This commentary was prepared by Mr Ahmad Alili for the ninth issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026 newsletter.
The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia are no longer being discussed only within Armenia itself. Today, the Armenian vote is being closely watched in Azerbaijan, Russia, Türkiye, across Europe, and in the United States. This is not simply another domestic electoral cycle in a small South Caucasus country. It is an event capable of influencing the future geopolitical architecture of the entire region. At the same time, its significance should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated.
For the first time in Armenia’s modern political history, an incumbent leader is approaching elections with an agenda centred on peace and normalisation rather than conflict management or historical mobilisation. This distinction is important. The 2021 elections were not about peace. In the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was effectively seeking a mandate connected to the preservation of the Karabakh issue and to a broader post-war political framework shaped by remedial secession narratives. The current political moment is fundamentally different.
What is now emerging is a debate not only about political leadership, but about Armenia’s entire geopolitical worldview and strategic self-perception.
For decades, the dominant Armenian geopolitical narrative rested on a relatively straightforward idea: Armenia is surrounded by hostile powers — primarily Azerbaijan and Türkiye — and therefore can survive only through external protection and asymmetric geopolitical balancing. Within this framework, the military presence of outside actors, particularly Russia, was presented not as a limitation on sovereignty but as the principal guarantee of survival.
This worldview was promoted not only domestically but internationally as well. One of the most recognisable formulations associated with former President Serzh Sargsyan was the portrayal of Armenia as “the last castle of Christendom in the East.” The narrative was designed largely for European and American audiences and sought to embed Armenia into a broader civilisational and emotional framework of geopolitical defence.
Over time, however, reality increasingly challenged this model. The very existence of close Armenia–Iran relations demonstrated that the simplistic dichotomy of a “Christian fortress surrounded by hostile Muslim powers” never fully reflected the complexity of regional politics. More importantly, the 2020 Karabakh war exposed the structural limits of the old geopolitical formula itself. The disappearance of the Karabakh issue in its previous form gradually undermined the logic upon which Armenia’s post-Soviet security architecture had long rested.
This is why one increasingly hears a phrase among parts of Armenian society and expert circles: “Why would we need Russia if there is no more Karabakh?” Behind this seemingly simple question lies a profound strategic transformation. If the unresolved Karabakh conflict historically served as the main justification for external military protection and geopolitical dependency, then its disappearance inevitably raises questions about the future purpose of those arrangements.
At the same time, these debates are unfolding within a deeply traumatised society still shaped by the psychological consequences of war, displacement, defeat, political polarisation, and prolonged insecurity. Public fears remain exceptionally high, and this atmosphere has inevitably become part of the electoral campaign itself. Competing political forces increasingly rely on the language of existential threat for Armenia. One side warns that losing power would inevitably lead to a new war with Azerbaijan and the collapse of Armenian security. The other argues that electoral defeat would expose Armenia to pressure, destabilisation, or confrontation with Russia. In this sense, both camps are actively securitising the elections and mobilising the traumas accumulated over recent years. The campaign therefore reflects not only a struggle over Armenia’s future direction, but also a competition over which fear Armenian society considers more existential.
As a result, the elections are gradually becoming a contest between two broader visions of Armenian statehood.
The first vision is largely rooted in the traditional security paradigm: Armenia remains a besieged state surrounded by enemies and therefore requires permanent external protection and geopolitical patronage in order to survive.
The second vision proposes a fundamentally different trajectory. It argues that Armenia should evolve into a more autonomous and genuinely sovereign regional actor that accepts the geopolitical realities of its neighbourhood and builds pragmatic relations with surrounding states. Within this framework, geography is interpreted not as an existential trap but as a potential foundation for coexistence, trade, connectivity, and regional integration. According to this logic, the development of stable neighbourly relations would gradually reduce Armenia’s dependence on external military guardianship.
