Turkey Replaces The EU With A Return To The Middle East

TURKEY REPLACES THE EU WITH A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST
By Soli Ozel

Daily Star – Lebanon
March 5 2007

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave the cue for Turkey’s foreign
policy priorities in this dual election year (first presidential
then general elections) when he declared that Iraq had replaced the
European Union as Turkey’s top priority item. The statement certainly
reflected the legitimate concerns of most observers who assess that
this year could be the defining one for the future of Iraq.

Turkey has felt all the repercussions of developments in Iraq since
even before the beginning of the war. Jealously status-quo-oriented,
the Turkish elites and populace alike opposed the war from its
inception, fearing the potentially revolutionary consequences.

Although negotiations were held with the United States prior to the
war and an understanding was reached on modalities for cooperation,
ultimately Parliament denied the US permission to deploy troops in
Turkey and open a northern front. Since then, US-Turkish relations,
particularly military-to-military ties, have been rocky though never
fatally damaged.

Today, having seen many of its most dire predictions come true, Ankara
is deeply concerned that Iraq’s descent into a brutal sectarian civil
war with seemingly inexhaustible reserves of violence threatens the
stability of the entire region. In addition, as with its neighbors
Syria and Iran, the prospect of an independent Kurdistan deeply
troubles the authorities and the non-Kurdish public alike.

At the same time, Ankara is concerned with other developments in the
region such as the instability in Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear
program. And it is equally worried about American policies on these
questions. Hence it tries to maintain a balancing act by staying on
good terms with Iran and Syria while improving relations with the US
and looking for ways for the two allies to limit the damage in Iraq.

It is therefore only natural that the government would divert its
attention and energies toward the Middle East, and particularly Iraq,
this year.

But there was another sense in which Erdogan’s statement could be
interpreted. Arguably the prime minister and his Cabinet lost much
of their appetite for EU-induced reforms as early as the day after
Turkey got a date to start accession negotiations in December 2004.

Those negotiations did begin on time in October 2005, but only after
acrimonious debates within the EU and between Turkey and the union
over Turkey’s obligation to open its ports to Greek Cypriot shipping.

Some EU members tried their best to renege on their promise to
treat Turkey the same way as other candidates. Politicians in member
countries built electoral platforms on Turkey-bashing.

By the end of 2006, then, much if not all of the momentum was lost
in Turkey’s EU bid. The final blow came when EU suspended 8 out of
35 negotiating chapters and effectively put the process on hold,
although technical work still continues and three minor chapters were
opened. That some of the suspended chapters, such as foreign affairs,
had no bearing on the controversial customs union issue with Cyprus
suggest that the latter was at least partially an excuse to delay
Turkey’s accession process.

Such a drifting apart in the relationship was what the nay-sayers in
the EU and the Euro-bashers in Turkey passionately wanted. Just as
anti-Turkish sentiment in EU member countries was on the rise, so was a
rampant, xenophobic, anti-Western nationalism in Turkey. Both Turkey’s
opposition parties and the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party)
decided to cater to nationalist sentiment.

Evidently the AKP’s higher echelons felt that to continue in an
election year with their reformist and liberalizing agenda would be a
losing proposition. They already had the example of Erdogan’s opening
to the Kurds in the summer of 2005, which fractured the party and cost
it dearly in terms of electoral support. Therefore for all practical
purposes, the reformist wave came to an end in 2006; it is unlikely
to pick up until after the general elections.

As a result of this rising nationalism, Turkey was shaken by successive
court cases brought against outspoken intellectuals. These cases
were all related to Article 301 of the penal code that criminalizes
offenses against "Turkishness." Turkey’s Nobel laureate in literature,
Orhan Pamuk, was among those who were tried and assaulted in court
by self-proclaimed guards of national pride. The AKP government
did close to nothing to contain these movements, nor did it change
or rescind 301. Arguably as an indirect result of such a climate –
jointly created by political classes, old elites and a susceptible,
offended and fearful population – a prominent Armenian journalist,
Hrant Dink, was murdered in January.

All these developments, alongside already existing anxiety about the
AKP’s so-called true intentions (read, seeking to advance Islamic
law), raised concerns in the West. Almost no conference relating
to Turkey in the West can be held lately without a panel entitled:
"Are we losing Turkey?" or "Who lost Turkey?"

Yet nationalist outcries notwithstanding, so far there is no indication
that Turkey’s Western orientation has been replaced by an alternative
one. Still, a number of problems present themselves.

First and foremost is the closing of political space in the country
because of the radicalization of nationalist discourse. Second is the
lack of harmonious relations among Turkey’s foreign policy-making
actors, particularly on Iraq. And third, the prime minister’s
aspiration to be elected president has raised tensions in the country,
corroding the government’s relations with the military.

The combination of these three domestic problems fuels nationalist
fever in Turkey. There are calls to attack the PKK inside Iraqi
Kurdistan. There are also calls for militarily intervening to stop the
Iraqi Kurds from taking over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, whose
demography has been drastically altered by the Kurdish authorities.

Just last week, Turkey’s National Security Council put an end to
an acrimonious debate conducted mainly in the media between the
government and military. The council called for appropriate diplomatic
and political moves to solve outstanding problems with the Iraqi
Kurds. The fact that such a decision was reached in the wake of
back-to-back visits by Turkey’s defense and foreign ministers and
chief of the general staff to Washington may also suggest that the
Turkish-American dialogue on the sensitive issues of the PKK and
Kirkuk is healthier than before.

