The Russian Embassy in Armenia congratulated on the Republic Day of Armenia. It is said in the congratulatory speech of the embassy:
“We congratulate the people of Armenia on the Republic Day.
We wish you well-being, prosperity and all the best.”
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Today, starting from a moment of the holiday, I get the same question from many journalists: have you heard the Prime Minister’s statement and what will be your reaction?
Since at that moment we were participating in the celebrations dedicated to the council of the day in Aparan, I promised to listen and respond later. I listened and honestly a simple human desire arose in me. in the near future, to have such a prime minister, whose wordings can be discreetly and meaningfully responded to, debated, presented with arguments, and counterarguments heard.
And now I ask my fellow journalists a question: how should I react to Nikol Pashinyan’s 2-minute monologue today? Can you suggest good options, I don’t mind.
We are talking about the program, problems, solutions, taking away, killing, hurting. We are talking about internal solidarity, he calls everyone a robber, spy, thief and bandit. We are talking about the agenda of moving the country forward, and what he is proposing is the same as 8 years ago: arrest, imprison, put in cages, etc.
I am sorry that this is today’s reality.
Iveta Tonoyan, speaker of the PAP president, deputy candidate
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What does it mean to raise the price of gas in Armenia? It means making Armenia’s economy completely dependent on Azerbaijan. It is not clear that Azerbaijani gas will be the “alternative”. Now, even if Azerbaijan will provide cheap gas to Armenia, isn’t it clear that it will not be done with charity? It is natural that he will do it with political strategic interest:
And what is the strategic problem of Azerbaijan? State absorption of Armenia. First of all, it implies economy, because say or do what you want, but the nature and logic of the state is the economy, the economic concept.
Now, if our economy comes under the “care” of Azerbaijan, I think it is not difficult to imagine the further “development” of that situation. Azerbaijan will give cheap gas, in return, of course, receiving strategic economic “wealths” from Armenia.
This is what the so-called Armenian-American Memorandum on Rare Fossils is about. if you think that the USA is interested in Syunik in that sense, you are wrong, to say the least. Syunik reserves are not enough to interest the USA. Azerbaijan is interested in them. The US is the “mediator” in both road and other issues. As the way was given de facto to Azerbaijan with US packaging, so it will be in the case of rare minerals. The US will simply get its so-called “commission” price from all of this, and of course the more global political arrangement with Azerbaijan, which is already a larger and strategically significant region in Central Asia. and resource calculation.
Analyst Hakob Badalyan
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The Sardarabad Monument (Photo by Matthew Karanian)
On May 28, 1918 Armenia declared independence for the first time after living under imperial rule for centuries. It was the epitome of advancing our nation’s right to self-determination and self rule.
This historic event came as a result of a national call to arms, with volunteers signing up from around the world to fight for Armenia’s independence mere years after the beginning of the Armenian Genocide.
At the time, Armenia was struggling economically as the influx of refugees who had survived the Genocide was testing its limits, while the threat of an attack from the Ottoman Empire was imminent.
The heroic battles of Bash Abaran, Gharakiliseh and Sardarabad sealed the fate of the Armenian Nation, as volunteers defeated the enemy and declared independence.
The 106th anniversary of Armenian Independence comes on the eve of a crucial election in Armenia. During the past five years, the very ideal of independence has been skewed by the ruling regime, whose leader, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has described Armenian sovereignty and independence as a reality for only those Armenians that inhabit its current border. History be damned.
The fact that Artsakh was a crucial part of the Republic of Armenia established in 1918 has been lost on those governing Armenia today. Similarly, the Artsakh Liberation Movement, which began in 1988, culminated in the reclaiming of Artsakh and advancing a crucial aspect of the national aspirations of all Armenians.
Pashinyan and his regime, however, having all but lost Artsakh during the 2020 war, have also opted to close that chapter of the fight for self-determination of all Armenians. They advocate that those who dare to dream of an Armenia that encompasses all or most of its historic parts are nothing but idealists who do not care for the future of Armenia. They also have altered the Armenian Genocide narrative, with Pashinyan overtly questioning the veracity of the tragedy that befell our nation and defined its resilience.
This mindset sends a dangerous signal not only to future generations of Armenians but also the world that Armenia is willing to sacrifice its own history—its own identity—at all costs, so that its current leaders can take a murky victory lap guised as having a seat at the proverbial table of power players.
