OBITUARY OF LADY SKIPWITH, WITTY ARMENIAN AUTHOR WHO TRAINED AS A NURSE AND WROTE BOOKS ON EXOTIC COOKERY AND ARABIC PROVERBS
The Daily Telegraph (LONDON)
September 18, 2006 Monday
ASHKHAIN, LADY SKIPWITH, who has died aged 64, was the author of
three books on Middle Eastern cuisine and the witty co-author of three
highly-successful books of Arabic proverbs that are widely read with
amusement throughout the Arab-speaking world.
A direct, zesty woman who held strong opinions, she nevertheless
wielded great charm and wit, inspiring love and fear in equal measure.
She was born Ashkhain Bedros Atikian in Jaffa on September 13 1941.
Growing up in Gaza as a member of a close-knit Armenian family born in
Palestine, she considered herself a double-refugee with a heritage of
two historical grievances. As a young woman Ashkhain moved to London
and trained as a nurse at the Whittington Hospital while living in a
bohemian menage at a large house in Blantyre Street, Fulham. It was
there that she met the artist John Bardell, whom she married in 1967.
The couple spent most of their three-year marriage travelling the
world, taking in the Middle East, India, Mexico and Canada, where
Ashkhain took nursing work while her husband painted.
Back in London after her divorce in 1970, Ashkhain worked as a cancer
nurse at the Royal Marsden Hospital and returned to live in Blantyre
Street where, in 1971, she met Sir Patrick Skipwith, the Old Harrovian
scion of an ancient baronetcy. They married the following year.
The Skipwiths moved to Saudi Arabia, driving the several thousand
miles from London to Jeddah in a Volkswagen Beetle car. Sir Patrick
pursued a career as a geologist and, despite Saudi laws forbidding
women to work, Ashkhain took various nursing and secretarial jobs.
She loved knitting, and produced a series of exotic sweaters for
members of her family and friends, based on designs by Patricia
Roberts, the British designer who raised hand knitting to the realms
of high fashion.
Another of her abiding passions was cooking, and Ashkhain – a talented
dinner hostess – collected some 20 Armenian recipes which she published
herself . This was followed by another privately-published book of
Middle Eastern recipes, and finally a third, Saudi Cooking Of Today
(1986), which was published commercially.
Ashkhain’s cookery books broke fresh ground in that they opened a
door to tastes and dishes hitherto largely unknown to Westerners.
Their success encouraged Ashkhain to collaborate with her friend
Primrose Arnander in producing a short series of humorous Arabic
phrase-books. The first, The Son Of A Duck Is A Floater (1985), was
followed by Apricots Tomorrow (1992) and finally Unload Your Own Donkey
(2003).
Ashkhain returned to Britain in 1986 when her second marriage failed,
and resumed her work as a nurse. In the early 1990s she moved to
Canada, shuttling between London and Calgary but only settling
permanently in Alberta in 1996.
She spent the last few years of her life nursing her mother in Calgary.
In November, she was diagnosed with a brain tumour, and died on August
23 having refused further treatment, a characteristically courageous
decision. She never remarried.

WORRIES GROW ABOUT THE NEXT KONDOPOGA
by Nabi Abdullaev, Staff Writer
The Moscow Times
September 18, 2006 Monday
Stoking fears of escalating xenophobia, a man died in a brawl involving
ethnic Armenians in the Saratov region last week and three people
were hospitalized after an attack on an anti-migration rally in
St. Petersburg on Sunday.
State Duma deputies sounded the alarm about a surge in violence. But
they also approved legislation that would increase penalties for
those who employ illegal migrants — a populist vote, critics said,
that tapped into widespread xenophobia.
The country is on edge after clashes and riots targeting Chechens in
the Karelian town of Kondopoga killed two people earlier this month.
Local residents clashed with four ethnic Armenians in a cafe in the
town of Volsk on Sept. 10, Saratov regional police said Friday. Three
ethnic Russians suffered knife wounds, and one later died in the
hospital.
Police and the local Armenian diaspora downplayed suggestions that
the fight was racially motivated. But Ekho Moskvy radio reported the
fight was followed the next day by an attack on ethnic Armenians at a
Volsk technical college that injured one student. Police denied the
report and said two ethnic Armenians involved in the cafe fight had
been placed on a national wanted list.
On Sunday, masked people attacked a rally by the radical Movement
Against Illegal Immigration in St. Petersburg, sparking a fight that
led to three people being hospitalized, Interfax reported.
About 30 activists were attending the rally to demand the expulsion
of Caucasus natives from Kondopoga, where people raided and destroyed
small businesses run by Caucasus natives after two locals were stabbed
to death in a fight with Chechen migrants.
St. Petersburg police said 21 attackers, who identified themselves
as members of an anti-Nazi movement, were detained, Interfax reported.
One of the victims was stabbed with a knife, while the other two
suffered head injuries. It was unclear whether the victims were
protesters or attackers.
The Movement Against Illegal Immigration also organized a
rally Thursday in Moscow to protest Caucasus natives in Russian
universities. Police tried to prevent the rally by detaining about
200 young men near the Dobryninskaya metro station.
Also Thursday, several dozen young men, some of them described by
witnesses as skinheads, participated in a fight inside the Oktyabrskaya
metro station. No one was detained.
In the Duma on Friday, nationalist Liberal Democratic Party Deputy
Sergei Ivanov likened the situation around the Moscow rally and metro
fight to that in Kondopoga. He said many of those detained at the
rally were carrying knives. As for the metro fight, Ivanov said,
“This was not a routine clash, and it happened in the capital,”
Interfax reported.
United Russia Deputy Alexander Khinshtein deplored a clash between
Chechen youths and police in the city of Saratov on Aug. 29 that
killed one officer and injured three others.
“Police are afraid to bring these people to justice,” he said,
accusing the youths of being “closely related to the Chechen
authorities.” The fight occurred after the officers quarreled with
three Chechen youths in a cafe, Saratov press reported. The three
left the cafe and later returned with a dozen friends, armed with
knives and baseball bats. Three suspects have been detained.
