December 18, 2023 06:22 PM 

While all eyes have strayed from the conflict in Ukraine to the conflict on Gaza, no one has been noticing what is happening in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In September, the Turkish-backed state of Azerbaijan conducted a lightning incursion into the landlocked island of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Russian-backed ethnic Armenians had held since capturing it after the USSR broke up in the early 1990s.

In what remains one of the most astonishing political events of modern times, the Armenians stood down instead of fighting back. In doing so, they avoided the violence and bloodshed that have marked previous encounters between the two groups. Then, rather than risk the persecution they feared that the Azerbaijanis might mete out on them, the Armenians—some 120,000 of them—simply packed up their possessions and retreated across Azerbaijan to Armenia proper. 

There were tears and recriminations but the community took the view that a safe life in its homeland was better than an uncertain life in contested territory. 

A week ago, the story became even more miraculous. Armenia announced its intention to recognise Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory and the two sides agreed to normalise their relations, exchange prisoners and, by the end of this year, sign a peace treaty based on mutual respect.

These two sides have, in the past, been locked in deadly war, with some 38,000 killings between 1988 and 1994, and another 3,000 in the following 25 years. And yet, in late 2023, pragmatism finally overcame rhetoric and the two countries can now look forward to a future in which both can bloom and prosper side-by-side. 

It’s hard to know why this happened but it may have had to do with the Armenians’ growing loathing of Putin (in return for which the Kremlin banned residents of Nagorno-Karabakh from flying Ukrainian flags) and even—we do not know—the receipt of tangible incentives to realign themselves alongside Azerbaijan within Turkey’s more welcome sphere of influence.

Had something similar happened in Gaza, I wonder what the world’s reaction would have been. Would those who carry banners in support of the Palestinians and who casually accuse Israel of apartheid and genocide have berated Gaza’s leaders and accused them of an unprincipled climb-down? Would there have been protests that the people of Gaza City and Khan Yunis, not to mention the Strip’s 1.7 million “refugees”, had been betrayed by spineless apparatchiks without a grain of commitment to the Palestinian cause?

The only answer can be yes: that is exactly what the world would have said, because the world evidently wants the Palestinian people to be locked into permanent enmity with Israel, and to act as a lightning rod for the world’s hatred of its bullying neighbour. 

How do we know this? Because that is what we hear from the overwhelming majority of United Nations members, who last week voted for a ceasefire that would prevent Israel from defeating Hamas—in the name of “peace”. It is what we see, also, from the massive United Nations apparatus that keeps Palestinians in an enduring state of dependence, funding their complaints about the Zionist entity on its doorstep, and burnishing their sacred sense of victimisation. 

Unembarrassed by this, UNRWA boasts that it is the largest agency of the United Nations, employing over 30,000 staff, 99 per cent of whom are locally recruited Palestinians, and registering nearly 6 million people as eligible for its services, compared with the 700,000 who took up residence in Gaza after the Arab attack on Israel at the founding of the state in 1948. And UNRWA is evidently adored by other arms of the UN, including UNICEF.

Had Hamas acted as the ethnic Armenians did in Nagorno-Karabakh, the world would have branded them as traitors. Or so one has to assume because no one has suggested that Hamas has behaved in anything other than an appropriate way in the face of Israeli rockets. Rather than backing down, and saving thousands of lives, Hamas has happily defied the IDF, sacrificing the Palestinian masses and goading Israel further by launching missiles of its own and threatening to replay October 7 again and again in the future, given the opportunity.

How can it be that less than a thousand miles away, one ruling faction—that of State President Samvel Shahramanyan—decided it was better to save lives and accommodate itself to reality while another ruling faction—that of Yahyar Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh)—decided it was better for its people to hold out against reality and get slaughtered, and in the greatest possible numbers?

Yahya Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh) has not been excoriated by the world. The world has not called for him to be captured, put on trial and punished for abusing those charged to his care, whether during this war or before it. Far from it. He is seen as heroic, a freedom fighter, and even—in a crass distortion of logic—a peace campaigner. His face flies on flags and his name is chanted in public gatherings, not only among the two billion Muslims who make up a quarter of the world but in the West among reasonable people and on campuses at respected universities. 

How shocked the world would be if he were to say, “I was wrong to take my people down this disastrous path. If only I had seen, as President Samvel Shahramanyan has seen, the potential that exists in forging an accord with those we have fought against so wastefully for so long.”     

Why do I think the world would have been outraged had Yahyar Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh) fallen on his knees and begged the Palestinian people to forgive him? Because of the obduracy with which those who are paid to know better still cling to their hateful prejudices.

I used to admire the way that Sarah Montague handled interviewees on the BBC’s highly regarded weekday lunchtime news show, The World at One, and on the World Service programme HardTalk. She is cool, composed and persistent and her questions are to the point. Her tone changes, however, when she gets Israel in the sight of her gun. In a sequence of interviews on radio yesterday she was especially egregious—not only in the words she used but in her tone of voice, exposing a bias inappropriate to someone representing the UK’s foremost public broadcasting channel.

