious groups
and sects are free in the practice of religious rites, and in the
management of religious endowments, their affairs, and their religious
institutions. Article 10 of the constitution establishes the state’s
commitment to assuring and maintaining the sanctity of holy shrines
and religious sites, and to guaranteeing the free practice of rituals
in them. The second clause of Article 43 of the constitution
reiterates this by explicitly guaranteeing the freedom of worship and
the protection of places of worship.
Deficiencies in security force capabilities and in the rule of law
made it difficult for the justice system to investigate or address
violations. Furthermore, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did not
operate at full capability during the reporting period and were unable
to prevent or remedy violations of these rights.
Although the constitution generally provided for full religious
freedom, it was heavily focused on the nation’s Islamic
identity. Article 2, which recognizes Islam as the country’s official
religion, mandates that Islam be considered a source of legislation
and that no law be enacted which contradicts the faith’s universally
agreed tenets. On June 14, 2006, the Council of Representatives
implemented bylaws requiring that a verse from the Qur’an be read
before each session.
The second clause of Article 2, however, stipulates that no law be
enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy, or basic
freedoms, which include the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religious belief and practice. Article 14 of the constitution
establishes that citizens are equal before the law without
discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin,
color, religion, sect, belief, opinion, or economic or social
status. Article 41 provides that citizens are free in their
commitments to their personal status according to their religious
groups, sects, beliefs, or choices.
Many Muslim holy days are also national holidays, including, Ashura,
Arbai’n, Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and the Birth of the Prophet
Muhammad. Although some non-Muslim holy days are recognized, such as
Christmas, only Muslim holy days are officially recognized as national
holidays.
Non-Muslims complained that although the Government recognizes their
religious holidays by law, in practice they were generally
disregarded. Schools routinely scheduled examinations during
non-Muslim holy days, and no special dispensation was given to
students wishing to observe them.
Religious groups are required to register with the
Government. According to the Christian and Other Religions Endowment,
approximately twenty foreign missionaries have applied to operate in
the country since 2003; however, only ten remain in the country.
After learning of the registration requirements, which include having
at least 500 followers, none of the organizations returned to complete
the registration process.
The Government permits religious instruction in public schools. In
most areas of the country, students in both primary and secondary
school must study Islam for approximately three hours daily as a
requirement for graduation. Religious study is not mandatory in the
north. Non-Muslim students are not required to participate in Islamic
studies; however, some non-Muslim students reported that they felt
pressure to do so. Alternative religious study is provided for in the
curriculum of non-Muslim schools.
Under civil law there is no penalty for conversion. Under Islamic
law, conversion from Islam to another religion is a criminal offense
subject to the death penalty. Article 1 of the Penal Code No. 111 of
1969, however, mandates that criminal penalties can be imposed only by
civil law. Despite the Shari’a punishment for conversion, the penal
code does not import the Shari’a penalty, nor does it contain a
similar penalty. The Law of Civil Affairs No. 65 of 1972 explicitly
allows non-Muslims to convert to Islam. The constitution provides that
citizens are to be free in their commitment to their personal status
according to their religious groups, sects, beliefs, or choices, as
regulated by law.
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Resolution 201 of 2001, prohibits
the Wahhabi branch of Islam and mandates the death penalty for
adherents if the charge is proved. Law No. 105 of 1970, prohibits the
Baha’i faith. Both are still part of the law.
Provisions in the TAL and the constitution provide for religious
freedom. However, at the end of the reporting period, the Ministry of
Interior’s Nationality and Passport Section continued to follow the
provisions of Regulation 358 of 1975 which prohibits the issuance of a
nationality identity card to those claiming the Baha’i faith. Without
this official citizenship card, Baha’i experienced difficulty
registering their children in school and applying for passports.
Although the constitution, as well as the TAL before it, provides that
any person who had his citizenship withdrawn shall have the right to
demand its reinstatement, the Transitional National Assembly (TNA)
passed a citizenship law on November 15, 2005, that, among other
things, specifically precludes local Jews from regaining
citizenship. The Presidency Council (the president and the two deputy
presidents) sent a notice to the TNA that it was vetoing this
legislation, but the TNA challenged the legal effectiveness of the
notice. The law came into effect in March 2006, when it was published
in the Official Gazette.