Several nationalist web sites reported Friday that revenge attacks were
being carried out in Volsk after the Sept. 10 fight. A spokesman for
the Saratov regional police, Alexei Yegorov, said police were worried
and had dispatched more street patrols in Volsk. But he denied any
escalation in ethnic tensions. “There have not been any pogroms in
Volsk after that drunken brawl, no friction whatsoever between the
locals and members of the Caucasus diaspora,” he said.
Araik Kosyan, vice president of KRUNK, the biggest Armenian diaspora
organization in the region, said he was not aware of any revenge
attacks. “I’ve talked to representatives of other diasporas, the
Azeris and the Chechens, and they also do not confirm any attacks
against their people,” he said.
Politicians might be overreacting to incidents involving Caucasus
natives after Kondopoga, said Boris Makarenko, an analyst with the
Center for Political Technologies. “Now the voices of the ‘hawks’
will be much better received by the public than those of sober-minded
politicians and media,” he said.
The public seems to be ready for ethnic violence: Over 57 percent of
Russians believe violence could break out in their towns, according
to a survey this month by the state-controlled VTsIOM pollster.
Russians’ belief that their town could be affected grew in proportion
with the size of the town, reaching 89 percent in Moscow and
St. Petersburg.
Human rights activists said the authorities needed to intervene
to prevent routine clashes from escalating into Kondopoga-style
violence. “Authorities need to state clearly that any calls to expel
natives of the Caucasus will never be met because they are against the
law,” said Galina Kozhevnikova of Sova, which tracks ethnic violence.
Alexei Mukhin, an analyst with the Center of Political Information,
suggested that the flare-up in xenophobia might be used by the
government to push through stricter anti-migrant laws.
Indeed, the Duma on Friday voted 398-1 to pass in a first reading a
bill that would fine anyone employing migrants who had not registered
with the Federal Migration Service. Employers now face a flat fine of
2,000 rubles ($74.66), no matter how many illegal migrants are hired.
The new bill says a private individual would face a fine of up to
2,000 rubles per migrant, while an official could be fined 5,000
rubles per migrant and a company could be fined 30,000 rubles per
migrant. Migrants themselves would be fined up to 1,500 rubles and
face expulsion from Russia.
Deputy Interior Minister Nikolai Ovchinnikov, who presented the
bill Friday, said only one in every 10 migrants was registered. Duma
Deputy Speaker Vladimir Katrenko said 702,000 foreign citizens were
registered as of last year.

KONDOPOGA SCENARIO
by Kira Latukhina
RusData Dialine – Russian Press Digest
September 18, 2006 Monday
New cases of ethnic conflicts registered in the Volga Federal District
Stoking fears of escalating xenophobia, a man died in a brawl
involving ethnic Armenians in the Saratov region last week and three
people were hospitalized after an attack on an anti-migration rally
in St. Petersburg on Sunday. State Duma deputies sounded the alarm
about a surge in violence. But they also approved legislation that
would increase penalties for those who employ illegal migrants –
a populist vote, critics said, that tapped into widespread xenophobia.
The country is on edge after clashes and riots targeting Chechens in
the Karelian town of Kondopoga killed two people earlier this month.
Local residents clashed with four ethnic Armenians in a cafe in the
town of Volsk on Sept. 10, Saratov regional police said Friday. Three
ethnic Russians suffered knife wounds, and one later died in the
hospital. Police and the local Armenian diaspora downplayed suggestions
that the fight was racially motivated. But Ekho Moskvy radio reported
the fight was followed the next day by an attack on ethnic Armenians
at a Volsk technical college that injured one student. Police denied
the report and said two ethnic Armenians involved in the cafe fight
had been placed on a national wanted list.
On Sunday, masked people attacked a rally by the radical Movement
Against Illegal Immigration in St. Petersburg, sparking a fight
that led to three people being hospitalized. About 30 activists were
attending the rally to demand the expulsion of Caucasus natives from
Kondopoga, where people raided and destroyed small businesses run by
Caucasus natives after two locals were stabbed to death in a fight
with Chechen migrants. St. Petersburg police said 21 attackers,
who identified themselves as members of an anti-Nazi movement,
were detained.
One of the victims was stabbed with a knife, while the other two
suffered head injuries. It was unclear whether the victims were
protesters or attackers. The Movement Against Illegal Immigration also
organized a rally Thursday in Moscow to protest Caucasus natives in
Russian universities. Police tried to prevent the rally by detaining
about 200 young men near the Dobryninskaya metro station.
Also Thursday, several dozen young men, some of them described by
witnesses as skinheads, participated in a fight inside the Oktyabrskaya
metro station. No one was detained.

Y. SOYLEMEZ AKP’S LOSS OF APPETITE FOR THE EU
Turkish Daily News
September 18, 2006 Monday
It is now the “secret de Polishinelle” that even the tightlipped EU
bureaucrats cannot hide the public secret that Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
has lost much of its politically gastronomic choice, which was the
appetite of a “gourmet” only three years ago. There is no denying that
the AKP had previously put the EU question as a first priority goal
in their foreign policy agenda, a pivotal item of declared essence
that is now on a slow fire, to say nothing of the back burner.
The reasons why and how the AKP government has regressed since last
October with no visible implementation or action are quite a few.
Primarily, the European Court of Human Rights headscarf decision
no doubt cast a severe blow to the AKP’s main goal in attaining EU
membership. This was more than a disappointment that backfired. The
EU refused to be used as an instrument against secularist principles.
Secondly, the EU kept on forcing the Cyprus issue as a means of
permanent political pressure over the AKP government, knowing full
well that it was too much too bear for the Erdogan government as no
concessions were possible on their part, or for any Turkish party or
government, for that matter. Thirdly, the important psychological
factor that “the EU does not want Turkey, so we don’t want the EU”
feeling in the body politic became widespread. As expected, support for
the EU has decreased from 78 percent to 54 percent in the time since
Turkey’s candidature was approved and a semblance of negotiations in
the form of the Screening Process started and completed.
