BAKU: Report on Armenia’s PACE commitments discussed

Report on Armenia’s PACE commitments discussed

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Jan 24 2007

[ 24 Jan. 2007 14:02 ]

The discussion of 11117th report on honoring of obligations and
commitments was discussed in the plenary meeting of PACE yesterday,
APA correspondent in Strasbourg reports.

The report worked out by PACE Monitoring Committee co-rapporteurs on
Armenian Georges Colombier, Mikko Elo was discussed in the meeting.

35 parliamentarians took part in the discussion as it was 30 minutes
left to the end of the meeting. Georges Colombier began his statement
with the positive points of the ongoing processes in Armenia. He
noted that necessary conditions were created for Armenia to fulfill
its commitments in the field of human rights, democratic development
and legislation. He highly estimated holding elections to Irevan
Major’s Office, the possibility of appealing to Constitution Court
and establishment of Commissioner Institute on Human Rights. The
co-rapporteur also noted that there are problems in election system and
forging of the results of referendums on constitution. He mentioned
that there is no mechanism in the country to punish the ones who
falsify the results of the elections and it put the results under
doubt. Generally, French parliamentarian did not utter any serious
shortcomings. Other co-rapporteur Mikko Elo made his speech wholly on
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. He estimated the conflict as the biggest
obstacle for the peace and stability in the region.

"But we did not stand on this issue in our report. Sub-committee
on Nagorno Karabakh have assigned on this purpose. The meeting of
the presidents held on November 28 last year justified hopes for the
settlement of the conflict. The settlement of the conflict serves the
interests of both sides. PACE with the assistance of Sub-committee
on Nagorno Karabakh will try to help to negotiations processes. We
will support the continuation of dialogue between the countries on
the level of parliaments as well as with Karabakh people.

As the discussions began late, out of 20 men registered in the
list, 7 made speech. Three of them were parliamentarians of Armenian
Parliament and one was the member of French parliament, pro-armenian
Fransua Roshebloun. Though 5 members of the Azerbaijani delegation
were included in the list, they were not given the floor. Only
Armen Roustamyan, Armenian parliamentarian touched upon Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. He said that Armenia’s position on Nagorno Karabakh
coincides with the commitments presented in the CE documents. He blamed
Azerbaijan for frustrating the process of negotiations and mentioned
the importance of Nagorno Karabakh’s participation in the dialogues.

"Azerbaijan’s position on this problem is obvious, they want to
possess Karabakh, which was once presented to them by Stalin," he said.

Other speeches were mostly devoted to the processes ongoing in
Armenia. Armenia proposed only three amendments to the resolution
and these amendments were accepted. The draft resolution was approved
32-1 with 2 abstaining. APA correspondent in Strasbourg said that the
members of the Azerbaijani delegation were generally dissatisfied
with the discussions. Member of the Azerbaijani delegation Rafael
Huseynov considers that the meeting more resembled meeting of Armenian
parliament, rather than of the PACE.

"The time, content and process of the discussions were organized so
that it more resembled the meeting of Armenian parliament. No one
from the Azerbaijani delegation was given the floor. I am sure that
it happened under the influence of Armenian lobby and forces connected
with the Armenian delegation. Chronologically, we were to make speech
first. Two days before the assembly I looked through the list in the
APCE secretariat, my name was the first in the list. But later, only
Roustamyan, Torosyan, Demirchiyan and pro-armenian parliamentarian
from France Roshebloun made speech. It was planned. I openly accuse
the CE secretariat and we will present written accusation to the
CE. Besides, only 40 minutes were allotted for the discussion of
the very important issue. Actually, the meeting resembled Armenian
parliament and Armenia’s commitments were not discussed, but the
discussions were imitated," he said. /APA/

NY vigil for slain Turk

N.Y. VIGIL FOR SLAIN TURK
By NILES LATHEM

New York Post, NY
Jan 24 2007

January 24, 2007 — Hundreds of ethnic Armenians gathered in Midtown
near the Turkish Consulate last night for a candlelight vigil for
Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, whose assassination last week sparked
world protest.