What the current leaders are not understanding is that despite overtures from the United States, the European Union, Russia and others, the fundamental interests of Armenia and the Armenian people are not being advanced, but rather they are being used for those powers’ own interests and agenda.
Armenian independence was won by Armenians. Artsakh’s self-determination was won by Armenians. In both instances these victories came about because heroic men and women gave their lives for the cause of independence, self-determination and freedom. To subvert this fact is to dishonor these sacrifices that have elevated our nation.
Armenia’s independence is not only important for Armenians who live in Armenia proper, but rather it is an imperative for all Armenians—the Armenian Nation.
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President Donald Trump with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White on Aug. 8, 2025
President Donald Trump on Thursday endorsed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s candidacy in the June 7 elections.
“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, of Armenia, a great friend and Leader, is making his Country strong, wealthy, and very secure!” Trump said in a post on his Truth Social.
“Nikol completely shares my vision of PEACE and PROSPERITY for Armenia and the entire South Caucasus region,” Trump added
“Our Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, just traveled to Armenia, where he advanced several important Deals for both our Countries. Soon, the United States and Armenia will break ground together on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which will transform the South Caucasus, and help our wonderful American Energy Companies gain access from Central Asia all the way to the United States,” Trump emphasized.
“For these reasons,” Trump said, “Nikol has my COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election on June 7, 2026. With Nikol’s help, we will bring the United States, Armenia, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia to greater heights than ever before. Make (Armenia) Great Again — MAGA!”
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By Jamal WakimProfessor of International Relations History at the Lebanese UniversityAl MayadeenPashinyan abandoned the slogans of democracy and freedom of _expression_ that formed the basis of the political discourse that brought him to power in 2018 through a Western-backed color revolution, and sought to subdue the judiciary and security services.
Turkey is preparing to launch its project to play a dominant role in the Central Asia region, after its ambitions to play this role in the Arab region failed, despite winning a share of influence in Syria, Libya, Sudan and Somalia.
As a result of its interests clashing with those of a large number of Arab states, Washington decided to withdraw its leading role in the Arab region and entrust it to Israel, and to compensate Ankara by granting it a dominant role in the South Caucasus and Central Asia region in a way that achieves American goals of penetrating through Turkey into the backyard of Russia and China and striking at the “Belt and Road” initiative, a major line of which passes through the Central Asia region.
Pashinyan: The West’s tool in the South Caucasus
It is worth mentioning that preparations for this role had begun years earlier by sponsoring Nikol Pashinyan’s rise to power in Armenia after a US-sponsored color revolution. The aim of this was to move Armenia from the position of a strategic ally of Moscow to the position of an adversary in order to encircle it from the south, while at the same time sponsoring a “neo-Nazi” regime in Ukraine in order to use it as a tool to strike deep into Russia.
Pashinyan, who was groomed by American circles in the same institutions that contributed to the production of Zelensky in Ukraine, Guaido and then Machado in Venezuela and Saakashvili in Georgia, was ready to play this role, even though it came at the expense of Armenian national security, which Russia had been the main guarantor of since Moscow’s protection of Eastern Armenia from the danger of Turkish invasion and genocide that the inhabitants of Western Armenia were subjected to, through the time of the Soviet Union, up to 2018 when Pashinyan’s rise to power constituted a violation of this legacy.
The first thing Pashinyan did was to distance himself from his natural ally, Russia, in addition to distancing himself from his second ally, Iran, and opening up to good relations with Ankara based on American dictates.
As a result, Armenia’s position became weak in the face of its enemies, which represent an existential threat to it, namely Turkey and Azerbaijan, which considered Armenia to be a geographical obstacle in the way of their geographical connection in order to open the land route from Turkey to Azerbaijan and from there towards the eastern bank of the Caspian Sea towards the Republic of Turkmenistan as a prelude to the penetration of Turkish influence in the Central Asian republics as a prelude to the penetration of American influence in this region in order to harm Russian national security and Iranian national security.
How did Baku exploit the Armenian transformations?
While Pashinyan was doing that, Azerbaijan was preparing for war in order to seize the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which Armenia had liberated in the early 1990s.