In spite of some positive and encouraging statements about the way
the screening process is going on the technical level, the loss of
appetite for the process has been obvious. Those involved in the
process while comparing notes about the acquis were in no way ready
to bind themselves on any issue regarding the future membership. Ali
Babacan, the chief negotiator for Turkey’s EU accession talks was
conspicuous by his absence from Brussels, by not being present at
the scene of activity and decision to canvas and to socialize. This
was naturally interpreted as a tactical display of a lack of interest
and a message that a non-committal attitude had prevailed.
This declining interest, which started at the end of last year,
seems to be of critical importance for Turkey-EU relations. The
process of negotiations may well go off the rails, causing a much
feared “train crash” which is a catastrophic eventuality, mainly due
to the impasse over the Cyprus problem. Ever since Turkey signed the
Additional Protocol last year the EU has been blunt on insisting that
by signing the Additional Protocol Turkey promised to open sea and air
ports to Greek Cyprus and that promise must be kept. That protocol,
though signed on behalf of Turkey, has not yet been submitted to the
Turkish Parliament for ratification, a legal necessity before it can
be adopted. The EU professes to understand Turkey’s predicament and
the fairness of quid pro quo that before this can be done, first and
foremost the isolation of the KKTC must be ended, but the EU is at
the same time unwilling to apply any pressure that this isolation be
ended. Thus there is a dialogue of the deaf but not the dumb. This
all means that the EU and Turkey are about to arrive at a dangerous
juncture in a relationship into which both are locked.
The EU’s Candidate Countries Director-General Pierre Mirel, in a
recent interview with Kriter magazine, analyzed the situation thus,
and I agree with him: “It cannot be denied that there is an impression
that Turkey has lost its excitement, or urge, for the EU.
Turkey does not seem to understand the importance of the Oct. 3,
2005 decision taken under very difficult conditions, in a political
environment that was against the enlargement of the EU. It is very
disappointing to see disinterest rather than an appreciating stand.”
He added that “Turkey seems to be behaving not as a future partner
but as an opposing party.” Indeed an example of this attitude can be
seen in the prime minister’s negative remarks vis-a-vis suspension of
negotiations over the past few months. What now seems a possibility is
that the Free Circulation of Goods, Customs Union and Transportation
chapter may not be opened but instead frozen because of the Cyprus
“Sword of Damocles” during September. This may even be followed at
the beginning of 2007 by suspension of negotiations between Turkey
and the EU.
Dutch rapporteur Camiel Eurlings’ Turkey report will be discussed
in the European Parliament around Sept. 25-28. It is an ice cold
shower for Turkey quite apart from the Cyprus issue. There are 343
motions in the report on matters like women’s rights, the Armenian,
Pontus and Syriac “genocides,” recognition of the rights of Turkish
Alawis and Yezidi minority rights, headscarves should be permitted in
universities (in spite of the Strasbourg ruling), the reopening of the
Greek Orthodox seminary on Heybeliada, as promised a few years ago,
withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, in addition to the opening
of Turkish Cypriot ports to Greek Cypriots. The report itself is
somewhat self-contradictory, in that the Armenian issue was added at
the last moment, as Eurlings confessed, although it is not something
new in that the European Parliament had already adopted an Armenian
genocide claim in 1987) saying that recognition of genocide should not
be made part of the criteria or preconditions for Turkey’s membership,
but those words of his are not reflected or contained in the report,
which is all the more surprising in view of the fact that Eurlings
is from Holland, 55 percent of whose population supports Turkey’s
candidature while Turkey’s support for its own membership according
to an opinion poll in July 2006 has fallen to 54 percent.
Although Eurlings says that he “wants Turkey’s membership to the EU
with all his heart and mind as an important alternative for Turkey”
his report does not reflect any positive thinking. Even so, his
report must be taken seriously because it reflects the general lack
of interest in Turkey’s membership not only by Turkey but by the
major political groups in the EU Parliament. Sadly, such a negative
report that has been described in the Western media variously as a
warning or even a slap, will not be conducive to more cooperation
but rather help further estrangement and lack of trust for the future
between Turkey and the European Union. This report is a wake up call
heralding a serious crisis that can either lead to a calamity or in
the famous words of Laurens Van der Post instead be an opportunity
for both sides to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordion Knot.

INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES WILL NEVER BOYCOTT IRAN OIL, CHIEF SAYS
Mehr News Agency, Iran
Sept 18 2006
Tehran, 18 September: There is no economic sanction at sight, and
the international oil companies will cooperate with Iran under any
condition, said the managing director of National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC) here on Monday.
Gholamhoseyn Nowzari made the remarks during a ceremony held to sign
an oil and gas exploration contract with the Norwegian Hydro Zagros
Company in Khorramabad oil block. A number of major international
oil companies including the French giant oil company Total and Eni
of Italy have announced readiness to cooperate with Iran.
Referring to the deadline set for the Japanese company INPEX at
Azadegan oilfield, Nowzari told reporters that Iran-Japan relations,
prioritizing the development of Azadegan oilfield with the Japanese
oil firm and Iran’s trust for intentional contracts, are all the
reasons that justify granting an opening to the Japanese company.
Nowzari also stated that the Master Development Plan (MDP) has been
prepared for purchasing required goods and equipments. The NIOC has
set September 30, 2006, as the not extendable deadline for the INPEX
to start operations in Azadegan oilfield; otherwise, the contract
will be considered null and void and Iran will pay some money to
INPEX for what has been already done.
As for Iran’s oil exports to Armenia, Nowzari said that Iran will
sell oil to any country who pays more for Iran’s oil.
In order to accelerate implementation of projects in the nation’s
oil and gas fields, NIOC has set a time limit for foreign companies
to accomplish the task. If the foreign company fails to take any
operation within the stipulated time limit, we will start cooperation
with other contractors.

ARMENIA BROADENING ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-KOCHARYAN
by Tigran Liloyan
ITAR-TASS News Agency
September 18, 2006 Monday 05:42 AM EST
The Republic of Armenia “is broadening its international relations
and, at the same time, consolidating its contacts with the traditional
friends. Armenia is continuing its policy of mutual supplementation
in the sphere of foreign policy,” President Robert Kocharyan stated
here on Monday, opening the third “Armenia-Diaspora” forum.
