The Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan strongly protested the H.R. adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives on July 22. 9087 regarding the amendment adopted within the framework of the bill.

The statement of the Parliament states that the accusations against Azerbaijan are unfounded, and the initiative is another example of disregarding the norms and principles of international law. According to Baku, it aims to use the US Congress as an instrument of political pressure for the benefit of the Armenian lobby.

Milli Mejlis also claims that Congressman Brad Sherman, the author of the amendment, has close ties to Armenian lobby groups and consistently promotes their political agenda.

In the statement, the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, as well as a number of deputies of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whom Azerbaijan accuses of prejudice against the country and participation in the anti-Azerbaijani campaign, were also criticized.

The Azerbaijani parliament also rejected the terms “prisoners of war” and “political prisoners” used in the amendment, arguing that it refers to people convicted by Azerbaijani courts of war crimes, terrorism, torture and other serious crimes.

The Milli Mejlis called on the US congressmen to abandon the practice of making decisions under the influence of Armenian lobby groups, to respect Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and international law, and not to hinder the peace process in the South Caucasus.

Let’s remind that H.R. 9087 is a bill related to US foreign policy, within the scope of which, with the amendment presented by Congressman Brad Sherman, the Foreign Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives called on Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Armenian prisoners of war and political prisoners. The Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan protested against that change.

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We have been witnessing a new round of active Iran-US military operations for almost two weeks now. How is this different from the previous one, the US seems to have a desire to expand operations, moreover, the US armed forces used a B-1 Lancer strategic bomber for the first time since the resumption of strikes against Iran, which indicates a significant escalation and expansion of operations by Washington.

What scenario is Iran ready for, how long will it withstand active military operations? By the way, after the first stage of the war against Iran, there were opinions that Iran won politically, while the military victory belonged to the US.

On these and other issues 168.amthe talked with Aram Shahnazaryan, expert on Iran issues, political analyst.

– This stage differs from the previous one not so much in the intensity of military operations, but in their political and strategic logic. If in the previous stage, the statements of Washington and Tel Aviv actually pointed to broader military and political goals: the destruction of Iran’s military potential, the neutralization of its regional influence, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic system, even the disintegration of Iran as a state unit, now the White House, at least at the public level, is trying to present the actions as limited military confrontations.

President Donald Trump declares that the goal of the United States is not to start a large-scale war, but to weaken Iran’s military infrastructure, missile and anti-aircraft capabilities, naval capabilities, as well as the elimination of Tehran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, in Iran, these statements are not perceived as a real limitation of goals. Tehran is convinced that the weakening of the key components of Iran’s containment system is a long-term strategic goal in itself, the end result of which could be the reshaping of the regional power balance to the detriment of Iran.

As for the evaluations of the previous round, the wording “the USA won militarily, and Iran won politically”, in my opinion, is too simplified. Undoubtedly, the United States and Israel demonstrated their technological, intelligence, and air superiority by delivering significant strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, separate links of the military-political command system, and strategic facilities. However, it is equally important to note that Iran was also able to deliver targeted and significant strikes to Israel’s military and strategic facilities, as well as to some components of the American military presence in the region.

Although the various sides present vastly different estimates of the actual scale and damage caused by these strikes, it is clear that their military and psychological impact was felt during the conflict itself, forcing the US and Israel to reconsider the organization of air defenses, deployment of forces, and calculations of future operations.

Therefore, if we evaluate the military results not only from the point of view of the damage inflicted, but also from the point of view of the costs imposed on the enemy, the operational limitations and the effect of deterrence, then it is more correct to talk about the relative results achieved at different levels rather than a one-sided military victory. In this context, it is important to take into account the fact that the criterion of victory in Iran’s strategic culture has never been limited to the results of the battlefield.

It is important for Tehran whether the state preserved its independence of political decisions, whether it prevented the strategic changes imposed by the enemy, whether it continued to act as an independent regional power. For this reason, the prevailing perception in Iranian political circles is that maintaining political resistance even in the face of significant military losses can be considered a success.

If the operations expand, Iran will most likely not choose a classic full-scale war, where the military advantage of the United States is obvious. Instead, it will continue the strategy it has developed in recent decades, relying on asymmetric deterrence. We are talking about targeted strikes of missile and ATS systems, use of pressure levers on maritime communications, cyber operations, increasing military and political costs for the enemy through regional partners and allied structures. The key idea in Iran’s strategic thinking is not how to defeat a militarily more powerful adversary, but how to deprive it of the possibility of a quick and low-cost victory by prolonging the conflict until its political and economic cost becomes unacceptable.

How long Iran will withstand active military operations depends not only on its military resources, but also on its internal political stability, economic resilience and external environment. For years, Iran’s leadership has built its national security concept on the logic of resisting prolonged pressure, taking into account the experience of both the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and decades of sanctions. For this reason, the belief prevails in Tehran today that the state can maintain its strategic vitality even in the face of heavy blows.

