Turkish Press: Pashinyan steadfast in turning Armenia into Ukraine BY MELIH ALTINOK

Daily Sabah, Turkey
Oct 5 2023

Armenia has been steadily losing territory to Azerbaijan since 2020, with the Azerbaijani Army recently achieving complete control over Karabakh.

Amid these developments, one might wonder whether Russia, Armenia’s longstanding ally, remained passive.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan certainly thinks so. He argues that Russia has fallen short in safeguarding the Armenian population in Karabakh. Pashinyan believes that placing Armenia’s security solely in the hands of Russia was a strategic error and that they have been contemplating a broader partnership with Western nations.

However, the Kremlin appears to dismiss Armenia’s “flirtation” with the West with mere rhetoric, stating firmly, “We have no intentions of withdrawing from the region.”

Curiously, the West seems equally disengaged when it comes to Armenia, mirroring Russia’s apparent disinterest. A recent display of mock troops sent to Armenia for supposed exercises serves as a clear indication of the level of seriousness with which they regard Pashinyan’s overtures.

It appears that Pashinyan is endeavoring to provoke Putin into breaking this impasse and constructing the desired relationship with the West through assertive actions. The recent approval of the Rome Statute in the Armenian Parliament represents the latest provocative step in this pursuit.

As commonly understood, the Rome Statute serves as the foundational document for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The binding authority of ICC rulings hinges on whether nations are signatories to the Rome Statute. Countries that have ratified the Rome Statute are obligated to enforce ICC decisions, while non-signatory nations can grant the court jurisdiction over specific crimes. In the past, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin on the grounds of the “unlawful deportation” of Ukrainian children.

With the recent decision passed by Pashinyan in parliament, he conveys a clear message to Putin, who seems reluctant to take decisive action: any movement toward Armenia will lead to potential arrest.

What could be the underlying motive behind this seemingly “unconventional” move, apart from possibly pressuring Moscow into intervention, similar to what occurred in Ukraine?

Nevertheless, Putin is a seasoned and unflappable leader, renowned for his ability to make composed decisions even when faced with global opposition. Luring him into a precarious situation is no easy task.

Perhaps Pashinyan is calculating that Putin’s focus on Ukraine may dissuade him from opening up a new front in Armenia.

However, Armenia is not even a burden on Putin, who, in addition to Ukraine, plays chess with the United States in Africa, the Pacific and Syria. He doesn’t seem inclined to intervene or even acknowledge it. The Azerbaijani Army, benefiting from the Kremlin’s passive stance, looms ominously close to Armenia’s borders. What’s more, Aliyev’s armed forces, driven by the zeal and confidence of resolving the three-decade-old Karabakh conflict, are as formidable as ever. It is widely known that they enjoy unwavering support from Türkiye. Armenia’s military appears powerless, and it seems they could surrender Yerevan to Azerbaijan without a single shot fired.

Setting aside these dynamics, the U.S. has little goodwill to spare, particularly in the run-up to elections. Just recently, the White House declared that the U.S. lacks the resources for long-term military aid to Ukraine.

As for the military assistance pledged to Armenia by French President Emmanuel Macron, delivered from Africa, it appears inadequate to secure Pashinyan’s position.

Following the path of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who led his nation into a “precarious venture” driven by Western assurances, Pashinyan should reconsider. Such a course would be detrimental to the already struggling Armenian populace, who have endured their share of hardships.

A refugee crisis is developing in Armenia. A political crisis will likely quickly follow

euronews
Oct 5 2023

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan faces the challenge of providing for Nagorno Karabakh refugees while mitigating risks of Azeri aggression against sovereign Armenian territory.

Caught against a setting sun, the clouds on Monday evening formed an otherworldly spiral of burnt orange above the town of Goris, eastern Armenia.

The day before, a lonely bus ferried in the last of some 100,000 ethnic Armenians fleeing a one-day military campaign that saw Azeri forces secure complete control of the once-autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, itself situated within Azerbaijan’s borders.

Few among the new arrivals have any love for Nikol Pashinyan. A feeling shared by thousands of demonstrators who poured out in the Armenian capital of Yerevan last week to protest against the prime minister’s handling of relations with Azerbaijan and Russia, viewed as precipitating the loss of a place regarded by many as the spiritual homeland of the Armenian people.

While the initial unrest may have since quietened down, what recent developments in the long-running conflict between these South Caucasian nations may mean for Pashinyan’s hold on power remains an open and deeply fraught question.

“It’s the most terrifying thing in the world, losing everything like this.”