“Several large-scale mutually profitable economic programs were
launched jointly with the Russian Federation and military-political
cooperation between the two countries is being deepened,” Kocharyan
noted.
“Several large infra-structural programs have been drawn up with
Iran, which is our neighbour. Stable and effective relations have
been established with it,” the president said, having in view, in
particular, the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia.
“At the same time, Armenia is taking active steps to promote its
relations with the European Union. The drafting of the document on ‘The
New European Neighbourhood’ is all but completed,” Kocharyan stated.
“Agreement has been reached on Armenia’s individual partnership
with the North Atlantic Alliance and it is already in the process
of implementation,” the president noted. He recalled that bilateral
military cooperation between Armenia and the United States was growing
in the context of the international fight against terrorism”. “The
Armenian army is taking part in the peace-making operations in Iraq
and Kosovo,” he added.
“We are making all the decisions on the most acute international
problems with due account of the interests of our diaspora,” Kocharyan
assured the forum.
Touching on the Nagorny Karabakh problem, he said the republic’s
international recognition should be regarded as Armenia’s national
super-task No. 1.
“Implementation of all the Armenian efforts to achieve an international
recognition of the Nagorny Karabakh Republic should be regarded as
our national super-task No. 1,” he stressed.
“The existence of the Nagorny Karabakh Republic is an undisputable
fact and its organisational foundations are faultless,” the president
believes. The Karabakh economy is steadily developing and the
democratic reforms are making increasing headway in the republic.
“The Nagorny Karabakh people have, in fact, implemented and defended
their right to self-determination and are now in the effective process
of building up their statehood,” Kocharyan stated. “Nobody in Karabakh
wants to give up these achievements,” he added.
The process of negotiations on the Karabakh settlement “has had its
ups and downs. There were several times when we were close to the
conclusion of an agreement, stipulating the right of the Nagorny
Karabakh people to a free life. “Unfortunately, we were unable to
achieve this end,” Kocharyan stressed.

ARMENIA FORUM TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY RURAL REGIONS
by Tigran Liloyan
ITAR-TASS News Agency
September 18, 2006 Monday
The Armenia-Diaspora forum that will open in Yerevan on Monday will
discuss issues related to complex development of the country’s rural
areas, especially Armenia’s border settlements. Representatives of
Armenian communities of dozens of countries, heads of the Armenian
Church and all-Armenian organisations have arrived to attend it.
The forum that will be held for the third time “has become a kind of
constitutional structure in relations of the motherland with foreign
compatriots,” Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan said.
According to the official, “These relations are at a qualitatively
new level corresponding to the changed challenges of the time and
increased country’s potential.” This time the forum coincides with
the 15th anniversary of Armenia’s independence.
The Armenian foreign minister said that programmes of foreign donor
countries, international organisations, in particular, the World Bank,
as well as various organisations of the diaspora are also specified in
the guidelines of Armenian rural areas’ development (the US government
will provide to Armenian rural areas 250 million dollars within the
framework of the Millennium Challenge programme).
The Armenian government has chosen 20-25 from the country’s 150
remote settlements that need aid most of all, Oskanyan went on
to say. According to him, the developed programmes that will be
proposed for financing by the diaspora envisage the improvement
of infrastructure, creation of favourable conditions for sustained
development and involvement of the rural population in the process
of the projects’ implementation.
If the Armenian population comprises 3.2 million then over five
million Armenians live outside the republic. Out of this number 2.5
million Armenians live in Russia, about one million – in the United
States and 450,000 – in France.

THE RWANDAN DILEMMA VIS-A-VIS THE GENOCIDE
by The New Times
Africa News
September 17, 2006 Sunday
PART 1
Introduction
A dilemma can be defined as a state of uncertainty or perplexity
among competing options. The Rwandan dilemma vis-a-vis the Genocide,
which entailed the polarisation of Rwandans, is how to move forward
as one nation after the Genocide.
Rwanda as a nation has a long history of over 1000 years. It is a
joint project of Rwandans created through their chosen institutions
(Ubwami/Monarchy, Ubwiru/Constitution, Ubusizi/oral tradition,
Ingabo/Army, Ubucengeri/patriotism, etc). These institutions ensured
unity, stability and cohesion before colonisation.
On the other hand, colonialism completely re-engineered Rwanda into
different ‘races’ (Tutsi-Hamites, Hutu-Bantu, Twa-Pygmoids). This
racism was the root-cause of Rwanda’s tragedy that culminated into
the 1994 genocide.
The genocide process took one hundred years (1894-1994) beginning
with the first colonialist, and entailed entrenchment of negationisme
within the society. This came about in the colonial reconstruction of
the Rwandan society that forced Rwandans into their own self-denial
as one people, their heritage and historical social institutions
leading to the 1994 tragedy.
The dilemma, therefore, is whether Banyarwanda jointly own the tragedy
and bear its consequences. This dilemma can be accounted for by the
peculiarity of the Rwandan Genocide, which was between close relatives,
where siblings set upon each other and neighbour killed neighbour.
Contrasting it to the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, the
Germans decimated the Jews and the Turks the Armenians. In both
these cases there is a socio-cultural difference between the victims
and perpetrators, as opposed to Rwanda which had no socio-cultural
difference between its people.
Therefore, while the Jews and the Armenians had a place to go to
after their genocides, Rwandans had nowhere to run to but live with
each other. Thus the resonance or echoes of polarity of Banyarwanda
after the genocide.
The Rwandan Genocide was possible through manipulation of the
traditional socio-cultural institutions such as the monarchy, Ingabo,
traditional media – the drums and horns to rally the populace for
a common cause. These included the monarchical decrees (guca iteka
or gushyira ingoma ku karubanda) that can be equated to presidential
decrees during the Genocide that compelled the populace to join in the
act. The use of Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM) during
the genocide can be equated with the use of the traditional horn for
mobilisation for war and hunting expeditions (umuhigo, kwasira etc.).
