Armenia not to sign peace treaty without security guarantees

Mehr News Agency

TEHRAN, Mar. 11 (MNA) – Armenia will not sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan without negotiating security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh, said the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigoryan.

“There is no question that agreements to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue need to be reached, and our understanding with our international partners is that the peace treaty could be finalized if there is progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, if there are guarantees of ensuring [the Karabakh Armenians’] security and rights, and if Armenia is certain that there will be no ethnic cleansing in Karabakh,” Grigoryan told Azatutyun.am., according to Massispost website.

Grigoryan said that such guarantees could include the establishment of a “demilitarized zone” around Karabakh or “international presence” in the Armenian-populated territory. He indicated that Baku and Yerevan have reached no agreements on that so far.

Grigoryan said that the Azerbaijani side is not interested in negotiating in good faith. He pointed to the March 5 armed incident near Stepanakert which left three Karabakh police officers and two Azerbaijani soldiers dead.

Armenian forces took control of Karabakh in a war that gripped the region as Soviet rule was collapsing in the early 1990s. Azerbaijan recaptured large swathes of territory in a six-week conflict in 2020 that ended with a truce and the dispatch of Russian peacekeepers, who remain in the region.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have met several times as part of efforts to resolve the conflict, but periodic violence has hurt peace efforts.

SKH/PR

After three-month blockade, RSF urges Azerbaijan and Russian peacekeepers to let reporters visit Nagorno-Karabakh

The Lachin corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, a separatist enclave in neighbouring Azerbaijan with a mainly Armenian population, will have been blocked for three months on 12 March. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the Azerbaijani authorities and Russian peacekeepers to allow reporters freedom of movement so that they can cover this blockade and its serious humanitarian impact.

Nagorno-Karabakh is turning into a news and information black hole because purported Azerbaijani environmental activists have been blocking all traffic along the Lachin corridor, the only road linking Armenia to the enclave, for the past three months, thereby causing a major humanitarian crisis. Only Azerbaijani journalists from state or pro-government media can cover the demonstrations on the corridor. The few independent local media are not allowed through the checkpoints.

The few journalists who have been escorted to the point where the road is blocked have not been able to report freely. When David López Frías, a reporter for the Spanish newspaper El Periódico de España, visited Azerbaijan in late February, he spent an evening on the Lachin road accompanied by “guides” from Azerbaijan’s state-owned Global Media Group, who let him interview the protesting “environmentalists” without any problem, but not any Russian peacekeepers. It was not possible either to meet with any members of the Armenian population, on the other side of the Russian checkpoints.

Futhermore, the Azerbaijani state news agency Azertac published an interview with López in several languages in which he was deliberately misquoted. It quoted him as saying: “Vehicles pass here without any problems. You just see people demonstrating to protect nature.” When RSF contacted López, he said: “I said the exact opposite. I clearly saw a blocked road.”

“This barefaced lie by a government-controlled media outlet is further evidence of a desire on the part of the Azerbaijani authorities to manipulate national and international public opinion. They not only violate the 2020 ceasefire agreement by supporting these ‘eco-activists’ but they also prevent any accurate coverage of the Lachin corridor blockade and its terrible humanitarian repercussions. RSF reminds the Azerbaijani government and Russian peacekeepers of their international undertakings and urges them to restore free access to the region for journalists.

Jeanne Cavelier
Head of RSF’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk

On the Armenian side, independent media have no access to the corridor or the enclave, and rely on photos and video provided the Azerbaijani state media and the local TV channel in Nagorno-Karabakh, and on what residents say, which is often hard to verify. Few media outlets have correspondents in the enclave. The news site Civilnet has a bureau with four journalists in Stepanakert, the enclave’s capital, but no other independent media outlet does.

Conversely, Azerbaijani journalists wishing to travel to the Nakhchivan autonomous republic, located southwest of Armenian territory, are forced to bypass Armenia via Iran or to fly there. No agreement has been reached between the two sides since the 2020 ceasefire to open a corridor directly linking this region to Azerbaijan.

This is by no means the first time reporters have had difficulty moving about in the enclave, which was the subject of fierce fighting in September 2020 and where deadly skirmishes are still common.

