U.S., Armenian Inventors Develop Stand-Alone Memory Device

U.S., ARMENIAN INVENTORS DEVELOP STAND-ALONE MEMORY DEVICE

US Fed News
December 15, 2006 Friday 1:34 AM EST

ALEXANDRIA, Va., Dec. 15 — Gevorg Torjyan, Albert Harutyunyan and
Valery Vardanian, all from Yerevan, Armenia, and Yervant Zorian
of Santa Clara, Calif., have developed an apparatus, a method,
and a system to allocate redundant components with subsets of the
redundant components.

According to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office: "In general,
various methods, apparatuses, and systems are described in which
logic executes, in series, a plurality of repair algorithms to
generate a repair signature for a memory. The memory has a full set
of redundant components associated with the memory. At least one or
more of the repair algorithms employ a subset of redundant components
that contains less than all of the redundant components in the full
set when attempting to generate the repair signature."

The inventors were issued U.S. Patent No. 7,149,921 on Dec. 12.

The patent has been assigned to Virage Logic Corp., Fremont, Calif.

The original application was filed on
Sept. 6, 2002, and is available at:
1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=% 2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&amp ;l=50&s1=7,149,921.PN.&OS=PN/7,149,921&amp ;RS=PN/7,149,921.

For more information about US Fed News federal patent awards please
contact: Myron Struck, Managing Editor/US Bureau, US Fed News, Direct:
703/866-4708, Cell: 703/304-1897, [email protected].

http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect

Pope In Turkey: Boom Or Bust For Ecumenism

POPE IN TURKEY: BOOM OR BUST FOR ECUMENISM
by R.L. Schwind

Spero News
Dec 17 2006

Pope Benedict’s purpose of exploring reconciliation between the
Churches of East and West is of great interest to Muslims, and to
the government of Turkey.

(Ed. note) The following is an adaption of an article by R. L. Schwind
from his website. He writes frequently on ecumenical issues involving
Western and Eastern Christendom and the problems involved in bringing
about full communion of the two. Herein he treats the goal of both
the Pope of Rome and the Patriarch of New Rome of bringing an end to
the millenium-long schism between their churches.

Here, too, he writes of Turkey’s raisons d’etat for allowing the
meeting at this time, as it awaits admission to the European Community,
while being governed by an Islamic (or at least a Turkish nationalist)
government.

The 2006 Visit of Benedict XVI to Constantinople

The Political Aspects

In the page above we discuss the proposed visit of Pope Benedict
XVI to his brother patriarch, Bartholomew I, Ecumenical Patriarch of
Constantinople and New Rome, at the end of November 2005 to celebrate
with him the Divine Liturgy on the feast day of the Apostle, St.

Andrew the First-Called, who is the Apostolic father and first bishop
of Byzantium, later Constantinople.

The Turkish state (9) viewed the proposed visit with much disfavor
and refused to issue an entry visa to Benedict, preferring instead
to invite him on a "state visit" in 2006 wherein its control over him
would be more easily enforced. Long before this visit came about the
Islamist-led Turkish state made it clear what its political interests
in the visit would be.

Benedict’s purposes to explore paths of reconciliation between the
Churches of East and West in a meeting between patriarchs are of great
interest to Muslims, for Islam recognizes no distinction between
religion and politics. Accordingly the proposed visit was regarded
by the Turkish state first and foremost as an opportunity to exploit
the Pope for its own political purposes and this it did very well.

The Turks do not view the Patriarch of Constantinople as anyone
but a local ethnarch in charge of the resident millet of a few
thousand Greeks in Turkey. His larger role as second in the order
of preference and dignity of the five Apostolic patriarchates (10)
established at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD and first among
equals of all Orthodox hierarchs are ridiculed as obsolete.

Moreover the Turks view contacts and close relations between the
Churches of East and West in efforts to reconcile differences as
inimical to the interests of the state and likely to diminish their
ability to control the Patriarch.

Pope Benedict’s political stagecraft was, in our opinion, a disaster.

He capitulated unconditionally to the Turks’ demands and received
nothing in return. Against all common sense, but probably at the
behest of certain Islamophiles in the Vatican bureaucracy and of the
ever-fearful Middle Eastern hierarchs, he abased himself in repeated
apologies for having referred to Islam as a "violent religion" –
a matter of objective truth fully manifest in the Quran, Hadith,
Sharia and 14 centuries of Islamic history; he repudiated his earlier
position that Islam belongs to the Islamic world of Asia, not Europe,
and followed that by his endorsement of Turkey’s application to join
the European Union which would be the open door to the inundation of
Europe by hordes of Asian Muslims.

What did Benedict obtain for his humiliating concessions? The transfer
of the Hagia Sophia (St. Sophia Church in Istanbul) to the possession
and control of the Patriarch for use as his patriarchal temple? NO!

Reciprocity in the treatment of Christian minorities in Turkey and
other Muslim countries such as Muslim minorities receive in civilized
countries? NO!

Freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarch to pursue his mission to promote,
maintain and extend the unity and faith of the Orthodox Churches
worldwide free of meddling by the Turkish state? NO!

Return to the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox seminary located on
an island in the Sea of Marmara closed by the Turkish state in 1971
because it was a private university? NO!

Withdrawal of the Turkish occupation from a portion of Cyprus and
its return to the Greeks? NO!

Admission of and apology for the massacres of Armenian Christians from
the 1890s to 1915 and of the Greek Christians in the early years of
the Kemal Ataturk’s regime? NO! Absolutely nothing!

Benedict returned to Rome with a bagful of pious platitudes about
harmony among Christians and Muslims, equality, brotherhood,
mutual respect, etc. etc. – all of which have not the least chance
of realization.

It appears to us that Benedict and his advisers failed to understand
that in the Muslims’ cosmology there is no equality, reciprocity,
fraternal affection or mutuality between Muslims and Christians.

The Quran defines Muslims as "the best of nations raised up to lead
all others" (Surah 3: 110) and infidels as "the vilest of animals"
(Surah 8: 55).

