Prime Ministers of Armenia, Russia discuss trade cooperation issues

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YEREVAN, AUGUST 17, ARMENPRESS. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin had a telephone conversation with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, ARMENPRESS was informed from the website of the Russian Government.

“The Heads of Governments discussed the key issues of Russian-Armenian cooperation in the trade and economic sphere and the implementation of joint projects in various fields.

Mikhail Mishustin and Nikol Pashinyan also discussed the priority issues of expanding cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union and the preparation of the session of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council to be held on August 25-26 in Cholpon-Ata (Kyrgyz Republic),” the press release states.

President Tokayev condoles with Armenian PM over Yerevan explosion victims

Aug 17 2022

NUR-SULTAN. KAZINFORM – President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan has extended his heartfelt condolences to Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian people on the occasion of the tragedy at the Surmalu market that claimed many lives, Kazinform has learned from the Akorda press service.

In the telegram of condolences the Head of State conveyed the words of deep sympathy to the bereaved families and those injured in the explosion.

Recall that the explosion rocked the Surmalu market in Yerevan on August 14 claiming lives of 16 people and injuring another 18.

Ice cream company goes digital in Armenia

Aug 17 2022

By Nick Thompson

Based in Yerevan, Armenia, Pink Berry specialises in the production of soft serve and packaged ice cream. Founded in 2017 and known for its colourful branding and unique flavour combinations, the business has become a market leader in the country.

With support from the EBRD’s Women in Business programme and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Pink Berry sought to introduce a raft of digital solutions to increase automation and streamline processes. This has allowed the company to operate more efficiently, increase the quality of its products and provide a better service for customers at its boutique cafes.

The foundations of an aspiring entrepreneur

Pink Berry has unusual origins: co-founder and CEO Ani Gyazaryan’s path to entrepreneurship was atypical, yet unsurprising to those around her.

Following school, Ani studied international relations to Master’s level before pursuing a career in the banking sector for six years. Her professional success and a burning desire to do something more creative and entrepreneurial were pushing her in two very different directions. Eventually, the latter won out and sparked the foundation of a viable business and her move away from banking. It was a risk ­– but one that has clearly paid off.

Pink Berry started as a passion project by Ani and her husband Levon, developed for their eldest son Davit, whose love for ice cream inspired them to create a range of delicious homemade flavours to compete with the ordinary commercial offerings at the time. They quickly mastered the process and realised that it could become a feasible business venture when family, friends and acquaintances told them how good their products were. The couple took the leap, scaling up production in earnest as they sought to establish the business in the marketplace.

The company stands out for its creative approach to flavour development, playful branding, sustainable packaging and commitment to high quality, unique and delicious ice cream that dictates trends in the market. Indeed, wild berry, and mango and passion fruit have become the most popular flavours in the country, and were introduced by Pink Berry to the local population.

EBRD support for business development and digitalisation

As Pink Berry began to see daily growth and increased sales, issues related to business administration within the company increased exponentially. This is where the EBRD’s Women in Business programme and SIDA came in.

“The digitalisation programmes we undertook through the EBRD have had a substantial impact, helping our business management processes and oversight become more streamlined, productive and efficient. They helped us create new packaging and increase sales through advertising campaigns, and provided advice on financial optimisation,” says Ani.

These improvements allowed the business to focus on growing and delivering on its environmental goals, with a stronger emphasis placed on the green economy within the company.

Indeed, Pink Berry produces all its new ice creams in eco-friendly paper packaging, and production is optimised to limit waste wherever possible. Any paper waste is recycled, and food scraps are donated to charity, so the company is doing its bit to limit its impact on the environment and become more sustainable.

A rosy future

Pink Berry recognises the value of its staff, placing a high degree of focus on ensuring that employees develop alongside the business. To Ani, her staff are the most important resource underlying sustainable business development.

“We constantly invest in human resources, seeking out high-level talent and nurturing existing potential through professional qualification opportunities,” Ani explains. “We have competitive salaries, open motivational programmes and regular team-building sessions. That’s why we have such a young, loyal and strong group. A team where everyone is equally valued, without discrimination.”