Mila Hovsepyan spoke softly as if in a daze from a shelter in Goris near the Armenian-Azeri border on Monday afternoon. She and her mother Maro, who suffers from severe mental disability due to advanced cerebral arteriosclerosis, arrived just days before on a bus from Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital of Stepanakert.

“We went straight to the hospital because my mother is very unwell. She cannot walk, and needs a separate toilet and bathroom so I can wash her with dignity,” Mila explained. “We need a wheelchair for me to move her, and a special mattress that prevents sores because she spends almost all of her time in bed.”

“We have no family here,” she said. “It’s the most terrifying thing in the world, losing everything like this.”

At this stage, their story is fairly typical. The vast majority fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia over the past week have now pushed deeper into the country, afraid of remaining so close to the border and the Azeri forces stationed there. Those left behind in Goris are largely either elderly or infirm, or without relatives in Armenia who might otherwise provide assistance.

Azerbaijan’s seizure of the mountainous enclave, which has claimed but failed to secure international recognition of independence since 1991, happened at lightning speed. Following a build-up of Azeri troops around the region, Russian peacekeepers stationed in the area fell short of preventing the launch of an all-out offensive on September 19 that lasted less than 24 hours before authorities in Stepanakert announced their surrender.

Although Artsakh, as it was known by its ethnic Armenian inhabitants, had by that point been under blockade for more than ten months, restricting the supply of food and desperately needed medicines, deputy mayor of Goris Irina Yolyan says there was little Armenian authorities might have done to prepare for an exodus of this scale.

“Right now we’re addressing their immediate needs – shelter, food, clothing and medicine,” she said. “At the same time, we’re also registering people and trying to understand what they may need in the near- to mid-term, especially as winter approaches.”

Asked about how Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has handled relations with both Azerbaijan and Russia, still formally a mediator between the long-warring South Caucasian nations, her manner becomes suddenly cold.

“Thousands of families are now homeless. Azerbaijan is like a steamroller across asphalt,” she said. “Nothing is stopping them, and this situation creates a great unhappiness, a great discontent with territorial losses and the sheer level of human suffering.”

Most Armenians welcomed what seemed a new dawn in the country’s politics when Nikol Pashinyan assumed power following a pro-democracy and anti-corruption revolution in 2018. Many have now grown increasingly disillusioned with the Prime Minister’s attempts to turn away from historic reliance on Moscow as a security guarantor to seek warmer ties with the West. That disillusionment last week boiled over into protests on the streets of Yerevan, with placards and chanted slogans denouncing Pashinyan as a ‘traitor’ to the country’s interests.

According to Maximilian Hess, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Pennsylvania, the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh has called Pashinyan’s diplomacy into serious doubt. The prime minister’s legitimacy now appears to rest on the question of how his government faces up to the challenges of managing the emerging refugee crisis, while at the same time mitigating risks of Azeri aggression against sovereign Armenian territory.

Prior to the assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan had long expressed keen interest in the prospect of opening up a corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan, an autonomous Azeri enclave within Armenian borders. This would in turn provide an overland passage to Turkey, further cementing Azerbaijan’s emerging position as a key trade and transit hub for Russia amid Western sanctions imposed in response to Putin’s war in Ukraine.

“The government is now in a place where it has very little room to manoeuvre,” Hess said. “The refugee crisis is really a question of state capacity – this is not a particularly wealthy country. What would precipitate further demonstrations would be a deteriorating situation around the refugees, and also the potential for further conflict with Azerbaijan.”

“I’m not saying the political crisis is necessarily going to lead to a revolutionary change in government,” he clarified. “But Pashinyan will need international help to ensure there isn’t a further deepening of that crisis as the result of Azerbaijani aggression turning it into a question about the future of Armenia itself.”

Right now, these wider geopolitical dilemmas all remain fairly academic to Bernik Lazaryan, who fled Nagorno-Karabakh last week with his wife, mother and infant daughter. Over several hours one night prior to his departure, he claims to have carried home the body of a childhood friend shot dead by Azeri forces, only to discover their village had already fallen.

“I have no idea what will happen to us next,” he said outside the Soviet-era Hotel Goris, where he is currently being put up with his family. “We must simply find a way to live.”

Russia leaves Armenia ally to burn in Azerbaijan

Asia Times
Oct 5 2023


Azerbaijan’s violent ouster of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh seized on Russia’s weakness caused by the Ukraine war

Vladimir Putin, self-declared protector of ethnic Russian and other allied communities along Russia’s borders, failed last week to defend nominal Armenians allies who live in Azerbaijan from being driven out of the country by the Azeri army.