Although the Personal Status Law of 1959 calls for incorporation of
Shari’a into the law in the absence of legislative text on a matter,
Article 2(1) expressly exempts from its application, individuals
covered by special law. Such special law includes British Proclamation
No. 6 of 1917 and the Personal Status Law of Foreigners, No. 38 of
1931. Proclamation No. 6 provides that the civil courts consult the
religious authority of the non-Muslim parties for its opinion under
the applicable religious law and apply this opinion in court. The
Personal Status Law of Foreigners requires that courts apply the
municipal law of the foreign litigants to resolve their domestic law
matters.
Article 92 (Second) of the constitution provides that the Federal
Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, experts in
Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars. The law is supposed to
regulate the number, method of selection, and work of the Court. At
the end of the period covered by this report, the law had not been
enacted, leaving unsettled the question of whether Islamic
jurisprudence experts would serve as consultants and advisors to the
judges or as members of the court.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
Government policy and practices generally did not interfere with the
free practice of religion; however, the ongoing insurgency
significantly harmed the ability of all religious believers to
practice their faith. Additionally, sectarian misappropriation of
official authority within the security apparatus impeded the right of
citizens to worship freely.
All political parties participated in the December 15, 2005, election,
including the Sunni Arab parties that had boycotted the January
elections. The two Sunni Arab coalitions won a total of fifty-five
seats in the Council of Representatives (COR). Sunni Arabs held the
positions of vice president and speaker of the COR, as well as several
ministerial positions.
The Government did not restrict the formation of political parties
based on religious beliefs, or interpretations of religious
doctrine. Although the political coalitions competing in the December
elections were based predominantly on religion or ethnicity, religious
belief or ethnicity was not a requirement for participation in all
cases. For example, the Kurdish List, which won 21 percent of the
seats in the COR, included Sunnis, Shi’a, Christians, and Yazidi; the
Iraqiyun List also included a variety of ethnicities and religious
groups. Likewise, the winning Shi’a Coalition, although predominantly
Shi’a Islamists, also included religious and ethnic minorities, such
as Sunnis, Yazidi, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak. The United Iraqi
Alliance also included secular Shi’a and political independents not
associated with any religious party.
Although the transitional government publicly supported the freedom of
all individuals to worship as they chose, there were some reports of
discrimination by Shi’a elements in the Government against Sunni and
non-Muslim minorities. The Wahhabi branch of Islam and the Baha’i
faith are prohibited by law; however, the respective provisions of the
TAL and provisions within the constitution on freedom of religion may
supercede these laws. Nonetheless, by the end of the reporting period,
no court had ruled on these laws as no challenges had been brought.
The Personal Status Law of Foreigners requires that courts apply the
municipal law of the foreign litigants to resolve their domestic law
matters. Despite this exception in the 1959 Personal Status Law,
there are instances in which this law, based on Shari’a principles,
applies to non-Muslims, thereby overriding rules particular to their
religion. For instance, the law forbids the marriage of a Muslim woman
to a non-Muslim; also, in the distribution of inheritance, a female
receives one-half of what a male receives. These provisions could be
considered inconsistent with Article 14 of the constitution, which
guarantees equal protection under the law without discrimination based
on gender or religion. No court has yet ruled on this issue.
Many residents on the Ninewah Plain, who are mostly non-Muslim, were
better able to participate in the October 2005 constitutional
referendum and December 2005 national election. Although the Chaldean
and Assyrian Christian communities were anticipating barriers to
voting–similar to those in January 2005–there were few documented
cases of voter intimidation according to the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI).
Passports do not indicate an individual’s religion; however, religion
is explicitly noted on the national identity card.
Government employees were not prohibited from displaying elements of
their religion.
Students generally were not prohibited from practicing elements of
their faith in school; however, during the reporting period,
non-Muslim minorities and secular Arabs in some schools were
increasingly forced, often under the threat of violence, to adhere to
conservative Islamic practices. During the reporting period, Basrah’s
education director instituted a policy requiring all females in the
schools to cover their heads and all female university students in
Mosul, even non-Muslims, were required to wear the hijab, or
headscarf.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
The Government does not officially engage in or tolerate abuses of an
individual’s right to religious freedom. However, the Government
focused most of its resources and attention on the ongoing insurgency
and reconstruction efforts during the reporting period; thus, it did
not have the capacity to address issues relating to abuses of freedom
of religion.