Soli Ozel is a professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi
University and a columnist for the daily Sabah. This commentary first
appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb

Loaning Is Not ADA’s Primary Problem

LOANING IS NOT ADA’s PRIMARY PROBLEM
Norair Hovsepian

Azat Artsakh, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh
March 5 2007

In 2006 Artsakh Development Agency, which implements a program
of assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises, loaned 937.4
million drams to 106 applicants, said Armen Avagian, the director of
ADA. The terms and conditions are same. Instead, there is progress with
regard to collective applications. In 2006 8 collective applications
were met compared with 4 in 2005, although it is not a big number,
especially considering that they included wine growing only. 37.7
percent of loans in 2006 went to Stepanakert, 30 percent Askeran,
17.5 percent to Martuni, the other regions 0.4-6.2 percent.

Armen Avagian says in 2007 the loan program will focus on other
branches as well, namely food processing. However, loaning is not
the only program the agency implements, he said. The director of ADA
underlined the program for fostering exports. Namely, according to
Armen Avagian, the agency helped a few local producers participate in
Armenia Expo 2006 and Pan Armenian Expo 2006 in Yerevan, as well as
Made in Armenia Expo in Toronto, Canada. Besides introducing separate
producers the nature resources and possibilities for tourism in NKR are
presented, he says. In 2006 ADA set up a website with a special page
on the program for fostering export. Another strand in the activities
of ADA is to foster investments. "Having an attractive sphere for
investors is not enough, it is necessary to provide information
to potential investors," says Armen Avagian. As a result of the
information policy, investors from a number of countries have turned
to the agency for more information. "They are interested in banking,
light industry, tourism, and other spheres," said Armen Avagian.

Genocide Denial Trial Raises Many Questions

GENOCIDE DENIAL TRIAL RAISES MANY QUESTIONS

Swissinfo, Switzerland
March 5 2007

The trial of Turkish politician Doðu Perincek, who made comments in
Switzerland denying the 1915 Armenian massacre was genocide, opens
in Lausanne on Tuesday.

The court case, which is centred on Swiss anti-racism legislation,
is set to test the already shaky relations between Bern and Ankara.

A meeting between Swiss Justice Minister Christoph Blocher – an
opponent of the law – and his Turkish counterpart Cemil Cicek in Bern
at the weekend has also raised eyebrows.

Perincek, the head of the Turkish Workers’ Party, stands accused of
racial discrimination after he called the genocide "an international
lie" during a public speech in the city of Lausanne in July 2005.

Under the Swiss penal code any act of denying, belittling or justifying
genocide is a violation of the country’s anti-racism legislation.

Armenians maintain the mass killings in 1915 were genocide, a charge
Turkey disputes.

Experts say the presiding judge at the district court in Lausanne
will have to negotiate some tricky waters concerning both the law
and Swiss-Turkish relations.

Tensions between Bern and Ankara were high in 2005 after Turkey
criticised the Swiss authorities’ decision to investigate Perincek.

It also later cancelled an official trip to Turkey by the then
economics minister, Joseph Deiss.

Law debate

The law itself has been the subject of debate after Blocher announced
during a visit to Turkey last October that the legislation was
incompatible with freedom of expression.

The comments were welcomed by Ankara but caused a storm of protest
in Switzerland.

Blocher has again come in for criticism by the media and some
politicians over the timing of the meeting with his Turkish counterpart
at the weekend. According to the justice ministry bilateral issues –
and not the trial – were discussed.

Legal experts have also raised questions about the law – albeit in
a different context.

"The lawmakers wanted to assimilate the negation of a historical
reality to a racist proclamation. This is controversial, because it
is about two different things," said Robert Roth, dean of the faculty
of law at Geneva University.

Roth believes, however, the central question of the trial will be
another one – who should make a judgement on historical events?

Perincek during his speech in Lausanne (Keystone)

Genocide or massacre?

The Armenians say Ottoman Turks slaughtered up to 1.8 million Armenians
in a planned genocide between 1915 and 1918. Turkey denies the mass
killings were genocide, saying the death toll is inflated.

So far most historians, the Council of Europe, the French parliament
and the Swiss House of Representatives – plus two cantonal parliaments
in Switzerland – have all recognised the events as genocide. The
Swiss government does not officially speak of genocide.

Francesco Bertossa, who was part of the defence team in another Turkish
genocide denial trial in 2001in Bern, believes the definition question
should not influence the verdict.

"The anti-racism law does not only punish genocide denial but also
any crime against humanity," he said.

Swiss-Armenians

For its part, the Swiss-Armenian Association, the private party
associated with the public prosecutor in the trial, welcomes the case.

"We will finally know if denigrating our people and tarnishing our
memory is a crime in Switzerland," said co-president Sarkis Shahinian.

Prosecutor-general Eric Cottier has been quoted as saying that
unless shown to be otherwise, the Armenian genocide was "sufficiently
recognised to be defined as such".

But Perincek remains defiant. Arriving in Switzerland at the weekend
he reiterated his call for the law to be abolished and said he could
prove that genocide did not take place.

A verdict in the trial is expected on Friday.

–Boundary_(ID_FBp2V0yBRecyLV8PJg9kJw)–

Washington Post: The House’s Ottoman Agenda

THE HOUSE’S OTTOMAN AGENDA
By Jackson Diehl

Washington Post
March 5 2007

Can a nonbinding congressional resolution really matter? Most are
ignored by everyone except the special interests they are usually
directed at. Even the House’s recent resolution on Iraq was dismissed
by both President Bush and Democratic antiwar leader John Murtha. Yet a
vote expected next month on a nonbinding House resolution describing a
"genocide" in the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1915 has the potential
to explode U.S. relations with Turkey, sway the outcome of upcoming
Turkish elections and spill over into several other strategic American
interests, including Iraq and Iran.