"We don’t want to shout and scream and protest. We want to honor him
and his work," said Leon Temiz, an Armenian community activist who
knew Dink.

Dink, 52, was gunned down Friday outside the Istanbul offices of his
newspaper, Agos. His funeral yesterday drew thousands to Istanbul.

It is widely believed that he was targeted because of his columns
discussing the slaughter of Armenians at the hand of the Turks in
the early 20th century – a tragedy which Dink, an ethnic Armenian,
called "genocide."

ANKARA: Mesrob II weeps at mass for Dink

Mesrob II weeps at mass for Dink

Hurriyet, Turkey
Jan 24 2007

The funeral mass for slain journalist Hrant Dink yesterday at the
Armenian Church of the Virgin Mary was led by the Archbishop Sahan
Sivaciyan, with words also spoken by Patriarch Mesrob II, who was so
moved by tears that he had a difficult time speaking.

The Ankara government was represented at the mass by Deputy Prime
Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin and Interior Minister Abdulkadir Aksu,
as well as many MPs from the Turkish Parliament. With officials and
citizens coming from all over the world to join in the march before
Dink’s funeral, as well as to attend the mass, it was clear that
the journalist’s death had touched a wide variety of walks of life
and beliefs.

TBILISI: Armenia sends mixed signals on new rail link

The Messenger, Georgia
Jan 24 2007

Armenia sends mixed signals on new rail link
By Christina Tashkevich

The Akhalkalaki – Tbilisi section
of the railway will have to be
completely rehabilitated

Armenia is ready to open its border with Turkey and has softened its
line on the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railway project, a leading
Armenian official said last Thursday.

"There are certain problems, because Armenia and Turkey have no
diplomatic relations," Armenian deputy foreign minister Ghegam
Gharibjanyan said. "Armenia is ready to open its border with Turkey,
and is ready for counter-proposals [to its stance on the new
railway]."

The diplomat added Armenia is also ready to join the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi railway project, but reaffirmed Armenia’s
position.

"We already have the Kars-Gyumri-Akhalkalaki railway, which has not
been used since the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the countries
in the region gained independence," he said. "If the border between
Armenia and Turkey is opened, the railway could be opened practically
the following day." The border between Turkey and Armenia has been
closed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eruption of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in which Turkey supports Azerbaijan.
Turkey and Armenia do not have diplomatic relations with one-another.

The deputy minister says that cooperation between all countries in
the region would add to the security of the South Caucasus.

Earlier in January another Deputy Foreign Minister Aram Kirakosyan
reaffirmed Yerevan’s desire to establish diplomatic relations and
reopen the land border with Turkey. He called for Turkey to "abandon
its policy of excluding Armenia from regional projects."

Kirakosyan says the re-establishment of the Kars-Gyumri railway is a
necessity for Armenia and the region, claiming it will encourage the
turnover of goods across the region.

The head of the board of directors of Analytical Center on
Globalization and Regional Cooperation, Stepan Grigoryan, thinks that
from the economic point of view the Kars-Gyumri route is more
acceptable, as the line already exists and does not need serious
investment.

"[Trying to activate Kars-Gyumri] Armenia should work on
normalization of relations with opponents: Turkey and Armenia are not
ready to do that without preliminary conditions, also Armenian and
Azeri governments have no readiness to quickly settle Karabakh
conflict," he said.

Azeri expert Ilgar Nur thinks that the proposal to use the existing
line of Kars-Gyumri and therefore not to construct Kars-Akhalkalaki
line is unreal.

"Armenia could have proposed with the same success another existing
route: Kars-Gyumri-Yerevan-Baku, which is not working for obvious
reasons. The position of Baku is that Azerbaijan would not
participate in any joint economic projects until the occupied
territories [Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas] are liberated," he
told Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Just before Armenian officials made their statements, US diplomat
Matthew Bryza requested Armenia become involved in the
Kars-Akhalkalaki trunk-railway project.