The relationship between Muslims and those who reject Islam is
governed by hatred. (Surah 40: 10) In addition, the Quran prescribes
the proper relationship between Muslims and Christians as the total
subordination of the latter to the former in a social and political
arrangement known as "dhimma" in which the condition of Christians
shall be humiliation (jizya) enforced by the obligation to pay the
annual jizya tax to the Muslim umma (community) in acknowledgement
of that humiliation. (Surah 9: 29) (11)

None of the issues which Christians might have raised to establish
a relationship based on peace, equality, and mutual respect between
Christians and Muslims were addressed. Thus we shall remain what we
have been for 14 centuries – despised infidels.

The Religious Aspects

As stated above, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s invitation to
Pope Benedict following the latter’s installation as Pope in 2005 to
visit him at his residence in Constantinople on the occasion of the
feast day of St. Andrew at the end of November was intended by both
first and foremost as an opportunity to continue the inter-ecclesial
dialogue and commitment to explore avenues for restoring the peace and
communion between the Churches as had existed in the First Millennium.

Unfortunately the Turkish government interfered. The proposed visit
was re-scheduled for the end of November 2006. The entire visit was
colored by the political agenda of the Turkish government which gave
it the outward appearances of a state visit.

Whenever the Patriarchs of Rome and New Rome met, their dialogue
was carefully crafted to express little more than platitudes about
the desired unity of the Churches and the commitment of each to
that objective.

On November 30, the feast day of the Apostle St. Andrew the First
Called, the two patriarchs issued a joint Declaration wherein they
renewed their "commitment to move towards full communion". The
Declaration reminded us of the acts of their predecessors "effacing
the memory of the ancient anathemas" which gave rise to the schism of
1054 and referred to the re-constitution of the Mixed Commission for
theological dialogue where the real issues confronting the Churches
might be discussed.

The Declaration continued with the affirmation that: "In any step
towards unification, minorities must be protected, with their cultural
traditions and the distinguishing features of their religions. In
Europe … we must unite our efforts to preserve Christian roots,
traditions and values, to ensure respect for history, and thus to
contribute to the European culture of the future and to the quality
of human relations at every level.

In this context how could we not evoke the very ancient witnesses and
the illustrious Christian heritage of the land in which our meeting
is taking place, beginning with what the Acts of the Apostles tell
us concerning the figure of St. Paul, Apostle of the Gentiles? In
this land, the Gospel message and the ancient cultural tradition met."

Thus both patriarchs remind us of the areas of their interest –
the Pope in Europe and the Ecumenical Patriarch in the Middle East.

The preservation of Christian roots in Europe is dear to Benedict
who views the secularization of Europe and the Islamic invasion as
threats to its existence.

To us this seems to contradict his endorsement of Turkey’s application
to join the European Union, for, in the unlikely event that it should
happen, and given the freedom which the populations of the member
states have to live and work anywhere in the Union, Europe would
suffer an invasion of Muslims of catastrophic proportions which,
in our opinion, would constitute within a few decades the demographic
invasion and Islamification of Europe which the Ottoman Turks attempted
militarily but failed to achieve in recent centuries.

The Ecumenical Patriarch’s interest in the Christians of the Middle
East is understandable but for them the future is dim as they in
ever increasing numbers seek relief from islamofascist tyranny and
oppression by emigrating abroad.

See "Christian flight from the Middle East" at:
tflight.html

An issue dear to Bartholomew was mentioned in the Declaration, namely
his "concern at the negative consequences for humanity and for the
whole of creation which can result from economic and technological
progress that does not know its limits.

As religious leaders, we consider it one of our duties to encourage
and to support all efforts made to protect God’s creation, and
to bequeath to future generations a world in which they will be
able to live." Herein is expressed Bartholomew’s restatement of
the Eastern Church’s broadly cosmologically view of creation which
contrasts, at least until recently, with the Western Church’s narrowly
anthropological view of creation. See "Cosmology of the Eastern Church
at:

In summary, we observe that the first meeting of the two patriarchs
may be characterized as exploratory. What was said privately we do
not know. What was expressed publicly in carefully crafted statements
we have heard before, namely re-commitment to the goal of unification.

Unfortunately the grim pall of Turkish interference hung over their
meeting like a poisonous fog and smothered whatever blessed spontaneity
of word or act that might have emerged. The real discussions in
the future are likely to take place in the Mixed Commission which
convenes elsewhere.

Let us hope that Bartholomew’s visit in 2007 to his brother patriarch
in the free air of Rome far from the meddlesome Turks will yield
happier results inspired by the Holy Spirit.

Conclusion and Remarks

As stated above, we are profoundly disappointed with the Holy Father’s
humiliation by the Muslim Turks. Regarding the religious aspects of
the visit, it may be said they have achieved what little was possible
under the circumstances.

We listed above several issues which Pope and Ecumenical Patriarch
might have discussed to advance reunion, the latter’s mission to
Orthodoxy and an improved relationship between Christians and Muslim
Turkey.

None of these matters were addressed and remain unresolved. Given
the hostility of the Muslim Turkish state to religious and ethnic
minorities in Turkey and its unrelenting efforts to Turkify all that
is deemed un-Turkish by harassing and suppressing the same, we see
little chance for much progress.

In effect there is little difference between what Muslims want and how
Turkish nationalists treat non-Muslims and non-Turks – the results
are the same. Demanding the return of Hagia Sophia to its rightful
owner, the Ecumenical Patriarch, and the withdrawal of the Turkish
occupation from Cyprus or any of the other matters raised above are
regarded by Muslim Turks as an affront to Islam and Turkish-ness to
be rejected out of hand, as, indeed, they are.

What then, under the circumstances, might Pope Benedict do to assist
his brother patriarch in his mission? We note that the Western Church
is far larger and richer that the Eastern Church.

Perhaps the money may be found to fund, equip and maintain a
patriarchal pan-Orthodox seminary and university located outside
of Turkey and free of Turkish meddling for the training of priests
and others from all over the Orthodox world to draw Orthodox from
diverse Churches closer to their Byzantine theological, liturgical
and ecclesial heritage and to the Mother Church of Orthodoxy in an
effort to overcome the parochialism of many national and autocephalous
Churches.

Money might be found to fund scholarships to encourage the exchange of
seminarians and other students among the several Orthodox Churches to
promote pan-Orthodoxy and broaden the international outlook of those
who may serve in the parishes and chancery offices in the future. We
would expect, of course, Turkish suspicion of a subterfuge to undermine
Turkish control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Nevertheless, the Pope might consider more aggressively other means
to assist his brother patriarch in many ways to slip the surly bonds
of the latter’s Turkish masters.