The purported purpose of the blocking of the Lachin corridor by Azerbaijani “eco-activists” since 12 December is to prevent work at a gold mine. But many investigations point to the Azerbaijani government’s total involvement in the blockade. Several international actors have blamed President Ilham Aliyev’s government and the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan to remove the blockade. Only Red Cross humanitarian convoys are currently allowed through the corridor.


https://rsf.org/en/after-three-month-blockade-rsf-urges-azerbaijan-and-russian-peacekeepers-let-reporters-visit

Armenia to leave the CSTO Russian military bloc? Opinion from Yerevan

  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Armenia-CSTO relations

In the CSTO military bloc, which allows members to assume leadership posts under a quota system, Armenia has abandoned its own quota for the post of Deputy Secretary General. This was confirmed by Foreign Ministry spokesman Vahan Hunanyan, who did not comment on the reasons for this decision by Yerevan.

This is the second controversial decision by Armenia concerning the bloc operating under the leadership of Russia this year. On January 10, the Prime Minister of Armenia announced that the country was refusing to conduct CSTO military exercises on its territory.

Political commentator Hakob Badalyan believes it is important to understand whether this decision is “the result of existing or new grievances.” He believes it is possible that in this way Armenia is making it clear that it does not want to take sides in the Russian-Ukrainian war.


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In the context of a collapsing world order, security systems are changing significantly, Badalyan believes, and the CSTO was not a “strong, ideological alliance based on common interests.”

“Most of the states that are members of this bloc have no desire to take sides in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Here internal problems and aggravations also arise, which are expressed in different ways, including in the context of Armenia-CSTO relations,” he told JAMnews.

In addition to being involved in the ongoing war in Ukraine, Armenia has another rhetorical question for the CSTO — how ready are the members of the organization to take practical responsibility for Armenia, which of course means “against Azerbaijan”?

The members of the CSTO are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The majority of Armenian society is disappointed that both Russia and the entire bloc operating under its auspices did not provide military assistance to the country, despite numerous appeals.

The country’s authorities have more than once openly expressed their claims that the CSTO is not ready to defend “the sovereign territory of Armenia from occupation by the armed forces of Azerbaijan”, to which the President of Belarus said that the members of the CSTO “have very strong ties with the Muslim state of Azerbaijan.” Ilham Aliyev himself said that in this organization “Azerbaijan has more friends than Armenia.”

Badalyan does not believe that Armenia will have to “pay dearly” for the decision to abandon the post of the Deputy Secretary General, despite the “touchiness of Moscow.” In his opinion, it should be understood whether this issue is of great importance for other CSTO member countries or whether it has “little weight compared to deep issues.”

Badalyan believes that Armenia must find out “what prospects of security architecture we are creating for ourselves.”

About the meeting with the participation of Putin in Yerevan and the protest taking place in parallel with the CSTO summit

Badalyan recalls that a few weeks ago, Alexander Lukashenko, at a meeting with the CSTO Secretary General, said that the members of the organization should develop a common position on the issue of Ukraine, as they would not be able to “sit quietly” and endlessly evade a decision.

In his view, Russia considers Belarus a “resource of possible war scenarios.” And Lukashenko, who has no desire to get involved in a war, is trying to achieve “collective resistance” through the CSTO countries, to form a “field for maneuver”:

“Perhaps, in this situation, Yerevan is simply trying not to be represented in such discussions, even at the level of deputy secretary general, in order to avoid direct or indirect responsibility. Of course, it will not be possible to completely move away from all this, because we are a member of the CSTO. And if the issue reaches the organization, it will affect us one way or another.”

According to political scientist Surenyants, Russia and the CSTO are unscrupulous partners, but failing a major upset, Armenia will not leave the Russian military bloc.

According to Badalyan, despite all the discontent, Armenia declares that it is not going to leave the CSTO.

In his opinion, the possibility of such an extreme measure as Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO or, what amounts to the same, a break in relations with Russia, is doubtful:

“If we are not able to withstand the challenges and risks in the status of a member of the CSTO, then by refusing this status, we are unlikely to get the opportunity to solve any significant problem.”

Badalyan considers allegations that Armenia will receive military support from the West if it leaves the CSTO a “delusion or deliberately manipulative assessment”:

“In the issue of our security, the West has set a very clear bar of responsibility — to regulate relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Due to the existing risk factors, no one will take responsibility on our behalf. It will not provide the protection.”

Nor does he count on the active participation of the CSTO in ensuring the security of Armenia. He says that these illusions have long been dispelled.

A day before the CSTO summit in Yerevan, the political scientist presented his view on Armenian-Russian relations, the expediency of membership in the CSTO, Armenia’s to reform the army and establish new military partnerships.