"Of course, we would like the railway, which connects Turkey with
Baku, to pass through Armenia, though if Azerbaijan, Turkey and
Georgia want to construct a railway, of course, we cannot object. But
we do not particularly support that project," he said.

Chief of the Georgian Railway, Irakli Ezugbaia, went to Baku on
January 23 to discuss the technical details of the
Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi project, while the meeting of foreign
affairs ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow was also
scheduled on January 23.

ANKARA: Turkey embraces the memory of Hrant Dink; hundreds of thousa

Turkey embraces the memory of Hrant Dink; hundreds of thousands march

Hurriyet, Turkey
Jan 24 2007

52 year old journalist Hrant Dink, who was gunned down as he left his
newspaper’s offices in Sisli last Friday afternoon, was accompanied
by tens of thousands of people and a cloud of white pigeons on his
last journey through the streets of Istanbul yesterday.

Mourners gathered from the early morning Tuesday in front of the Agos
newspaper offices in Sisli, amassing to leave candles and flowers
around the portraits of Dink in front of the building, and later to
hear the words spoken by the slain journalist’s wife, Rakel Dink.

Reading a letter she had entitled "A Letter to my Lover," Rakel
Dink addressed Hrant, saying "You have left those you love. You have
departed from your children, your grandchildren, those who are here
to say farewell to you, my embrace. But you have not departed from
your country." Standing behind Rakel Dink were the couple’s children,
Sera, Ararat, and Delal.

Following the 11.00 ceremony for Dink at the Agos offices, the long
slow cortege of perhaps one or even two hundred thousand people began
was to be the 8 kilometer march behind the hearse carrying Dink’s
coffin. The path taken by the marchers wound its way from Sisli through
Taksim, eventually winding up at the Balikli Armenian cemetary, and
taking those participating hours to complete. The crowds walking behind
the hearse were mostly silent, some carrying large posters and small
signs saying "We are all Hrant Dink," or "We are all Armenian." While
many of the signs were in Turkish, a significant number were also in
Armenian and Kurdish, as the show of support in Dink’s memory brought
together a wide spectrum of different ethnic and religious groups.

The religious services for Dink took place yesterday at 14.00 at
the Armenian Church of the Virgin Mary, across the street from the
Armenian Patriarchate in Kumkapi. The journalist was then buried by
family and friends and numerous supporters at the Balikli Armenian
cemetary in Zeytinburnu.

ANKARA: PM Erdogan to visit Dink family home today

PM Erdogan to visit Dink family home today

Hurriyet, Turkey
Jan 24 2007

Though Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, due to his pre-determined
program that included hosting Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi,
was not able to attend funeral services for slain journalist Hrant
Dink, the Ankara prime ministerial offices have confirmed that the
leader will visit the Dink family at their home in Istanbul today to
convey his condolences.

Following a visit with the Dink family in their home in Bakirkoy,
Prime Minister Erdogan will also be visiting with Armenian Patriarch
Mesrob II to speak about the journalist’s death.

Building a Black Sea/Caspian Natural Gas Bridge

BUILDING A BLACK SEA/CASPIAN NATURAL GAS BRIDGE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
By Mamuka Tsereteli

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Jan 24 2007

articleid=4682

Developments in 2006 and notably the recent Russian-Belarusian crisis
proved that energy is consolidating its position as Europe’s long-term
security challenge. Different countries are facing different types
of challenges, however. With diversified supplies of natural gas and
access to alternative energy resources, leading European states feel
less vulnerable to potential Russian pressure.

Unlike France, Germany or Italy, East European states have no
alternative to Russian gas, while Gazprom’s constant problems with
transit countries and producers in Central Asia make them increasingly
vulnerable. Eastern Europe hence needs alternative supply of natural
gas. This demand could support long-term purchase contracts with
Caspian suppliers via the Black Sea, making the development of new
transportation infrastructure possible.