Resistance by the Turks to ecumenical dialogue between the Churches
is not the only obstacle to inter-ecclesial unity. Many Orthodox
Churches view these efforts with grave misgivings. Since the schism
of 1054 the Church of Constantinople has devolved into a plethora of
national and autocephalous Churches, each claiming full independence
while acknowledging the Ecumenical Patriarch as "first among equals",
but in reality paying him scant heed.

The largest Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate of Moscow, which is not
an Apostolic Church at all and itself a creature of Constantinople,
frequently claims equality in status with Constantinople and has
never abjured its "Third Rome" pretensions.

It asserts as condition prerequisite to any dialogue with Rome that
the latter abandon its hierarchical administration of Roman Catholic
parishes in Russia and, of course, the Eastern Catholic Churches (the
hated "Uniates") and concede exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction
to Moscow over all the territory occupied by the former Russian Empire.

We doubt that inter-ecclesial dialogue between Rome and Constantinople
can proceed far without involving the other Orthodox Churches and
that no unity will ever be consummated without the unanimous consent
of all Orthodox Churches.

During the Pope’s visit we noted that both Pope and Patriarch,
in their respective liturgies, adhered to the ancient practice of
excluding the other from the diptychs. (12) What this failure means
to say is this: "We do not pray for any hierarchs with whom we are
not in peace and communion."

While that is clear in its intent, it is also obsolete, unchristian
in its purpose and the antithesis of what the Churches seek. For
example, in the Byzantine liturgy we pray for peace, salvation,
the well-being of the Churches, the government, the armed forces,
travelers, for good weather, etc. and for every other Tom, Dick
and Harry who enters through the door etc., but have never a kind
word for the patriarchs and other hierarchs of our Sister Orthodox
Churches. "Therefore pray for each other that you may be healed."

said St. James in his Epistle at: 5: 16.

Then why don’t we pray for the hierarchs of our Sister Churches? In
response to that paradox we suggest here below an amendment to the
diptychs for use in the Great Entrance of the Divine Liturgy and in
the Commemorations following the hirmos after the epiclesis:

First, Lord, remember His Holiness N, Pope

of Rome, our Holy Patriarch N, our Most Rev.

Father and Archbishop N and our Bishop N, His

All-Holiness N, Patriarch of New Rome, and all

the venerable Catholic and Orthodox Bishops.

Preserve them as a blessing over Your holy Churches

in peace, safety, honor, health, long life, rightly

dispensing the word of Your truth.

Returning the Orthodox hierarchs to the diptychs requires
neither consent from the Turks, nor reciprocity, for charity
is non-reciprocal. It would be an enduring act of good will and
Christian charity which is Christ’s first mandate, namely that we
love one another.

________________________________________ _____________________

FOOTNOTES:

9) The Prime Minister of Turkey is RECEP ENDOGAN. His Islamist party,
AKP, has controlled an absolute majority in the Turkish parliament
since 2003. Endogan and his party are committed to the revocation of
the secular constitution of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and its replacement
by the Islamic law code, the Sharia. Turkey’s gradual return to
the reactionary Islamic East bodes ill for any amelioration of the
conditions of its religious and ethnic minorities.

10) The Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD ranked the order of precedence
of the Apostolic patriarchates as follows: Rome, Constantinople,
Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem.

11) Over the centuries the institutionalized practice of humiliating
"people

of the book" viz. Jews and Christians became increasingly onerous and
intruded on all aspects of life. The purpose was to impress on all
the wholly inferior and despised status of those who rejected Islam
in order to compel their conversion to Islam, to plunder their wealth,
and to force them into exile.

The Christian virtue of humility is not valued by Muslims. Their
concept of self-esteem and worth is governed by exaggerated notions
of honor and shame derived from the Bedouin society of the 7th
century Hijaz.

The honor-shame society of Islam propels Muslims to extremes in quest
of honor and glory and, conversely, to exert great efforts to avoid
dishonor. These notions are further aggravated in the Muslim vs.

infidel context.

Because Muslims regard themselves as "the best of nations" and
infidels as "the vilest of animals", any words or acts by infidels
deemed offensive to Muslims, their god, Muhammad, the Quran and
Islam are treated presumptively as "hadd" crimes (beyond the limits)
punishable by death.

Thus the great emphasis on humiliating the Pope by insisting that
he apologize for uttering that which is the unvarnished truth and to
reverse his stance on admitting Turkey to the European Union.

Tragically Benedict fell into the trap. By humiliating the chief
prelate of Christendom, the Muslims confirm what they already believe,
namely that infidels, even the exalted ones, are indeed the vilest
of animals.

12) In its liturgical usage, the term "diptychs" refers to
commemorative prayers in which are included the names of the high
hierarchs in peace and communion with the Church. When Pope and
Patriarch excommunicated each other in 1054 AD, they also struck each
other from the diptychs of their respective liturgies. Although Pope
and Patriarch have revoked the ancient excommunications, they still
exclude each other from their liturgies.

http://www.byzantines.net/byzcathculture/chris
http://www.byzantines.net/epiphany/cosmology.htm

TEHRAN: FM: UNSC Resolution On Iran A Hostile Move

FM: UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAN A HOSTILE MOVE

Fars News Agency, Iran
Dec 17 2006

TEHRAN (Fars News Agency)- Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
stressed here on Sunday that Tehran views any UNSC resolution on
sanctions against Iran as a hostile measure.

Speaking in a joint press conference with his Armenian counterpart,
Mottaki also described referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) as illegal and politically-driven,
and reminded that none of the reports presented by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General or inspectors speak of
Iran’s diversion from peaceful to military nuclear activities or goals.

"When a completely technical issue is pretended to be a security
problem, it means that they are politicizing the issue," he reminded.

The Iranian top diplomat referred to the recent acknowledgement of
the Zionist regime officials that the Israeli regime is equipped with
nuclear weapons, and lashed out at the Security Council’s indifference
to the issue, asking, "What measures has the UN Security Council
adopted so far in this regard?"

The Iranian foreign minister also condemned the statements by the
Zionist regime officials about accumulation of nuclear weapons in
the region.