This sense of unity has helped the business thrive, overcoming many economic headwinds and external challenges since its formation in 2017. At present, Pink Berry has about 150 employees, with plans to double that number in 2023. With the recent growth, the company has adjusted its immediate and long-term goals in tandem, as it plans for expansion.

“As a result of franchising partnerships, Pink Berry’s sales points are increasing and we want to continue to establish these and our ice cream boutiques throughout Armenia,” says Ani. “We also want to identify export opportunities and capture new markets. Domestically, our ambition is to continue increasing our market share and improve on our current market position through innovation, product development and building on existing brand awareness.”

The inside scoop is that Ani and her team are in a strong position to achieve these targets and disrupt their competition in the local market and beyond!

Armenia: Geography as Geopolitical Kryptonite

Aug 17 2022


Armenia is a country still recuperating from the disastrous 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, a conflict that illustrated its precarious geopolitical position. Wedged between two hostile nations of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Yerevan has had little choice but to rely on the protection and vassalage of Russia.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Armenia finds itself in an even more precarious situation. Facing potential new military aggression with Azerbaijan, growing normalization talks with Turkey, and a drift away from the Kremlin, Armenia finds itself in one of the most fraught geopolitical standoffs existing in the world today—and the wrong move against one of the three authoritative leaders of these countries could spell disaster.

Armenia has historically been used as a battleground between world powers due to its strategic location in the Caucasus. Between the Romans and Persians fighting over control of the country to the Arabs, Turks, and Russians—Armenians persisted and continued to survive endless conflicts and even a genocide. The country’s winds of change blew once again during the Bolshevik Revolution where the ‘Wilsonian Armenia’ idea died, and the Soviets annexed the country into the USSR. Ever since then, Armenia has found itself under the boot of the Kremlin.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia engaged in a years-long  war with Azerbaijan over the region known as Karabakh. The war saw several massacres on both sides and mass displacement of refugees, with the origins of the conflict tracing back to border manipulations created by Moscow. The region, which has had an Armenian majority for over a thousand years, was transferred to Azerbaijan by Josef Stalin, a Soviet dictator who was not averse to deporting millions of people out from their homelands to “conform” to the Soviet lifestyle.

Despite the early nineties war ending with a decisive Armenian victory, the region is still internationally recognized as Azerbaijan and the war created a refugee crisis that is still not resolved to this day.

After years of pro-Kremlin prime ministers, many of which were shrouded in controversy stemming from either corruption or negligence, the Armenian military and Artsakh Defense Forces were left in a hollowed-out state. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan quietly built up its own military following the disaster of the 1994 war. Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan since 2003, used his country’s oil wealth to his advantage, signing defense contracts with Turkey, Israel, and Russia—the same nation that promised to protect Armenia and incorporated it into the CTSO collective security framework, which effectively tied Armenia’s ongoing security to its willingness to appease the Kremlin.

In 2018, Armenians took to the streets to protest decades of corruption, deposing a leadership structure rife with oligarchs and other Kremlin-linked figures. This was known as the Velvet Revolution, which has created consequences felt to this day.

Under the administration of Nikol Pashinyan, there have been several OSCE Minsk Group conferences to press the issue of the peace process between Baku and Yerevan, only to quickly falter each time. Aliyev had continued to build up his military while the inexperienced Pashinyan focused more on corruption from past administrations rather than bolstering defenses for the inevitable war to come. The first major clashes took place between Pashinyan’s Armenia and Aliyev’s Azerbaijan in the Tavush region of Armenia in July 2020, lasting several days. A quick ceasefire was established, though in retrospect the fighting was likely a combat test for the wider clashes to come later in the year.

Using the most opportunistic time during the United Nations General Assembly, Azerbaijan launched a war against Armenia and the Artsakh Defense Forces in September 2020, an operation that actually changed the face of conventional warfare forever. Using the now-infamous Baykar Bayraktar TB2 advanced drone platform from Turkey, the Azerbaijani military hit Armenian logistical supply chains, convoys, and troops in open territory, resulting in stunning success on the battlefield and, subsequently, serious psychological blows as the footage was quickly disseminated across the Internet.