According to Badalyan, in the current situation Armenia and Russia manage to resolve some issues, some being postponed. He says that this is not about behind-the-scenes agreements, but about “tacit consensus”:

“Yerevan expresses its dissatisfaction and is pleased with it. Russia does not interfere, does not use the CSTO as a tool, and it has no problems with Azerbaijan. Other CSTO member states are also satisfied, who, again, do not get involved in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, because it is not in their interests.”

Behind the scenes, according to Badalyan, lies the crisis of the world order that existed before and the collapse of security systems, which is also observed in the CSTO — a bloc that has never been an integral, stable security system.

https://jam-news.net/armenia-csto-relations/

Zangezur Corridor At Risk As Azerbaijan-Armenia Dispute Continues

In late February 2023, the State Agency of Azerbaijan Automobile Roads announced that 73 percent of the Horadiz-Jabrayil-Zangilan-Agbend highway has been completed (News.az, February 28). This highway, which runs to Agbend, the westernmost town of mainland Azerbaijan, is planned to link up with the Zangezur Corridor. The construction of the new highway was inaugurated with a groundbreaking ceremony on October 26, 2021, where both Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan participated (see EDM, January 28, 2022). A railway line along the same route is also under construction and, per the latest updates by the Azerbaijani authorities in December 2022, 40 percent of the work on this project has been completed (Caspiannews, December 16, 2022; see EDM, April 21, 2021). According to Aliyev, Azerbaijan plans to complete both projects next year (Caspiannews, December 16, 2022). Nevertheless, while Azerbaijan is developing its part of the Zangezur Corridor, the work on the Armenian section of the route, from Agbend to Nakhchivan via Armenia’s southern territory, has yet to start. This, coupled with geopolitical complexities and ongoing disputes between Baku and Yerevan, creates an uncertainty that continues to loom over the project.

“The Zangezur Corridor is a historical necessity,” Aliyev argued in an interview with local television channels in January 2023, adding that the project “will happen whether Armenia wants it or not” (President.az, January 10). In line with the Russian-brokered trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, Armenia has not opposed opening the route but nevertheless rejects the “corridor logic” inherent in the project. Specifically, the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wants both the highway and railway connections to be under Armenian control and subject to Armenian legislation and regulation (Arka.am, September 14, 2022). This would mean the establishment of checkpoints along the Zangezur Corridor where it enters and exits Armenian territory.

Ever since talks over the re-opening of transportation routes in the region began, the issue of checkpoints has been a sticky consideration in negotiations. In advance of his first European Union–mediated meeting with Pashinyan in Brussels on December 14, 2021, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan could only agree to Armenia’s terms if an equally restrictive standard were applied to the Lachin Corridor as well (see EDM, January 28, 2022). The Lachin road physically connects Armenia with the Karabakh region and is currently under the control of the Russian peacekeeping force there (see EDM, January 19, 2023). Such restrictive regulations could be applied to the trans-Zangezur highway only if they are applied to the Lachin Corridor as well, declared Aliyev (see EDM, January 28, 2022). Even so, for over a year, little progress has been made in these negotiations.

In an interview on February 18, which followed a meeting with the Armenian premier (and was moderated by the United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken), Aliyev reiterated his position: “Checkpoints should be established at both ends of the Zangezur Corridor and on the border between the Lachin district [of Azerbaijan] and Armenia” (President.az, February 18). Several days later, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan told reporters that Yerevan would not accept a re-negotiation of regulations regarding the Lachin Corridor (1lurer.am, February 22). Criticizing Armenia’s negative reaction to Aliyev’s proposition, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov indicated that the proposal had received positive assessments from unspecified “international partners” (Apa.az, February 24).

It is, however, clear that Russia is against the idea of checkpoints along the Lachin road. In the course of his latest visit to Baku—which took place after Aliyev’s statement—Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters that “it is not envisioned to create any border checkpoints” along the Lachin road, insisting that the regime and function of the road “must be fully consistent with the very first trilateral statement—the statement dated November 9–10, 2020” (Apa.az, February 28). Lavrov proposed the installation of “technical means” to inspect shipments passing through the corridor in hopes of assuaging Azerbaijani concerns regarding Armenia’s use of the Lachin Corridor for military and other non-humanitarian purposes.

In truth, Russia has clear reasons to oppose the creation of checkpoints in the Lachin Corridor. The establishment of checkpoints and Azerbaijani control in this area would reduce Russia’s relative influence in the South Caucasus and constitute a major step toward re-integrating Karabakh with Azerbaijan. It is not unreasonable to assume then that Bayramov was referring to the EU and US in particular when he cited the support of “international partners” for Baku’s proposal.