BACKGROUND: After gaining full control over Armenia’s pipeline network
and the Moldovan distribution network, as well as partial control
over the Belarusian transit pipelines, Russia’s State-controlled
gas monopoly, Gazprom, is getting closer to its ultimate goal to
control all pipelines connecting the former Soviet Union’s states
to other markets and potential suppliers. The same strategy is now
being applied to Europe.

Russia is the primary source for imported natural gas in most European
states, and its role is set to increase in next decade, despite a
potential shortage of the gas on the domestic market. In order to
secure supplies, in recent months the leading European states and their
government-supported energy companies – a frequently underestimated
force in European energy politics – concluded bilateral deals with
Russia’s Gazprom on long-term energy supplies. The deal between the
Russian and French gas monopolies, Gazprom and Gaz de France (GdF)
on the supply of Russian gas is the latest in a row of bilateral
deals between Gazprom and major European consumer states. The deal
establishes Gazprom’s strong position in a major market and guarantees
GdF sizeable supplies of gas for 24 years in return for giving the
Russian company a slice of the French distribution market. Earlier,
Gazprom concluded similar deals with German and Italian companies.

These bilateral agreements weakened potential for EU’s common strategy
towards Russian energy, and regarding energy security in general. On
the contrary, it strengthened Gazprom’s position tremendously. Gazprom
has very clear strategy: to obtain strong dominance over natural gas
supply and distribution networks in Europe. So far, implementation
of this strategy is brilliant. By obtaining control over the transit
infrastructure in transit countries, Russia limits access to markets
for other potential suppliers, and by obtaining the distribution
business, it limits the ability of importing countries to conclude
long-term gas purchase agreements with other producers. Without those
agreements, the development of new transportation infrastructure is
commercially impossible.

IMPLICATIONS: There is enough gas in the neighborhood of Europe;
but the problem is delivery infrastructure. The particular problem
is delivery to Central and Eastern European states, where access to
gas supplies from Northern Europe, Algeria or Central Asia is limited.

The existing pipeline network connects those states only to Russian
gas sources, and – only through Gazprom pipelines – to Central Asian
gas. The potential to get access to Azerbaijani gas through Turkey via
the so-called Nabucco pipeline, stretching from Turkey to Austria’s
Baumgarten terminal via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary is still present,
although Russia is trying hard to close the only remaining window
for alternative gas by supplying additional volumes to Turkey via
the Blue Stream pipeline. This would effectively flood the market,
thus preventing the entry of Caspian gas into the link from Turkey
to Austria.

Despite that effort, the recent history of disruptions in supply,
and the rising price of Russian gas elsewhere in the region pushes
Central and Eastern European states to seek alternative supplies based
on commercially viable solutions. In this context, the development
of transportation infrastructure connecting Central Asia to Central
Europe is the key to resolving this problem. The aggregate demand of
the Central and Eastern European countries for import exceeds 100
billion cubic meters, and may well grow in the future. A long-term
purchase agreement with Caspian, in the first place Azerbaijani but
in the longer term also Central Asian producers, could initiate the
development of the basic infrastructure, which consequently could
evolve into a strategic supply line for Eastern Europe.

The South Caucasus Pipeline connecting the Azerbaijani Shah-Deniz
natural gas field to Turkey via Georgia, and then to South-East and
Central Europe, is the key priority. Shah-Deniz will produce up to
30 bcm, a significant amount, but one that could be compounded by
Kazakhstani or Turkmenistani resources to generate the volume needed
to make large-scale pipeline construction commercially viable.

In this sense, the South Caucasus pipeline could be connected to the
Georgian Black Sea cost, and then through an underwater pipeline to the
western shores of the Black Sea, from where additional inter-connectors
could transport gas to Central and Eastern Europe via existing pipeline
networks. There are two options to end the pipeline: One in Ukraine,
and another in Romania. Both options can co-exist and complement
each other.

The destinations may look too distant and economically not viable.