He further added that the Islamic Republic of Iran is pursuing
the case of accumulation of more than 200 nuclear warheads in
the occupied Palestinian territories by the Israeli regime through
continued contacts with the Arab League Secretary General, President
and Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), UN Secretary General, Chairman of the UN Security Council,
Chairwomen of the UN General Assembly and IAEA Director General.

Mottaki said Tehran expects regional countries show a decisive reaction
in this regard and initiate to adopt the necessary measures at the
regional and international levels.

He also expressed the hope that the counterparty to Iran’s nuclear
case would return to the negotiating table.

Elsewhere, the minister voiced Iran’s preparedness to take part in
a consortium for the management of Armenia’s gas pipeline.

BAKU: EU Does Not Recognize Referndum In Nagorno-Karabakh

EU DOES NOT RECOGNIZE REFERENDUM IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
Dec 17 2006

Visiting Azerbaijan European Union Special Representative for the
South Caucasus Peter Semneby held a press conference December 16 at
the ISR-Plaza hotel.

P. Semneby said he met with government officials, NGO representatives,
and human rights activists to discuss the main principles of the
action plan of the European Neighborhood Policy.

European diplomat noted that EU-Azerbaijan relationship transformed
from the stage of cooperation to the stage of integration, and said
that government of Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy allowed
establishing friendly relations with the countries of the region.

He said the European Union does not recognize the referendum held by
Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh, adding that it may have a
negative impact on the conflict resolution process.

According to P. Semneby, EU will open its office in Azerbaijan in 2007,
as it will help watch more closely the ongoing processes here.

The report on realization of the action plan will be prepared yearly.

Then, EU representative answered to the journalists’ questions.

Armenia Thwarted Lebanese Threat

ARMENIA THWARTED LEBANESE THREAT
by Ara Tatevosjan

Source: Kommersant, December 12, 2006, p. 10
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 15, 2006 Friday

Posed by a visiting veteran of the conflict in Karabakh

CONSPIRACY BLOWN IN ARMENIA; Armenian secret services claim prevention
of external meddling in "political processes".

The Armenian National Security Service (NSS) reports arrest of one
Gerard Sefiljan of Lebanon who planned "illegal interference by force
in the forthcoming political processes in Armenia."

Sefiljan, leader of the non-governmental organization Armenian
Volunteer Union, was taken in on Sunday night. Some weapons were
confiscated as illegally possessed. Sefiljan’s accomplice Vardan
Malhasjan was arrested as well. Armenian secret services maintain that
the Armenian Volunteer Union convened a secret meeting on December 2,
where its leaders suggested removal of the existing regime by force
and even came up with a specific plan of accomplishing it. A source
in the NSS Press Service claims that "we have irrefutable evidence
that the Armenian Volunteer Union, an organization lacking official
registration, intended illegal interference by force in the forthcoming
political processes in Armenia and planned some radical action on the
eve of the parliamentary election in 2007." The said "radical action"
would have come down to encouraging the Armenian opposition to convene
unsanctioned protest actions, clashes with law enforcement agencies,
and other suchlike activities.

Once a member of Dashnaktsutyun who chose to remain in Lebanon
after the Karabakh war since his appeals to Yerevan for Armenian
citizenship were turned down, Sefiljan is a dedicated critic of the
Armenian powers-that-be. He branded Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanjan as
"promoter of an ideology of slaves" in early 2004, and later said that
"existence of a country like Azerbaijan in the region is certainly
harmful." "My associates and I will prevent self-reproduction of the
Armenian regime in the forthcoming election," Sefiljan was quoted as
saying this summer. His associates are therefore convinced that the
authorities decided to take Sefiljan out of the picture now to spare
themselves trouble at a later date.

Armenian Volunteer Front activists are convinced as well that there
may be some connection between Sefiljan’s arrest and the process of
Karabakh conflict resolution. They refer to the scenario in accordance
with which Azerbaijan will put up with a referendum on the status in
Nagorno-Karabakh in return for liberation of the occupied territories.

Awarded the Combat Cross for participation in the Karabakh war,
Sefiljan is coordinator of the Organization for the Liberated
Territories, a structure established by war veterans. Its activists
are dead set against the return to Azerbaijan of the territories that
surround Karabakh and serve as a security belt.

Official Baku in the meantime was perplexed to hear of a
connection between Sefiljan’s arrest and his views on the problem of
Nagorno-Karabakh. This correspondent was told in the Armenian Foreign
Ministry that "the negotiations are not in their final phase yet,
and all these speculations on the return of the territories are but
theoretizations."

Sefiljan and Malhasjan are facing charges under the article of the
Criminal Code pertaining "public calls to topple the constitutional
regime in the Republic of Armenia". They may draw either a fine or
three years imprisonment. Sefiljan is a foreigner, however, and will
probably be deported from the country after the trial.

Living In The Long Shadow Of A Resurgent Russia

LIVING IN THE LONG SHADOW OF A RESURGENT RUSSIA
By Stefan Wagstyl

Financial Times (London, England)
December 15, 2006 Friday

Of all the changes that have swept central and eastern Europe this
year, none is more significant than the emergence of Russia as an
energy superpower. The year had barely begun, when President Vladimir
Putin ordered Gazprom, the gas monopoly, to turn off supplies to
Ukraine in a move which also effected shipments to the European
Union. Supplies were soon restored – but Europe is still digesting
the effects of this harsh lesson in energy politics.

Gazprom has been negotiating big price increases for 2007, particularly
for former members of the Soviet Union which have enjoyed favourable
terms. The gas group has indicated it is ready, if necessary, to cut
off supplies for states that fail to sign new contracts.

The Kremlin insists that Russia supplies oil and gas on a purely
commercial basis. However, in practice, Russian officials have been
adept at using energy for political as well as commercial ends. In
the Caucasus, for example, Georgia, a hostile state in Russian eyes,
is charged considerably more for its gas than neighbouring pro-Russia
Armenia, even though Armenia’s gas is piped across Georgian territory.

Gazprom argues that its aim is to raise prices in the former Soviet
Union to market levels and end subsidies dating back to Soviet times.

It is also increasing Russian domestic prices, although not until
after the 2008 presidential election.

As well as higher revenues, Gazprom is trying to buy stakes
in downstream assets, including pipeline networks to enhance its
market presence and profits. It already has made such acquisitions,
in co-operation with German partners, in Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia, and this year acquired control of a small British gas
company. However, many European governments are wary of Russian
energy investments, fearing that economic control would generate
political influence.

