Armenia’s Territorial Administration Minister Davit Khdatyan (left) meets with Iran’s Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi in Tehran on Jul. 26

Iranian and Armenian officials have agreed on a new roadmap for energy cooperation that includes integration of electricity grids, hydroelectric power development and an overhaul of an existing gas-for-electricity trade mechanism, as Armenia looks to boost gas imports from Iran.

The agreements were finalized during two high-level meetings in Tehran, involving Iran’s ministers of energy and oil, and Armenia’s Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure, Davit Khudatyan, Tehran Times reported on Monday.

The developments mark a strategic pivot for both nations, aiming not only to complete long-pending infrastructure projects but also to position Armenia as a potential transit hub for Iranian natural gas exports to broader international markets.

Officials from both sides described the talks as “highly constructive,” emphasizing their shared determination to transform bilateral energy relations from a simple barter system into a multidimensional, commercially robust partnership.

In the first of the two meetings, Iran’s Energy Minister, Abbas Aliabadi, hosted Khudatyan to review the status of joint electricity projects. According to statements from the Energy Ministry, the two sides placed particular emphasis on accelerating the implementation of the third power transmission line—a project that has remained stalled for over 12 years—as well as developing the broader Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia power corridor.

The third transmission line, designed to operate at 230 kilovolts, has faced significant delays, primarily due to liquidity constraints affecting cabling works. In their discussions, both ministers underscored the urgency of securing the necessary financial resources to resolve this bottleneck, thereby ensuring the line can be energized and brought into service.

The Tehran Times reported that an Iranian contractor involved in the project has pledged to complete the installation of transmission towers in two sections of the project within the next month.

Beyond this longstanding project, Aliabadi raised the prospect of constructing the Meghri run-of-the-river hydroelectric power plant. The Armenian side responded positively, referencing prior agreements and expressing full readiness to cooperate.

An Omani company has reportedly stepped forward with an offer to finance and implement the Meghri project, which could add approximately 200 megawatts of clean, renewable capacity to the regional grid, Tehran Times reported.

A focal point of the discussions was the development of the Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia power corridor. Aliabadi emphasized that technical and economic studies have already confirmed the viability of electricity exchanges along this route. Highlighting Iran’s technical expertise, he announced that Iranian companies stand ready to construct the transmission line segment between Armenia and Georgia, effectively linking the Caucasus to the broader Eurasian energy network.

This corridor is viewed as a strategic asset for Iran, providing a direct overland route to northern markets and reducing reliance on maritime chokepoints.

Aliabadi described Armenia as “one of the main links” in this vision, noting that alongside Armenia, other countries are actively involved in the planning stages to operationalize this high-voltage connection.

In parallel with these infrastructure ambitions, both nations addressed environmental concerns regarding the Arax River, a vital waterway bordering the two countries. Aliabadi confirmed that discussions touched upon pollution control measures, and both sides expressed a strong interest in convening the Arax River pollution working group in the near future.

The Iranian minister also highlighted domestic progress, noting that Iran has added approximately 9,000 megawatts to its national power generation capacity over the past year—a development that strengthens its ability to export electricity while meeting internal demand.

While the energy ministry focused on electrical infrastructure, a second meeting took place between Khudatyan and Iran’s Oil Minister, Mohsen Paknejad. The discussions at this session revolved around overhauling the decades-old gas-for-electricity barter arrangement that currently underpins bilateral energy trade.

Paknejad described Armenia as “one of Iran’s important neighbors” and emphasized Tehran’s willingness to assist its friendly counterpart within the framework of its capabilities.

He proposed a fundamental shift in commercial strategy: defining a new model for gas trade that would go beyond simple swaps. Specifically, Iran is exploring the feasibility of exporting natural gas through Armenian territory to access third-party markets, effectively transforming Yerevan into a transit corridor for Iranian energy resources.

“The current model of cooperation is based on gas-for-electricity barter,” Paknejad explained. “However, Iran’s clear proposal is to define a new commercial model for gas exports. Implementing this requires examining existing infrastructure and the possibility of expanding gas trade beyond Armenia’s market and through its territory.”