In 2020, under Pashinyan’s policy of weakening the Armenian army as the Armenian institution supporting a close policy with Moscow, Azerbaijan launched a war against Armenia, through which it was able to seize large parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh region.
Baku benefited from the neglect suffered by the Armenian army at the hands of Pashinyan, in addition to Turkish support for the Azerbaijani army, especially with regard to the use of drones and modern technology, in order to achieve a clear and decisive victory over the Armenian army.
Moscow tried to contain the Armenian losses as much as possible by intervening to sponsor a ceasefire, but its task was difficult in light of the deep damage inflicted on the structure of power and the Armenian army under Pashinyan.
In an attempt to evade responsibility, Pashinyan sought to blame Russia for not intervening militarily on his side, knowing that he had previously distanced himself from Moscow and adopted policies that led the Russian leadership to doubt his intentions. Moreover, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which includes Armenia and Russia, had no right to intervene in the conflict, given that the Artsakh region was legally considered a rebellious Azerbaijani territory according to the United Nations.
As a result of Pashinyan’s negative stance towards Moscow, Azerbaijan felt that Armenia was distancing itself from its most important ally, which strengthened its position and led it to launch a new war against Armenia in May 2021 with the explicit support of Turkey and the implicit support of the United States, which led to Azerbaijan’s occupation of large parts of Armenian territory.
Ironically, Pashinyan decided not to confront the Azerbaijani invasion with military force and instead resorted to mediation by the United States, which led many in Armenia to accuse him of colluding to cede Armenian lands in order to allow Armenia to open a land route through Armenian territory towards Turkey to secure land communication between Türkiye and Azerbaijan.
What reinforced these accusations was Pashinyan’s later signing of an agreement with Azerbaijan and Turkey, sponsored by US President Donald Trump at the beginning of his second term, with the aim of establishing the Zangezur route from eastern Turkey through Armenian territory towards Azerbaijan, which would lead to the establishment of a bridge linking Turkey and Turkmenistan, and allow Washington to extend its influence across the South Caucasus towards Central Asia.
Strengthening ties with the West at the expense of Armenian sovereignty
In parallel, Pashinyan was reorienting his policies to strengthen ties with the West. Yerevan intensified its contacts with the United States and the European Union, even participating in military exercises with the United States at a time when it was reducing its security cooperation with Moscow, albeit at the expense of Armenian national security.
At this time, Baku was intensifying its efforts to dominate Armenia in coordination with Turkey, aiming to strengthen their geographical connection at the expense of Armenian territory. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev went so far as to openly declare his intentions when, at a European summit attended by both Azerbaijan and Armenia, he announced his plans to establish regional corridors and solidify geopolitical arrangements with Turkey through Armenian lands. This sparked widespread concern among Armenians, prompting them to voice their opposition to Pashinyan, who was present when Aliyev delivered his speech. Pashinyan’s silence was interpreted as tacit acceptance of sacrificing Armenian sovereignty and even part of Armenian territory in exchange for Western political and economic support. This led many Armenian allies to declare that Armenia had become a Turkish colony.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan carried out a swift military operation that effectively ended the existence of the Armenian separatist entity in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to a mass exodus of tens of thousands of Armenians from the region to Armenia.
This development came as a major shock to Armenian society, as many felt that the government had failed to protect the Armenian population in Karabakh or to secure international guarantees that would prevent the collapse of the humanitarian and political situation there.
The opposition also accused Pashinyan of practically paving the way for abandoning the region through his repeated recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within the former Soviet borders.
As a result, opposition to Pashinyan’s government intensified within Armenia, prompting him to respond with repression. In this context, Pashinyan abandoned the slogans of democracy and freedom of _expression_ that formed the basis of the political discourse that brought him to power in 2018 through a Western-backed color revolution. He sought to manipulate the judiciary and security apparatus to launch a campaign of arrests against opposition figures, in addition to attempting to restrict freedom of the press and _expression_, especially since criticism also extended to the rampant corruption within his inner circle.
Local and international reports indicate a worsening of administrative and economic corruption within Armenian state institutions since Pashinyan took power in 2018, in addition to bribery, nepotism, political manipulation of the judiciary, and a decline in transparency. Pashinyan has tried to cover all of this up by adopting a populist, anti-Moscow rhetoric that blames Moscow for everything Armenia is suffering from, including the loss of territory to Azerbaijan.