Armenia suffered from its reliance on Soviet-era military doctrines and weaponry that a conventional military could not manage against a more well-armed conventional force. Toward the end of the war, Armenia could have used its geography to embark on a war of attrition against Azerbaijan akin to the Taliban’s methods of holding out against NATO forces, but the country’s leader signaled for capitulation, giving way to an unpredictable future.

The capitulation of Armenia was met by a trilateral agreement between Yerevan and Baku, mediated by Moscow. Though Azerbaijan had won the war, many people have mused that Russia was the true winner. The Kremlin, which stayed idle most of the war, showed Armenia that it had to depend on Russia to survive, and expects complete loyalty from here on out. They also gained a near permanent foothold in the Karabakh region, solidifying Russia’s influence in the lower Caucasus.

The 2020 war was a hard lesson for Armenia—not only did it learn the error of its ways in not investing in defense after decades of stagnation and reliance on Soviet-era weaponry, but it also learned first-hand what would happen to states that broke ranks with Russia. Such lessons have also been learned by countries like Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, all of which have had to respond in various ways when their citizens pushed back against pervasive Russian influence.

The war also showed Western hypocrisy when it came to human rights violations, as numerous executions and instances of cultural destruction took place under the Azerbaijani military, allegedly under Ilham Aliyev’s orders. Contrary to the framework of the Geneva Conventions, Azerbaijan has also refused to release Armenian POWs and has held mock trials for them in kangaroo courts, akin to what Russia has done with POWs from the Ukrainian Azov regiment.

Now the trilateral agreement faces increasing uncertainty, and “Russian peacekeepers” are clearly not living up to their name. Numerous ceasefire violations have taken place, primarily faulted to Azerbaijan, and all with little enforcement of the peace deal by Russia.

Over the past year, Armenia has initiated a normalization process with Turkey. This has led to skepticism and division between Armenians and the diaspora, as the issue of genocide recognition from 1915 and the question of whether the Turkish government will keep Azerbaijan at bay loom large. Likewise, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has cozied up to Russia over the past several years, establishing a joint military base with Moscow in the Karabakh region, purchasing S400s despite wide NATO condemnation, and giving Russian oligarchs a haven from sanctions in Turkey. This has also put Yerevan in a predicament, with fears that Moscow would leave the country to its fate in order to placate Erdogan’s authoritarian government, and in the process seed new conflicts in NATO at the expense of its own allies.

Against the backdrop of the Ukraine war, Putin solidified an alliance with Ilham Aliyev on February 24th, causing new concerns in Yerevan. Armenia has taken an extremely neutral approach thus far, though fake news rumors at one point put the country on the international radar when, early in the war, NATO officials visited Armenia on rumors that they had sent their fixed wing aircraft to reinforce Russia’s invasion – an allegation that was proven false. Armenia has also seen a mass influx of Russian citizens and oligarchs who are bent on circumventing sanctions, putting a strain on their already vulnerable economy.

As the European Union has looked to divest away from Russian gas, Azerbaijan took full advantage, setting a landmark deal with the EU to supply gas to the continent until 2027. This has come with skepticism as EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called Aliyev “trustworthy” on her official Twitter. By effectively placating one dictatorship for another, Armenia once again has received the short end of the stick. This was further reinforced when Aliyev emphasized Armenians in Karabakh would not have special status under Azerbaijani authority, dismissing any autonomy for them and fueling more mutual antagonism between both nations.

Armenia is now a centerpiece on a chessboard between Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan, and with few allies and minor strategic importance to the wider international community, any wrong move could spell another humanitarian disaster right under the nose of the United Nations.

 

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/armenia-geography-as-geopolitical-kryptonite/

Who Is Undermining Peace In The South Caucasus? – OpEd [Azeri]

Aug 17 2022

By Dr. Esmira Jafarova

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia know the horrors of war at first-hand, not by hearsay. The 44-day Karabakh war brought back painful memories from the 1990s associated with the First Karabakh War and its devastating consequences. It was very unfortunate that Azerbaijan had to use military means to enforce the observance by Armenia of international norms and principles, as well as the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) reaffirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. However, with the peace process led by the OSCE Minsk Group failing to deliver any acceptable solution to the long-running, protracted conflict, and Armenia becoming increasingly hostile and uncooperative since Prime Minster Pashinyan came to power, war remained as the only way out of the deadlock. 