The Oil Minister acknowledged the technical and commercial complexities inherent in this proposal, stressing that it would require extensive expert-level studies. To address these challenges, both sides agreed to establish a joint specialized working group dedicated to the energy sector. This working group is tasked with analyzing infrastructure capacities, assessing commercial viability, and preparing the ground for the new model’s implementation.

The scope of the oil ministry’s discussions extended well beyond gas exports. Paknejad and Khudatyan reviewed a broad spectrum of cooperation areas, including the trade of petroleum products, the export of technical and engineering services, and the potential construction of a refinery to meet Armenia’s domestic needs.

Khudatyan acknowledged the existing cooperation, noting that Armenia currently utilizes Iranian products in its road construction projects—an indication of the practical ties that already exist between the two nations. He expressed Yerevan’s strong interest in increasing the volume of energy exchanges and deepening bilateral collaboration “more than ever.”

The decision to form the joint working group was met with approval by both sides. Paknejad proposed that the group commence its activities as swiftly as possible, with results and follow-up achievements to be reviewed at the next high-level ministerial meeting.

Khudatyan echoed this sentiment, stating that the two countries are “determined to expand bilateral cooperation across all relevant areas.” He confirmed that the working group would begin its operations “in the shortest possible time,” focusing on all domains falling under the purview of the two ministries.

One of the most tangible deliverables of the talks is the 400 kilovolt transmission line, currently under construction between the two countries. Khudatyan provided an update on this critical infrastructure, acknowledging that while certain obstacles remain, both sides are committed to resolving them through active consultation. He expressed optimism that with sustained joint cooperation, the project will be commissioned by the end of the current calendar year.

Aliabadi, Iran’s energy minister, in his remarks, framed the broader context of these projects as a natural extension of the long-standing historical and brotherly ties between Tehran and Yerevan. “Both countries have always strived to develop these relations,” he stated, emphasizing that Khudatyan’s visit was specifically aimed at completing unfinished projects and initiating new joint ventures.

The proposed gas export transit model, if implemented, could fundamentally alter regional energy flows, offering Iran a vital gateway to northern markets while providing Armenia with enhanced energy security and transit revenues.

Simultaneously, the push to complete the two transmission lines, alongside the development of the Meghri hydroelectric plant and the Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia corridor, signals a long-term commitment to physical grid integration. These projects, once realized, will diversify energy routes, increase regional resilience, and foster economic interdependence.

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EDITOR’S NOTE: Asbarez will publish, with regular frequency, prepared by the Center for Armenian Research and Analysis, reports pertaining to Artsakh, in an effort to record the rampant exploitation of Artsakh’s resources and wealth. These reports will focus on what is being built on the currently occupied lands of Artsakh, who is building it, who is paying for it, who is being paid, and who is reaping the blood profits from the destruction of a whole civilization, its people and culture.

SPECIAL FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMENIAN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

Fourteen hours out of Baku. Professional guide, comfortable transport, entry to all sites, hotel pickup. Guides available in English, Russian, Italian, Turkish, and Spanish. Listed among the inclusions, without comment or explanation: “Permission to enter Karabakh zone.”

You can book it on Marriott’s own platform. You will earn Marriott Bonvoy points.

Read the itinerary and you arrive at the tenth stop–a monument every Armenian can picture without being told its name: Babik-Mamik, “We Are Our Mountains,” the Grandmother and Grandfather.

Hewn from volcanic tuff, set into the heights above Stepanakert, Marriott’s copy calls it “one of the most well-known landmarks in the Karabakh region,” a “notable example of regional stone art and architecture.” However, the word Armenian appears nowhere in the listing, in the description, anywhere. Not beside the monument, not beside the university built in occupied Stepanakert, not beside the parliament building of a republic that existed for thirty-two years and was extinguished in a week, the home of a land and people that has existed and flourished for millenia.

The tour promises visitors “the rebirth of a region,” a land “now welcoming visitors after decades.”

After decades of what? The sentence declines to say. That silence is not sloppy copywriting. It is part of the plan.

This is the condition of Artsakh in 2026.

In September 2023, after a nine-month blockade that starved a population of food, fuel, and medicine, Azerbaijan emptied the land of more than 120,000 indigenous Armenians in a matter of days, the completion of an ethnic cleansing, and by the assessment of former prosecutors of the International Criminal Court, a genocide.