Many attributed the escalating violence in the country, especially the
tremendous upsurge in sectarian violence following the February 22,
2006, bombing of the al- Askariya Shrine “Golden Mosque” in Samarra to
terrorists attempting to sow sectarian strife. Sectarian attacks and
reprisals following the Samarra bombing, were estimated to have
claimed more than one thousand lives and damaged more than sixty
mosques across the country. In the aftermath of the Samarra bombing,
it became increasingly difficult to determine how much of the violence
was based on religious affiliations rather than criminal elements.
The Sunni Arab community often cited police raids of its mosques and
religious sites as an example of targeting by the Shi’a-dominated
government.
On May 19, 2005, for example, security forces raided Baghdad’s
prominent Sunni Abu Hanifa Mosque as Friday prayers were ending,
reportedly to detain alleged terrorists. Local leaders complained that
security forces used tear gas and abused women. The prime minister
subsequently provided compensation for damages to the Sunni religious
endowment office and promised a full investigation of the incident.
On June 9, 2005, police broke into Amarra’s Sunni Hetteen Mosque in
the south charging that it harbored terrorists. Subsequently, the
police turned the mosque over to the Shi’a Endowment Office, which
changed its name to Fatima Al Zahraa Mosque.
There were allegations that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
engaged in discriminatory behavior against religious
minorities. Christians living north of Mosul claimed that the KRG
confiscated their property without compensation and began building
settlements on their land. Assyrian Christians also alleged that the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-dominated judiciary routinely
discriminated against non-Muslims and failed to enforce judgments in
their favor. Despite the allegations of KRG discrimination against
religious minorities, many non-Muslims fled north from the more
volatile areas in the middle and southern parts of the country where
pressures to conform publicly to narrow interpretations of Islamic
teaching were greater.
Sunni Arab leaders accused the Badr Organization, an armed militia of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and
the Jaysh al-Mehdi Shi’a militia, of assassinating Sunni clerics. The
Badr Organization group claimed it had relinquished its weaponry and
become a strictly political organization. However, by the end of the
reporting period, reports of Jaysh al-Mehdi militia attacks on Sunni
residents and places of worship were increasing.
The Armenian Church of Iraq was working with government officials to
regain properties that the former regime forced it to sell. Although
the Church was paid fair market value for six properties in Mosul,
Basrah, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Dohuk, it was forced to sell the
properties under pressure. Church officials stated that discussions
with the Government yielded no results during the reporting period;
however, they were optimistic about the KRG’s return of property in
the north.
There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the
country.
Forced Religious Conversions
There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of
minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from
the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States. However, there were reports that
Islamic extremists threatened, kidnapped, and killed Mandaeans for
refusing to convert to Islam.
Abuses by Terrorist Organizations
While the general lawlessness that permitted criminal gangs,
terrorists, and insurgents to victimize citizens with impunity
affected persons of all ethnicities and religious groups, many
individuals were targeted because of their religious identity or
secular leanings. Individuals were victims of not only harassment and
intimidation but also kidnapping and even killings. Women and girls
were often threatened, assaulted with acid, and killed for refusing to
wear the hijab or for dressing in western-style clothing. On August
5, 2005, Assyrian college student Anita Tyadors was killed in the
Zohoor region of Mosul. She was reportedly targeted for her modern
lifestyle, including speaking English and wearing Western
clothing. Some women claimed they were denied employment and
educational opportunities because they were non-Muslim, did not dress
in accordance with conservative Islamic norms, or did not sufficiently
adhere to strict interpretations of religious rules governing public
behavior.
On March 15, 2005, Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists attacked picnicking
Basrah University students, claiming they were violating the
principles of Islam with their western-style clothing, and by singing,
and dancing. The Sadrists fired guns at the students and beat them
with sticks. Police were present during the incident but did not
intervene. University officials reported that at least fifteen
students were hospitalized, many with serious injuries. One student
reportedly died in the incident.