The EU has responded with new efforts to diversify supplies – notably
from the Caspian basin. New gas and oil pipelines from Azerbaijan to
Turkey were completed this year and more are under consideration. But
the huge costs and the uncertainties over the size of reserves makes
energy groups cautious. Meanwhile, Russia has successfully exploited
tensions within the EU, by playing members off against each other
notably over the Baltic Sea gas pipeline which will supply Germany
but circumvent Poland and other transit states.

Meanwhile, Russia has become an increasingly difficult environment for
foreign oil companies. After years of discussion, the Kremlin decided
to exclude foreign groups from the huge Shtokman gas project in the
Barents Sea and is increasing the pressure on Shell, the Anglo-Dutch
company, and other investors involved in developing offshore gas at
Sakhalin Island in Russia’s far east. This month, Shell caved in and
agreed to sell a controlling interest in its Dollars 20bn Sakhalin-2
project to Gazprom.

Russian officials seem to think that they no longer need international
capital or technology. Mr Putin is instead promoting domestic companies
as global champions, headed by Gazprom and Rosneft, the oil group
that was floated on this year with a value of Dollars 80bn.

The Kremlin seems determined to increase domestic control over
Russia’s resources. There is a growing nationalist mood in Russia,
driven by confidence in the country’s energy wealth, by the confusion
caused by the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and by fears about
possible threats, including global and local terrorism.

Mr Putin has capitalised on these sentiments by following more
assertive foreign policies. A year ago, its main target was Ukraine,
following the 2004 victory of the pro-west Viktor Yushchenko as
president. But the success of Viktor Yanukovich, Mr Yushchenko’s
Russia-oriented rival, in this year’s parliamentary elections, and
his appointment as prime minister have prompted Moscow to soften
its approach to Kiev. Instead, Georgia and its pro-west president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, are in the Kremlin’s sights.

With the 2008 presidential elections looming, Russian politics is
becoming sharper and more brutal. Recent months have seen a string
of high-profile political killings, including that of Alexander
Litvinenko, the former Russian spy, poisoned in London. The Kremlin
denies involvement but the range of possible suspects includes spies
and ex-spies as well as gangsters and business people.

These developments are viewed with concern in central Europe.

However, government attitudes to Moscow vary, with Poland and the
Baltic states more willing to criticise Russia than the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Hungary, which take a more pragmatic view.

Poland, led by president Lech Kaczynski and his twin brother, Jaroslaw,
the prime minister, has developed robust foreign policies.

As well as annoying Russia, however, the approach has raised hackles
with EU partners, notably Germany, and has complicated intra-EU
co-operation.

Across central Europe, new political forces are testing their
strength in the form of populist parties and tendencies. After more
than 15 years of post-Communist change, people are tired of economic
reforms. With EU and Nato accession safely in the bag, politicians
are struggling to persuade voters to accept more change.

In Hungary, for example, political discontent prompted riots in
Budapest. The immediate cause was the admission by Ferenc Gyurscany,
the prime minister, that he had lied over the economy. But the
demonstrators were also concerned about the threat that reform
represents to a generous welfare state.

In south-east Europe, there is relief in Romania and Bulgaria that
they are to join the EU on January 1, despite concerns in Brussels
about the level of preparation. Other countries in the region are
worried that with enlargement fatigue growing within the union, and
a crisis over Turkey’s admission negotiations, the EU may rule out
further enlargements.

In the former Yugoslavia, perhaps the most troubled spot in mainland
Europe, the death of Serbia’s former leader Slobodan Milosevic in his
prison cell at The Hague war crimes tribunal removed one source of
potential instability. But others remain, notably in the strength of
Serbia’s extremist Radical party, the political stalemate in Bosnia,
and the delays in the international community’s efforts to secure a
final settlement for the disputed territory of Kosovo.

Meanwhile, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from Berlin to the
Bering Strait, good economic growth, with rising living standards.

While political turmoil has a destabilising impact in some countries,
the effects could be much worse if the economy was performing less
robustly.

In a recent annual economic survey, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development forecast expected average increases in
gross domestic product of 6.2 per cent this year and 5.8 per cent in
2007. If the predictions are right, the region will by the end of this
year have recovered all the economic ground lost, in output terms,
since the fall of communism and see GDP reach 103 per cent of the
levels of 1989.

There are sharp differences among sub-regions, with central Europe
already enjoying GDP levels more than one-third higher than in 1989,
while the countries of south-east Europe have just returned to 1989
levels and the nations of the former Soviet Union still have a little
way to go. However, south-east Europe and the former Soviet republics
are closing the gap, growing faster than central Europe.

The money is concentrated in the region’s big cities. Moscow, Warsaw
and Prague are all booming, as are smaller centres, including Riga,
the Russian industrial city of Ekaterinburg and the western Romanian
commercial hub of Timisoara. In the former Soviet Union, resource-rich
regions are also expanding rapidly, such as the oil and gas province
of Khanty-Mansiysk in western Siberia, producer of more than half of
Russia’s oil.

However, away from these commercial dynamos, life is generally poorer,
and sometimes it is very difficult. Small towns and villages have
often seen little benefit from post-Communist transformation.

Whole countries are still struggling with serious political
instability, notably in central Asia and the Caucasus.

Even poorer states offer some scope for investment, including foreign
investment. According to the EBRD, foreign investment is forecast at
Dollars 50.3bn for 2006, just short of 2005’s Dollars 53.8bn record.

Central Europe continues to take the lion’s share, with Dollars
22.1bn forecast for 2006, but south-east Europe has increased its
take sharply from Dollars 13bn in 2005 to a predicted Dollars 19.3bn.

Russia and other former Soviet republics (except for the Baltic states)
are attracting considerably less. In this sub-region, the inflow is
forecast to drop from Dollars 13.3bn to Dollars 8.9bn.

But companies in the former Soviet Union are finding other ways of
raising funds, such as the international capital markets. Russian and
Kazakh companies have tapped the London stock market, as have, on a
smaller scale, Ukranian groups. Even when the region’s complicated
politics creates considerable obstacles, money seems to find a way
to seek out potential profits.