Transformations that reflect an existential crisis?!
This Armenian shift reflects a deep crisis related to Armenia’s position in the new international order, which is undergoing a transition from a unipolar system to a multipolar system, witnessing the rise of Russia and China in the face of American hegemony.
In the midst of this pivotal moment, Pashinyan’s choices come as a surprise, as instead of taking advantage of the rising role of Russia, which has been the primary refuge for Armenians for a century and a half, he has chosen to align himself with a power whose influence in the world is waning, namely the United States and the West, even if this means sacrificing structural and vital interests for Armenia.
In this context, we find that Pashinyan is participating in a summit between the European Union and Armenia, making statements attacking Moscow, and signing a joint declaration with Brussels that includes a clause claiming “respect for the rules-based international order,” which observers consider to be part of the West’s soft rhetoric to justify geopolitical interventions.
These observers believe that Pashinyan’s actions are increasing Armenia’s dependence on the West instead of adopting a balanced policy that could safeguard the vital interests of Yerevan and the Armenian people. A segment of the Armenian elite fears that Pashinyan’s policies will strain relations with Russia, potentially leading to Armenia losing its most important military and strategic ally.
Russia maintains a military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri and is a major economic partner and a key source of energy and remittances for Armenia. Therefore, any complete break with Moscow could have serious economic and security repercussions for the Armenian state.
A summaryExperience shows that the policies adopted by Nikol Pashinyan since he came to power in Armenia until today have led to a serious erosion of the elements of Armenian national security, the loss of Artsakh being one of its most important manifestations.
The loss of the region, and subsequently the loss of additional Armenian territory, revealed profound strategic shifts in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s ability to impose the old power dynamics diminished, while Azerbaijan strengthened its regional position, benefiting from Turkish support and its growing importance as an energy supplier to Europe.
At the same time, Russian influence in the region is facing unprecedented challenges, while the West seeks to expand its political and economic presence in the Caucasus. The current debate within Armenia concerns not only Pashinyan’s responsibility for the loss of Artsakh but also the future of Armenian national identity and strategic alliances.
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A great deal has happened since I published my three-part series a couple of months back on Erdoğan’s road to authoritarian consolidation. Notably, Viktor Orban, another frequently cited example of a would-be authoritarian, decisively lost a recent election in Hungary and is—at least for now—no longer in power.
Hungary is not all of a sudden a healthy democracy, but Orban’s defeat shows that there are real limits to the so-called “competitive authoritarianism” model. Both he and Erdoğan managed to stay in power for so long because they have successfully sustained a critical mass of popular support—something approaching fifty percent of the electorate—despite their polarizing styles. That model of governance simply ran out of gas on Orban.
And Erdoğan’s sagging popularity suggests the same dynamic is playing out in Turkey. But instead of setting himself up for possible electoral failure, Erdoğan has decided to double down on authoritarianism.
This past Friday, May 23, Erdoğan released a two-sentence presidential decree ordering the closure of Bilgi University, one of Turkey’s most prestigious private institutions. The president provided no rationale or justification for revoking the university’s license to operate. It seems Bilgi was an annoying liberal thorn in Erdoğan’s side, and so he decided to take care of the problem once and for all.
Erdoğan’s decree was met with shock both at home and abroad. Blindsided and still processing what had happened, Bilgi students and faculty attempted to occupy the campus. After being violently removed, they protested outside of the campus gates. Barely two days after issuing the decree closing the school, Erdoğan issued another equally cryptic two-line decree allowing it to reopen.
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Perhaps handling two major controversies was just too much for the aging president. On Saturday, one day after issuing the decree closing Bilgi, police raided the headquarters of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Ankara. Before the raid, the Erdoğan-aligned Turkish judiciary issued a decision that invalidated CHP’s current leadership and returned to the head of the party its septuagenarian and chronically unpopular former leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
As was the case with Bilgi University, party members attempted to occupy the building and, once forcefully evicted by the police, staged protests outside of it, with photos of the now-ousted CHP leader, Özgür Özel, leading them. Unlike in the Bilgi case, there is no indication that Erdoğan and his allies plan to back down.