At the same time, it is obvious that a long-term, high-intensity war, accompanied by the systemic destruction of military infrastructure and the economy, will significantly limit these opportunities. Therefore, Iran’s primary goal will most likely remain not uncontrolled escalation, but maintaining such controlled pressure that will force Washington to return to the field of political and diplomatic calculations.

– Are there changes in Israel’s actions and what?

– Israel’s current behavior may seem passive at first glance, but in fact it is more about a tactical realignment than a decrease in activity. If in the previous stage, Israel acted as the main initiator of military operations and sought to shape the escalation agenda by its own forces, now there is a change in the distribution of roles. a significant part of the heavy military burden was actually shifted to the USA. This allows Israel to conserve its own military resources, restore air defense and missile defense systems capabilities, perform an intelligence reassessment, and at the same time maintain the ability to quickly join operations if the situation demands.

From Iran’s point of view, this relative restraint of Israel is also due to the experience of the last war. Tehran believes that Iran’s missile and anti-aircraft strikes have shown that even multi-layered air defense cannot completely exclude the vulnerability of Israel’s strategic facilities. For this reason, Israel currently prefers to act more calculatedly, avoiding such steps that could lead to new large-scale retaliatory strikes by Iran. However, this does not mean at all that Israel has abandoned the force option. On the contrary, Tel Aviv continues to maintain high combat readiness, active intelligence activities and the ability to immediately engage in military operations at the right moment.

– Is there a change in Turkey’s position if we take into account the ambitions to have positional advantages in NATO? Let’s not forget that one of the key topics of the NATO summit held in Ankara was Iran, moreover, the concluding declaration clearly stated: Iran should never have nuclear weapons։

– In my opinion, there is no significant strategic change in Turkey’s position, but there is an increase in tactical caution. Ankara continues to try to maintain a difficult balance, on the one hand, remaining a key member of NATO and not opposing the general strategic logic of the alliance, on the other hand, avoiding such steps that could involve it directly in the US/Israel-Iran military conflict. The priority for Turkey remains the preservation of its own national security, economic stability and regional influence, rather than unconditional support of any camp. It is for this reason that Ankara criticizes the military escalation in public statements, but in practical politics it tries to maintain communication channels with both Washington and Tehran.

At the same time, Turkey’s special position in NATO gives it an additional strategic maneuver. Ankara realizes that due to its geographical position, its influence on the Black Sea, the Middle East and energy routes, it has a high value for the bloc, which increases its degree of political independence. This circumstance allows Turkey, if necessary, to act as a mediator or communication platform without giving up its own regional ambitions.

 

If the conflict deepens, Turkey will most likely try to maintain this balancing policy as long as possible. However, if the involvement of the US and NATO expands dramatically, or Turkey’s immediate security environment is threatened, the possibilities of neutrality for Ankara will be limited.

 

– What changes are still waiting for the South Caucasus, and what role does Iran play now, what kind, what is it striving for? More specifically, is there a change in Iran’s position regarding TRIPP, or does Iran just need the border with Armenia not to be disrupted? In this case, to what extent is Iran today the guarantor of Syunik’s security, does it have the ability to do so? 

– The South Caucasus is currently at a stage when the regional power balance is not yet fully formed. The deepening of the US-Iran conflict, the change in Russia’s role, the activity of Turkey and the competition over various transport projects turn the South Caucasus into an area of ​​not only economic, but also strategic significance.

For Iran, this region is directly related to its own national security, because any changes occurring in the South Caucasus may affect the geopolitical position, security and transit possibilities of Iran’s northern borders.

Tehran’s main goal is to maintain such a balance in the region that will exclude its isolation, will not limit the common border with Armenia and will not allow any extra-regional power/US-West-Israel/ or regional power/Turkey-Azerbaijan/ to form a dominant position in its immediate neighborhood.

In this context, the issue of Syunik and the Armenian-Iranian border has not only bilateral, but also strategic significance for Iran. For this reason, Tehran has repeatedly emphasized that the change of the borders of the region or such solutions that can limit Iran’s physical connection with Armenia are not acceptable for it. However, it should also be understood that Iran is not the “guarantor” of Armenia’s security in the sense that a member state of a military alliance can be. Iran’s opportunities are limited by its own national interests, political, diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, by deterrence tools. Tehran is ready to use these tools if it considers that its vital interests or regional balance are threatened.

 Competition over transportation projects is one of the important components of this conflict. According to the Iranian perception, some initiatives, in particular, “Trump’s Path to International Peace and Prosperity”, may have not only an economic but also a geopolitical purpose to change the communication map of the region and reduce Iran’s role as a transit hub.

Therefore, Tehran is trying to promote such projects that will preserve its participation in regional communications and at the same time will not allow the transportation system of the South Caucasus to be formed at the expense of Iran’s interests. In this sense, the instruments of pressure are not limited to the military dimension, but include diplomatic impulses, economic ties, infrastructural initiatives and strengthening of relations with regional partners.