Tbilisi Free of Russian Military

Kommersant, Russia
Dec 15 2006

Tbilisi Free of Russian Military

The Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus dispatched the last
of its property and equipment from Tbilisi suburb of Vaziani to the
102nd Russian Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia, yesterday. There
remain only 13 Russian officers in Georgia now, who are overseeing
the closure of the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Commander of the
North Caucasus Military District Army Gen. Alexander Baranov told
journalists that eight closed car and 16 open train cars containing
arms and equipment have been dispatched to Armenian.
Today and on December 19, two convoys containing 12 pieces of
equipment each will be sent by road. The personnel of the Tbilisi
garrison will leave next week. The military operational staff of the
Group of Forces will leave Tbilisi on December 25. `There will not be
a single Russian serviceman left in the Tbilisi garrison by the end
of the year,’ Baranov stated. An exception will be the guards at the
Russian embassy in Tbilisi, which was vacated by Russian diplomats
after the October spying incident. The Group of Forces school, where
both Russian children and Georgian children studied, has also been
closed.

The decision on early withdrawal of the Tbilisi garrison from Georgia
was made by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov in October during
the scandal over the arrest of several Russian officers in Tbilisi
and Batumi on espionage charges. The Tbilisi garrison had previously
been slated for withdrawal by the end of 2008. The base in Batumi
will be closed by the end of next year and the base in Akhalkalaki by
the end of 2008.

Mamuka Panchulidze, a spokesman for the Georgian Ministry of Economic
Development told Kommersant that the large Group of Russian Forces’
building and its grounds in the most exclusive neighborhood in
Tbilisi would be turned over to that ministry and the government
would decide how to put them to use. He said that the facilities may
then be auctioned off. `It could be turned into a five-star hotel,’
he observed. Several construction firms have also expressed interest
i n tearing the building down and putting up new elite housing in its
place.

Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus

The Power and Interest News Report- PINR
Dec 15 2006

”Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus”

In recent months, relations between Georgia and Russia have
deteriorated. The clash between these two states is only a symptom of
the broader strategic positioning of the West and Russia in and
around the South Caucasus. In this scenario, at regional and global
levels, countries and organizations are involved in a struggle for
power and energy security. Considering these two issues, what is the
current situation in the South Caucasus and what can be expected in
the future?

Affecting the region are the political-military and security policies
of the actors involved. These actors include Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan, and their "frozen" conflicts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, the leverage of regional powers,
such as Turkey and Iran, and of global powers, such as the United
States, Russia and China, is part of the power configuration in the
region.

In addition to countries, international organizations are also
involved in this game. At the regional level, there is the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (B.S.E.C.), the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR)
the Caspian Sea Force (CASFOR), the cooperation between Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (G.U.A.M.) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (C.S.T.O.) within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.). At the global level, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the European Union also exercise
political weight in the South Caucasus.

Energy Security

In addition to the power configuration is the issue of energy
security. Energy security is high on the international agenda, as the
United States, the European Union and N.A.T.O. have expressed their
concern about threats to energy security. E.U. countries as a whole
currently import 50 percent of their energy needs (the U.S. imports
58 percent of its oil), and will import 70 percent by 2030.
Furthermore, E.U. countries import 25 percent of their energy needs
from Russia, which may rise to 40 percent in 2030 (another 45 percent
comes from the Middle East). Besides this growing dependency, it has
became clear that the energy instrument is an essential part of
Russia’s external and security policy after it used this to force
Ukraine to pay a higher gas price at the end of 2005.

The geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus is also based on
the presence of energy resources. Stability in the Caucasus is a
vital requirement for the uninterrupted transport of Caspian oil and
gas. The Caspian Sea region (the South Caucasus and Central Asia)
contains about 3-4 percent of the world’s oil reserves and 4-6
percent of the world’s gas reserves. In itself, the Caucasian share
of global oil and gas reserves is not considerable. However, in light
of the uncertainty over the reliability of Persian Gulf supplies, as
well as the possibility that Russia may use energy delivery as a
power tool, the transport of Caspian and Central Asian (Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan) energy supplies to the West via the Caucasus has
gained vital importance.

The importance of the region has also grown as a result of energy
policies by consumer states in the West that want to decrease their
dependence on resources from Russia and the Middle East. A number of
states and organizations are making efforts to end Russia’s near
monopoly on the transport of energy supplies in the Eurasian region
by creating alternative pipeline routes to transport these supplies.
Thus, the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline (China and Kazakhstan), the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (B.T.C.) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (B.T.E.)
pipelines (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Kazakhstan) and the
Nabucco gas pipeline (European Union, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,
Hungary and Austria) are operational, under construction or planned.

Defrosting the Frozen Conflicts

Washington wants a stable South Caucasus region for its investment in
the energy sector, as well as for its geostrategic interests in the
region. The separatist regions in Georgia — Abkhazia and South
Ossetia — have become areas of the major players’ interests in the
region. With the exception of the tensions surrounding Tbilisi,
Russia has not played a very neutral role in these conflicts. Russia
has used the conflicts as political leverage with the West.

The objectives are clear: the West and Russia have the aspiration of
being the major player in the South Caucasus. Russia, however, is
gradually being forced to retreat from this region. To counter this
development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances
by keeping the so-called "frozen conflicts" active. This makes it
harder for Georgia to attract Western investment and it is
complicating its accession to N.A.T.O.

The tensions are likely to continue if these global powers and their
organizations cannot find consensus or "peaceful coexistence." In
these circumstances, a solution to the frozen conflicts is rather
unthinkable. If that is the case, disputes — harmful to the economic
development of the South Caucasus — are likely to continue until the
time that these countries are consolidated into Western structures.

Concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the outlook is similar to that of the Georgian regions.
The main foreign actors in this conflict — Russia, the United States
and the European Union — will have to find a compromise. At the
moment, the United States is the party most interested in solving the
conflict and is putting serious efforts into finding a settlement.
Yet, political will and public support has to be created on both
sides. It seems that political pressure is rising on Azerbaijan and
Armenia. The United States — perhaps more than Europe — has the
military, political and economic capacities, and, due to its
investments, the will to force a breakthrough in the negotiations.
Just like the Georgian separatist regions, the main condition for a
solution is cooperation with and by Russia.