Though distant geographically, the Azerbaijan offensive was a byproduct of Putin’s failure to conquer Ukraine, where the Russian leader has also pledged to defend ethnic Russian allies. Such active solidarity is one of the Kremlin’s key foreign policy talking points.

But Azerbaijan took the opportunity of Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine to end more than three decades of war with pro-Russian Armenians living in the breakaway Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians are now effectively no longer in Azerbaijan.

Russia’s war in Ukraine seems to have played a role in the spasm of violence. The Azerbaijan government gambled that Putin would be unwilling to take on a new military operation, however small, while fighting a full-scale war in Ukraine.

Armenians inside Azerbaijan and within Armenia suspect that Ukraine had sapped Russia’s war-making abilities. “Armenia’s security architecture was 99.999% linked to Russia, including when it came to the procurement of arms and ammunition,” Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said.

“Today we see that Russia itself is in need of weapons, arms and ammunition and in this situation it’s understandable that even if it wishes, the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia’s security needs.”  

In any event, Azerbaijan’s action is the latest of multiple, unexpected and negative events along Russia’s borders stemming from the Ukraine war.

Russia faces a new NATO adversary in Finland, which rushed to join NATO after the  Ukraine war. Before the invasion, Helsinki, even if wary of Russia, maintained a formal neutrality between Moscow and the West. Sweden, shelving a long tradition of neutrality in Europe, is also joining.  



The fallout of Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia

GIS Reports
Oct 5 2023

Azerbaijan rid itself of Russia’s “frozen conflict” hotspot. Routing Yerevan’s army has accelerated the changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Southern Caucasus.

  • The victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia has far-reaching consequences
  • Turkey’s role in the Southern Caucasus has grown, and Russia’s has waned
  • Isolated Armenia risks being left out of new strategic transport routes

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan renewed its military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. The aim of its “anti-terror operation” was to force what it referred to as “illegal Armenian military formations” to surrender their weapons and to dissolve the “illegal regime” of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh. 

After less than 24 hours of fighting, the Armenian side surrendered. The message is that Azerbaijan has decided to once and for all suppress any form of self-determination for the ethnic Armenian population living in the once-autonomous province.

The return of kinetic warfare ended a period of rising hopes that, after more than three decades of intermittent war, Armenia and Azerbaijan might finally be nearing a negotiated peace. A first step was taken in early May 2023, when United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken hosted Azeri Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan for preliminary talks in Washington. Significant progress was said to have been made, as the sides “agreed on principles” for normalizing their bilateral relations.

By early June, optimism was growing that a peace deal might be signed by year’s end. Yet, matters started to slip by the end of the month when the parties met for intense talks in the U.S. The Azeri side imposed a blockade on the ethnic Armenian population in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, trapping some 120,000 people and provoking accusations of genocide from the Armenian side. The official explanation from Baku was that it was merely a question of environmental activists seeking to stop illegal mining.

The failure of Western-led mediation will translate into a significant loss of influence.

Attempts at mediation continued, involving the U.S. and the European Union, and separately, Russia. Yet, on July 21, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan warned that renewed war must be considered “very likely” without a peace deal. The conflict was edging toward a resolution with force mainly because the geopolitical framework had turned decisively against Armenia. 

There are three dimensions where the stakes in the process go far beyond Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

The first concerns the international order of peaceful conflict resolution. When the Soviet Union collapsed, ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh found themselves a landlocked minority inside independent Azerbaijan. Taking up arms to fight for independence, they were supported by the armed forces of Armenia, which, in turn, were backed clandestinely by Russian armed forces. The outcome was an Armenian occupation of territories that stretched between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper. The self-declared Republic of Artsakh was proclaimed in September 1991.

Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s territories held by Armenian military since the 1994 cease-fire. © GIS

Following the 1994 cease-fire agreement, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) embarked on a lengthy but feeble process of seeking durable peace. That process was halted in 2020 when Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to recapture the Armenian-occupied territories. With support from Turkey, the Azeri forces came close to complete victory. In a last-ditch intervention, Russia managed to broker a cease-fire that entailed the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. Their primary mission was to ensure free movement along the Lachin Corridor that connects Armenia proper with the remnants of Artsakh.

Three years later, Azerbaijan delivered the final blow to the enclave, and now it is questionable if the West will have any future role in the South Caucasus. The failure of Western-led mediation will translate into a significant loss of influence. The problem is compounded by a crisis in the EU’s relations with Georgia. These approached rock bottom as the government in Tbilisi has been reluctant to condemn the Russian war against Ukraine. Meanwhile, relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are tightening, and the geopolitical circumstances in this strategically important region have shifted in their favor.