So, yes: The Armenian Genocide Resolution sponsored by Rep. Adam
Schiff does matter, logically or not. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gul spent several days in Washington last month lobbying against it,
though the Turkish-American agenda is chockablock with seemingly more
important issues. Friends of Turkey in Washington, from American Jewish
organizations to foreign policy satraps, are working the Hill; so is
the Bush team. On the other side is the well-organized and affluent
Armenian American community, 1.4 million strong, and some powerful
friends — including the new House speaker, Nancy Pelosi.

Here is a debate that could occur only in Washington — a bizarre
mix of frivolity and moral seriousness, of constituent pandering,
far-flung history and front-line foreign policy. And that’s just
on the American side; in Turkey there is the painful struggle of a
deeply nationalist society to come to terms with its past, and in
the process become more of the Western democracy it wants to be.

Start with the pandering: Schiff, a Democrat from Los Angeles,
cheerfully concedes that there are 70,000 to 80,000 ethnic Armenians
in his district, for whom the slaughter of Armenians by the Young
Turk regime during World War I is "anything but ancient history."

Local politics also explains why a resolution that has failed numerous
times in the past 20 years is suddenly looking like a juggernaut:
Pelosi, of San Francisco, also has many Armenian supporters.

"There’s a sense of momentum now about the resolution that we haven’t
had before," Schiff told me. "The votes are there in the committee.

The votes are there on the floor." If Pelosi allows the resolution to
be brought up, as she has reportedly pledged to do, it will probably
pass. Its language is almost comically heavy-handed: It begins by
declaring that the House "finds" a series of 30 paragraphs of facts
about the genocide, ranging from the number killed (1.5 million) to
the assertion that "the failure . . . to punish those responsible"
helps explain subsequent atrocities, including the Holocaust.

Imagine the 435 members of the House, many of whom still don’t know
the difference between Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis, solemnly weighing
whether Schiff’s version of events 92 years ago in northeastern
Turkey deserves congressional endorsement. But the consequences of
passage could be deadly serious: To begin with, Turkey’s powerful
military has been hinting that U.S. access to the Incirlik air base,
which plays a key role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, could
be restricted. Gul warned that a nationalist tidal wave could sweep
Turkey and force the government to downgrade its cooperation with the
United States, which needs Turkey’s help this year to stabilize Iraq
and contain Iran. Candidates in upcoming presidential and parliamentary
elections could compete in their anti-American reactions.

No wonder the Bush administration as well as even Democratic-leaning
foreign policy experts, such as Clinton-era ambassador Mark Parris,
are trying to stop the resolution. Yet theirs, too, is a contorted
campaign. After all, historians outside of Turkey are pretty much
unanimous in agreeing that atrocities against Armenians worthy of
the term genocide did occur. Though Congress may look silly with its
"findings," the continuing inability of the Turkish political class
to come to terms with history, and temper its nationalism, may be the
country’s single most serious political problem. Prominent Turkish
intellectuals, including a Nobel Prize winner, have been prosecuted
in recent years under laws criminalizing "insults" to Turkey — such
as accurate accounts of the genocide. In January a prominent ethnic
Armenian journalist was murdered by an ultranationalist teenager.

Maybe Congress has no business debating Turkish history, maybe it is
doing so for the wrong reasons. Yet if Turkey is to become the stable,
Western-oriented democracy that it aspires to be, its politicians
will have to learn, at least, to react the way everyone else does to
nonbinding House resolutions: that is, with a shrug.

nt/article/2007/03/04/AR2007030401047.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte

ANKARA: Ankara To Change Lobbyists In US

ANKARA TO CHANGE LOBBYISTS IN US

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
March 5 2007

The Turkish government has decided to work with a new lobbyist in the
United States to able to better fight the Armenian genocide resolution,
which was introduced in the US House of Representatives in January.

For the last seven years Turkey has been working with The Livingston
Group, a Washington, D.C., public relations and lobbying firm founded
in 1999 by former Republican congressman Robert Livingston.

Taking into consideration the fact that last November the Democrats
won a majority in Congress, Turkey decided to work with a lobbyist
known to be close to the Democrats, DLA Piper.

Turkey’s agreement with The Livingston Group expires as of March 1,
but it will continue working with the firm for another six months
in an attempt to avoid any problems during the changeover period,
Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States Nabi ªensoy told Cihan News
Agency (CHA).

Nevertheless, no deal has been signed yet with DLA Piper. After six
months, Turkey may decide to work only with DLA Piper or work with
both of them, ªensoy also said.

Dick Gephardt, who retired in January 2005 after serving Missouri’s
Third Congressional District for 28 years, is one of senior counsels
working at DLA Piper.

–Boundary_(ID_f1ZbGH6o+FKHf8kJP0GmPQ)–

ANKARA: Patriarch: Dink Murder Still Mystery

PATRIARCH: DINK MURDER STILL MYSTERY

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
March 5 2007

The patriarch of Turkey’s Armenians, Mesrob II, lamented yesterday
that the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink has not
been fully resolved, as mourners gathered at an Ýstanbul church to
commemorate him.

Mourners laid flowers at Hrant Dink’s grave on the 40th day after
his killing.

Dink, the editor of the bilingual Agos daily, was gunned down on Jan.

19 outside his office in downtown Ýstanbul. A 17-year-old suspect,
O.S., was arrested after the murder and confessed to the killing.