Islamist militants harassed shopkeepers for providing goods or
services they considered to be inconsistent with Islam and sometimes
killed them for failing to comply with warnings to stop such
activity. Liquor storeowners, primarily Christians and Yazidi, were
especially targeted. Liquor stores in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah were
bombed, looted, and defaced. More than fifty liquor stores operated by
Assyrians in Baghdad were closed during the reporting period due to
threats by Islamic extremists.
The Christian and Other Religions Endowment reported that, after a
series of church bombings and incidents of violence targeting
Christians over the past two years, more than 200,000 non-Muslims left
the country or fled to the North. Many remained in Jordan or Syria
awaiting improvement in the security situation.
A succession of car bombs on January 29, 2006, targeted Christian
churches in Baghdad and Mosul. Attacks on the Catholic Church of the
Virgin Mary and the Orthodox Church in Kirkuk, and Saint Joseph’s
Catholic Church and an Anglican Church in Baghdad killed at least
three persons and injured nine. The same day, a car bomb also exploded
outside the residence of the Apostolic Nuncio (also referred to as the
Vatican Embassy).
Christian leaders inside and outside of the country reported that
members of their Baghdad community received threat letters demanding
that Christians leave or be killed. Thousands of Christians reportedly
left their neighborhoods to live with family either in other
neighborhoods, or outside of Baghdad.
Both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims reported receiving death threat letters
demanding that they leave their neighborhoods following the attack on
the al-Askiriya mosque. More than 100,000 Shi’a and Sunnis reportedly
left their homes to avoid these threats. Some were living in
internally displaced camps, while the majority sought refuge with
families or through religious community support systems.
During the reporting period, Sabean leaders reported that their
community was increasingly targeted. In the spring of 2006, Sabeans
began to receive death threat letters accusing them of practicing
sorcery and urging them to leave the country. According to estimates,
more than ten Sabaeans were killed and ten to fifteen Sabaeans were
kidnapped for ransom during the reporting period. There were also
reports that Islamic extremists threatened, kidnapped, and killed
Sabaeans for refusing to convert to Islam.
The Yazidi community reported that eleven Yazidis were killed during
the reporting period, including Ninewa Provincial Council member Hasan
Nermo, who was assassinated on April 20, 2006.
In addition to targeting non-Muslims, terrorists continued to attack
both Sunni and Shi’a communities during the reporting
period. Insurgents attacked mosques in Sunni and Shi’a neighborhoods
and killed clerics, other religious leaders, and private citizens of
both sects. There were also accusations that both insurgents and
militia wore police uniforms to incite sectarian violence and
discredit the Government in the eyes of the public.
On July 16, 2005, a suicide bomber killed more than ninty-eight people
and injured more than 130 in a suicide attack in front of a Shi’a
mosque in Musayyab. The explosion occurred as worshipers were
emerging from evening prayers. The same mosque was also targeted in a
suicide attack on November 2, 2006, which killed at least twenty
persons. In that attack, a bomber exploded on a minibus in front of
the mosque as persons were arriving for sunset prayers.
On September 14, 2005, Baghdad was hit by at least a dozen attacks
that appeared to target Shi’a civilians. Violence continued two days
later, with an attack on a Shi’a mosque in Tuz Khurmatu in Salah ad
Din province that killed fourteen, and assassinations of Shi’a clerics
in Mosul and the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad. In an internet
posting, Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the series of
attacks and declared an “all out war” on Shi’a in the country.
On October 5, 2005, a bomb planted in the doorway of a Shi’a mosque in
Hilla killed at least twenty-five and injured more than
eighty-seven. The bomb at the Ibn al-Nama mosque exploded as
worshippers gathered for prayers on the first day of Ramadan.
On November 18, suicide bombers struck two Shi’a mosques in the town
of Khanaqin, near the Iranian border. More than ninety persons were
killed in the midday attacks, as worshippers gathered for Friday
prayers. Both the Greater and Smaller Khanaqin mosques were destroyed
in the attacks.
The February 22, 2006, bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra led
to an increase in sectarian violence. Those who attacked the Golden
Mosque sought to exploit divisions among the population and the
political leadership. The Government and religious leaders alike, in a
demonstration of national unity, condemned the attacks and called for
an end to sectarian unrest. Many families fled mixed neighborhoods
for fear of attack, and estimates indicated that between 50,000 and
80,000 persons were internally displaced. Although the majority of the
displaced were Shi’a, almost 25 percent of the families were
Sunni. Reports also indicated that as many as one thousand Christians
were also displaced due to threats and intimidation.