Negationisme
The Rwandan dilemma begins with the denial of the Genocide. According
to Dr. Gregory H. Stanton of Genocide Watch, negationisme or denial is
the final of the eight stages in the continuum that is the genocide
process. In the eight stages, Classification of the victims, their
negative Symbolisation and Dehumanisation form the first three.
These are followed by Organisation of the potential perpetrators;
Polarisation of the society into enemies and allies; Preparation and
mobilization of the population; before the Extermination and supposed
purification of the society.
The last stage is the negation or Denial of the genocide, but which
is manifest in every stage in the continuum. Negationisme itself is
an in-built mechanism in all the stages of the process to assure
oneself that nothing wrong is being done, and propel the actors
to the next stage. Thus negationisme and genocide in this sense go
hand-in-hand-they are like Siamese twins (ni umwana n’ingobyi).
Negationisme is therefore a dilemma because not all Rwandans accept the
fact of the genocide, which has become a way of life predicated on the
“we-they” predisposition; that is, we the Hutu and they the Tutsi and
vice versa, and therefore not Rwandans but enemies and allies. The
post-genocide military campaigns will suffice to illustrate this
polarisation.
After committing the Genocide at the urging of the genocidaire regime,
Rwandans were persuaded to vacate the country, seeing it as having
been taken over by alien invaders, and created the biggest refugee
influx in the world. In a bid to recapture power, the genocidaire
regime in exile reorganised itself in the Congo refugee camps to
launch armed attacks into Rwanda.
This created the first concrete manifestation of negationisme that
continues to this day. To begin with, the genocidaires transformed
humanitarian assistance to the Rwandan refugees in the Congo into
military hardware and embarked on what came to be known as Operation
Insecticide.
Operation Insecticide entailed genocidal incursions in Northwest and
Southwest of Rwanda between 1995 and 1996. Note the term “insecticide”,
which symbolised their continued extermination of the Inyenzi (Tutsi
coachroaches).
Operation Insecticide internationalised the Rwandan conflict, and would
form the basis for the forced return of the Rwandan refugees in late
1996 with the RPF/A pre-emptive attacks on the armed genocidaires in
the refugee camps, that would be followed by the overthrow of their
ally, President Mobutu, in May 1997.
In October 1997, insurgence operations started in earnest in Rwanda
beginning with what would come to be known as The First Operation
Alleluia, which targeted Congolese Tutsi refugees in Gisenyi and
climaxed with the Mudende massacres. The Second Operation Alleluia
targeted Goma and Gisenyi, and was partly “successful” in Goma with
the capture of arms from Katindo.
This was followed by Operations Amen and Odyssey in the DRC in June
and July of 1999 and 2000, respectively, but both of which failed
due to RPF/A counter-insurgency operations in the country.
In May and December 2001, Operation Oracle du Seigneur got underway in
Rwanda, only to be crushed by the RPF/A counter-insurgency operations
under the command of General James Kabarebe that resulted in the
capture of the Armee de Liberation du Rwanda (ALIR) Commander,
Col. Evariste Bemera and his Chief of Intelligence. This capture,
which included 1,762 insurgents, effectively marked the end of
insurgency inside Rwanda.
Women, both mothers and wives of the insurgents, played a crucial role
in ending the insurgency, by persuading their sons and husbands to
end the rebellion and join hands with the new government of national
unity. This is a testimony of the women having transcended the dilemma
of polarity.
However, in September and October 2003, the failed Operations
Trompete and Tabara took place from South Kivu and saw the return
to Rwanda of the top FDLR commanders in their denunciation of the
insurgencies. And beginning 2004 to date, Operation la Fronde (sling)
has been going on and is doomed to fail with the return of other top
commanders, including Seraphin “Mahoro” Bizimungu and more recently
Lt Col Nsanzabera.
Note the Christian insinuation of the genocidal attacks with the names
given to the insurgency operations, i.e., Alleluia, Amen, Oracle du
Seigneur (Oracle of the Lord), Trompete (suggesting Joshua’s trumpet
as he entered Jericho in the Old Testament), and la Fronde (evoking
David’s defeat of Goliath with the deadly sling).
These insinuations suggest the Christian God’s blessings, thus giving
weight and credence to the negationisme of the continued genocide. It
suggests that the Christian God is for the genocidal tendencies and
the purification of “Christian” Rwanda from the Tutsi “infidels”
who are also “inyenzi” (cockroaches).
This religious fanaticism and tendencies also evoked the medieval
Christian crusades that supposedly had God’s blessings. It is no
wonder that in their fanaticism these insurgents have been listed as
international terrorist groups due to their mindless breach of peace
and destabilization in the region. Such naming of the insurgency
activities demonstrate how Christianity can be perverted and used
to condone genocidal acts and other crimes against humanity, which
constitutes a Christian dilemma par excellence in Rwanda.
PART 2
The continued denial of the Genocide notwithstanding, who then
is responsible? Responsibility for the Genocide, according to the
German philosopher Karl Jaspers, can be distinguished between types
of guilt and degrees of responsibility. The question of guilt deals
with individual and collective responsibilities, with the individual
and his or her relationship to others and to society.
Drawing from his Nazi German experience of the Holocaust that saw
the decimation of six million Jews during the Second World War,
Jaspers distinguished between four different concepts of guilt,
namely: criminal, political, moral and metaphysical.
Criminal guilt is defined by the law and established through
courts of law. It is evidence-based on the act and conduct of the
suspect who ultimately bears individual responsibility. However,
in Rwanda criminal responsibility became an issue because of the
overwhelming numbers of the suspected perpetrators. The challenge
was how to prosecute the large numbers, leading to the enaction of
the law categorising the perpetrators and establishing the Gacaca
justice system. Resorting to the traditional justice system, Gacaca,
underscores Rwanda’s resilience.
The current challenge is universal acceptance of the Gacaca process
by all Rwandans, as evidenced by those who recently fled to Burundi
to escape it or those who seem to be forced to attend the Gacaca
sessions as in the case of Ruhengeri (Musanze).