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CHP has its own mixed record when it comes to democratic governance. But if elections were to be held today, Özel would have a strong chance at winning the presidency. By removing Özel as leader—a decision made by the supposedly independent judiciary— Erdoğan can avoid the bad visuals that would come with shuttering the CHP outright or cancelling presidential elections. Instead, he can choose who he runs against: in this case, the ineffectual Kılıçdaroğlu.
Orban’s position was weakened by the fact that, as a member of the EU, Hungary is especially vulnerable to diplomatic, political, and economic pressure from more powerful member states. Any attempt by Orban to do what Erdoğan is doing now in Turkey would have been met with likely insurmountable political opposition both within Hungary and outside. EU membership remains popular in Hungary, and the EU had already frozen billions in development aid to Hungary in response to Orban’s rule-of-law violations. While the EU often appears politically and diplomatically feckless, it is hard to imagine it standing by idly had Orban resorted to extreme measures to meddle in the electoral process.
Erdoğan, meanwhile, benefits from Turkey’s geopolitical importance vis-à-vis both Russia and Iran. There is simply no appetite on the part of EU leaders to stoke political instability in Turkey. Erdoğan is operating with a veritable diplomatic blank check as he runs roughshod over the last remaining vestiges of Turkish democracy. Indeed, at the same time Erdoğan’s government was shutting down Bilgi University and occupying CHP headquarters, Spain’s foreign minister celebrated his country’s “robust partnership” with Turkey. Mark Rutte, secretary general of NATO, signaled his enthusiasm for the coming NATO summit to be held in Ankara, promising the hosts would put on a “good show.”¹ It’s hard to come away with any other conclusion than the near-term picture in Turkey is truly a bleak one.
There is no question that we are living in an era of widespread democratic backsliding. It is also the case that the path taken in one country does not predict the path that will be taken in another. I think it is also worth considering what lessons we are to take from the fact that a supposed beacon of democratic vitality such as Spain and a self-proclaimed democratic bulwark such as NATO are willing to let diplomatic and political expedience trump support for the ideals of democracy in the case of Turkey.
We may once again live in a world where democracy feels like it is on the ascent, but the road ahead is a rocky one. And it is clear that democratic restoration in Hungary, Turkey, and elsewhere will be very challenging without robust institutional, political, and diplomatic support.
Samvel Karapetyan. Screengrab from a press briefing on 7 May 2026.
The news was announced on Tuesday by the ENA’s state-appointed temporary manager Romanos Petrosyan, a member of the ruling Civil Contract party.
Petrosyan cited the 25 May deadline established by the Armenian Administrative Court during which the shareholders of the ENA ‘were expected, based on a proposal by the Armenian government, to transfer 100% of the company’s shares in a manner agreed with the government’.
He noted that no transfer of shares took place within the established timeframe, and citing relevant legislation, Petroyan announced that the Armenian government ‘will initiate the process of declaring the shares of ENA as being of overriding public interest and proceeding with their alienation (nationalization)’.
Armenian authorities have not disclosed the sum offered in exchange for the ENA, which, according to documents obtained by RFE/RL, was $59 million, ‘on the condition that Karapetyan returns to the company the dividends he received over the past 10 years, amounting to $60 million’.
Based on this, RFE/RL concluded ‘if the owner returns the dividends he received to the company, the government’s offer for the ENA shares would amount to $360,000’.
The ENA is owned by Karapetyan’s Tashir Group. The tycoon, who is currently under house arrest, was detained in June 2025 after making public statements siding with the Armenian Apostolic Church amid its confrontation with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
At the same time, Pashinyan announced that the time had come to nationalize the ENA.
Katrapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance, established following his detention, is considered to be Pashinyan’s Civil Contract’s main challenger in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 7 June.
In November 2025, Armenia’s Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) voted to revoke the ENA’s electricity distribution licence, based on several serious violations identified by Petrosyan, the state-appointed interim manager of ENA.
According to legal amendments rushed through parliament in summer 2025, shortly after Karapetyan’s detention in June, if the ENA loses its license, the grid must be recognized as a ‘publicly overriding interest’ and have its value assessed. The current owner, Tashir Group, would then be compensated for the takeover.
Tashir Group had initiated international arbitration, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation over what it describes as unlawful interference in its investment in Armenia’s power sector.