Military Alliances as Guardians of Energy

Matters of energy security tend to attract the attention of military
organizations. For example, military organizations are at the center
of the security of oil and gas pipelines against terrorist attacks.
In G.U.A.M., increasing tensions between Georgia and Moldova with
Russia has forced it to reconsider its energy security and to find an
alternative to dependency on Russian oil and gas. In such an
alternative scenario, Azerbaijan is to play a crucial role both as
energy supplier and transit country for oil and gas from Central
Asia. The sustainability of such a scenario is yet to be shown.
Considering the current more pro-Russian government in Ukraine,
however, G.U.A.M.’s energy security plans have become unlikely.

The Russian armed forces are currently tasked with the protection of
energy resources, such as off-shore platforms. Also, for the
Russian-led C.S.T.O., energy security seems to be recognized as a
task of growing importance. A recent exercise at a nuclear energy
station in Armenia showed that the C.I.S. Anti-Terrorist Center is
already involved in this. It is not unlikely that in the future the
C.S.T.O. will take over energy security tasks and other
responsibilities of the C.I.S. Anti-Terrorist Center. Therefore, the
involvement of the C.S.T.O. in energy security, especially in the
South Caucasus, specifically in Armenia, is likely to develop
further. Moreover, regional maritime task forces — CASFOR and
BLACKSEAFOR — could potentially be used for such operations around
the Caucasus.

According to Western and Russian sources, the West is also directly
involved in energy security in the South Caucasus. Allegedly,
military officers from Turkey, together with their colleagues from
Azerbaijan and Georgia, have regularly carried out command staff
exercises to practice the protection of the B.T.C. pipeline.
Furthermore, in 2005 an agreement had supposedly been reached which
arranged for the United States and N.A.T.O. to secure the B.T.C.
pipeline. In the future, they would also safeguard the B.T.E. gas
pipeline.

In addition to this, military units of N.A.T.O. and the United States
would also support and/or train Azeri and Georgian troops tasked with
the protection of pipelines. Moreover, the United States is allegedly
going to provide Azerbaijan three cutters and small submarines,
intended to guard its oil fields. However, Georgian, N.A.T.O. and
U.S. officials all deny any N.A.T.O. or U.S. involvement in pipeline
security in Georgia and Azerbaijan and claim that these two states
have their own dedicated units for pipeline protection. Nevertheless,
statements by leading N.A.T.O. officials, dedicated meetings, and
other activities indicate that N.A.T.O. is increasingly interested in
the South Caucasus and its energy resources in particular.

Considering that the United States and N.A.T.O. are likely to be
involved in energy security in the South Caucasus, as is Russia with
the C.S.T.O., this could lead to rivalry. In the worst case, even a
local arms race between their regional allies — with Iran and
Armenia on the Russian side versus Azerbaijan and Georgia on the
Western side — should not be ruled out.

U.S.-Russian Competition in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea

The geostrategic importance of the South Caucasus and the Caspian
region as a corridor from Europe to Central Asia, as a bridgehead to
control and pressure Iran, and also because of the energy resources
and the war on terrorism, are the main reasons for the U.S. presence
in the region. The United States, with its heavy military involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and following the switch of Uzbekistan to
the Russian camp, is apt to seek strong points in the Caucasian area
in support of its global geostrategy.

The recent involvement of the United States might upset the
precarious power balance in these regions, which has evolved after
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is especially true now
that Iran and Russia, the greatest powers in the region, feel
threatened. Russia regards the South Caucasus as its traditional
backyard of influence and counters increasing involvement in the area
by the West. The United States has chosen Azerbaijan as its most
important ally in the Caspian basin and has developed a program of
intense military cooperation. Russian military analysts argue that
the situation is reminiscent to the U.S.-Georgian Train and Equip
Program, which since its start in 2002 has provided Georgia with a
capable, well-trained and equipped army. Russian analysts fear that
this soon will be the case with Azerbaijan as well, thus depriving
Russia of all its means of influencing Azerbaijan.

U.S. military cooperation in the South Caucasus and the Caspian seems
to evolve smoothly. Although the United States gives the impression
of being reluctant to make its military presence and activities
public, it is clear that it is effectively defending its interests in
the region, including its energy security. In addition to U.S.
military support, Azerbaijan’s increasing defense budget will also
contribute to strengthening its military power. The question remains
whether the United States will be able to convince other states, such
as Kazakhstan, to join this military cooperation.

Russia has shown it is seriously interested in preserving its
regional authority with its Caspian Flotilla. Yet with a growing U.S.
presence, it will need to form alliances. A Russian-led CASFOR
maritime force, including other littoral states in addition to Iran,
still seems far in the future. A cause of potential conflict is the
unclear legal status of the Caspian. So far, the littoral states have
not reached an agreement on dividing the Caspian Sea. Near armed
clashes have already occurred between Azerbaijan and Iran over
disputed oil fields. Tensions are likely to continue as long as the
legal situation of the Caspian Sea remains in dispute. Because of the
geostrategic and economic interests at stake, and an apparent failure
to come to a consensus from both sides, the competition between
Russia and the United States in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea is
likely to be prolonged in the years ahead.

A Comprehensive Role for the E.U. in Conflict Resolution

The separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia form a hindrance
for further integration of Georgia into the Western architecture.
Although Georgia is eager to see the Russian peacekeepers withdrawn,
conversely Russia is keen to continue its presence to maintain
influence in Georgia. Nor will Russia accept its forces to be
replaced by those of N.A.T.O. in the separatist areas, which is
another objective of the Georgian government.

Recent statements by the European Union display a more active policy
in the South Caucasus. The European Union has the reputation of an
"honest broker" and as having a wide scope of instruments for
achieving peace and stability. Conversion of statements into an
active security policy could be established by forming a military
mission to be deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not to replace
the Russian peacekeepers, but as an additional asset to promote
stability and reconstruction. Such a mission would be beneficial for
the stature of the European Union, to prove that it is capable of
conducting crisis management missions. Furthermore, this would adhere
to the call of the Georgian government to introduce Western
peacekeepers in the disputed areas.

Russia may oppose a competitive peacekeeping force, but it will have
a difficult time openly disapproving of such an E.U. mission since it
wants to maintain good relations with the European body and also
because it has no grounds to feel threatened by E.U. peacekeepers. A
possible E.U. military mission to the separatist areas should be part
of a larger E.U. operation, using its social and economic instruments
as well for stability and reconstruction. Such an approach would
strengthen a normal economic build-up and thus be detrimental toward
the largely illegal economic structures of the current leadership of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With such an encompassing program, the
separatist regions could gradually develop into stable societies,
which would also be beneficial for their position toward the Georgian
government.