Political guilt, according to Jaspers, encompasses the actions of the
government as well as of the governed. Citizens bear the consequences
of the actions of their governments. They are subject to the State’s
power and dependent on the order that the State creates. However,
Jaspers insisted that everybody has a responsibility for how he or
she is governed.
To that extent political guilt is shared among the governments and the
governed. It is determined by the winning candidate in an election
whose power and will to judge is only restrained by his sense of
justice, political foresight, and respect for natural and international
law. In this sense, political guilt becomes collective responsibility.
In the Rwandan context, this means that the First and Second
Republics, which paved the way for the Genocide, could not have
done it by themselves without the overwhelming electoral support of
the governed, who continually returned the leaders to power with an
absolute majority of, at times, 99.9%.
In this sense, therefore, the majority of the population shares in the
political guilt, hence the collective responsibility. The dilemma is
failing to accept this political reality, of which many Rwandans —
including Hutu, Tutsi and Twa — previously lived in acquiescence.
This is despite the fact that the Genocide was committed in the name
of the Hutu.
Note that the Genocide was a political project based on demographic
majority disguised as “democratic”, “republican” and “revolutionary”
(demokarasi ya Rubanda nyamwinshi yakandamijwe ikigobotora ingoyi ya
cyami na gihake).
On the other hand, Jaspers established the concept of individual
moral guilt, which he posited as an absolute condition that everyone
is morally responsible for his or her actions, regardless of the
circumstances. He explicitly argues that following orders does not
exculpate (absolve) any individual, including the military. Moral
guilt is established through one’s conscience and through discourse
with friends and neighbours.
The dilemma is that, despite the ascribed political guilt, which
is collective, it does not absolve one from his or her own moral
responsibility, which has to begin with individual introspection
and self-examination. This lack of individual introspection and
self-examination vis-a-vis taking the moral responsibility accounts
for the current criticism of the general leadership in Rwanda. An
example of this criticism can be seen in those leaders adversely
mentioned in Gacaca who have failed to take moral responsibility.
Finally, the solidarity between fellow humans created the possibility
of what Jaspers calls metaphysical guilt. The belief in one human race,
transcending nations, races and conditions make everyone share in the
responsibility for injustice in this world, in particular for crimes
that happen in our presence or with our knowledge. If we fail to do
everything in our power to stop this crime from happening, we share
in the guilt.
In the choice between doing everything to save others and being
destroyed in the process or giving up in the face of insurmountable
obstacles, the morally innocuous (not intended to harm) choice for
one’s own life still produces a sense of failure and guilt.
The Rwandan Genocide was witnessed by the whole world, which failed
to act. This inaction entailed not just the superpowers, but each and
every individual belonging to the human race who did not do anything
in their power to stop the Genocide.
The immediate dilemma is the continued presence of the genocidaires
on the rampage in the region with the knowledge of the world, despite
the limited efforts to disarm and apprehend them.
Ultimately, the enormity of the Rwandan Genocide is beyond any human
reckoning or understanding. Thus Jaspers, discussing the German
dilemma, also observes: “[T]here remains the shame of that which is
always present, impossible to discover, merely to be explored.”
Sloganeering or even mounting placards merely denouncing the ideology
that informed the Genocide (Ingengabitekerezo) does not help in
understanding the complexity of the Rwandan Genocide. It is merely
being caught up in the rut of political posturing without addressing
the Rwandan dilemma.
However, there are many suspects who have taken it upon themselves to
own up the Genocide. One of the most illustrative examples is that
of a suspect who was found guilty by the Gacaca on a lesser charge
of pillaging but declared himself guilty of the greater charge of
genocide, saying he could not live with the guilt, a clear example
of assuming moral responsibility.
PART 3
The first challenge to the leadership is the full understanding
of the complexity of the truth about the Genocide. There are some
truths, foremost of which is the truth about the unity of the Rwandan
nation. It is this truth that has all along eluded Rwandans, including
many Rwanda scholars, since the coming of the colonialists and has
been about the Rwandan identity and how Rwandans historically related
to each other.
It includes the truth about their social relations and the alleged Hutu
“historical wounds” that continue to impact on the current social
discourse. It is also the truth about the social categorization of
Rwandans into different “races”.
There is also the truth about colonial reconstruction of the Rwandan
society that forced Rwandans into their own self-denial as one people,
their heritage and historical social institutions. These distortions
of the truth form the bedrock of the Rwandan dilemma.
Understanding these complexities of the truth is the beginning of
the Rwandan reconciliation.
The second aspect of the truth is the reality of the Genocide, which
is about the actors – that is, the victims, the perpetrators and
bystanders, and their respective roles. It is about who died and
his or her profile, so that in the process we restore honour and
dignity to the victims who have otherwise been represented as mere
statistics. The question will be who died, who killed them and who
witnessed it? When did they die? Where, how and why were they killed?
And, finally, where was he or she ‘buried’?
Many victims of the Genocide keep on being discovered in the most
unlikely and indecent places, including abandoned pit latrines
or cemented foundations of buildings. Many witnesses, including
guilty pleaders, are not willing to disclose the whole truth about
the Genocide. They only reveal the information that favours them and
hide that which is needed to aid in the unravelling of the truth in
the justice process.
Diverse victimhood
Victimhood also applies to the perpetrators, because in their very
act of genocide they too were dehumanised and continue to live with
individual guilt and shame for their roles in it. Many are, therefore,
traumatised. The leadership challenge is to fully appreciate the
diversity of victimhood and its implications in post-genocide Rwanda.
With the Genocide encompassing different actors — namely the
perpetrators, the victims and bystanders — it is in the admission
of the truth and assuming moral responsibility of what happened and
the role played by each and everyone that the reality of the Genocide
may begin to unravel.
The expected thoroughness of the Gacaca process, including the
national judicial system and the Arusha-based ICTR, is to facilitate
the establishment of the truth and therefore the criminal guilt of
the suspects. However the major challenge is with the Gacaca process,
which is yet to be fully owned by Rwandans and usually tends to be
undermined by some in the international community.