On March 24, 2006, a bomb planted outside a Sunni mosque in the town
of Khalis killed five persons and injured seventeen others. The
explosion at the Sunni Saad Bin Abi Waqqas mosque occurred as
worshippers were leaving from Friday prayers.
On April 6, 2006, a car bomb exploded approximately 300 meters from
the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf. At least thirteen persons were killed in
the attack against the most revered holy site for Shi’a Muslims in the
country.
On April 7, 2006, three suicide bombers attacked a Shi’a mosque in
Baghdad, killing at least seventy-nine persons. The attack on the
Baratha mosque, which is affiliated with the largest Shi’a political
party, occurred as Friday prayers were ending. Two of the bombers
detonated in the crowded courtyard, while the third exploded at the
main exit. The Baratha mosque was again attacked on June 16, 2006.
Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious
Freedom
Despite the tenuous security environment and the Government’s
preoccupation with fighting the insurgency and rebuilding the
country’s infrastructure, significant improvements were made with
respect for religious freedom during the reporting period.
While the Sunni minority did not broadly participate in the January
elections, resulting in only nominal representation in the TNA, the
transitional government made some efforts to encourage Sunni
participation in the political and constitutional development
processes. Members of all minority and religious groups participated
in the October constitutional referendum, approving a constitution
that protects the rights of all citizens, regardless of religious
affiliation. Although there was some initial concern from minority
leaders, especially Christians, about the extensive role of Islam in
the constitution, the Government has reached out to these leaders to
assure them that their rights as minorities are protected. During the
transitional government administration, both President Talabani and
Prime Minister Jafari met with Chaldean (Catholic) Patriarch Emmanuel
III Delly in September 2005 to discuss constitutional concerns.
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari met with Pope Benedict XVI in Rome on
August 26, 2005, to discuss religious freedom and legal rights for
Christians in the country. Zebari attended a Catholic Church sponsored
conference in Italy. Later, in November 2005, President Talabani also
discussed religious freedom with the Pope.
Despite violence against Christian communities, fifteen new
evangelical Christian congregations have reportedly been established
in Baghdad since April 2003. Under the previous regime, only two
evangelical churches–both Presbyterian and led by Egyptian
nationals–were allowed to exist. At the end of the period covered by
this report, Baptists, Methodists, and other Christian congregations
emerged, all led by local clergy.
During the reporting period, Government leaders repeatedly spoke of
the need for all citizens to unite–regardless of religious
orientation–to confront terrorism. Government leaders often
emphasized their commitment to equal treatment for all religious
groups and ethnicities. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari
frequently expressed his concern over implications of Government
involvement in violence against the Sunni Arab minority. By the end of
the reporting period, no information regarding investigations into
alleged ISF abuses or punishment of perpetrators had been released to
the public. The Government also made clear it would not exempt mosques
and homes of religious leaders from assault if they were being used as
insurgent strongholds.
The Government publicly denounced all incidents of sectarian violence
and, as such violence escalated in late February, repeatedly
encouraged unity among the county’s religious sects. Both President
Jalal Talabani and former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari immediately
condemned the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra and called for
calm as sectarian tensions flared.
Religious leaders reported that they generally had good relations and
worked together to promote interfaith understanding. The Sabeans
sought the assistance of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI’s Hakim,
Prime Minister Jafari, and Muqtada al-Sadr in supporting minority
rights.
Religious leaders of all religious groups condemned the terrorist acts
committed by the insurgency and urged the country’s religious
communities to refrain from retaliation and join together to end the
violence.
After the Samarra bombing, Sunni and Shi’a religious leaders in cities
across the country joined together for joint prayer services in
protest of sectarian violence. In early March 2006, representatives of
the Sunni Muslims Scholars Association visited Grand Ayatollah Al
Sistani and the Marjaiya, or the Shi’a supreme religious authorities,
in Najaf to discuss ways to calm the sectarian violence and unite the
population.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
The country’s cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity is far
better reflected in its political and economic structure than prior to
the 2003 liberation. Shi’a Arabs, the religious majority of the
population, were long disadvantaged economically, politically, and
socially but now constitute the majority in the Government.