These two visions increasingly place the European Union, the United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan within one broader geopolitical framework that favours the transformation of Armenia into a more autonomous, regionally integrated, and post-conflict state. At the same time, Russia and, to a certain extent, Iran appear more comfortable with the preservation of the older Armenian security model, in which Armenia’s sense of vulnerability and isolation created an internal political and psychological demand for external security patronage. Within that framework, the continued perception of existential threat legitimised the long-term military, political, and economic presence of outside actors in Armenia.
This transformation is precisely why the Armenian elections are being discussed far beyond Armenia itself. The issue is not merely who governs Yerevan. The broader question is whether Armenia will continue functioning primarily as a heavily securitised geopolitical outpost dependent on outside powers, or whether it will attempt to reposition itself as an integrated participant within the South Caucasus regional system.
The growing involvement of external actors in the electoral environment further reinforces this perception. Russia, European actors, and the United States are no longer passive observers of Armenian domestic politics. Many Armenian opposition figures maintain deep political, economic, or personal ties with Russia, including, in some cases, Russian citizenship itself. Simultaneously, European and American political engagement with Armenia has become increasingly visible through high-level visits, symbolic gestures of support, and expanding diplomatic involvement. Armenia has therefore become part of a broader geopolitical competition among external centres of influence, each attempting — directly or indirectly — to shape the strategic environment in which Armenian political choices are made.
The implications extend well beyond Armenian domestic politics. If the second vision gradually gains ground, it could open the possibility for a qualitatively different South Caucasus. Regional integration projects might become politically sustainable rather than remaining abstract geopolitical concepts. Economic corridors, transport connectivity, energy cooperation, and trade routes would no longer exist merely as instruments of geopolitical competition but as shared interests contributing to long-term regional stability.
More fundamentally, the Armenian debate increasingly concerns the future logic of the South Caucasus itself. Historically, the region became vulnerable precisely because its states often remained isolated from one another while integrating into competing external geopolitical systems. Under such conditions, South Caucasus nations could easily be instrumentalised against each other by larger powers pursuing their own strategic interests. From this perspective, regional integration is not simply an economic or infrastructural ambition; it increasingly appears as a strategic necessity. A more interconnected South Caucasus reduces the space for external manipulation, lowers the incentives for perpetual confrontation, and creates shared interests that strengthen the sovereignty of all regional states simultaneously.
Conversely, the continued fragmentation of the region risks preserving a geopolitical environment defined by dependency, rivalry, militarisation, and recurring external competition. In this sense, the elections concern not only Armenia’s future, but also the future coherence of the South Caucasus as a geopolitical space.
For this reason, the Armenian elections represent neither a civilisational turning point nor a routine domestic political procedure. They are something more nuanced, yet potentially more consequential: a strategic referendum on how Armenia understands sovereignty, security, and its place in the region after the end of the Karabakh era. And Azerbaijan closely watches.
Source: Mr Ahmad Alili is the Director of Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre, an independent think tank based in Baku, Azerbaijan. His LinkedIn can be found here.
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Turkish Press: Russia suspends sale of 64.5M bottles of Armenian mineral water
May 29 2026
Russia suspends sale of 64.5M bottles of Armenian mineral water
Russia has suspended the sale of 64.5 million bottles of mineral water imported from Armenia, citing health-related concerns, Russia’s consumer safety agency said Friday.
In a statement, Russia’s Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) announced measures targeting the Jermuk mineral water produced by Armenia-based Jermuk Group CJSC.
The agency said health-related violations had been identified in the products and ordered the suspension of their sale across Russia.
“Rospotrebnadzor has instructed the relevant authorities to suspend the sale of 64.5 million bottles of mineral water produced by Armenia-based Jermuk on Russian territory,” the statement said.
The agency added that it had issued an additional directive to the operator of the Chestny Znak state labeling system to halt the sale of 64.5 million units of Jermuk natural mineral medicinal and carbonated table water.
“The order to block new batches is valid from May 28, 2026 until additional notice,” the statement said.
Agency cites technical regulation violations
Rospotrebnadzor said the decision was based on violations of technical regulations.
According to the agency, testing found excessive levels of hydrogen carbonate ions, chlorides and sulfates in the water.
The agency said the discrepancies could create misleading impressions about the product’s medicinal properties and could have adverse health effects.