Some of the detractors of Gacaca are using the same political antics
of mobilizing sections of the population (i.e., Butare) claiming that
the Gacaca is the beginning of a “Hutu” genocide in vengeance of the
1994 Tutsi genocide.
The other leadership challenge is about the leaders’ political
responsibility emanating from the Genocide. This essentially brings
the question of credibility of the leaders already adversely mentioned
in the Gacaca process, and why they should continue in office. The
leadership should take political responsibility by individually
introspecting and examining themselves. This is a moral challenge
many leaders are reluctant to face — it may seem that leadership in
Rwanda is all about gainful employment.
Many of these leaders take cover under collective political guilt,
which allows them to shun individual responsibility for their
alleged roles in the Genocide. It is because of the shame and
assumed collective guilt (i.e., I was not the only one, all of us
are implicated) that Genocide has almost become a taboo subject to
discuss. The fact that such leaders do not talk about the Genocide
makes them vulnerable to blackmail by their peers and rivals who
assume the moral high-ground in the “we-they” (Hutu-Tutsi) polarity.
The cover of collective political responsibility ceases to be once
one becomes a leader, as he or she must be vetted and therefore take
individual responsibility for any alleged wrongs to society. It
is for these reasons that the public continuously questions the
credibility of their leaders, for which the only way out is taking
moral responsibility. For such leaders, moral renewal can be achieved
by introspection and self-examination to confront whatever doubts
and pangs of conscience they may have experienced and reassure the
questioning public. The challenge is that most of these leaders
vehemently deny any guilt, collective or otherwise.
For those on the moral high-ground, they should live with the fact
that they too are politically guilty. If we accept that the Genocide
was a process that took a century to consummate, then most of the
Rwandans living today would not be exempt from political guilt. It
is this that underscores the collective ownership of the tragedy and
lays the foundation for national reconciliation.
Reconciliation
Another major objective of Gacaca, apart from seeking, acknowledging
and recognizing the truth, is to develop and promote reconciliation
within the divided nation of Rwanda.
Reconciliation can only become a reality once the above-mentioned
denials, dilemmas and challenges are overcome. Reconciliation
therefore will meaningfully be accomplished by going back to ubumwe
bw’ Abanyarwanda. As the African proverb goes, when you want to
solve disputes, you do not take a knife to cut, but a needle to
sew. A Kinyarwanda approximation of the proverb would be: uca urw’
abavandimwe ararama.
Basing it on the truth, and whatever the grievance, Gacaca provides
the forum to continually dialogue on the challenges facing Rwandans
and provides a framework for concessions for the sake of a united
nation. Rwandans, in other words, should emphasize their commonalities
rather than their imagined differences and focus all their efforts
on national development, which in itself is a conflict resolution
strategy par excellence.
Conclusion
Despite the Genocide and the polarity it engendered, there are many
instances where Rwandans have individually transcended the myth of
differences between Banyarwanda.
A good example is that of the illustrious Nyange school girls who
refused to be separated into Hutu allies and Tutsi enemies as ordered
by insurgents (Abacengezi) in 1997, and opted to die in solidarity
as Rwandans.
Another example is that of Zula Karuhimbi who received The Campaign
Against Genocide Medal (CGM) for having saved over 100 Rwandans during
the 1994 Genocide.
There is also the example of Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) as a national
institution where former adversaries are working together, as opposed
to the sectarian Forces Armee Rwandais (FAR).
All in all, Rwanda has been “de-racializing” the society and being
all-integrative, so that citizenship is not based on descent but
residence as long as you subscribe to the “Rwandan dream”!
The article is based on a paper presented at the RDF Senior Officers
Seminar held on 24th and 25th August, 2006.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KOCHARIAN CALLS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF NK ARMENIA’S ‘NO. 1 TASK’
Associated Press Worldstream
September 18, 2006 Monday 4:48 PM GMT
President Robert Kocharian on Monday said international recognition
of Nagorno-Karabakh was Armenia’s top task.
Speaking at a forum of diaspora Armenians, Kocharian said “Our
position is this: the existence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
is an inarguable fact … An all-Armenian effort for the international
recognition of the NKR should be the number-one task for our nation.”
Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in Azerbaijan that has been under control
of Armenian and ethnic-Armenian Karabakh forces since a 1994 cease-fire
ended a separatist war. The region’s final status has not been worked
out, and years of talks under the auspices of OSCE mediators have
brought little visible result.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev frequently states that his country
is prepared to try to re-exert control of the region through force.
On Monday, a group of Iranian businessmen were in Nagorno-Karabakh
to visit local enterprises and discuss trade prospects.
“The visit of the Iranian delegation to the republic
of Nagorno-Karabakh is a new step on the road to deepening
cooperation,” said Anushava Danelian, the prime minister of the
region’s internationally unrecognized government.
Since the end of the war, Nagorno-Karabakh has remained largely
isolated, connected to Armenia only by a road running through
Azerbaijani territory. Nagorno-Karabakh proper does not border Iran,
but its forces occupy adjacent Azerbaijani territory that abuts Iran.
Iran has become a significant trade partner for Armenia, since Turkey
and Azerbaijan closed their borders in protest of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

WHEN IRAQI CHRISTIANS VANISH, RELATIVES IN U.S. PAY THE PRICE
by: Kelly Thornton
Copley News Service
September 18, 2006 Monday 11:30 AM EST
B.E. was hoping for a call about a house-painting job. Instead, the
Iraqi immigrant living in El Cajon, Calif., heard his sister’s voice,
with terrible news from Baghdad.
A family member had been abducted by masked gunmen demanding a
$30,000 ransom.
Kidnapping is nothing new in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, but lately there’s a new twist: Some of the targets are
Iraqi Christians likely to have family members in the United States
or Europe who can pay to save them.
B.E. – who insists on anonymity because of concern for his family
– began frantically seeking help from relatives and friends in El
Cajon. Family members in Chicago, Detroit and Europe did the same.