But the case of the North Stream pipeline may set a positive
precedent. North Stream is a planned 1200-kilometre-long off-shore
natural gas pipeline stretching through the Baltic Sea, from Vyborg,
Russia to Greifswald, Germany. It will have two on-shore connections
from Geifswald to the south and west of Germany with a total length
of 850 km, and one 917-kilometre-long on-shore connection to bring
gas from the Russian system to Vyborg. The commercial viability of
the North Stream is not in question for Western European companies,
given the significant quantities involved.

The undersea pipeline in the Black Sea would be shorter, and requires
less additional infrastructure to be connected to markets. Over the
years, Azerbaijan and Georgia proved to be a reliable supplier and
transit country, respectively, while NATO and EU member Romania could
use existing pipeline network to connect natural gas to consumer
countries. Technical and environmental challenges also seem much
less problematic.

A more remote option would be to develop liquefaction facilities on
the Georgian Black Sea shore, and to ship LNG to Romania and Bulgaria,
where it could be degasified and fed into the pipeline system. A fleet
of LNG tankers may build a strong and reliable energy connection
between the two shores of the Black Sea. Developing technology and
the reduction of infrastructure cost may support this solution.

CONCLUSIONS: It would be natural for the EU to lead the process of
developing the Caspian-European Natural Gas Bridge. This is a unique
chance to show leadership and prove that the EU is capable of securing
alternative energy supply for Europe by working with producer, transit
and consumer countries. The United States would also benefit from
committing resources and assisting countries of Eastern Europe to
sign long term supply contracts with Caspian producers, which will
be the basis for the development of the gas fields and transport
infrastructure. This will cement the relationship between the Black
Sea/Caspian region and the EU and would help their Euro-Atlantic
integration. In case the EU is passive and fails to organize itself to
support a Caspian-Black Sea energy bridge, the U.S. may help interested
Eastern European states to form a Consortium of Gas Importing States
to lead the infrastructure development.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Mamuka Tsereteli is the Executive Director of the
America-Georgia Business Council. He also teaches at George Washington
and American Universities in Washington D.C.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?

Azerbaijan & Europe: Toward closer integration?

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, DC
Jan 24 2007

AZERBAIJAN AND EUROPE: TOWARD CLOSER INTEGRATION?

Fariz Ismailzade

e.php?articleid=4681

Azerbaijan’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures is going
much slower than in Georgia’s case, mainly due to fear of Russia
and Iran. Yet the Azerbaijani government seems to have decided the
opportunity has come to turn words into action and seriously knock
at Europe’s doors. The time is perfect, considering the tensions
between Russia and Azerbaijan over gas prices. If Azerbaijan does
not shift its foreign policy, EU will not help, as it’s interest
into Azerbaijan is determined exactly by the degree of the latter’s
interest in the EU. Seeking and obtaining EU and NATO membership is
the only real chance for Azerbaijan to achieve political stability
and economic prosperity and resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The chance should not be missed.

BACKGROUND: In December, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev
traveled to Brussels to meet with EU and NATO officials, and to
sign the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) agreement between the
EU and Azerbaijan. This agreement has started a new chapter and is
aimed at further deepening relations between Azerbaijan and the EU
and the integration of the country into European structures. Similar
agreements have been signed with Armenia and Georgia, and Azerbaijan’s
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO is already under
implementation. President Aliyev also signed with EU officials an
agreement about the export of Azerbaijani gas from the Shah-Deniz
field to the European markets.

It seems that Azerbaijan is slowly but steadily moving towards closer
relations with EU structures, and is fully intending to deepen its
integration with the EU, even up to the level of seeking NATO and EU
membership down the road.

Yet experts in Baku, familiar with both IPAP and ENP, believe
that both documents contain only symbolical activities, that do
not in real practice deepen the integration of Azerbaijan into
European institutions. They explain this with the reluctance of
the Azerbaijani government to conduct the kind of real political
and economic reforms that are a requirement for any move toward the
prospect of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus delays in
Azerbaijani’s integration with Europe is caused by a desire by strong
forces among the authorities to perpetuate the domestic status quo.