Although the unemployed, secondary school graduate O.S. was quickly
captured along with several others believed to be involved in the
killing, public suspicions remained regarding the real motives behind
the murder that shocked Turkey and talk of a shadowy "deep state"
as a potential accomplice in the killing has resurfaced.

Mesrob II, speaking at a ceremony to commemorate Dink on the 40th day
of his death, said shedding full light on the murder would strengthen
the environment of peace in Turkey.

"It is extremely saddening and thought-provoking that the real inciters
of this assassination have not been found over the past 40 days,"
he said at the ceremony at Santa Maria Armenian church in Kumkapý,
Ýstanbul. "Prompt clarification of this murder is essential for the
atmosphere of peace as well as confidence in security institutions."

"This investigation is not going well," said journalist Cengiz Candar,
who was one of the mourners attending the ceremony. "It seems the
authorities will not pursue this determinedly due to the approaching
elections but this means we are heading to a point that poses dangers
for Turkey’s international image and internal peace."

Dink’s widow Rakel, his daughters, novelist Elif Þafak, Þiþli
Mayor Mustafa Sarýgul and journalists Ali Bayramoðlu, Ayþe Unal
and Oral Calýþlar, all attended yesterday’s ceremony. The tradition
commemorating the dead on the 40th day of their death is shared by
Muslim Turks as well.

–Boundary_(ID_KJvWc0lIL+N2X6DX/A321g)–

UN Secretary General And RA Foreign Minister Discuss Issues Relating

UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND RA FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS ISSUES RELATING TO NAGORNO KARABAKH SETTLEMENT

Noyan Tapan News Agency, Armenia
March 5 2007

EREVAN, MARCH 5, NOYAN TAPAN. On March 2, the day of 15th anniversary
of Armenia’s joining UN, RA Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian met with
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon at the UN General Headquarters in
New York.

Congratulating Ban Ki-moon on the occasion of being elected as
UN Secretary General, the Minister said that Armenia efficiently
cooperates with various UN structures in Armenia.

As Noyan Tapan was informed from RA Foreign Ministry Press and
Information Department, V. Oskanian noted that parallel with RA
government’s poverty reduction strategy, a new program is being
elaborated with involvement of international organizations, Diaspora
and country’s internal resources, which will be aimed at liquidation
of rural poverty.

RA Foreign Minister and Secretary General also touched upon the
last developments in the South Caucasian region and the process of
settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Presenting the developments of
the current stage of negotiations, Minister Oskanian emphasized that
the right of Nagorno Karabakh people’s self-determination is their
basis. In this context Minister Oskanian explained that the efforts
aimed at voicing statements not corresponding or contradicting reality
in UN or other instances will damage the process and will postpone
long-lasting settlement.

ANKARA: Turkey And Israel: Windows Opening To Harmony Or A Chaos?

TURKEY AND ISRAEL: WINDOWS OPENING TO HARMONY OR A CHAOS?
Senay Yegin

Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
March 5 2007

1. Introduction:

As globalization is fueled up, the Westphalia Treaty is forgotten
which also mean the decline of nation-states’ importance. Borders are
also like the states but they change meaning. They are protections
but at the same time circles of mine. They are the security but also
the Bermuda triangle. They are lines that bring together but also
separate. Borders are hopeful; borders are disappointments. Borders
are reasons for peace since they are the causes of wars. Turkey having
seven borders, it acts as a country of the Balkans, the Europe, the
Eurasia, the Turkic world and a more conflictual region; the Middle
East. As a Middle Eastern country the harsh job of Turkey got more
essential, since in the Middle East, there is a rising but never
declining turmoil especially after the invasion of Iraq. That’s
why today, in the Middle East, any conflict can have influences
immediately on other parties, like Israel and Turkey. In this paper,
I will recommend policies for Turkey to the main problems of Turkey
and Israel Palestine conflict, Iraq and Kurdish issue and to improve
Turkish-Israeli relations.

They are the two rare countries which are separated from the other
Middle Eastern countries in terms of having political legitimacy,
warm relations with the US and western-oriented lifestyles. Since they
are the allies of the US in Middle East, they both share some threats
from Al-Qaeda like Turkey witnessed Istanbul Synagogue bombings, and
Egypt witnessed Sharm al-Seyh bombings where the target was mainly the
Jewish. On the one hand Turkey and Israel have military cooperation
agreement, Aegean Commerce Agreement, and allied operations such
as capturing of Ocalan. However, on the other hand the alliance is
facing some conflictual problems, too.

2. Problems in Israeli and Turkish Relations:

a. Palestine Conflict: Besides the strategic alliance of Turkey and
Israel, they face some problems, too. Indeed, according to the Israeli
ambassador in Turkey named Maurice Fisher, Turkey’s relations with
Israel are based on fragile grounds. He emphasized in 1953 that,

"Our relations with Turkey have been extremely good of late… (but)
these good relations could deteriorate overnight, and we should learn
from the bitter experience of others […] For them, there exists one
sole principle: in any conflict with a foreigner, whether a private
individual, a company or a state, the Turk is always right."[1]

One of the most prominent problems of Turkey and Israel relations
is the division between the attitudes of both parties towards
the Palestine conflict. Turkey’s attitude towards the Palestine
and Israeli conflict was changed according to the external powers
and pressures. For instance, Turkey’s short-lived support of the
Palestinians started in 1947, when it voted against the division of
Palestine at UN. However in 1949, while Turkey’s foreign policy was
to preserve its neutrality, it recognized Israel.[2]