One cousin donated $5,000. Another cousin, $2,000. An uncle, $4,000,
and so on. B.E., who was mostly unemployed and has children, managed
to contribute $1,000 from what he had and from his circle in El Cajon.
Two days later, after the full ransom had been paid in U.S. dollars,
B.E.’s brother-in-law, Albert Anderious, was released.
On that day in March, the 45-year-old father of five was transported
in the trunk of a car to a road near the infamous Abu Ghraib prison,
west of the Iraqi capital, and released by a masked gunman who told him
to leave Baghdad or be killed. Anderious is a member of the Chaldean
Church, a branch of the Roman Catholic faith.
A substantial number of Iraqi families in California, Michigan,
Arizona and Europe have been extorted in this manner, according to
Iraqi-Americans and immigrant-rights activists.
“This started shortly after the American invasion, but now it’s
increasing,” said John Kalabat, an Iraqi-American who immigrated to
the United States in 1979 and became a language professor at Cuyamaca
and Grossmont colleges near San Diego. “For the mafias, it’s a nice
business, kidnapping someone and getting $20,000 to $50,000.”
Christians in Iraq make up perhaps 3 percent of the population and
include Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians and Syriacs.
The Chaldean community is mushrooming in El Cajon, where the group
has a larger presence than anywhere else in the country except
Detroit. The Chaldeans, who number about 25,000 in San Diego County,
have been vocal supporters of the U.S.-led invasion.
Probably less than 800,000 Christians still live in Iraq. They have
been leaving for places such as the United States for decades, to find
economic opportunity and to flee political persecution under Hussein.
Iraqi immigrants in El Cajon said they suspect Sunni and Shiite Muslim
insurgents are choosing Christian victims for two reasons: Because
they are more likely to have relatives with cash, and to accomplish
the bigger goal of driving them out their homes and the region.
B.E. and his family are just one story: Many Iraqi immigrants living
here know of a relative or friend from their home village who was
abducted for ransom. Family members scramble for funds; sometimes
the hostage is released, sometimes not.
Anderious’ family was overwhelmed with relief when he came home,
but the experience has made B.E., and others, bitter and broke.
“This thousand (dollars), it was for me – it was a big money, because
I need it more,” B.E. said. “But what (do) you do if there’s someone
in trouble? You have to help him. You have to cut it from your wage,
from your bills, from your kids, from your food, and pay for them. I
feel anger here. These bastards, they get this money for nothing.
It’s not right.”
As security in Iraq disintegrates, B.E. said, there is no one to call
for help and the kidnappers exploit that. “These people, they know
there’s no power of law there. Therefore, they do what they want.
They know the police (are) very weak. They do nothing.”
The sectarian violence raging in Baghdad prompted U.S. commanders in
recent weeks to send more soldiers to the capital in a renewed bid
to curb the surge of killings and kidnappings.
There’s even a market among criminal groups who buy and sell
hostages to each other to maximize profits, said Farouk Gewarges,
a Chaldo-Assyrian who owns an insurance business in El Cajon.
“Some people, they want to get money the easy way. All they know is
how to kidnap and use their guns,” said Gewarges, who knows Anderious
and many sad stories about other kidnappings.
“They are thugs who don’t know how to work, they have no brain. It’s
an easy job – put a gun to (a) head, kidnap him, ask for money and
release him,” Gewarges said.
Anderious called B.E. in El Cajon after his release, thanking his
brother-in-law and asking for financial help to come to the United
States.
Anderious, who works as a taxi driver, told B.E. he was chauffeuring
two Iraqi engineers when he was boxed in by two cars. Masked gunmen
jumped out, pulled the three men from the taxi, blindfolded them and
shoved one man in the trunk of each of the vehicles.
After a couple of hours, they arrived at their destination. The
abductors proclaimed that the two engineers had been working with
the Americans. Then they were shot to death in front of Anderious.
Anderious got lucky. He had not been observed helping Americans. If
his family paid, he would live.
The kidnappers used Anderious’ cell phone to call his family.
Anderious was forced to live in darkness and wear a blindfold –
even for eating or trips to the bathroom.
Once he was freed, Anderious wasted no time in heeding the kidnappers’
warnings to leave Baghdad. The day he was released, he took his family
to northern Iraq, where most Chaldeans have settled.
But there is no money left for his family to escape the country.
“He called me when he got out,” B.E. said. “He wants to leave Iraq.
He called me for help. I said, ‘I’m sorry I can’t. Because I need
now help because I’m new in America. Jobs not too much good.'”
There are many similar stories of violence and suffering.
For Ramzi Marcus’ 17-year-old nephew, Fadi Marcus, it was a different
outcome.
The Chaldean boy was snatched from the street while walking to
school. He was a high school senior. A quiet, shy kid who liked
reading, swimming and soccer. The kidnappers used the boy’s cell
phone to ask for ransom.
Marcus and his family scraped together the $20,000 and then followed
directions. The kidnappers sent them to 10 places before finally
allowing them to leave the money under a rock. The kidnappers said
the teen would be released within two hours, but he was not, said
Thaira Sako of El Cajon, the boy’s aunt.
That was a year ago.
The boy’s parents remain in Iraq. His mother is “crazy” with grief.
His father is “looking for bodies constantly,” said another aunt,
Janet Namo of El Cajon. Every time there is news that corpses have been
found, Fadi’s father rushes to view them, not knowing what to hope for.
It is just the latest of many tragedies for the family. When Ramzi
Marcus was 27, he became a political prisoner in Iraq. He was held
for eight years. While he was imprisoned, his 23-year-old brother
was hanged by Hussein’s regime because he was a Chaldean activist.
To get to the United States, Marcus, who is now 50, walked from Iraq
to Turkey to Greece. He made his way to Frankfurt, Germany, then to
Mexico City and then to Tijuana, where he was among a group of about
130 Chaldeans who made news when they were temporarily detained at a
Tijuana hotel before being allowed to cross the border in September
2000.
He received political asylum June 20, 2001. But he and his wife worry
and grieve for the family members they left behind.
Sako, his wife, puts it this way: “We pray a lot.”