Azerbaijani government representatives, meanwhile, take a rather
careful approach to the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration, and claim
that Azerbaijan is making real steps towards it but within the frames
of the "balanced foreign policy" that Baku officially pursues. At
the moment, Azerbaijan indeed enjoys warm relations both with the
West and Russia and Iran, thus trying to satisfy the interests of
all regional powers. Unlike neighboring Georgia, Azerbaijan does not
make strong statements towards EU and NATO integration and tries not
to anger the Kremlin.

Yet lately, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have entered a difficult
period mainly due to competition on the gas markets and the eviction
of Azerbaijani labor migrants from Russia. Gazprom and RAO-EES
have increased export prices of Russian gas and electricity to
Azerbaijan, and sharply reduced volumes to be shipped. Baku responded
by threatening to stop the usage of the Russian pipeline for the
export of Azerbaijani crude oil, to increase the price for the Gabala
Radio Station, currently leased by the Russian Ministry of Defense,
and to shut down Russian TV stations in the country.

IMPLICATIONS: The consequences of the fallout in Russian-Azerbaijani
relations are likely to be a strong shift in Azerbaijan’s foreign
policy, towards the EU. This is a unique opportunity, occurring at
an opportune moment, and which will test the skills and determination
of both Azerbaijani and European policy-makers.

As Azerbaijan starts extracting its own offshore natural gas fields in
2007, it will gradually grow much more independent from Russia than
has ever been the case. By supplying gas to Georgia, Baku will also
contribute to saving its neighbor and strategic partner from Russian
pressures. Together, they can pave a new path of integration towards
Euro-Atlantic structures.

Yet, in order for that to happen, Azerbaijani officials need to learn
from their Georgian counterparts on tactics to build solid and deep
relations with the EU and NATO, and alter their own course of action.

Slow, symbolic steps towards Europe do not produce real and effective
results for Azerbaijan’s integration into the EU. The myth that the
EU needs Azerbaijan more than the other way around, which is present
in Baku, is neither helpful nor correct. The EU, preoccupied with
its internal problems and the digestion of already admitted members,
is certainly not considering another round of enlargement. Neither
does NATO. Azerbaijani officials and public are mistakenly thinking
that the integration of Georgia into EU and NATO will inevitably draw
both Azerbaijan and Armenia into the same path. Yet, the experience
of Cyprus shows the opposite: while the Greek part of the island
was admitted into EU, the Turkish part remained effectively outside
the club.

In order to put Azerbaijan into the radar screen of EU and NATO
officials, it is Baku that will have to take action and not the other
way. This entails passing through the same path that Poland, Hungary
and other East European countries took in 1990s -knocking at the EU’s
doors, raising interest in Azerbaijan, actively seeking partnership
and cooperation, and more importantly, conducting genuine political
and economic reforms at home. The most important areas of reforms
include reform of police force, economic monopolies, and not least
the judicial system and the courts.

Words that are not followed with actions produce what one
Brussels-based analyst termed the "Kuchma effect", referring to a
situation where EU officials do not see real actions behind the words
of a government, thereby raising doubts regarding their interest in
integration into the EU.

In this context, another important strategic shift can be observed,
which lies in the sphere of marketing. The semantics of the EU
integration of the South Caucasus is gradually being changed from the
"South Caucasus’ integration into EU" to "the Black Sea region’s
integration into EU". To EU officials, the latter concept appears
much warmer, closer and more important than the former, associated
mainly with trouble in the form of conflict and corruption.

EU officials have repeatedly stated that their level of interest
and cooperation with Azerbaijan is determined and developed by the
policies of Azerbaijan itself. The more Azerbaijani authorities pursue
European integration, the closer and more realistic it will be.