Despite these changes, conservative and extremist Islamic elements
continued to exert tremendous pressure on society to conform to their
interpretations of Islam’s precepts. Although this impacted both the
Sunni and Shi’a secular Muslim population, non-Muslims were especially
vulnerable to the pressure and violence because of their minority
status and the lack of protection provided by a tribal structure.
Sunni Muslims claimed general discrimination, alleging revenge by the
Shi’a majority for the Sunnis’ presumed favored status under the
former regime, but also because of the public’s perception that the
insurgency was composed primarily of Sunni extremists and former
regime elements with whom the majority of the Sunni population
supposedly sympathized. While some within the Sunni community
supported and even assisted the insurgency, many denounced the
terrorism as vocally as their non-Sunni counterparts.
Non-Muslims, particularly Christians, complained of being isolated by
the Muslim majority because of their religious differences. Despite
their statistically proportional representation in the National
Assembly, many non-Muslims said they were disenfranchised and their
interests not adequately represented.
The combination of discriminatory hiring practices, attacks against
non-Muslim businesses, and the overall lack of rule of law, have also
had a detrimental economic impact on the non-Muslim community and
contributed to the significant numbers of non-Muslims who left the
country. The Armenian Diocese estimated that the number of destitute
Armenian Christians, for example, had grown by 50 percent since 2003,
a condition exacerbated by the inadequate security environment, which
hampers Armenian Christians’ ability to find employment. Terrorist
threats have compelled tens of thousands of Christians, including
Armenian Orthodox and Chaldean Catholics, to leave the country in the
wake of church bombings in 2004 and early 2006.
Terrorist threats also caused thousands of Sunni and Shi’a to leave
their homes and flee to more tolerant neighborhoods or leave the
country altogether. The magnitude of sectarian attacks on both Sunnis
and Shi’a was extremely high, albeit difficult to track.
Anti-Semitic feeling remained a strong undercurrent during the
reporting year. According to the head of the Christian and Other
Religions Endowment, the country’s 2,700-year-old Jewish population
had dwindled to less than fifteen persons in the Baghdad area.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. government is committed to promoting religious freedom and
continues to work closely with the Government on this as part of its
overall policy to promote human rights. U.S. officials at all levels,
including the secretary of state, regularly engaged the Government on
problems relating to freedom of religion. This took the form of public
statements calling for unity in the face of sectarian violence,
high-level meetings with government officials and religious leaders,
and working-level interaction urging representatives of the Government
and religious organizations to include minorities. The embassy also
facilitated interfaith discussion by hosting meetings, roundtables,
and other events with all member religious groups of the country’s
diverse religious communities and funded training, seminars,
conferences, and exchange programs to promote religious understanding
and tolerance.
The embassy’s primary focus during the reporting period was on
reducing sectarian violence, increasing Sunni and non-Muslim inclusion
in the political and constitutional development processes, and
increasing interfaith understanding. The United States worked to
increase Sunni inclusion in the political process by providing
technical assistance to Sunni leaders. U.S.-funded projects worked
with religious minorities by bringing together members of different
religious and ethnic backgrounds to discuss common problems. The
United States also conducted a significant amount of conflict
mitigation at the local level through its Community Action Program
(CAP). Under the CAP, community groups were formed with diverse
membership, including women and youth, in an effort to promote
reconciliation. In ethnically or religiously mixed communities, these
community groups included representatives from all segments of
society. These groups identified and prioritized their needs and
developed projects to address those needs. The projects did not
specifically target any one ethnic or religious group for
assistance. Rather, they sought opportunities to bridge differences.
The Iraqi Institute of Peace (IIP), an interfaith dialogue center
established with financial and organizational support from the U.S
Institute of Peace, continued to focus on mitigating conflict and
building peace primarily through its forum work. IIP forums target
specific groups such as women, youth, and the media, and focus on key
topics such as human rights and religious dialogue.
IIP forums have promoted tolerance and peace through democracy
building. They played a critical role in the drafting of the
constitution by educating the public about the process and made a
concerted effort to encourage Sunnis, who had boycotted the January
2005 elections, to participate in the process. Conferences and forums
educating citizens about the constitutional referendum and the
national election were also held.