Much has changed since the November 10, 2020, Trilateral Declaration was signed, and there is real hope that the existing agreements that ended the war between the two nations will be fully observed. In the post-conflict period, the parties are meeting with the assistance of international mediators such as the European Union and the Russian Federation to clear up issues stemming from the relevant commitments in the November Trilateral Declaration including Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization; border delimitation and demarcation; cultural and humanitarian issues; and matters relating to the opening of all economic communications in the region.

However, recent events that have again unfolded between Armenia and Azerbaijan testify to the unwillingness of the Armenian side to abide by its commitments under the November 10, 2020, declaration. For one, the inconsistencies and controversies surrounding Armenia’s official narrative when it comes to the post-conflict period are very disappointing, to say the least. One moment Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declares that Armenia has to reduce its maximalist demands concerning Karabakh; the next, he again makes an incendiary statement implying Armenia’s territorial/secessionist claims against Azerbaijan. 

Not very long ago, Nikol Pashinyan, in a speech in the country’s National Assembly on April 13, 2022, made several sensational statements regarding Armenia’s handling of its former conflict with Azerbaijan, as well as future perspectives. In the latter specifically, Pashinyan noted that, “Today, the international community is again telling us to lower our bar a little bit on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh,” apparently referring to the maximalist claims about the so-called ‘independence of Nagorno-Karabakh’—a narrative that was dominant in Armenia’s position over the entire course of the conflict. The message this statement sent was a powerful one, as it testified to the growing understanding in Armenia of the necessity of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan. Armenia had also previously accepted Azerbaijan’s five-point proposal that was put forward in March 2022 to serve as a foundation for a future peace treaty.

Fast forward to August 4, 2022, a couple of months after the above acknowledgment Armenia’s Prime Minister, at the meeting of the government on that day, delivered another controversial statement that contained secessionist claims affecting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, thus ultimately undermining the post-conflict peace agenda. He specifically noted that Azerbaijan has to accept three conditions: first, the existence of Nagorno-Karabakh as a separate entity; second, the fact that there is a new line of contact in Karabakh; and third, the central role of the Lachin Corridor that unites Armenia with Karabakh. 

Pashinyan’s comments, unfortunately, carry little value when it comes to the promotion of the post-conflict peace agenda and disregard the relevant provisions of the Trilateral Declaration. The latter neither specified a separate entity named ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’ nor defined a new line of contact. The November Declaration is rather clear about ending the armed hostilities between the warring parties and ensuring the withdrawal of all armed forces belonging to the Republic of Armenia and its proxies from the liberated territories of Azerbaijan, Karabakh included. The deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent along the fault lines—existing for that moment—where military hostilities between the warring parties occurred did not automatically create a new line of contact. The concept of a new line of contact is flawed, as is any attempt to twist the essence of the already signed documents and the associated commitments. Such attempts do nothing but harm the fragile post-conflict peace agenda that is inching towards some progress thanks to the efforts made by Azerbaijan and international mediators such as the European Union and the Russian Federation. 

Lamentably, the above statement by Nikol Pashinyan came amid the heightened rhetoric in Armenia’s higher echelons that also conveyed defiant messages as to the implementation of Armenia’s commitments vis-à-vis the November 10, 2020, Trilateral Declaration. Just before Pashinyan made his infamous remarks, the chairman of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, said that Azerbaijan’s demands to replace the Lachin Corridor with an alternative route is supposedly not legitimate because not all parties agreed to a new alternative route. However, Article 6 of the November Declaration states: 

…By agreement of the Parties, a plan for the construction of a new route along the Lachin corridor shall be determined in the next three years, providing communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, with the subsequent redeployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to protect this route. The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the safety of citizens, vehicles and goods travelling along the Lachin corridor in both directions… 

This excerpt clearly states that an alternative route to the Lachin Corridor is to be decided by 2023 and the construction of this road by Azerbaijan is already close to completion. As to the argument used by Mr. Grigoryan suggesting that not all parties agreed to the alternative route, it should be kept in mind that the text of the November declaration was signed by all parties, including Armenia, and it is fully legitimate for Azerbaijan to launch the initiative to build an alternative route to the Lachin Corridor, given that agreement in principle by all parties is already enshrined in the Trilateral Declaration and Karabakh is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan. Once again, tampering with the language of the Trilateral Statement is an attempt to misinterpret the existing obligations, clearly to avoid the implementation of one party’s commitments, and chips away at the only opportunity for peace in the region after so many years.