The suspension comes days after Russia imposed temporary restrictions on imports from Armenia in other sectors.
Moscow introduced restrictions on flower imports from Armenia on May 22 and expanded the measures to include fruit and vegetable imports on May 28.
The latest move comes amid increasingly critical exchanges between Russian and Armenian officials in recent months.
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Armenia unveils upgraded Iranian-made Majid air defense system during Republic
Armenia publicly unveiled an upgraded Iranian-made AD-08 Majid short-range air-defense system during the Republic Day parade in Yerevan, a development reported on May 28, 2026, that signals a stronger focus on countering drones, cruise missiles, and other low-altitude threats within its evolving air-defense network. The new configuration combines the Majid’s established electro-optical targeting system with an onboard radar, expanding detection and reaction capabilities against difficult-to-track targets and improving performance in challenging weather conditions.
The addition of radar surveillance to the infrared-guided AD-08 enhances target acquisition while preserving the system’s low-emission engagement profile, increasing its effectiveness against UAVs, loitering munitions, and low-flying aircraft. Integrated alongside Armenia’s S-300PS, Tor-M2KM, and Akash systems, the upgraded Majid strengthens the country’s layered air-defense architecture and reflects a broader shift toward mobile defenses optimized for persistent drone and precision-strike threats.
On May 28, 2026, Armenia displayed at least two Iranian-made AD-08 Majid short-range air-defense systems during the Republic Day parade in Yerevan, revealing a configuration not previously seen outside Iran. Unlike the original Majid unveiled in April 2021, the Armenian variant combined the standard electro-optical fire control suite with a planar-array radar mounted on the launcher, according to Patarames. Earlier Majid systems relied primarily on passive target acquisition and imaging infrared-guided missiles rather than radar support, and the AD-08 gained prominence during the 2026 Iran war after reportedly hitting U.S. F-35 stealth fighters.
The Armenian configuration appears to represent a more complete and potentially export-oriented variant that combines passive sensors with active surveillance, potentially addressing limitations associated with adverse weather, low-signature targets, and the field-of-view constraints of electro-optical sensors. The AD-08 appeared within a broader modernization display reflecting Armenia’s military restructuring after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and subsequent border confrontations. Indian acquisitions included the Akash surface-to-air missile system, Pinaka multiple launch rocket system, and ATAGS 155 mm towed howitzer.
Russian equipment included the S-300PS long-range air defense system, Tor-M2KM short-range air defense system, Iskander-E ballistic missile system, and T-72 main battle tanks, while the French CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzer made its first public appearance in Armenian service. Assets acquired over the previous decade, such as BM-30 Smerch launchers, Osa-AKM air defense systems, armored personnel carriers, and tactical vehicles, were also displayed. Within this force structure, the AD-08 complements the S-300PS, Tor-M2KM, and Akash within a layered air-defense network extending from area defense to point defense around military formations and critical infrastructure.
First unveiled by Iran in April 2021, the AD-08 was developed to engage small UAVs, loitering munitions, cruise missiles, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft that are often inefficient targets for larger radar-guided SAM systems. According to an official brochure from Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, the Majid system consists of the AD-08STO electro-optical detection and tracking system, the AD-08CC command-and-fire-control subsystem, the AD-08L launcher, and the AD-08 interceptor missile. The Majid can engage four targets simultaneously under all-weather conditions.
Unlike conventional SHORAD systems, the original Majid emphasized passive engagement through electro-optical tracking rather than continuous radar illumination, reducing emissions while maintaining effectiveness against low-altitude threats. The AD-08 missile measures 2,670 mm in length, 156 mm in diameter, and weighs 75 kg, including a 14 kg warhead. Engagement range extends from 0.7 to 8 km, and engagement altitude from 0.2 to 5 km. Early launchers carried two missiles, while later production vehicles (either the Iranian-made Aras-2 4×4 tactical vehicle or the Iveco Daily 4×4 light truck) adopted a four-canister configuration, doubling ready-to-fire capacity.