After the 6 days war in 1967, Turkey’s attitude towards Israel
policies changed. One of the reasons for this change was the Cyprus
issue. Turkey couldn’t find what it expected from the West. But there
was a more important reason that would affect its relations with
Israel for a long time. The reason was not to frustrate the Arabs,
whom it had economic relations with, mainly in the oil sector. The
Saudi government was supporting Islamists activities in Turkey not to
support Israel. [3] This policy showed itself in the Israeli-Palestine
conflict, too. Turkey’s policy in this issue is a strategy of pleasing
the both parties. [4]

In an interview in Cumhuriyet on the 17th of February 1974, the Foreign
Minister Turan Guneþ emphasized that "Turkey would conduct its policy
vis-a-vis Israel in the light of international law and UN resolutions
rather than fluctuating economic and political circumstances." At
last, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the
representative of Palestine.[5] Turkey got closer to the Arabs mainly
the Palestinians because of Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem Law in
1980, which was emphasizing that Jerusalem was a united, indivisible
and eternal capital of Israel. [6] After the declaration of the
law, Turkish PM Demirel said that Israel’s move was "unwise, wrong,
and contrary to international law and fundamental justice."[7] This
law irritated not only the government but also the Turkish people,
for instance on the 27th of July, in Cumhuriyet it was written that
"no relations with it whatsoever". Although Turkey recalled its charge
from Tel Aviv, after the Jerusalem Law became a Basic Law of Israel,
Turkey was traumatized by the attitude of Iraq which attempted to
stop oil shipments and loans to Turkey, unless Turkey changed its
attitude towards Israel. [8] During the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, Turkey
recalled its diplomatic staff from Israel, and Turkey received $250
million loan from Saudi Arabia.[9]

Another situation that downgraded the relations with Israel was
Israel’s decision to occupy the Golan Heights in 1981.Moreover the
fire in Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, the Lebanon War and the massacre in
Palestinian refugee camps near Sidon in 1982, Israel Turkish relations
were at a lower point. However in 1984 four MPs from the opposition
party visited Israel but this visit resulted with the Interior Minister
Yýlmaz’s critique of them that they harmed Turkey’s political goals
by visiting Israel. In 1987, with the Palestinian upsurge; Intifada
Turkey’s support to Palestinians increased [10] and in 1988, Turkey
recognized the state of Palestine. Although Israel emphasized its
disappointments in the attempt of Turkey, Turkey mentioned that the
states in the Middle East have the right to exist as a state with
certain borders peacefully. Moreover, Turkey also accepted the Israeli
former PM Shamir’s peace plan in 1989 which was suggesting elections
in the occupied regions of Palestine.[11] During the visit of Tansu
Ciller to Israel, she made an official visit to the autonomous region
of Palestine and to the Eastern Jerusalem to meet with the officials
of Palestine and examined the problems of Palestine people.[12]

Today, Turkey’s attitude is almost the same; supporting both
Palestine and Israel. On the 8th of May in 2005, during the Sharm
el-Seyh Summit Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and Palestine PM Mahmud Abbas
declared a truce. According to the office of PM directorate general
press and information, after the summit, Erdoðan’s speech is showing
his support; Turkey was pleased with both the efforts of Israel
and Palestine which put an end to the fighting. Turkey’s support
to Palestine was refreshed by the visit of Erdoðan to Palestine on
the 1-2 May. Erdoðan opened the Turkish Cooperation and Development
Agency’s Program Coordination Office in Ramallah.

Moreover, the Turkish PM attended a meeting of Turkish Palestinian
businessmen.[13] Furthermore, according to Barry Rubin’s article
"Turkey-Israel Relations", today the potential problem can arise
from Turkey’s closeness to the Labor Party of Israel, not to the
PM Netanyahu. Rubin emphasizes that Turkey supports the UN Security
Council Resolutions that benefit both Israel and Palestine. However,
Israel is not in favor of a Resolution that benefits Palestine,
too.[14]

b. Iraq and Kurdish Problem: c.

The second prominent problem between Turkey and Israel is their
differing attitudes towards Iraq’s unity. Turkey is supporting a
loose Iraq for a long time, since by the end of the Gulf War in 1991
the autonomous Kurdish entity was giving its signals to be founded.

So that in 1996; the former PM Tansu Ciller emphasized that "We shall
not allow an independent Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq. Iraq’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity are important to Turkey."

[15]Turkey’s policy of Iraq after 2003 did not change. For Turkey,
Iraq should be a centralized and strong country which protects its
territorial integrity. In contrast, Israel is in favor of a loose
and decentralized Iraq.

The world was informed by the BBC News that Israel was alleged that
it was training Kurds in the Northern Iraq. Although the claim is
not accepted by the Israeli government not to injure the relations
with Turkey, the pleaded news is supported by Turkish and American
experts that Israel is training the PKK in Northern Iraq. For
instance according to Seymour Hersh’s article called "Plan B-The
Kurdish Gambit", a former official from Israel’s intelligence said
that Israel has been training the Kurdish commandos with the same
effectiveness as the Israel’s most secretive commando units, the
Mastaravim. Moreover, he added that this was a more efficient way to
make an insurgency. An American official from the intelligence said
that the Israeli’s tie to Kurds "would be of greater value than their
growing alliance with Turkey."[16]

Turkish side’s response to the claim was that; on the 26th of May, in a
news conference in Ankara, Abdullah Gul said that "presenting us with a
choice, that is not a real choice, between survival and alliance."[17]

However, Turkey and Israel was hand in hand in combating terrorism.