Stefan Hedlund
is a professor of Russian Studies at Uppsala University.

The second and related dimension concerns the future role of Russia in the South Caucasus. While Armenia and Azerbaijan remained at war, Moscow was able to cement its role as regional hegemon by playing both sides. Although it presented itself as a protector of Armenia, with a sizeable military garrison at Gyumri, it was not shy about selling weapons to both sides. The war in 2020 has brought that balancing act to a screeching halt. 

Although the Moscow-brokered cease-fire that year did save the Armenian forces from a rout, that intervention may well have been the last stand for Russia in the South Caucasus. 

Having long been able to use the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as leverage to remain a regional hegemon, Moscow has now been decisively outflanked by Turkey. Likely, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rationale for meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi shortly before Azerbaijan’s attack was to inform the Russian side about the pending operation and to demand that its peacekeepers stand aside, which they did. 

The currently dominant transportation route through the region is the east-west Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

It is symptomatic that Moscow did not react when, in the early hours of the assault, the deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping force, Captain First Rank (Colonel) Ivan Kovgan, was killed. Although he was a senior officer, having served as deputy commander of the submarine force of Russia’s Northern Fleet, his death did not cause much public reaction from Moscow. And it is also telling that Armenia recently opted to hold military drills with U.S. forces.

The third – and in a longer-term perspective, most important – dimension of the geopolitical transformation concerns the regional transport infrastructure. The geographical location of the South Caucasus, wedged between the Caspian and the Black Seas, means that it is critical to controlling the main transport arteries between east and west (China and Europe) and north and south (Russia and the Indian Ocean nations). 

In the Soviet era, the South Caucasus was a major conduit for the flow of goods from southern Russia along the Caspian seaboard in Azerbaijan, and onward to Iran and India. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh blocked that route, as its vital link through southern Azerbaijan ended up in a war zone. The railroad link that skirted its southern border fell into disuse and disrepair.

The currently dominant transportation route through the region is the east-west Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Also known as the Middle Corridor, it forms part of the well-funded Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013.

Iran is attempting to break its international isolation by promoting two alternative routes to revive the link from north to south. One is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 kilometer-long “multimode” network of shipping lines, rails and roads that links India with Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan. At present, it is mainly used for running guns from Iran to Russia. 

Tehran has also sought to revive an old proposal for a corridor from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea that would connect Mumbai in India with Bandar Abbas in Iran and proceed onward to Europe via the South Caucasus, bridging Georgia and Bulgaria across the Black Sea.

Banking on its traditional friendship with Iran, Armenia hopes this latter corridor will bypass Azerbaijan. Its optimism is enhanced by India, which has emerged as a prominent provider of weapons shipped via Iran. Under a $245 million deal signed in October 2022, New Delhi agreed to supply Yerevan with multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank rockets and drones, and equipment for demining, communication and night-vision surveillance. 

Following decades of mutual animosity, the Armenian side has every reason to fear that life for those who become subjects of Azerbaijan will not be easy.

In March 2023, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan said the country’s armed forces had received significant deliveries of weapons and ammunition. At the same time, an Armenian delegation visiting New Delhi sought Indian investments for the Persian Gulf-Black Sea Corridor to be drawn via Armenian territory. The proposal was timed to coincide with a visit by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan. Eager to circumvent the Suez Canal and avoid disruptions caused by the confrontation between Russia and the West, India may find the idea tempting.

The main problem for both variants of a north-south corridor is that they mainly serve for arms smuggling. In contrast, the BRI and the Middle Corridor bypassing Russia and Iran are firmly based on commercial interest. And while Russia and Iran are economic basket cases, the powers behind the Middle Corridor have ample resources.

In the final analysis, much will depend on whether some form of peace can be engineered. The core concern is the fate of the ethnic Armenian population that remains inside Nagorno-Karabakh. The two sides have agreed in principle to recognize each other’s territorial integrity, which means that the story of Artsakh is over. But the outlook for sustained peace is uncertain. 

Following decades of mutual animosity, the Armenian side has every reason to fear that life for those who become subjects of Azerbaijan will not be easy. Although the Azeri blockade of the Lachin Corridor (a mountain road linking Armenia and Artsakh) hardly qualifies as a crime against humanity, it seriously indicates what may be in store for the Armenian minority. The possibility of discrimination and ethnic cleansing policies cannot be ruled out. The outcome of the “anti-terror operation” casts a shadow.