Sadly, the dismissive attitude shown by Armenia to the existing commitments is not confined to the aforementioned issues. The same also goes for Article 4 of the Trilateral Declaration, which calls for the complete withdrawal of all remaining armed forces of Armenia from the liberated Azerbaijani territories. More specifically, Article 4 states: “the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation shall be deployed in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces.” Unfortunately, obstacles still remain vis-à-vis this clause of the November Trilateral Declaration, and the onus in this regard lies with Armenia proper and the Russian peacekeepers, whose responsibility it is to ensure that no armed Armenian forces remain in Azerbaijani territories. President Ilham Aliyev, in one of his statements in mid-July, mentioned that the Russian side promised to make remaining Armenian militias leave Azerbaijani territories by June 2022, however, the issue remains unresolved. 

Violations of Article 4 of the Trilateral Declaration are still causing deaths and spreading insecurity. Periodic attacks by the remnants of Armenia’s armed forces and militias from the areas of temporary deployment of the Russian peacekeepers against Azerbaijani positions in the liberated areas cause justifiable frustration in Azerbaijan and beget harsh responses. As a result of the latest terrorist sabotage operation carried out by Armenian militias on August 3, 2022, Azerbaijani military serviceman Anar Kazimov was killed. In response, on August 4, Azerbaijan launched a short military operation called Qisas (vengeance) and regained control over the strategic Qirkhqiz and Saribaba heights along the Karabakh chain of the Lesser Caucasus mountain range and once again showed that its military response to Armenia’s provocations was necessary, but proportional.

Similar problems are also recurring with regard to the implementation of Article 9 of the November Trilateral Declaration, which envisages the opening of all communications in the region. Although connectivity issues are not the focus of this article, it is still noteworthy that Armenia’s dalliance with the idea of whether or not to cooperate with Azerbaijan in making the “Zangezur Corridor” a reality has thrown a spanner into the ongoing works in this direction. Full implementation of the November Trilateral Declaration is necessary for the achievement of sustainable peace, development, and the elimination of any chance of future war in the region. If there is one thing that everyone, including Armenia, had to learn from the 44-day Karabakh war, it was that forceful occupation of the internationally recognized territories of sovereign states, attempts to violate the inviolability of state borders, policies aimed at ethnic cleansing, and other unlawful policies do not stand a chance of surviving. Turning post-conflict normalization and peace into a roller-coaster of controversies and adopting a cozy attitude with regard to the implementation of existing commitments is not the way to go. 

Dr. Esmira Jafarova is a Board Member of the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center), Baku, Azerbaijan

https://www.eurasiareview.com/17082022-who-is-undermining-peace-in-the-south-caucasus-oped/

Azerbaijani human rights activists visit Armenians imprisoned in Baku


Aug 17 2022

  • JAMnews
  • Baku

Azeri activists and Armenian prisoners

Human rights activists working under the Azerbaijani public advocate visited Armenian citizens who were arrested in Karabakh and sentenced to hard time in Baku. According to their report, prisoners have the opportunity to communicate with their families and are provided with medical services. Azerbaijan and Armenia interpret the status of these prisoners differently. According to one expert, Russia’s position in the matter is closer to Azerbaijan’s.


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Members of the National Preventative Group (NPG) for the Prevention of Torture under the Azerbaijani Ombudsman visited one of the temporary detention centers. This was stated in a message published on the official website of the public advocate’s office.

The messages states that the purpose of the visit was to investigate the conditions of imprisoned Armenian citizens convicted of crimes in the liberated territories of Azerbaijan, after the signing of the tripartite statement of November 10, 2020 on cessation of hostilities.