According to the 1996 Agreement of Military Cooperation, the first
principle was; "Cooperation against terrorism requires both parties
to exchange information and experience." [18] Moreover, according to
Mustafa Kibaroðlu’s article called "Turkey and Israel Strategize";
each country can deploy or temporarily station its land, air and
naval force units in the other country’s territory. For that purpose,
they can use one another’s air space, airports and naval ports. [19]
In addition to that, on the 22nd of May in 1996, according to the
Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Israel was going to supply an electronic
fencebordering the Southeastern part of Turkey; Iran, Syria and Iraq.

This would perceive the sound waves to capture the PKK terrorists.

[20] The extent to which the allegations are true is discussed by
many experts.

Taking these into consideration, Turkey does not support what Israel
seeks for, a united Iraq, mainly because of the possibility of
increasing terrorist attacks of Kurds, since a federation in Northern
Iraq means a strong Kurdish population. However, the result of a
loose Iraq can be a threat to Israel, too. In an interview made by
the International Crisis Group, on the 27th of October in 2004, with a
Turkish official; he stated that "If Iraq falls apart, the Kurds will
fight for power, causing instability in the north, while in the south,
the Shiites will then set up a theocratic state that, by osmosis, will
move closer to Iran; this, in turn, will resurrect Iranian rhetoric
about spreading revolution among Shiite populations in the Gulf. This
would be a problem for Israel, and all of this will lead to chaos. For
both Israel and Turkey, it is better to keep Iraq whole".[21] To find
a logical solution to Israel’s strategy over Northern Iraq can be,
according to Ephraim Inbar’s book Turkish-Israeli Strategic Alliance,
allying with non-Arabs that include the Turks and the Kurds.

3. Policy Recommendations

Middle East where there are catastrophic wars and conflicts for
centuries. That’s why everyone living in the Middle East needs a
miracle to stabilize the region. However, at least foreign policies
can help to take a step towards the miracle to occur; to stabilize
the region. In this respect Turkey can imply policies which generally
benefit both parties using its lobbying and campaigning tactics and
make diplomacy through its cultural activities, trading opportunities.

a. For the Israel-Palestine Conflict:

-Water Routes: A policy recommendation for the conflict that could not
solve but help to reduce the problem is water supply from Manavgat
to Palestine and Israel. This project was suggested by many Middle
Eastern experts for instance, Military of Turkey suggested a water
route from Turkey to Israel and Palestine. [22] Today, the water
project is being negotiated, but it could be accelerated. Water routes
project is important since there is a scarcity of water in Israel. By
supplying water to Israel and Palestine, one of the problems of the
two countries can be solved.

-Turkish Investment in Palestine:

Another policy recommendation for the conflict between Israel and
Palestine is Turkish investment in Palestine. Since unemployment
raises conflicts and since the financial well-being is less in
Palestine than it is in Israel, investment in Palestine could reduce
unemployment. Turkey can make investments in Palestine in sectors
such as electronics, since Israel imports most of its electronics
from Turkey. Another area for investment can be food. Since Turkey
exports high amounts of food products to Israel, a food company can
operate in Palestine.

-Conflict Solution Contest:

Another policy recommendation can be a Conflict Solution Contest which
has a money prize of $100,000 for the winner. The foreign ministry of
Turkey can initiate this project with sponsors from all around the
world; including states, business groups; to find solutions to the
unsolved problems of the world. Everyone who seeks for peace can join
the contest. This is so, to embrace all kinds of ideas. The prize can
be increased according to the number of states who join the project
for sponsoring. The amount of the prize can be increased since this is
a difficult contest that the participant should come up with an idea
that could persuade the three parties; the USA, Israel and Palestine.

b. For the Kurdish Problem:

-Turkish intelligence and freezing of some agreements: As a
policy recommendation for Israel’s training program of Kurds in
Northern Iraq Turkey can freeze some of its military agreements with
Israel. According to the Agreement of Military Cooperation signed in
1996, the first principle was; "Cooperation against terrorism requires
both parties to exchange information and experience."[23] However,
because of Israel’s actions in Northern Iraq, Turkey can stop sharing
information and experience; because for Turkey, Kurdish terror is the
most prominent area to solve. Turkey could freeze economic agreements
and cooperation with Israel; but then it could be disadvantageous
for Turkey, too. So that blocking the information and experience flow
from Turkey would be a better option to choose.

However, before freezing the agreements, Turkey should be certain that
Israel is training the Kurds. If the CIA knew Israel’s activities in
Northern Iraq, Turkish secret service should know it, too.[24] But if
not, Turkey can implement a policy such as; it can integrate its own
officials from the intelligence to the Northern Iraq as Kurds. It
can train the selected group of officials, teach them Kurdish and
make them learn if Israelis really train the Kurds, there.

– Resemblance to Jewish of Kurds’ activities: Another policy
recommendation to implement against Israel’s training operations of
Kurds is that Turkey can resemble the bad memories of the Jewish and
Kurds to rather the Jewish lobby or through media to the world. After
the capture of Ocalan, Israel was one of the states that Kurds blamed
for helping Turkey to capture him. To protest Israel, Kurds tried to
enter the consulate of Israel in Berlin in 1999, but three of them were
shot by Israeli security guards and the upsurge was suppressed.[25]
Moreover, Turkey can argue that how can the Jewish support PKK which
is also supported by the Syrian government. Since Syria is one of the
countries which does not get along with Israel. Since the Jewish lobby
and Turkey have good relations, Jewish lobby could be effective through
the American government or through the Israeli to impede the support
of Israel to Kurds. Moreover, Jewish lobby can be a good option to
resemble these memories, because there is an active Kurdish lobby in
the US that can influence the Jewish lobby easily. To suppress that,
Turkey or Turkish lobby could facilitate this policy. Moreover, Turkey
can spread these memories of Jewish and Kurds through media, to blame
the Kurds. Through media, Israel can be criticized for helping the
Kurds or at least Israeli people can question the actions of Israel.