Yerevan is running short on friends who might support its cause. It had a good run with Russia as a patron. Its successful assault on Azerbaijan in the early 1990s would not have been possible without Russian support. The same was true about maintaining the illegal occupation of Azerbaijan’s territories. But these days, Armenia has abandoned all hope of help from Russia in securing an equitable peace. 

The Armenian position is so weak that Yerevan may have to accept promises it does not feel it can trust.

Looking to the West for help may appear a logical alternative. Under other circumstances, given their emphasis on human rights and minority protection, Western governments would be sympathetic. But Armenia has alienated many potential Western supporters by cultivating friendship with Iran and playing an intermediary role in Russian sanctions-busting schemes. In 2022, it helped Russia obtain significant shipments of U.S.- and EU-made chips, processors, and the desired consumer goods, such as autos.  

If India continues to veer toward the West, Armenia’s only remaining friend will be Iran. Although the two only share a short border stretch, Iran has been a vital supplier of energy and other necessities over the years. However, if needed, it will be easy for Azerbaijan to seal this passage, leaving landlocked Armenia isolated between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 

It is possible to envision a scenario where international mediation succeeds in brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It would need to contain a mutual pledge to respect each other’s territorial integrity and guarantees for Azerbaijan’s Armenian minority. What speaks in favor of this outcome is that the Armenian position is so weak that Yerevan may have to accept promises it does not feel it can trust. But that still leaves open the question of what Azerbaijan is playing for.

A more likely scenario is that Azerbaijan keeps stalling the process in hopes of securing what it views as the main prize. At the core of the alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan lies the prospect of a transport corridor that links Turkey with Central Asia via Azerbaijan. The key is the Zangezur Corridor, a stretch of land in southern Armenia that separates Azerbaijan from its Nakhichevan exclave, which, in turn, borders Turkey. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh blocked the corridor, which since has remained inaccessible.

Although the Russia-brokered cease-fire did entail opening Zangezur for transport, it was under Russian control, and Armenia refused even to discuss extra-territoriality. Under the present circumstances, Baku will likely maintain pressure on Armenia until it gets concessions on Zangezur. That will open the door for Turkey to expand its presence in Central Asia.

President Erdogan recently lashed out at Iran for opposing the Zangezur Corridor. With a boost in financing from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan for the Middle Corridor and the financial muscle of the Middle Kingdom in the background, the odds favor an enhanced role for Turkey, reduced prospects for Iranian-Armenian cooperation and waning Russian influence in the South Caucasus.

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/azerbaijan/

Editor’s take: The trampling of Armenia

EURACTIV
Oct 5 2023

DISCLAIMER: All opinions in this column reflect the views of the author(s), not of EURACTIV Media network.

As EU leaders gather in Granada today, their most publicised agenda item is the situation with Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh following a 24-hour military operation that ended almost four decades of tension.

The international press has focused on Azerbaijan’s strongman, Ilhan Aliyev, who snubbed the five-way talks planned on the sidelines of the summit with the leaders of France, Germany, and Armenia, hosted by Council President Charles Michel.

Such a snub is embarrassing for the hosts. But Aliyev is the EU’s favourite dictator. After Russia attacked Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s gas became precious as Russian supplies dwindled.

Aliyev has so far accepted all the invitations by the EU’s Michel to discuss Karabakh, and there were many photo opportunities with his Armenian counterpart Nikol Pashinyan, despite the total failure of the exercise.

Now Aliyev took Karabakh as a low-hanging fruit because he could.

He can also claim there is no ethnic cleansing: The population of 120,000 left to seek refuge in Armenia, not because Aliyev’s army drove them out but because they feared this would happen. There is no damage to civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and housing or to cultural and religious sites in Karabakh, the UN said.

So everything is fine, the EU’s favourite dictator has accomplished the perfect war – without casualties, without destruction, without war crimes.

Moreover, under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory of Azerbaijan, so one may argue that this was going to happen sooner or later.

Aliyev succeeded, it seems, because Europe has forgotten how things went down in Munich in 1938.

Appeasing the dictator (Hitler in that case) was the basis of the 1938 agreement between France, the UK, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. It essentially provided for the German annexation of a part of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland, where more than three million people, mainly ethnic Germans, lived.

Giving Hitler “what he wants” to appease him was of course a shameful and wrong move.

Aliyev is suspected of gearing up for another war, whose aim is to establish a land corridor between the Azeri enclave of Nahichivan and mainland Azerbaijan – by grabbing Armenian territory.

And he has the support of Turkey, which has megalomaniac dreams about a bigger Turkic corridor, all the way from Anatolia to the Uigurs in China. The only piece of land lacking to complete this puzzle is Armenian territory.