“During confidential meetings, it was discovered that the convicts have the opportunity to make telephone calls, correspond, maintain contacts with family, access information (television, publications), and are provided with medical services.

“The prisoners did not complain about the conditions of imprisonment nor treatment,” the source says.

It was also noted that during the visit, human rights activists observed that prisoners were provided with all essentials and not being discriminated against.

Azerbaijan has not given an exact number of Armenian citizens imprisoned in the country.

Human rights activists under the Azerbaijani Public Advocate visited Armenian soldiers arrested in Karabakh and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in Baku. Photo: Azerbaijan public advocate’s website

According to the Armenian public advocate’s office, at least 41 soldiers and four civilians remain under arrest in Azerbaijan. This is stated in a report by Human Rights Watch published in 2022.

The document also notes that in 2021, Azerbaijan extradited over 100 detainees to Armenia.

The mass arrest of Armenian soldiers took place at the end of November 2020, half a month after the end of the second Karabakh war. Sixty-two Armenian soldiers were arrested in the Khojavend (Martuni) region of Karabakh.

Some time later they were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment in Azerbaijan.

62 citizens of Armenia were detained on the territory of the Khojavend region. The Azerbaijani side considers the detained as saboteurs, the Armenian side as prisoners of war

“The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, which put an end to the second Karabakh war, entails the return of all military personnel who were captured during hostilities in the autumn of that year,” comments Azerbaijani expert Mahmud Babayev.

According to Babyev, the status of Armenian soldiers in Azerbaijan is interpreted differently by the two nations:

“Armenia claims that these individuals are subject to the terms of the tripartite declaration. And each time, under the pretext of “solving humanitarian issues”, they demand the release of “prisoners of war”.

14 Azeri prisoners of war and 44 Armenian prisoners of war returned to their homes as a result of an all-for-all exchange, including those who were captured before the second Karabakh war

“Azerbaijan categorically disagrees with this. The statement refers to prisoners of war whom both nations had at the time of signing the document. If a ceasefire was declared on November 10, 2020, and in fact the war ended, then what kind of prisoners of war can we talk about with regard to the citizens of Armenia, who were arrested two weeks later?

“Here, the position of Russia, the main mediator in this conflict, is also of interest. It was given by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the last meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. He said that these people were arrested after the end of the war, and thus cannot be considered prisoners of war.

“Azerbaijan has several times exchanged Armenian citizens for maps of minefields. But everything was done legally. A few days before the exchange, the courts decided to reduce the term of imprisonment to the period already spent behind bars.

“There have been no such exchanges for a long time. But often before high-level meetings, as a gesture of goodwill, Azerbaijan releases several imprisoned Armenian citizens. Given that two such meetings are planned by the end of August – in Moscow and Brussels – we can hope for the continuation of this process,” the expert said.

https://jam-news.net/azerbaijani-human-rights-activists-visit-imprisoned-citizens-of-armenia/

Armenia declares two-day mourning for mall blast victims

India – Aug 17 2022
IANS | 10:41 AM

YEREVAN: Armenia has declared Wednesday and Thursday as days of mourning for victims of a blast at a shopping mall outside capital Yerevan earlier this week.

The decision was published on the official website of the Armenian government, reports Xinhua news agency.

The death toll increased to 16 on Tuesday after rescue workers pulled out more bodies out of the rubble of the collapsed buildings.

According to authorities, a pregnant woman and a child were among the dead.

Three people remain unaccounted for and seven were still hospitalized, the authorities said, adding that a rescue operation was still underway.

An investigation has been launched to ascertain the cause of Sunday’s blast.

Minister of Emergency Situations Armen Pambukhchyan on Monday denied the possibility that the blast was carried out by terrorists.

According to the latest investigations, the blast occurred when a warehouse where fireworks were stored blew up at the wholesale site, triggering an explosion of a gas pipeline.

The three-storey building collapsed.

The massive blast generated huge clouds of smoke and several buildings collapsed, triggering panic.