-Investment in Southeast of Turkey: The last policy recommendation
for Israel’s training operations of Kurds, Turkey can implement
financial policies in the Southeast Turkey. Since, investment
increases welfare and brings high living standards; Turkey can make
profitable investments in the Southeast of Turkey such as building
dams, outlet centers, hotels and casinos in cooperation with Israel
government or offer these investments to the Jewish lobby to build
them together. Building dams is a need for the Southeast to solve
the water problem. An outlet center can also be profitable since it
can attract customers from Syria, Iraq, Iran and other Middle Eastern
countries. Hotels and casinos can be built together in only one city
to make that city headquarter of entertainment in the Middle East. It
could attract many oil-rich customers since there is a small number
of such cities in the Middle East. These investments can help the
Southeast region to develop and the Kurdish residents to get richer;
but never richer than the owners of these investments; Turkey and
Israel. This investment policy should only target the low-income
Kurds to make them feel pleasant of living inside the borders of
Turkey. Since the city will be a touristy place the economy of the
Southeast region would develop.

Alternatives to improve Turkish-Israeli Relations: -Establishment of
an NGO: A policy recommendation for Turkey to improve Turkish-Israeli
relations can be to establish an NGO that uses media, art and sports
to lobby and influence the countries and also its own citizens. The
NGO can work with various agencies; such as the Ministry of Culture
and Tourism get policy recommendations; the business groups to
get financial support and the universities to get ideas from the
academicians. This would be separate from the state because it
should work faster and more efficiently than the state. When there
is a problem that the NGO can handle, it should find solutions and
implement them. It should deal with some problems which are at state
level and target the public to change their opinion. For instance the
NGO can produce films to correct the ill-informed sources by showing
the realities about the so-called Armenian Genocide and to develop
relations with Jewish. It can give the message of Jewish and Turkish
friendship; or it can arrange concerts of Jewish-Turkish-Arabic
music to give the message that "We are together and we get along
peacefully." It may also arrange a peace cup in the field of sports
such as football. Football can be an attractive activity since
Israeli people know Turkish football well. This NGO can make the
same activities for other countries who are seeking for its own
advertisement for instance Palestine and also Israel. In this way,
it can earn money and use it for the lobbying and the process of
advertisement of Turkey.

-Exchange Programs: Besides the media policy, Israel and Turkey can
operate exchange programs between the two countries. The universities
in Turkey can add Israel option for their exchange programs,
specifically targeting the business and international relations
students. The exchange program should include only the universities
which are mostly in the Western part of Israel, because the students
should not abstain from living in Israel. Moreover, the students should
have the option of staying with a host family to know the Jewish
culture. For business students, Israel can be an attracting choice
since Jewish are famous with the image of genius businessmen. Moreover,
for international relations, who basically want to study the Middle
Eastern policies, Israel would be a great opportunity. Since Turkey,
Israel and Middle East are related conflictual issues, a Turk studying
in Israel or an Israeli studying in Turkey could be a good experience.

4. Conclusion: Taking all these into consideration, Turkey and
Israel is in between the windows which are opened to a harmonious
and a chaotic environment. Since the timeline that the Middle East
witnessed a peaceful atmosphere is quite short, the policy makers are
more experienced. So, they can come up with better solutions. However,
like Israel’s so-called secret trainings for the Kurds, there can be
curtains which impede the policymakers to know the real situation.

That’s why, Turkish intelligence should be developed and the policy
makers should be persuasive to implement the strategies that benefit
the all parties. To get close to the peaceful environment, Turkey
can play a big role.

——————————————- ————————————-

[1] Nachmani, Amikam. Israel, Turkey and Greece. London: Frank
Cass Press, 1987. (p.43) [2] Oðan, S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail
Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu, Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým
Evi. 1997. (p.103) [3] Liel, Alon. Turkey in the Middle East: Oil,
Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.225) [4] Liel, Alon. Turkey
in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.206) [5] Oðan,
S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p.105) [6] Liel,
Alon. Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.206) [7] Liel, Alon. Turkey
in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.(p.208) [8] Liel, Alon. Turkey
in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.(p.209) [9] Liel, Alon. Turkey
in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.(p.210) [10] Liel, Alon. Turkey
in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p. 211) [11] Oðan,
S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p. 106) [12]
Oðan, S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p. 127)
[13] Office of the Prime Minister and Directorate General
of Press and Information, "Prime Minister Erdoðan’s Visit
to Israel and Palestine", June 2005 (14 December 2006)
< ay-jun/n10.htm>

[14]Rubin, Barry. "Turkey-Israel Relations", (17 December 2006)
< ;
[15] Liel, Alon. Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.233) [16] Hersh,
Seymour. "Plan B-Kurdish Gambit", 21 June 2004, (17 December 2006)
< n/0621_hersh.html>

[17]Hersh, Seymour. "Plan B-Kurdish Gambit", 21 June 2004, (17 December
2006) < _hersh.html>
[18] Oðan, S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu,
Bugunu, Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p121)
[19]Kibaroðlu, Mustafa. "Turkey and Israel Strategize", Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2002, (16 December 2006).