Aliyev knew he would be under pressure in Granada, alone against four at the five-way talks, so he turned down the invitation. As a pretext, he used “pro-Armenian statements” by French officials and an alleged French decision to supply Yerevan with military equipment.

French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna was the first Western official to visit Yerevan after the fall of Karabakh. But she didn’t announce a decision to supply Armenia with French armament. What she said was:

“France has given its agreement to the conclusion of future contracts with Armenia, which will allow the delivery of military equipment to Armenia so that it can ensure its defence.”

Giving “an agreement” for the conclusion of future contracts does not mean military supplies would start anytime soon. And France doesn’t have much to send anyway, as the supplies sent to Ukraine have dried up the stocks.

The real context: France is home to half a million ethnic Armenians and Colonna needed to visit Yerevan and say something that would sound nice and appropriate. Aliyev knows that, but the pretext was just too good to pass up.

The EU made a major mistake by not inviting Turkish President Recep Erdoğan to the five-way mediation talks in Granada. The Turkish president is a major player in the region, and a strong backer of Azerbaijan, and should not be absent from such talks.

If the Granada meeting was expected to be a milestone, indeed, it will be one, in terms of failed European policies.

The gathering will likely encourage Aliyev and Erdoğan to go ahead and grab from Armenia what they want. The Armenians can try to fight – but perhaps they had better surrender. It seems no one is really prepared to help them.

[Edited by Zoran Radosavljevic]


LA Times Today: Armenian Americans say another genocide is underway in Nagorno-Karabakh, rally for U.S. action

World & Nation
[SEE VIDEO]
Salpi Ghazarian is the special initiatives director at USC’s Institute of Armenian Studies, and she joined Lisa McRee with more on the conflict and what it means to the Southland’s Armenian community.

M-S: Frankfurt Demonstration Supports Artsakh

Protestors in Frankfurt

M-S: Samantha Power Visits Armenia

Suren Sargsyan

On September 25, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development Samantha Power arrived in Armenia accompanied by US Department of State Acting Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Yuri Kim.

Power has previously served in the Obama Administration as the 28th US Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2013-2017). Before that, Power served on the National Security Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. As for Armenians, Power became well known thanks to her book called A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, which analyzed US foreign policy – more specifically how it failed to respond in the face of the genocides of the 20th century, including the case of the Armenian Genocide. Despite the book and her extensive work in the area of human rights, the Obama Administration, which Power was part of, did not recognize the Armenian Genocide and hence, Power was seriously criticized for not strongly advocating for its official recognition. Years later Power apologized, stating that she was “sorry that, during our time in office, we in the Obama administration did not recognize the Armenian Genocide.”

As part of the Biden administration, Power was sworn into office on May 3, 2021 as the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). As administrator, Power was much criticized for being not active concerning atrocities conducted by the Azerbaijani government against the population of Artsakh. Critics believed that during the 9-month-long blockade against Artsakh, Power as USAID Administrator did not take any concrete steps to support the people of Artsakh. Her only action was in the form of statements condemning the blockade.

Her visit to Armenia took place after the blockade, while more than 100,000 people of Artsakh were fleeing from their homes, after Azerbaijan attacked and occupied the remainder of Artsakh. During her visit Power met with the Armenian prime minister and personally conveyed Joe Biden’s letter, which read “I have asked Samantha Power, a key member of my cabinet, to personally convey to you the strong support of the United States and my Administration for Armenia’s pursuit of a dignified and durable regional peace that maintains your sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and democracy. …I assure you that the United States will continue to stand besides Armenia.” This message was also reiterated a few times by Power herself. During her visit Power announced the provision of $11.5 million in urgent humanitarian assistance ($1 million through USAID and $10.5 million through the State Department). When asked about sanctions against Azerbaijan, for example the suspension of the provision of assistance to Azerbaijan, Power dodged those questions, vaguely responding that the United States is yet looking into “what the appropriate response is” to Azerbaijani actions.

On September 27, Samantha Power traveled to Baku. The same day, Ruben Vardanyan, co-founder of Aurora Foundation, for which Power served as a member of its prize selection committee, was captured by the Azerbaijanis. However, this incident was also left without any response from Power.