In addition to promoting peace through democratic reform, IIP
regularly meets with tribal leaders, senior clerics and community
leaders in tension-filled areas to improve dialogue and mitigate
conflict. IIP, along with a network of affiliated NGOs, also organized
Brotherhood Day events during Ramadan in assorted cities. These events
were attended by clerics of different religious sects, tribal sheiks,
and other notables who held common prayers and signed declarations of
brotherhood.
Released on September 15, 2006
Source: US State Dept.

Sun-Sentinel.com, FL
Sharon Robb
Miranda sick of waiting
Published September 17, 2006
Colombian middleweight Edison Miranda of Hollywood-based Warriors
Boxing was forced to wait an extra month for Saturday night’s title
fight and admittedly was getting a little “antsy” at his Puerto Rico
training camp.
Miranda, 25, (26-0, 23 KOs) was originally scheduled to fight Armenian
Arthur Abraham (21-0, 17 KOs) on Aug. 26, but a cold forced Abraham to
postpone the fight.
Abraham is healthy now and will defend his IBF middleweight title
Saturday night at Rittal Arena in Wetzlar, Germany.
Miranda left last week with his managers, Hollywood businessmen Steve
Benbasat and Greg Wantman and trainer Jose Bonilla to acclimate to
what’s expected to be hostile surroundings.
“I hope the medications he keeps referring to helped his cold and will
let him step into the ring like a man,” Miranda said. “If I caught a
cold or even the flu, I am going in that ring and knocking him out.
“This extra time has made me an even more dangerous fighter. If he
thinks he was sick for the first fight just wait until Saturday.”
INSIDE THE ROPES
The WBO elevated Russian Sultan Ibragimov of Hallandale Beach to the
No. 1 contender and mandatory challenger to fight WBO heavyweight
champion Sergei Liakhovich. Ibragimov (19-0-1, 16 KOs), a 2000 Olympic
silver medalist, most recently drew record ratings on ESPN2 while
battling to a controversial draw with fellow contender Ray Austin in
July at Seminole Hard Rock Live …
Another Warriors fighter, former heavyweight champion Oliver McCall
(48-9, 35 KOs) stopped Darroll Wilson (27-9-2, 21 KOs) 40 seconds into
the fourth round Saturday night at Louisville. McCall floored Wilson
in the second round and wobbled him again in the fourth round before
the fight was stopped. McCall, the WBC’s No. 5 contender, picked up
the vacant WBC Fecarbox title. … Another local heavyweight
contender, Shannon Briggs (47-4-1, 41 KOs) of Pembroke Pines, will
fight Liakhovich (23-1, 14 KOs) for the WBO title on Nov. 4 at Chase
Field in Phoenix. The card will be announced Monday at a Don
King-hosted news conference at Phoenix. “I am going to knock out
Liakhovich and then I intend to knock out Oleg Maskaev [WBC], Nikolai
Valuev [WBA] and Wladimir Klitschko [IBF] and take back all the
heavyweight championships of the world,” Briggs said. … After a
20-year hiatus, Key West’s Mallory Square and promoter Richard Dobal
will stage his second pro card in four months at 7 p.m. Saturday.
Nigerian middleweight Eromosele Albert of Miami heads the
card. … October is a busy month for pro shows. Randall Bailey of
Fort Lauderdale Contenders Gym is the main event on the Oct. 13
Warrior’s Boxing card at the Hard Rock. The former two-time world
champion will fight former lightweight champion Cesar Bazan. The
following night Puerto Rican Kermit Cintron (26-1-0, 24 KOs) and Mark
Suarez (25-2-0, 13 KOs) will fight for the vacant IBF welterweight
title at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm
Beach. …
WBC middleweight champion Yvonne Reis of Dania Beach and Michelle
Linden of Deerfield Beach will be part of a historical all-woman
boxing card at Nairobi, Kenya on Dec. 2. Reis will fight Leaticia
Robinson for the WIBF world title at 160 pounds. The card features
five U.S. boxers against some of Africa’s top boxers.
Sharon Robb can be reached at [email protected].