A journalist since 2016, Arshaluys specializes in fact-checking and open-source investigations, with a focus on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, politics, and social and gender issues. She is also a strong advocate for media literacy and closely follows Armenia’s media landscape.
May 28, 2026
Levon Zurabyan, the vice-chairman of the “Armenian National Congress” (ANC) party, writes: “ANOTHER ANTI-PEOPLE DEAL BY NICOLE
With his call to support Nikol Pashinyan, Trump does not even hide that he is doing it exclusively for one purpose. is to “give our wonderful American Oil Companies access from Central Asia all the way to the United States.”
In other words, the flagrant violation of the principles of democracy, the gross foreign interference in the free expression of the people and the imposition of a foreign puppet on the neck of the Armenian people is CLEARLY justified for the FIRST TIME exclusively for the purpose of achieving American geopolitical interests and huge oil profits.
Nikol Pashinyan actually went to a deal. he is building TRIPP, drawing Armenia into a geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia and Iran, in which we can literally fall under our feet, instead receiving the anti-democratic support of the West for the anti-popular illegitimate regime in Armenia.
As always in such situations, Armenia will receive only destruction and loss, it will receive a dictatorship, in the best case becoming a raw appendage of the world economy, whose owner and ruler will be Azerbaijan, with all its consequences for our national identity.
But there is another way, Armenia’s Wise Way, which refuses to become an affiliate of any camp, including Russia, and considers Armenia as a sovereign independent country. Our formula for peace and development, TRIP BRICS is a plan to harmonize the interests of the superpowers, which will bring stable and lasting peace and development to our country.”
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May 28, 2026
Prospects for the development of the “Middle Corridor” became the central topic of the webinar of the Edinburgh Business School, according to the correspondent of the Kazinform agency in London.
During a webinar entitled “The Middle Corridor and the Future of Trade between Great Britain and Central Asia” held on Wednesday, representatives of the academic community, expert circles and business discussed the potential of the route connecting Asia and Europe through the territory of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of the world’s gas and oil supplies pass, once again exposed the vulnerability of global energy chains. Markets are bracing for a prolonged period of volatility amid the ongoing standoff between the US, Israel and Iran.
Additional risks are created by the activity of Yemen’s Houthis, who threaten the security of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. it is the key route between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Instability in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, only exacerbates the threats to global trade and shipping.
“The crisis around the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the vulnerability of traditional routes, has drawn renewed attention to the risks of dependence on narrow transport hubs and alternative and emerging routes such as «Middle corridor», to the need to pay more attention,” said Arzu Abasova, a researcher at the British Defense Research Institute, in her speech.
John Easton, professor of sustainable transport at the Edinburgh Business School, noted that the main problem of the “Middle Corridor” is not related to the infrastructure of the central sector, but to the final, first of all, congestion of the European networks. According to him, this factor may limit further growth.
He pointed out the difficulties of implementing the unified European system of train traffic management, which is designed to speed up the movement of rolling stock on the territory of Europe. However, in practice this model is still far from working perfectly, although in the long run it should significantly simplify logistics.
“The problem is that the introduction of a single European rail traffic management system in Europe is significantly behind schedule. Currently, only about 10-20 percent of the continent’s rail network is equipped with this system, while the target date of 2030 is fast approaching,” John Easton emphasized.
According to him, the increase in the price of rolling stock also becomes an additional challenge. The introduction of new technologies increases the costs, which mainly fall on the shoulders of freight transport operators.
Today, the European Union remains the largest external contributor along the Middle Corridor, supported by a €10 billion investment commitment to strengthen Central Asia’s connectivity.
UK interest is also gradually increasing. Policymakers and think tanks are increasingly paying attention to the route’s strategic importance, and British expertise in infrastructure financing, regulatory standards and export mechanisms is seen as a potentially important resource for future trade interactions.
“Its long-term success will depend not only on infrastructural investments, but also on coordination, institutional trust and operational reliability,” said Dr. Asilbek Nurgabdeshov of Edinburgh Business School, who moderated the discussion.
In his estimation, during the coming decade, the “Middle Corridor” is able to significantly expand the economic interaction of Great Britain and the European Union with Central Asia and the South Caucasus in several strategic areas at once.
Earlier, the European expert told how Central Asia is strengthening its position in global logistics.
TIMUR DUSEKEYEV
Source: Kazinform
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