The role of civil society in the Turkish-Armenia normalisation – analysis

Aug 17 2022

Turkey and Armenia have been making efforts for a diplomatic normalization process to end three-decades of hostilities between the two neighbours. Turkish and Armenian envoys have held four rounds of exploratory talks since January, as part of ongoing efforts to restore diplomatic ties and reopen the border between the two countries. Armenian and Turkish academicians Dr. Philip Gamaghelyan and Dr. Pınar Sayan wrote an article for Eurasianet on Tuesday in which they argued that the recent normalization efforts were turning a blind eye to the civil society in favour of a rather a top-down approach. Below is the full reprint of their article.

 

 

Since 2021, Turkey and Armenia have been engaged in direct talks, in yet another attempt to restore the diplomatic relations that have been severed for nearly three decades. 

Unlike previous efforts, which saw official diplomacy accompanied by civil society exchanges and third-party mediation in a multi-track approach, the current talks are taking place for the most part solely between official Ankara and Yerevan.

So what changed? Where is civil society now? Is this single-track process viable? And how can non-state actors, both domestic and international, support this process and make sure that it reflects the interests of Armenian and Turkish societies and not only power players?

A first attempt at normalization was halted in 1993 by the escalation of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a Turkey ally. Another attempt was made in the late 2000s, an effort supported by the United States and Europe that became known as “football diplomacy”: Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan to watch a football match in 2008, and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan followed suit at a 2009 match in Bursa. 

Those negotiations ultimately collapsed under pressure from Azerbaijan, which objected to Turkey-Armenia normalization while there was little progress in resolving its own conflict with Armenia. 

Now, following Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Baku has retracted its objections to Turkey-Armenia normalization. But now there is a new obstacle.

The normalization attempts of the 1990s, and especially the 2000s, took place in the era when liberal democracy appeared to have triumphed and within the context of what is known as a liberal peace approach. That approach, which links conflict resolution with democratization and respect for human rights norms, relies heavily on the institutionalization of civil society and its robust engagement in the peace process.

NGOs and other networks led academic, cultural, media, and dialogue initiatives that helped build trust and supported the official normalization process. These activities served as a means of checking the “pulse” of Armenian and Turkish societies, allowing for an assessment of which official steps would be accepted by the broader public and which would not. 

In those years, Armenian genocide commemorations were held in Turkey; the number of books and articles published on the topic was increasing. Turkish tourists, academics, and journalists were regular fixtures in Yerevan’s streets and hallways. And crucially, NGO efforts persisted even when official contacts were suspended, helping to create a continuity of contact between the two societies. 

Today, however, genocide commemorations are restricted in Turkey, mutual visits are not as common as before – even following the easing of pandemic travel restrictions and reopening of direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul – and the number of joint NGO initiatives is very small. 

In the absence of civil society or grassroots support, the official talks run the risk ofstumbling over public resistance by societies who may see the process as illegitimate.Moreover, should the talks collapse as they did in the past, there would no longer be the safety net that civil society has provided in the past, enabling dialogue to continue moving forward.

Why isn’t the current process being accompanied by visible civil society engagement? Where is the institutional infrastructure built through decades of collaboration?  

We surveyed peace activists and peacebuilders in Armenia and Turkey in 2021 and 2022, conducting 24 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions, to try to answer these questions.

One reason we found: mistrust between Armenian and Turkish NGOs due to Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War. Another was the securitization of the negotiation process, where the national security interests far outweigh considerations of human security and the needs of the populations.

Another commonly mentioned factor was democratic backsliding and the shrinking of civil space. This would seem to not apply as much to Armenia, which has generally been rising in international democracy indices in recent years. But there, just as in Turkey, NGO involvement in peacebuilding also has been shrinking significantly. Even during the more authoritarian Kocharyan and Sargsyan eras, NGO peacebuilding activities were far more widespread than they are today.

The key factor appears not to be the level of democratization of any particular country, but the global slide away from liberal democracy, the dominant framework within which previous Armenia-Turkey negotiations were conceived and implemented. 

The peace processes pursued from the late 1990s to the mid-2010s were supported by the U.S. or the EU in the context of EU-integration aspirations by both Armenia and Turkey. The vision and strategies of local and international NGOs had been based on liberal democratic ideology and norms including the respect for universal human rights, economic interdependence, transitional justice, strengthening participation in international organizations, and similar issues. 