Agence France Presse
16 septembre 2006 samedi 9:48 AM GMT
Chirac en Arménie (29 septembre-1er octobre): Aznavour et Karabakh au menu
Le président français Jacques Chirac se rendra en visite en Arménie
du 29 septembre au 1er octobre, où il assistera à un concert du
chanteur Charles Aznavour et évoquera le problème du conflit du
Nagorny-Karabakh, a annoncé samedi la présidence arménienne.
Il s’agit de la première visite officielle du président français dans
cette ex-république soviétique du Caucase du Sud. Il sera accompagné
de son épouse Bernadette, de ministres et d’hommes d’affaires, a
déclaré à l’AFP le porte-parole du président Robert Kotcharian,
Viktor Sogomonian.
Il assistera le 30 septembre à un concert du chanteur et compositeur
français d’origine arménienne Charles Aznavour, adulé en Arménie, sur
la place de la République, dans le centre d’Erevan, en ouverture de
l’Année de la France en Arménie.
Soulignant les “liens traditionnels d’amitié” entre l’Arménie et la
France, où vit une importante diaspora arménienne, M. Sogomonian a
précisé que la question du Nagorny-Karabakh serait au menu des
discussions, la France faisant partie du groupe de médiateurs de
l’OSCE.
L’Azerbaïdjan et l’Arménie campent depuis des années sur leurs
positions concernant le conflit qui les oppose au Nagorny Karabakh,
une enclave habitée en majorité par des Arméniens et qui a fait
sécession de l’Azerbaïdjan après un conflit débuté à la fin des
années 1980.
Un cessez-le-feu est intervenu en 1994, mais la situation reste
tendue.
La France avait accueilli en février des pourparlers entre le
président azerbaïdjanais Ilham Aliev et Robert Kotcharian, qui
s’étaient soldées par une absence totale de progrès.
Le président Chirac se rendra également au mémorial des victimes du
génocide arménien de 1915 sous l’empire ottoman, non reconnu par la
Turquie.

Azat Artsakh, NKR
Sept 15 2006
CENTER OF CULTURE AND SPORT OPENED
On September 12 the Center of Culture and Sport was opened in
Stepanakert, which is very important for the cultural life of the
republic and the capital. NKR President Arkady Ghukassian, Speaker
Ashot Ghulian, Vice Prime Minister Ararat Danielian and others were
present at the ceremony of opening. The minister of culture and
education Kamo Atayan emphasized the importance of the Center. He
mentioned that different bands, choirs and colleges will be
accommodated by the Center, namely the Choreographic College, the
School of Arts, the Mrakats Choir, the State Choir and Artsakhi
Balikner Children’s Band.
Nvard Soghomonian.
15-09-2006

Azat Artsakh, NKR
Sept 13 2006
HARVEST WAS BETTER ORGANIZED THIS YEAR
Vladimir Zakiyan, the deputy minister of agriculture of NKR, says
this year harvesting of grain crops started late was delayed by
rains, but it finished in time. He pointed out that this year the
harvest was better organized and more agricultural machines were
used. On the whole, the deputy minister is satisfied with the course
of harvest, but he is worried by the low yield. The average yield per
hectare was 1140 kg, which is lower by 210 kg compared with 2005. The
lowest yield was in Shushi, where the average yield per hectare was
900 kg, and in Kashatagh, 940 kg. The yield of grain in Martakert was
comparatively good, the average yield per hectare was 1610 kg, in
some parts the average yield totaled 3000 kg per hectare. By official
data, 55,272 hectares was harvested, 62,454 tonnes of grain was
produced. The deputy minister said, unfortunately, the lasting heavy
rains in May damaged almost 50 percent of the yield. In answer to the
question whether it was possible to prevent the losses, V. Zakiyan
said sustainable yield requires deep tillage and several procedures,
which are not always performed by the farmers. Besides, very few
farmers use phosphate fertilizers; it is clear that an ordinary
farmer cannot afford to. Another cause of the poor yield is that
people sow wheat and barley in the same field every year. Crop
rotation is not practiced, however, and one of the problems is the
tax on land. If the government exempted farmers from the tax on land
for a year, it would be very helpful. V. Zakiyan said this year land
under crop will expand. He also informed that he government will
provide seeds and fuel aid to the owners of fields, which were
damaged by weather or fires, which is moral support rather.
M. DAVTIAN.
13-09-2006