Likewise, taking into account the fact that the O.S.C.E.’s long-time
negotiations to reach a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh have been in
vain, the European Union could also pursue an encompassing action
program on this conflict. Here, as well, the deployment of an E.U.
military mission, together with social and economic measures to
encourage development of state and society, could bring a political
solution closer. Moreover, a stabilized South Caucasus would also be
advantageous for structural energy supplies from Central Asia via the
South Caucasus to Europe. Therefore, political and economic
objectives could be united.

A Joint Effort of N.A.T.O. and the E.U. in the South Caucasus

Moving past their reluctant attitude in the 1990s, in the 21st
century the alliance and the union have started to pursue a much more
active policy toward the South Caucasus. The reasons for the change
in attitude of N.A.T.O. and the E.U. are found in a corresponding
U.S. agenda, which even earlier started to follow a proactive course
in this region. For the European countries, the issue of energy
security has resulted in more attention for the South Caucasus due to
rising prices, increasing scarcity and uncertainty of energy
deliveries. Although the entrance of Georgia into N.A.T.O. — and
subsequently Azerbaijan and perhaps Armenia as well — might still
take some years, it is probable that the relationship between
N.A.T.O. and the South Caucasian states will further deepen, with
Georgia taking the lead. Similarly, increased ties between the South
Caucasian states and the E.U. can also be expected, although
membership of the E.U. for them seems further away than that of
N.A.T.O., due to the enlargement fatigue within the E.U.

Although formally denied, there is reason to believe that N.A.T.O.
has, or will have, a role in pipeline security in the South Caucasus,
for clear geostrategic reasons. The E.U. is also likely to build up
its activities in the South Caucasus, especially in energy
infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, and probably also
conflict solution — for which it has a more independent reputation
than does N.A.T.O. Consequently, N.A.T.O. and the E.U. will share an
upcoming long-lasting involvement in the region, which, by
establishing a labor division in their best fields of expertise, may
be able to bring security and prosperity to the South Caucasus.

Synergy of Military and Energy Instruments of Security Policy

Considering that the military power of the U.S., N.A.T.O., Russia and
the C.S.T.O. and the regional maritime task forces are assigned to
energy security in this region, the conclusion seems valid that in
the near future the combination of military and energy will
constitute the major instruments of power in the South Caucasus.
Because of the growing importance of energy resources, a further
intertwining of these two policy tools can be expected, not only
around the South Caucasus, but elsewhere in the world as well. This
is in contrast with the thinking that the military instrument has
been replaced by the economic (energy) instrument. Therefore,
countries and organizations will need to have a well-considered
build-up and coordination of their military and energy instruments in
order to conduct a successful security policy.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Marcel de Haas

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.
PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may
not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to
[email protected].

Two films, two journeys

New Anatolian, Turkey
Dec 15 2006

Two films, two journeys

Author: Bill Meyer
People’s Weekly World Newspaper, 12/14/06 16:56

Movie Review

Director Robert Guédiguian ()

A few years ago, the entire life’s work of French communist director
Robert Guédiguian was screened in a retrospective tribute at the
Toronto International Film Festival.

Guédiguian is unique in that he has chosen the setting of Marseilles
for all his films, using the same principal actors in varying roles.
This creates an amazing and intriguing sense of continuity, even
though the themes and stories are extremely different from one film
to the next.

It isn’t surprising that his films are relatively unknown in the
United States. Choosing social themes that are based on knowledge of
class struggle, American imperialism and progressive politics, he
makes films that have limited commercial appeal to the Western media.

This year, for the first time, Guédiguian has ventured outside
Marseilles for a story about Armenia.

It’s a touching, thought-provoking drama about a French woman doctor
who has had little connection with her immigrant Armenian father, who
is suffering from heart problems. Rather than undergo surgery, he
slips away from her to his homeland to conclude his life. Her concern
takes her to a country she knows little about, a culture and a
history she has avoided most of her life.

His reasoning for returning home is beyond her understanding. But the
film makes a dramatic statement about the Armenian condition and the
emotions that draw people back to their place of birth. The film
`Voyage to Armenia’ is not only about the trip to a country, but the
journey one makes in life to discover true meaning and love for
people and their culture.

Since this film probably won’t be available for quite a while, you
can get a taste of a Guédiguian masterpiece by renting the available
DVD `Marius and Jeanette.’

In a revealing film about terrorism of the 1970s variety, Hans
Joachim-Klein tells his amazing tale. `My Life as a Terrorist’
follows the life of a member of the German radical left who joined up
with the infamous Carlos the Jackal and became involved in the 1975
plot to kidnap oil ministers in Vienna. The plot went awry and
resulted in the death of three captives.

The film points to Libya as having been implicated in the plot.
Through a process of negotiations with the authorities – including
the fact that he wasn’t one of the actual killers – Joachim-Klein
served a minimum sentence. After his release he went into hiding for
many years.

Joachim-Klein’s testimony decries the senseless violence adopted by
the radical left fringe of that era, and concludes, `From a moral
perspective, these groups had completely hit rock bottom.’

The soft-spoken Klein, the child of a troubled working-class family,
shows remorse for his involvement and makes a sincere effort at
trying to explain what drove some leftists to the extremes. As he
retraces critical moments and places in his life in an almost
cathartic way, the audience begins to share his newfound tranquility.

iew/10310/1/351

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.pww.org/article/articlev
www.diaphana.fr

Isfahan’s Armenians cast their votes

IRNA, Iran
Dec 15 2006

Isfahan’s Armenians cast their votes
Isfahan, Dec 15, IRNA

Isfahani Armenian like other citizens cast their votes in Friday
elections in Iran.

The Isfahani Armenians in all revolutionary stages and events of the
country have had an active participation and they have also dedicated
a number of martyrs and war disabled during imposed war.

The Armenians, like other religious minorities living in the Isfahan
province, have always had an active participation in the elections to
determine their country’s fate.

Around 8,000 Christians live in Isfahan province.

Iranian Armenians have a deputy in the majlis (Parliament).