With all their faults, these approaches had clear conceptual roots and relied on well-established financial streams, educational institutions, international organizations, and other liberal democratic structures. In that context, institutional civil society had been widely accepted as a normal part of a functional – even if semi-authoritarian – state.

The global crisis of liberal democracy and its impact on these countries has contributed to anxieties about safety – and perhaps even more importantly a loss of vision and direction – for some of the institutional peacebuilding actors. 

This is the case not only in increasingly authoritarian Turkey with shrinking civil space, but also in Armenia, which has seen the rise of narratives denouncing peacebuilding as harmful to Armenia and serving a foreign agenda. 

In the face of these developments, and Turkey’s military support for Azerbaijan, our research found that NGOs previously engaged in peacebuilding in Armenia have largely sought to distance themselves from the normalization process until a time when the liberal democratic vision in the wider region, or at least in Turkey, might again prevail.

The diminished role of the NGO sector, however, does not need to be the end of peacebuilding. Informal transnational networks have long served as viable alternatives. 

Since the 2020 war we have seen the emergence of new online informal networks in the Armenia and Azerbaijan context – most prominent among these being the Caucasus Talks, Bright Garden Voices, and Caucasus Crossroads initiatives – and they look poised to enter the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process as well. 

Our research found that, far from giving up, many non-institutional actors see the current crisis as an opportunity to rethink their own goals and methods, to redefine peacebuilding, and adapt to new modes of work in non-democratic environments. In a context like this, democratization – an important goal in itself – should be pursued separately from peacebuilding. The international donor community should diversify its support to include more flexible and creative networks – informal academic networks, feminist and environmentalist collectives, online groups of anti-war activists, and diaspora dialogue projects – not only bureaucratic NGOs.

Donors often express concern about the difficulty of establishing robust accountability and sustainability mechanisms when funding non-institutional actors. Indeed, some of these organizations are bound to fail or prove ineffective – but then, so can better-established peacebuilding NGOs. 

Rethinking mechanisms of accountability and measures of effectiveness, and factoring in a probability of failure into an otherwise promising endeavor of investing in informal peace networks that remain active even in face of extreme adversity, would be a small price to pay for the prospect of sustaining this peace process. Support for such networks is particularly important in countries like Turkey and Russia where NGO activities are restricted.

Networks complementing traditional peacebuilding NGOs can help sustain peacebuilding efforts in the short-term and pave the way for the emergence of genuine local, regional, and global peace movements in the long-term.

Triple S VC Fund has Launched in South California and Armenia

Aug 17 2022

Russian Embassy sends note to Armenian Foreign Ministry over false accusations

Aug 17 2022
According to the document, the embassy considers such publications as a direct provocation of political forces behind such insinuations, aimed at undermining the Russian-Armenian allied relations

YEREVAN, August 17. /TASS/. The Russian Embassy in Armenia has sent a note to the republic’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday over the false accusations against Russian structures’ involvement in the blast at the Yerevan’s Surmalu wholesale market, the press service of the Russian diplomatic mission reported on Wednesday.

“We are indignant with the cynical publications in the local media which contain blasphemous and false accusations against the Russian structures’ participation in the tragedy that took place on the territory of the Surmalu wholesale market on August 14 of this year. An appropriate note was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia,” the statement reads.

According to the document, the embassy considers such publications as a direct provocation of political forces behind such insinuations, aimed at undermining the Russian-Armenian allied relations. “We expect the Armenian authorities to take steps aimed at suppressing such unfriendly manifestations, including the necessary public comments,” the statement said.

The Russian Embassy also recalled that “the Russian side, represented by the Russian-Armenian center of humanitarian response, has been involved in elimination of the tragedy’s consequences since the first minutes.”

The explosion and subsequent fire at the Surmalu wholesale market took place on August 14. According to preliminary data, the explosion occurred in a pyrotechnics warehouse, which made it very difficult to extinguish the fire and part of the building collapsed. According to the latest information, 16 people, including a pregnant woman and a four-year-old child, became victims of the tragic incident, while two citizens are still missing.