For its part, Iran’s hostility toward the development of rail and road lines in the Zangezur Corridor further complicates the project’s prospects. Tehran has opposed the project since the end of Second Karabakh War in 2020, claiming that it would disrupt Iranian-Armenian communication (see EDM, September 23, 2022). Although Iran has limited influence in the South Caucasus to veto Zangezur’s development, Tehran’s support for Yerevan and the two countries’ deepening defense and security ties discourage Armenia from cooperating with Azerbaijan (Moderndiplomacy.eu, December 11, 2022). At a conference in early February 2023 about relations between the two countries, Tehran’s ambassador to Yerevan declared that Iran and Armenia would not allow the creation of any such “corridor” (Sputnik Armenia, February 9). And in October 2022, at a ceremony for opening a consulate in the southern Armenian town of Kapan, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian made clear that Tehran opposes any “geopolitical changes” in the region (Hetq.am, October 21, 2022).

Ultimately, negotiations over the unblocking of regional transportation links have been complicated by a number of factors—namely, the disagreements between Baku and Yerevan over the legal regime of the Zangezur and Lachin corridors. Additionally, Russian and Iranian support for Armenia’s position against the creation of checkpoints along the Lachin road as well as the debate over Zangezur further complicates the picture. Thus, under these circumstances, Baku’s and Yerevan’s efforts to establish lasting stability in the region may miss the window of opportunity that emerged after the Second Karabakh War.

By the Jamestown Foundation

Azerbaijan cuts off gas supply to Nagorno-Karabakh

Azerbaijan cut off the gas supply from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. This was announced by the information headquarters of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on Friday, March 10.

“The Azerbaijani side has just once again blocked the supply of gas from Armenia to Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh. – Ed.). Please strictly follow the safety rules,” reads the Telegram channel of the headquarters.

The situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated in the fall of 2022. Yerevan and Baku accused each other of the escalation, and also reported deaths from each side as a result of shelling.

On November 1, at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan agreed to refrain from the use of force, discuss and resolve all problematic issues solely on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty.

In September 2020, the Azerbaijani armed forces occupied a number of villages and strategic heights in the Fizuli and Jabrayil regions, adjacent to the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh. Two months later, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the participation of Russia, signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The document, among other things, provided for the introduction of Russian peacekeepers into the region, the exchange of prisoners between the parties to the conflict, the transfer by Armenia to Azerbaijan of a number of regions of the region and the return of refugees to Karabakh.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have disputed ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1988. Then the region, which is inhabited mainly by Armenians, announced its withdrawal from the Azerbaijan SSR. During the military conflict of 1992-1994, Baku lost control over Karabakh.

 

Central Bank of Armenia: exchange rates and prices of precious metals – 10-03-23

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 17:30,

YEREVAN, 10 MARCH, ARMENPRESS. The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 10 March, USD exchange rate down by 0.31 drams to 388.18 drams. EUR exchange rate up by 0.44 drams to 411.00 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate down by 0.01 drams to 5.11 drams. GBP exchange rate up by 3.04 drams to 464.88 drams.

The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.

Gold price up by 170.35 drams to 22856.38 drams. Silver price down by 0.02 drams to 251.10 drams. Platinum price stood at 16414.1 drams.

Armenia did not discuss the integration of Artsakh within Azerbaijan. Secretary of Security Council of Armenia

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 18:59,

YEREVAN, MARCH 10, ARMENPRESS. Armenia has not discussed the integration of Artsakh into Azerbaijan, ARMENPRESS reports, Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan said  in an interview with “Azatutyun” radio, referring to the question that Baku insists that the issue of integration of Karabakh Armenians should be on the agenda of the dialogue, and it is known that Stepanakert refuses.

“We have not discussed such a question. Everyone has publicly said that these discussions are about rights and security, and these are the international agreements, and these agreements must be implemented,” said Grigoryan.

To the question whether it is Yerevan’s position that it should not be discussed, the Secretary of the Security Council answered,

“Yerevan’s position is to discuss what we have agreed on, that is, rights and security within the framework of the international mechanism.”

To the observation that, according to Azerbaijan, this may imply integration, Grigoryan emphasized that if the end result is predetermined, then these negotiations will be difficult to move forward, because Nagorno Karabakh can also announce the end results of its expectations.

“That’s why, in order for the negotiations to take place, it is necessary to create an opportunity for discussions, and it is necessary to stay within the scope of the agreements, because we have agreed to discuss security and rights,” Grigoryan concluded.