The missile is launched from angled canisters, uses a proximity fuze, and relies on passive imaging infrared homing for terminal guidance. In October 2023, the missile was adapted for use with the jet-powered Karrar drone, expanding its potential employment options beyond ground-based launchers. The defining feature of the original AD-08 architecture was its passive engagement cycle. Detection and fire control were performed through a sensor suite combining a daylight camera, thermal imager, and laser rangefinder. The system provides a 15 km acquisition range, 360-degree azimuth coverage, 0-48 degree elevation coverage, and simultaneous processing of four targets.
Because the acquisition range is nearly twice the missile’s maximum engagement distance, operators can establish target tracks before threats enter the firing envelope. Since neither the fire control sequence nor the missile requires radar illumination, adversarial aircraft or drones receive no conventional radar-lock warning. The absence of continuous radio-frequency emissions also reduces vulnerability to a response with anti-radiation missiles and certain electronic warfare techniques. The radar installed on the Armenian vehicle represents the most significant visible modification.
Earlier Majid units could operate alongside the Kashif-99 mobile phased-array radar, designed to detect small aerial targets and reportedly capable of tracking up to 300 contacts simultaneously. However, similar radar-equipped Majid systems appeared in Iran during late 2025. The radar’s size suggests a search-and-cueing role rather than missile guidance, since the interceptor remains infrared-guided. The addition improves detection of low-thermal-signature UAVs, low-radar-cross-section targets, and threats obscured by haze, dust, clouds, or precipitation, while reducing reaction times through automatic cueing of the electro-optical tracker toward detected contacts.
Operationally, the AD-08 occupies the lowest layer of Iran’s ground-based air-defense network beneath the 9 Dey, Khordad-15, Mersad, Bavar-373, and S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air systems, focusing on threats that penetrate medium- and long-range engagement zones. Its 0.7-8 km engagement envelope corresponds closely to the flight profiles of tactical UAVs, loitering munitions, and low-altitude reconnaissance assets. Simultaneous engagement of four targets provides greater resistance to saturation attacks than single-channel SHORAD systems, while radar integration improves performance against drone swarms and small low-observable targets. Moreover, combining radar surveillance, electro-optical tracking, thermal imaging, laser ranging, and imaging infrared guidance introduces sensor redundancy and increases resilience when one detection method is degraded.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Hungary, Armenia shift away from Russian influence
May 29 2026
Hungary, Armenia shift away from Russian influence
Two countries long friendly with Moscow moved towards Brussels, pointing to Russia’s waning sphere of influence.
Hungary and Armenia were largely pliant allies of the Kremlin’s in years past, but Viktor Orbán’s recent electoral defeat and Yerevan stating its intention to pursue EU membership have upended Moscow’s strategy.
The shift comes into stark relief today, with new Hungarian leader Péter Magyar in Brussels to revive EU ties that fell into disrepair during Orbán’s tenure. Armenia will also skip a summit of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s hold is even weakening in Central Asia, as Beijing vies for influence there, a “trend [that] has become so persistent that Moscow has virtually no chance of reversing it,” an expert wrote.
— Prashant Rao
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Pressure from Russia on Armenia ahead of elections: economy as tool of influen
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A statement was made: “Everything is already clear with Armenia — everyone kno
15:07
The leaders of the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) at a meeting in Astana held a discussion of the situation that is developing around Armenia. As a result, a statement was adopted, which will be published soon, said Russian Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov.
“There, the application was accepted by four managers. … There was a business discussion of the situation that is developing. And everyone is well aware of this situation,” Ushakov said.
At the same time, the Armenian side did not request a separate meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the summit in Astana.
“No, a separate discussion was not planned. And there was no request either,” Ushakov said.
As EADaily reported, in April 2025, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturian approved the law on the republic’s intention to join the EU adopted earlier by the parliament, although the association itself did not even offer membership to the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on April 1, noted that simultaneous presence in the customs union with the EU and the EAEU is impossible by definition. Pashinyan did not come to the current summit of the EAEU leaders in Astana, citing the election campaign
More details: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/05/29/a-statement-was-made-everything-is-already-clear-with-armenia-everyone-knows-the-situation-perfectly-well
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Moving towards the EU is Armenia’s sovereign right, but it should not be done
Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that as Armenia moves closer to the European Union, it will inevitably face difficulties within the Eurasian Economic Union.