During her trip Azerbaijan, Power was accompanied by Acting Assistant Secretary Kim, and US Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations Louis Bono. The three had a meeting with President Ilham Aliyev. During this visit Power also reiterated “the importance of respecting Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

This statement that was reiterated many times at the highest level by the United States together with the events that unfolded can bring us to the conclusion that there has been some pressure brought to bear by the US on Azerbaijan and Turkey. The latter were strongly pushing for the so-called “Zangezur corridor” through Armenian territory, threatening the use of force in case Armenia resisted their plan. However, following the visit of Power, the aggressive rhetoric from both Azerbaijan and Turkey seems to have abated. For example, following the meeting between Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Nakhijevan, Aliyev did not talk much about the issue, just stating that “construction of the railway connecting Azerbaijan with Naxcivan [Nakhichevan] and Turkey is also progressing successfully.” There was no mention of Armenia or the term “Zangezur corridor.” Erdogan commented on the issue upon returning to Turkey, stating that “If Armenia does not pave the way for [the corridor]…It will pass through Iran.”

Thus, despite the fact that there have not been any sanctions so far against Azerbaijan for all its atrocities committed against the population of Artsakh, and there is no information on suspending US assistance to Azerbaijan, Power’s visit seems to have had an impact on the issue of the so-called “Zangezur corridor.” Aliyev and Erdogan, who were previously aggressively pushing for it, softened their statements right after Power’s visit, who reiterated many times the United States’ support of Armenia’s territorial integrity.

‘This time the relocation is permanent’: The Armenian exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh

The New Humitarian
Oct 5 2023

‘I wish I could stay there, of course. We had everything there, and it was home.’


In the space of just two weeks, more than 100,000 people – out of an estimated population of around 120,000 – have fled Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia.

The territory, inside the borders of Azerbaijan but controlled by Armenian separatists since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, fell to Azerbaijani troops following a lightning 19 September offensive, which was preceded by a nine-month blockade that starved the area of supplies. 

As few as 50 to 1,000 ethnic Armenians may now be left in the Nagorno-Karabakh, according to the UN. 

“They starved us, terrorised us, shelled us. They want to force us to take their citizenship, which we don’t want, because, honestly, given how they treat their own people, and our decades of war, who would want that,” Marat, a 22-year-old from the town of Askeran in Nagorno-Karabakh, told The New Humanitarian.

Marat currently lives in a shelter set up by Armenian NGOs in a gymnasium in the city of Artashat, near the capital Yerevan, with six other family members. Over 100 beds are installed on what used to be a basketball court, where volunteers now distribute food and clothes. 

“I wish I could stay there, of course,” Marat said. “We had everything there, and it was home. But how could we, when we have some children in my family, and they could die there? We have to think about their safety,” he added, pointing at his little sister playing around nearby. 

The exodus from Nagorno-Karabakh began almost immediately after Azerbaijani forces took control of the region.

A few cars with lifetimes’ worth of belongings on their roofs slowly made their way through the Lachin corridor – the lone road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Then it was buses, trucks, and ambulances forming long queues on the mountainous road. 

Within a few days, it was all over: Nearly the entire population of the territory, which operated as a de facto autonomous republic for over three decades, had fled, leaving everything they could not carry behind. Of the more than 100,000 refugees, about 30,000 are children.

During the evacuations, the Armenian Red Cross and volunteers provided food and assistance to people crossing into the country. The refugees were then redirected to Goris, the closest Armenian city to the border with Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, to register. Hotels filled up quickly, and Armenian authorities started organising buses to redirect refugees to cities all across the country.

Like Marat, many Armenians who fled Nagorno-Karabakh have no relatives in Armenia and nowhere to go. They are completely dependent on humanitarian aid for both emergency assistance and longer-term support, as most of them lost their livelihoods. The financial assistance provided by the Armenian government, equivalent to around $100 per month, is not enough to rent an apartment.

“A lot of people want to rely on themselves, and not aid, because there is this feeling that this time the relocation is permanent, and not temporary, as opposed to 2020 during the war,” said Shoushan Keshishian, the CEO of Hub Artsakh, an NGO that had been based in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

“We first focused on providing an emergency response and humanitarian aid, but quickly realised that people were worried about employment and legal issues like passports, or registering a business here in Armenia,” she said.

Despite being displaced itself, Hub Artsakh has vowed to continue assisting the Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh. The NGO, which is soon to open an office in Yerevan, has already created a hotline for refugees, with a team of operators to match them with lawyers and human resource specialists.

Azerbaijani officials have said they want to “reintegrate” the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and have pledged to respect their rights and freedoms, but refugees The New Humanitarian spoke to said they do not trust them and fear repression and violence. 

Armenia and Azerbaijan have been fighting over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh for decades. A first war in the 1990s, won by the Armenians, left 30,000 dead on both sides. A million people fled their homes.