Without greater commitment to reform, Azerbaijan will in spite of
its energy resources not be able to move closer to Europe. As such,
it would continue to persist in a position of limbo between competing
regional powers. Only European integration will in the long term
guarantee political stability at home, and economic development and
prosperity in the region. Moreover, it will drastically increase the
chances for a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

CONCLUSIONS: The time seems ripe for the Azerbaijani government
to shift gears and take more active steps towards Euro-Atlantic
integration. As the government appears increasingly inclined to do so,
the opportunity is better than ever. President Aliyev and his party is
unchallenged in the country, and this foreign policy move is unlikely
to face domestic resistance. Internationally, Azerbaijan is becoming
more secure, and its independence and sovereignty are consolidated, in
spite of renewed Russian pressures. Finally, the Georgian experience
shows that in reality there is not much Russia can do to prevent the
integration of the South Caucasus into the EU.

It is now up to Azerbaijan’s leaders to close the gap with Georgia.

Otherwise, Georgia is likely to move toward closer integration with
the EU and NATO, while Azerbaijan and Armenia could continue to remain
bogged down in domestic stagnation and ethnic-territorial conflict. In
this context, the renewed strong interest in Azerbaijan in Tbilisi is a
welcome development. President Saakashvili and his close advisors seem
increasingly aware of the need to embrace Azerbaijan and support its
efforts to develop ties with the West. In this context, the prospect
of stronger Georgian-Azerbaijani cooperation vis-Ã -vis Europe could
turn into a major development of 2007.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a Baku-based freelance writer.

–Boundary_(ID_ZaVXiOe1AJ+/NoSoS51WeA)–

http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_articl

Mourners flood Istanbul for ethnic Armenian editor

Mourners flood Istanbul for ethnic Armenian editor

Globe and Mail, Canada
Jan 24 2007

Istanbul — More than 100,000 mourners choked the streets of Istanbul
yesterday for the funeral of an ethnic Armenian journalist whose
slaying sparked debate about freedom of expression and whether Turks
of different backgrounds can live together.

"We are all Armenians!" mourners chanted in an extraordinary
outpouring of affection for editor Hrant Dink, who had made enemies
among nationalist Turks by labelling the mass killings of Armenians
as genocide.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

UT community mourns journalist slain in Turkey

UT The Daily Texan, TX
Jan 24 2007

UT community mourns journalist slain in Turkey
Death threats began after conviction for insulting Turkishness

By Lindsey Mullikin

Mourners were given red carnations and copies of Armenian journalist
Hrant Dink’s last article as they entered the memorial service held
for him in the Sinclair Suite at the Texas Union last night. Dink
was shot to death in Turkey on Jan. 19, 2007.

Various University organizations sponsored the memorial service,
including the Armenian Cultural Association.

Students were invited to share the importance Dink’s work had in
their lives.

"It was one of the last things I expected to happen in my country,"
remarked graduate student Emrah Zarifoglu. "He was always talking
about unity."

Dink was the editor of an Armenian-Turkish publication, Agos.
Actively involved in the furtherance of democratization in Turkey,
he utilized his paper to help unify the Armenian and Turkish peoples
by bridging communication gaps between the two cultures.

Over time, however, tensions began to rise between Dink and the
Turkish community. In May 2006, he was charged by the Turkish court
with "insulting Turkishness."

After being convicted, matters got worse for Dink. In a later interview
with The Associated Press, Dink revealed that he had been receiving
numerous threatening messages. In what was to be his last article
in Agos, the journalist expressed severe concerns for his personal
safety. The day that article was published, he was assassinated
outside of his newspaper’s office building.

The response to his death has been overwhelming. Yesterday in Turkey,
more than 100,000 citizens paid tribute to the journalist by marching
five miles. At the University of Texas, students celebrated the life
that Dink led.

"He was a voice of freedom and unity," said Taleen Asadourian, Plan
II senior and president of the Armenian Cultural Association. She
and others were glad that representatives from the Turkish University
Students Association and Armenian Cultural Association attended the
vigil. "It’s symbolic to bring these groups together who historically
haven’t been," she said. Nearly all in attendance agreed.

Dink was only 53 when he died, but his dream of unification will
perhaps continue for generations to come.