Further steps for the development of the water sector strategy discussed at Government

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 19:47,

YEREVAN, MARCH 10, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chaired a consultation, during which conceptual approaches to the development of the water sector strategy were discussed, ARMENPRESS was informed from the Office of the Prime Minister.

In particular, reference was made to the existing regulations, problems in the water sector, international experience of the sector, planned legal frameworks, models of regulation of water systems, the structure of the strategy to be developed.

An exchange of ideas took place, various observations and recommendations were presented.

Prime Minister Pashinyan emphasized the development of the water sector strategy and noted that it should provide answers to the following questions: How much water resources are available in our country, how much should be stored and how much and in what directions should be used? Nikol Pashinyan emphasized that the priority task is the effective management of existing resources, the formation of the water market and distribution system, and the promotion of reservoir construction.

Baku violates the ceasefire on the NK contact line by using firearms. the situation has relatively stabilized

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 20:30,

YEREVAN, MARCH 10, ARMENPRESS. The Azerbaijani armed forces violated the ceasefire in the northern direction of the contact line between 19:10 and 19:40 on March 10, using firearms.

As ARMENPRESS was informed from the defense ministry of the Republic of Artsakh, there were no casualties from the Armenian side as a result of the ceasefire violation.

The ceasefire violation was reported to the command of the Russian peacekeeping troops.

Currently the situation on the contact line is relatively stable.

EU-Armenia Parliamentary Partnership Committee urges Azerbaijan to immediately withdraw from Armenian territories

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 21:03,

YEREVAN, MARCH 10, ARMENPRESS. The European Parliament and the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia held the second meeting of the EU-Armenia Parliamentary Partnership Committee (PPC) on 24 February 2022 in Yerevan, marking a strong commitment to the deepening of relations between the EU and Armenia, ARMENPRESS was informed from the official website of the EU.

“This was the first meeting since the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) entered into force in March last year and an occasion for us to review the state of its implementation. We welcome the progress made and encourage the Armenian authorities to continue on the reform path.

We also note the substantial EU support provided, such as in the crucial area of justice reform. We applaud the fact that the EU’s Economic and Investment Plan will provide a sizable stimulus to investments in key areas, including strategically important connectivity projects and support to the most vulnerable regions, and appreciate the EU’s efforts to help Armenia deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The recent signing of the Common Aviation Area Agreement in November marks a significant step with tangible benefits for the citizens and businesses of both the EU and Armenia. Enhanced connectivity helps boost people-to-people contacts as well as economic growth. Among other concrete steps to achieve tangible results, we also welcomed the recent agreement on Armenia’s association status to the Horizon Europe research and innovation programme and the agreement on strategic cooperation with Europol.

We appreciated that despite the difficult context created by the Second NagornoKarabakh War and the COVID-19 pandemic, the early parliamentary elections of June 2021 were competitive and generally well-managed, living up to democratic standards. They also delivered a clear mandate for the Government of Armenia to further reform the country, improve governance, tackle corruption and modernise the economy.

We stressed the need to decrease polarisation in politics and called on all political forces to show restraint. We also highlighted the importance of ensuring that all reforms respect the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law and recommended seeking and following advice of the Venice Commission on all constitutional matters.

We reiterated our unwavering support to a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to the process within the mandate of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship, based on the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

We appreciate the engagement of the President of the European Council in order to help create an atmosphere of trust and build confidence, including through the creation of a direct communication link between the Ministers of Defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the EU’s mediation to repatriate detained Armenian servicemen. We encourage stepping up the EU’s involvement to help address urgent outstanding issues, such as the return of all remaining Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees, the protection of cultural heritage in the conflict area, and the unblocking of humanitarian access to Nagorno-Karabakh.

We find it unacceptable that on 12 May 2021, troops from Azerbaijan temporarily entered the territory of Armenia, which amounts to a violation of the territorial integrity of Armenia and of international law. Further progress on border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is of utmost importance; in the meantime, we call for the withdrawal of all military forces from the border areas, returning to positions before 12 May 2021, to prevent escalation and guarantee the rights of the local population.

The unblocking of regional communications, in line with the trilateral statements of 9 November 2020 and 11 January 2021, will present a significant opportunity for Armenia and the entire South Caucasus region. We support the Armenian government in pursuing this ambitious objective and encourage further progress. Likewise, the recently started efforts to normalise relations with Turkey without preconditions have our strong support, as their success would be a boon to the regional economic development and stability.

We look forward to further developing our interparliamentary relations and holding the 3rd meeting of the Committee in 2023 in Brussels or Strasbourg”, reads the statement of the meeting.