For Iran, under the current crisis, the South Caucasus is also a matter of security depth. As external pressure on Tehran increases, it becomes more important for it to have a stable and predictable environment along its northern borders. Therefore, Iran’s strategic goal is most likely not to establish hegemony in the region, but to maintain such a multipolar balance, where its communication channels, the border with Armenia and the minimum necessary level of its own influence will be preserved.

From this point of view, the issue of Syunik is considered for Iran as a hub of wide regional competition, where the future geopolitical architecture of the South Caucasus is determined.

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168TVof “Trigger” the guest of the program Hayk Khalatyan is the head of the Analytical Center for Strategic Researches and Initiatives.

During the program, key international and regional processes were discussed: the conflict between Iran and the United States, the confrontation between Russia and the collective West, as well as the prospects of Russian-American relations.

Particular attention was paid to the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as the latter’s statement that the “Spirit of Anchorage” is no longer relevant.

The issues of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus, the reaction of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the ongoing geopolitical changes, as well as the prospects for the development of Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku occupied a special place in the conversation.

The visit of the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Germany and his negotiations with the Federal Chancellor Friedrich Mertz were discussed in a separate block.

During the program, an assessment was also made of the current state of Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Armenian relations, as well as the possible scenarios of the future development of the situation in the region against the background of ongoing global geopolitical changes.

Hayk Derzyan

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 The income of Artur Poghosyan, who has been the chairman of the Investigative Committee since 2024, exceeded 54 million drams in 2025. About these and other “achievements” of the President of the Central Committee 168․amis informed from his declaration submitted to the Corruption Prevention Commission in 2026.

In this official form, Artur Poghosyan also mentioned 6 immovable properties owned by him, only one of which is a shared property.

3 parking spaces in the capital bought in 2024 and owned by one person, one apartment bought in 2024 and managed with 50% share ownership again in Yerevan and an apartment and garage bought in 2014 and 2021 in Vanadzor.

In 2025, Artur Poghosyan managed to buy another plot of land in Lori region, in Spitak community, and alienated another property, an apartment, in Vanadzor community.

In this year’s declaration, the President of the Central Committee mentioned about the 2019 Honda car he bought in 2023.

From the line of the document: “Delivered and returned loans” we learn about the 2 million 160,000 AMD loan at the end of the year. “LAV-SAR” LLC was mentioned as the debtor. This LLC is a construction company.

Artur Poghosyan also has a bank deposit of 18 million drams.

About the funds of the President of the Central Committee․

The balances of Artur Poghosyan’s several bank accounts increased during 2025. having the following appearance at the end of the year: 6 dollars, 110 euros, 11,188,615 drams and 213,943 drams. The official’s cash, 14 million drams and 5,000 USD, became 40,000 USD and 1 million drams at the end of the year.

54,159,060 drams of income of the President of the Central Committee for the reporting year was generated from rent payments or other compensations, 16,830,000 drams received from alienation of property, 4,022,383 drams of income tax refund received from the State Revenue Committee, 600,000 drams received from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Republic of Armenia and other payments received from the Central Committee 31,806,677 drams from salary and other payments equal to it.

In the line of payments aimed at repaying the loan, he mentioned 2 loans and directed a total of 14,820,246 drams to their repayment. Poghosyan also spent 2,500,000 drams for the repair of real estate.

Artur Poghosyan reported in the additional public information section: “Belonging to me, Yerevan M. The real estate at 263, building 46/2, Melkonyan Street, although it is indicated in the cadastral certificate as a parking lot, it is actually a warehouse with an area of ​​5.5 square meters.

Anichka Ghukasyan, the wife of the President of the Central Committee, in the line of “delivered and returned loans” of the declaration, he mentioned a loan of 17.6 million drams. the debtor is again a construction company, “ML Mining” LLC. In the table “The balance of principal amount of received loans and borrowings as of December 31 of the reporting year” he informed about the size of the balance of the principal amount of 15,455,192 loans, specifying the apartment as the object of the mortgage.

By the way, he allocated 2,015,784 drams to repay the loan in 2025.

The wife of the president of the Central Committee had 2.5 million drams in cash at the beginning of 2025, and 400 thousand drams at the end of the year.

Anichka Ghukasyan’s income of 597,613 drams for the reporting year was generated from 547,298 drams of other income received from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 17,855 drams of income tax refund received from the SRC, and 32,460 drams of wages and/or other equivalent payments received from “Yerevan Zorayr Khalapyan Primary School No. 156”.

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The 12-hour interrogation of Gagik Tsarukyan ended.

It lasted about 12 hours. Tsarukyan was transferred from the prison to “Yerevan-Kentron” prison.

The interrogation of Tsarukyan started at 11:30 in the morning.

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