After the war, there were virtually no Azerbaijanis left in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and virtually no Armenians left in Azerbaijan, apart from in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan continued to claim as its territory.

A new war broke out in September 2020, which Azerbaijan won, recovering 80% of the territory it had lost 30 years earlier. More than 7,000 people were killed across both sides. 

In December 2022, Azerbaijan closed the Lachin corridor, subjecting the population of Nagorno-Karabakh to a nine-month blockade with no electricity, no water, and numerous food and medicine shortages, before attacking on 19 September. The Armenian population of the enclave fled, fearing ethnic cleansing, violence, and persecution, while the Armenian authorities that had governed Nagorno-Karabakh as the unrecognised Republic of Artsakh for more than three decades said they would dissolve and cease to exist by the end of this year. 

Meanwhile, tensions are still high between Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Russia has traditionally been the arbiter of peace, using its relations with both countries and military power to maintain the status quo. But Russian peacekeepers did not intervene when Azerbaijani forces launched their offensive on 19 September. 

Armenians now fear Azerbaijan will seek to grab more territory in Syunik, the southernmost province of Armenia, to create a land route connecting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan with the rest of the country. 

Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, who are still recovering from one humanitarian disaster, already fear another war. 

“I was offered housing in Kapan. But it’s a city on the border. You can see an Azerbaijani checkpoint a few metres away… I am scared, I want to live far away from them. What if they attack again?” said Marina, a 40-year-old mother of two from Stepanakert, who The New Humanitarian met at an aid centre in Goris. “I could not bear losing everything and being displaced again.”

Edited by Eric Reidy.

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2023/10/05/armenian-exodus-nagorno-karabakh

Israeli doctors treat hundreds of burn victims in medical relief mission to Armenia

Jerusalem Post
Oct 5 2023
By JUDY SIEGEL-ITZKOVICH


After just 24 hours on the ground in Armenia, a medical delegation to treat hundreds of victims of an explosion in a fuel depot last Wednesday in Nagorno-Karabakh had provided care to dozens of patients and performed dozens of emergency surgical procedures.

The medical relief mission left Israel on Tuesday night to provide critical assistance to civilian victims, many of them suffering from serious burns.  The 14-person director-general Prof. Ofer Merin, is a leading cardiothoracic surgeon. His team includes plastic surgeons, anesthesiologists, and burn-care specialists. 

The mission was launched in response to a request from the Armenian health ministry and the World Health Organization to their Israeli counterparts to send relief teams and equipment to the nation’s capital city of Yerevan where many of the victims had been evacuated. 


The Shaare Zedek team includes Merin and Dr. Yoav Granowitz, director of the plastic surgery department, and senior plastic surgeons Dr. Adi Lotan and Dr. Ronen Toledano; anesthesiologists Dr. Mohamed Jabar, Dr. David Ben Ari; and Rachel Havivi, head nurse in the plastic surgery department. 

They are joined by colleagues from Soroka-University Medical Center in Beersheba including Dr. Yaron Shoham, director of the burns unit and the plastic surgery department, Dr. Eliran Yaakobi and Dr. Suvchi Khakrush from plastic surgery; Dr. Gal Ron and Dr. Michael Dubilet from the hospital’s anesthesiology and intensive care service; and Yassin Mamduch, a surgical nurse. 


“This is an extremely rare type of incident with a very large number of burn victims, and we see it as a distinct honor to be heading up this mission and providing such a necessary response on behalf of the State of Israel, which was the first nation to arrive in this role,” said Merin. “I want to express our thanks to the Health Ministry in Jerusalem for their commitment to supporting our teams from Shaare Zedek and Soroka who immediately responded to the call and were ready to leave as soon as possible for this important mission.  This is further proof of how Israel stands ready at all times wherever in the world we might be needed.”

Granowitz added that the scope of this event “is truly extraordinary; we are treating over 150 patients who are all suffering from extreme burn wounds where they were injured while carrying fuel-laden containers and experienced serious burns to their face, chest, and extremities.  This will require a large number of surgeries involving skin transplantation and skin replacement using materials and equipment donated with the support of the Tzamal Medical Corporation. Our team has created a working platform in coordination with our colleagues from Soroka to provide the best and most appropriate care possible.  It’s a great honor to be a part of this mission.” 


Shoham said, “We’re performing surgeries in two operating theaters at the same time, from morning till night, caring for patients with extremely complex burns and injuries.  We’re extremely proud to be part of a mission representing our country that is helping save many lives and brings international pride and recognition to the state of Israel.”

The mission is expected to continue over the coming days with plans in place for the arrival of additional teams from other hospitals next week. 


https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-761887