Peskov noted that moving towards the EU is Armenia’s sovereign right, but it should not done at the expense of the financial resources of EAEU member states.
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Leaders of four EAEU countries adopt statement on Armenia
May 29 2026
Leaders of four EAEU countries adopt statement on Armenia
Yerevan /Mediamax/. Aide to the Russian President Yury Ushakov said today that the issue of Armenia was discussed at the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit.
“The statement of the leaders of the four EAEU countries has been conveyed to the Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia,” he said, according to TASS. The text of the statement has not yet been published.
Mediamax notes that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is not participating in the session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Kazakhstan due to the campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections in the country. Armenia is represented at the summit by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan.
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Zakharova accused Yerevan of “bending over to the EU” due to its lack of trust
Elections to the National Assembly of Armenia will be held on June 7. According to analysts, the parties of Samvel Karapetyan, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and former President Robert Kocharyan will be key competitors in the elections. Samvel Karapetyan’s “Strong Armenia,” along with Robert Kocharyan’s “Armenia” bloc and Gagik Tsarukyan’s “Prosperous Armenia” party, is one of the most pro-Russian parties in the Armenian parliamentary elections. The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared a report titled “2026 Elections to the National Assembly (Parliament) of Armenia.”
Russia planned to send three State Duma deputies and a representative of the Karachay-Cherkessia election commission to Armenia to observe the parliamentary elections as part of a CIS mission, but their Armenian partners “informally notified” the organization that it was undesirable to include Russians in the mission.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated at a briefing on May 28 that “observers from Russia are being denied permission to observe the elections.” According to Zakharova, Yerevan has not provided an official response to the request on this matter and has not explained the reasons for this position.
“We have no idea what these specific individuals might have done wrong to Armenia. We know that there are a number of individuals who are on some kind of blacklists, stoplists—no, these are not those people. They have never had any problems visiting Armenia,” she stated.
At the same time, Zakharova acknowledged that Russian candidates for CIS observers “are on the European Union’s sanctions list.”
“And this is a kind of bowing posture by official Yerevan before its EU elders (…) If this is true, then it turns out that the Armenian side is once again demonstrating, in the direction of Russia, that it is choosing the anti-Russian course of the EU, Brussels, and the West. How then can we expect assurances of friendship and continued cooperation?” she stated.
Expressing “deep regret and incomprehension” on behalf of the Russian side, Zakharova warned that Moscow “is not ready to accept this logic.” “We will be forced to take it into account in our future work with Yerevan,” she added.
The “Caucasian Knot” reported that at a meeting with Nikol Pashinyan in the Kremlin on April 1, Vladimir Putin warned the Armenian Prime Minister that combining a course toward rapprochement with the EU and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is “impossible by definition,” he stated. He also stated that Moscow would like to see all pro-Russian political forces allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections in Armenia.
The first Armenia-EU summit, which took place in Yerevan on May 4-5, gave Moscow media a reason to accuse Nikol Pashinyan of “betrayal” and an anti-Russian course. Russian officials also echoed similar rhetoric: Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, in his Telegram channel, called the summit participants, including Pashinyan, “brainless Russophobes.”
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Source: Caucasian Knot
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The Armenian side found no violations in the Jermuk samples.
Temporary restrictions on the import of fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, herbs, and strawberries have been imposed by Rosselkhoznadzor since May 30.
As reported by the “Caucasian Knot,” Rosselkhoznadzor imposed temporary restrictions on the import of flowers from Armenia starting May 22, 2026, and on fresh tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, herbs, and strawberries starting May 30. Rospotrebnadzor explained the suspension of imports of all batches of Armenian mineral water “Jermuk” to Russia as a “temporary sanitary measure” due to the detected excess of chemical substances; 37 million bottles were banned from sale. Rosselkhoznadzor also announced a ban on the import of certain cognacs and wines to Russia. Pashinyan called such bans common practice, while opposition representatives saw political overtones in Russia’s actions.