<; [20] Oðan,
S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p.141)
[21] Middle East Report No 35. "Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears
Over Kurdish Ambitions", January 2005 (19 December 2006)
< m?l=1&id=3241> [22]
Oðan, S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p.131)
[23] Oðan, S. Mustafa. Turkiye-Ýsrail Ýliþkileri’nin Dunu, Bugunu,
Yarýný. Ýstanbul: Harp Akademileri Basým Evi. 1997. (p.121) [24]Olson,
Robert. "Turkey’s Policies toward Kurdistan-Iraq and Iraq: Nationalism,
Capitalism and State Formation". Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter
2006. (p.7) [25] Liel, Alon. Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam
and Politics.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.237)

–Boundary_(ID_+H2gtzCLAzsSvmjqpod+CQ)–

http://newspot.byegm.gov.tr/arsiv/2005/m
http://tsi.idc.ac.il/rubin_notes_on.html
http://tsi.idc.ac.il/rubin_notes_on.html&gt
http://www.bintjbeil.com/articles/2004/e
http://www.bintjbeil.com/articles/2004/en/0621
http://www.meforum.org/article/128&gt
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cf

Top General Expects Flawed Election

TOP GENERAL EXPECTS FLAWED ELECTION
By Ruzanna Stepanian

Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
March 5 2007

A top army general who leads the largest association of Armenian
veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh war predicted on Monday that the
upcoming parliamentary elections will be deeply flawed.

Lieutenant-General Manvel Grigorian, chairman of the influential
Yerkrapah Union, saw a "100 percent" chance of large-scale vote rigging
as he answered questions from RFE/RL. "There are lots of [vote rigging]
professionals around," he said. "So I guess there will be [fraud.]"

The comments will hardly please Armenia’s leaders and Defense Minister
Serzh Sarkisian in particular. They are at pains to dismiss opposition
concerns about a repeat of serious fraud that defined just about
every Armenian election held over the past decade.

Grigorian, who is also a deputy minister of defense, said his
organization will work hard to ensure that voting and counting
of ballots is relatively clean in individual constituencies where
Yerkrapah members are running for parliament. "We will make every
effort to minimize falsifications in places where there are Yerkrapahs
in the running," he said.

Asked how Yerkrapah plans to do that, Grigorian replied in a typically
blunt manner: "In any case, we won’t beat, we won’t kill.

We’ll just say polite things."

Among the several prominent Yerkrapah figures running in single-mandate
constituencies is Seyran Saroyan, another top army general and a
close friend of Grigorian’s who was discharged from the armed forces
to join the race last month. Yerkrapah candidates can also be found
on the electoral slates of the governing Republican Party and several
other parties.

According to Grigorian, the union wants all of them to get elected.

"It doesn’t matter if they are with the Dashnaks, the Republicans or
anybody else," he said. "We will support them."

The mustachioed general also ruled out his own involvement in the
election campaign. "I don’t participate in any elections," he said.

"If necessary, I instruct others to participate, but don’t do that
myself."

The Yerkrapah Union was particularly influential on the Armenian
political scene in the late 1990s when it was used by the authorities
against their political opponents protesting at electoral fraud.

Yerkrapah’s political clout has declined considerably since the
October 1999 assassination of its founder, Vazgen Sarkisian.

Incidentally, March 5 marked the 48th birth anniversary of Sarkisian.

Grigorian was among top military officials and prominent politicians
who visited the Yerablur military cemetery in Yerevan and laid flowers
at Sarkisian’s grave on the occasion.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian MP: American Radars Will Most Possibly Be Deployed In Nakhi

ARMENIAN MP: AMERICAN RADARS WILL MOST POSSIBLY BE DEPLOYED IN NAKHICHEVAN INSTEAD OF GEORGIA

Regnum, Russia
March 5 2007

The question of deploying a US radar station in Caucasus is to a
certain amount a staged surprise played by American politicians,
Member of the Armenian Parliament, Member of the Republican Party
Armen Ashotyan told a REGNUM correspondent.

Speaking of true aims of deploying a radio location system in South
Caucasus, Ashotyan divided them into three scenarios. Depending on what
the radio location system will be directed at, the question is to be
treated from the points of view of Russia, Iran and Armenia, the MP
believes. Russian officials, he continued, have already announced that
a radio location system will not put Russia’s security under threat;
so, the Russian leadership determined its position and, probably,
developed certain steps to counteract. "As for Iran, probably, a
radio location system is a kind of counteraction to possible missile
launches from Iran. But such scenario, as well, to all appearances,
can be subjected to criticism, as it is clear that at present stage
Iran has no missiles with the range of 10,000 km necessary for possible
bombardment of the United States. Maximal range of missiles, by which
the Iranian Armed Forces are equipped, is 1,500-2,000 km, and it is
clear that such talk is only concealing USA’s true aims," he said.

Ashotyan said that the true aim of deploying the RLS is a wider
coverage and control over Black Sea and Caspian Sea area, with access
to India and Middle East. "It is clear that from geographic point of
view, the Caucasian Range will prevent the RLS from working towards
Russia. The most effective deployment of the system would be in lower
parts of Caucasus, despite the fact that Georgia is mostly mentioned
in the media." "However, I think that Georgia will be far from goals
and aims posed to the radio location system: control over the Black Sea
and Caspian area with access to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean,"
Ashotyan said adding that, most probably, lower part of Azerbaijan,
the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, suits this target most.

Meanwhile, Ashotyan believes that information of US readiness to deploy
its radio location system in South Caucasus is "an information action"
aimed at examining reaction of local elites from neighboring countries
as well as countries in South Caucasus. "Till true aims are concealed,
it is hard to discuss on characteristics of the station.

As soon as the radio location system is built and directed, it will be
clear against whom it is targeted. From the technical point of view,
it is question of three-four years. And when the station is ready, one
will have more grounds to say how it will affect Armenia’s national
security and for changing the balance of powers in the regions,"
Ashotyan stressed.