Armenian hostages remain in Baku’s prisons, hostages to this day. At least eighty forcibly disappeared and more than two hundred missing persons remain unaccounted for, and Azerbaijan is not meeting its obligation to investigate or acknowledge a single one of them.

What follows the emptying is the erasure. Churches are destroyed or “restored” into something else, culture, identity appropriated. Cemeteries vanish. Stepanakert becomes Khankendi, Shushi becomes Shusha, Akna becomes Aghdam, and the crime becomes a “Great Return,” $14 billion in “reconstruction,” glossy urban-development panels, and a global media forum convened in occupied Shushi to teach the world’s journalists the “correct” vocabulary to present murder and genocide as restoration and sovereignty.

And, this is where the West arrives. Not as witness; as both vendor and customer.

Anglo Asian Mining, listed in London, issued a press release in 2020 welcoming the “liberation” of territory it intended to mine, and today it extracts gold, among other undisclosed ores, from Artsakh soil; a sitting U.S. Senate candidate holds a stake in it worth up to $5 million, his largest single disclosed investment. Italy’s Ansaldo Energia supplies the substations. The German-Azerbaijani Chamber of Commerce ran a “Karabakh Strategic Reconstruction Mission” this spring, walking business leaders through Kovsakan, Berdzor, occupied Shushi, Stepanakert, and Akna in search of opportunity. Slovakia’s president toured the ruins in July and went home to arrange export financing. The United Nations lent its World Urban Forum to Baku, where officials discussed “restoring destroyed identity” in cities whose identity they had just destroyed.

Marriott International notes that its activities platform operates under license rather than direct ownership. The domain is Marriott’s. The brand is Marriott’s. The loyalty points are Marriott’s. A corporation does not get to franchise its name onto the whitewashing of a crime against humanity and then plead that the paperwork sits with a subcontractor.

The Center for Armenian Research and Analysis (CARA) is a trans-national research institute that provides investigative, analytic, and informational resources to public and private entities across the Armenian experiential spectrum.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses a Victory Parade in Moscow on May 9

In a telephone conversation initiated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, President Vladimir Putin of Russia on Monday urged the Armenian leader to hold a national referendum on Armenia’s membership in the European Union or remaining in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.

According to the Kremlin, Putin reaffirmed the joint statement adopted on May 29 in Astana with the leaders of the three EEU member states on Armenia’s actions regarding joining the EU.

In the May statement, the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan issued an ultimatum to Armenia, threatening to suspend its membership in the EEU. The declaration cited the 2025 Armenian parliament approval of a government-backed measure to seek EU membership, as well as a reaffirmation by EU leaders in a declaration signed in Yerevan on May 5.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters the Putin-Pashinyan conversation on Monday “focused on the statement recently adopted by the leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union countries on Armenia. The need to hold a referendum in Armenia as soon as possible to decide which direction Armenia wants to go was emphasized.”

Weeks before the Astana meeting, during his speech at a Victory Day celebration, which Pashinyan did not attend, Putin had proposed what he called a “mutually beneficial divorce” with Armenia, given Yerevan’s mixed signals about joining the EU and remaining in the EEU.

According to an Armenian government statement, the referendum reference in the EEU declaration would be practically possible only after Armenia officially submits an application for EU membership, making the issue a concrete matter for consideration.

The statement from Pashinyan’s office said the conversation focused on challenges affecting economic relations between Moscow and Yerevan.

Ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections, Russia created roadblocks and placed sanctions on imports from Armenia, especially agricultural products, citing safety concerns. These steps have created challenges for Armenian exporters. The EU provided a multi-million euro package to Armenia and eased import restrictions to allow the flow of Armenian products in the European market.

According to the Armenian government, Pashinyan stressed that restrictions on the export of Armenian products to the Russian market contradict the legal and contractual framework governing Armenia-Russia relations, as well as the EEU regulations. He reportedly asked the Russian president to take steps to resolve the issue.

Pashinyan also reaffirmed the Armenian government’s readiness to address these issues through open, constructive and friendly dialogue with its partners.

Moscow has not yet congratulated Pashinyan or the ruling Civil Contract Party on their election victory.

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