New Jermuk parties blocked in Russia
Rospotrebnadzor sent an additional order to the operator of the state labeling system “Honest Sign” to suspend the sale of 64.5 million units of Jermuk natural mineral drinking carbonated water in the Russian Federation. The order to block new batches is valid from May 28, 2026, until further notice.
“The order was based on the manufacturer’s violations of mandatory requirements of technical regulation legislation. Excessive levels of bicarbonate ions, chlorides, and sulfates were detected in the water. This could lead to misconceptions about its medicinal properties and negatively impact health,” the agency reported, adding that since the beginning of 2026, at the request of Rospotrebnadzor, the operator of the state labeling system “Honest Sign” has already blocked the sale of 38.4 million units of Jermuk bottled water.
An inspection in Armenia found no deviations in the composition of the mineral water
The food safety inspectorate commented to the ARKA news agency on the suspension of the sale of 64.5 million units of Jermuk water in the Russian Federation.
“The regulator conducted a sample collection of Jermuk.” According to the results of the laboratory examination, no deviations were found: the content of “hydrocarbonate”, “sulfate” and “chloride” ions complied with the standards established by the technical regulations of the Customs Union,” the Arka news agency quotes the department’s statement.
Since the circulation of “Jermuk” was suspended by the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Economy of Armenia is resolving the issue, the department reported.
Rosselkhoznadzor doubts the competence of the Ministry of Economy of Armenia
Rosselkhoznadzor believes that the ministry is not coping with the powers vested in it after the abolition of the Ministry of Agriculture of Armenia, TASS reports.
The department stated that in Armenia, as a result of the structural reform of the government in 2019, the Ministry of Agriculture was liquidated and issues of state policy in the field of agriculture were assigned to the Ministry of Economy, which is responsible for Agricultural policy, agricultural processing, livestock farming, veterinary medicine, crop production, the use of pesticides and agrochemicals, organic farming, agricultural cooperatives, and fisheries.
“Considering that Russia is the main market for Armenian agricultural products, and the fact that recently imported products from Armenia do not meet the phytosanitary requirements of the EAEU and Russia, it can be assumed that the Armenian Ministry of Economy is failing to fulfill the powers vested in it following the abolition of the Ministry of Agriculture,” RIA Novosti quotes the ministry as saying.
Russia imposed restrictions on the import of flowers and mineral water as Armenian political forces prepare for parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7. Meanwhile, the European Political Community Summit and the Armenia-EU Summit were held in Yerevan in early May. In this regard, Russian pro-government media accused Armenia of “betrayal” and an anti-Russian course, and Vladimir Putin noted that the Armenian authorities should decide as soon as possible on whether to join the EU or the EAEU. Putin previously stated that combining Armenia’s course toward rapprochement with the EU and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is “impossible by definition,” and noted that Moscow “would like” all pro-Russian political forces to participate in the parliamentary elections in Armenia.
The June parliamentary elections in Armenia will effectively be a referendum on the future of Nikol Pashinyan’s government and the country’s foreign policy. At stake is the preservation of power by the current team or its transition to the opposition, which promises to reconsider the key decisions of recent years, according to the “Caucasian Knot” report “2026 Elections to the National Assembly (Parliament) of Armenia”. Samvel Karapetyan’s “Strong Armenia”, along with Robert Kocharyan’s “Armenia” bloc and Gagik Tsarukyan’s “Prosperous Armenia” party, is one of the most pro-Russian parties in the parliamentary elections of Armenia. The Kremlinis betting on Karapetyan, but by law he cannot participate in the elections, Armenian political scientists pointed out earlier.
As a reminder, in August 2025, hundreds of trucks carrying grapes, plums, and peaches were not allowed to enter Russia at the Upper Lars checkpoint and were forced to return to Armenia. This problem is political in nature, said opposition MP Garnik Danielyan.
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