Here, her repeated questioning of Ehud Olmert about how long he thought the war in Gaza should go on was provocative, because the idea of waging war by calendar is preposterous. Her quoting of a phrase used by former UK Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace—that Israel’s attack was a “killing rage”—was provocative because it is self-evidently something quite different. Her asking Olmert whether he thought too many innocent Palestinians had died was provocative because it implies that he has a favoured death tally. Her suggesting that a one-off accident (the killing of the three hostages) was indicative of something more general about Israel is provocative because it promotes a judgement based on no knowledge of battlefield conditions. 

In all these cases, Montague acted exactly as a cheerleader for Hamas might have done, letting the listener know not just where she stood but where they should stand too. Instead of questioning a string of very objectionable value judgements, she endorsed them. 

In the same way, she appeared to accept, because she offered no challenge, the idea that Hamas could not be destroyed “because it’s an ideology”, that Israel has lost its moral authority, and that what is most urgently needed now is a rapid humanitarian truce, a set of notions which also serves to protect Hamas, which the BBC (like the three American university heads quizzed in Congressional hearings recently) still refuses, to its shame, to call a terrorist, genocidal, racist, repressive organisation that has totally failed to protect the wretched people it claims to represent.

Has this war gone on too long, as Montague asked? Absolutely. Have too many been killed? Absolutely. Could the war have been shortened and the number of deaths diminished? Yes, easily—by Hamas resigning, just as the Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh did in September, within 24 hours of Azerbaijani forces moving in. That was an honourable surrender, and the ethnic Armenians are greatly to be praised for it. There was a cost but the cost was face, not lives, and face is a trifle. By the end of December, Samvel Shahramanyan’s presidency will have been wound up and, with it, the post itself. He accepts this, in the name of the greater good. Now that’s real heroics. 

Exactly the same could have happened at any time in Gaza. And yet Sarah Montague and all the bien-pensants of the BBC and the liberal establishment of which I consider myself a member have done nothing to push for it. Instead, they ally themselves with the accusation that Israel is the shameful party. It is deplorable. 

In the most recent issue of the magazine I edit—Booklaunch—the cultural critic Keith Kahn-Harris has mused on the question of how those who have no skin in a game choose sides. Why do they find it so easy to cry with the Palestinians but not, say, with the Tamils (or the Sinhalese)? It’s a very good question and not one I know the answer to. But Sarah Montague, a supposedly impartial news host who adjudges that Israel has lost its moral authority, evidently knows better than me. She must do, because she represents precisely that inexplicable taking of sides. 

• CONFLICT AND PEACE
• SOUTH CAUCASUS

"Despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023", writes Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. "However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024", he argues. 

2023 started with mixed feelings in Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations. It seemed that the October 2022 Prague statement, where the Armenian government recognized Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, paved the way for the signature of an Armenia – Azerbaijan peace agreement. Many perceived the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fate of the Armenian population as the primary obstacle to the peace process. Meanwhile, the blockade of the Lachin corridor, imposed by Azerbaijan in mid–December 2022, added tensions in bilateral relations.

The negotiation process resumed in February 2023, as Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, a summit facilitated by the US Secretary of State. This meeting opened the way for months of intensive negotiations. The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met twice in Washington in May and June 2023 to discuss a peace agreement, while Pashinyan and Aliyev met twice in Brussels in May and July 2023. In the meantime, the two leaders also met in Chisinau on June 1, 2023, on the margins of the second European Political Community summit, accompanied by the President of the European Council, the President of France, and the German Chancellor. The sides registered significant progress in elaborating the peace agreement, claiming that at least 70 percent of the text was agreed.

On the other hand, the continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade impacted the process negatively. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan established a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, and since mid-June, banned all transportation in and out of the region, with rare exceptions of medical evacuations done by the International Red Cross. Azerbaijan pushed for the usage of the Aghdam road to supply Nagorno Karabakh, while Armenians rejected this option, fearing that it would be another step towards "reintegration into Azerbaijan." Armenia applied to the International Court of Justice, but Azerbaijan de facto refused to implement the court's decision. Upon Armenia's request, the UN Security Council discussed the situation on August 16, but the gathering ended without any statements or resolutions.

Despite the ongoing tensions around the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, negotiations on the peace agreement continued, and on September 11, Azerbaijan provided its latest version of the text to Armenia. However, Azerbaijan decided to use force to "close the Karabakh chapter" and launched a large-scale military offensive on September 19. Armenian government decided not to intervene militarily, and Russian peacekeepers took the same approach. Without any external support, the authorities of the self-proclaimed Nagorno Karabakh Republic were forced to capitulate and sign a decree on the dissolution of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by the end of 2023. Within ten days, all Armenians left Nagorno-Narabakh, and on October 15, President Aliyev reviewed a military parade in Stepanakert with practically no Armenians remaining in the town.

Some hoped that the "destruction of Nagorno Karabakh" would facilitate the peace process. The EU put significant hope on the scheduled Granada meeting between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan on the margins of the third European Political Community summit. The Secretary of the Armenian Security Council and Foreign policy advisor to President Aliyev met in Brussels on September 26, and everything indicated the sides were ready to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. Then, suddenly, Azerbaijan pulled away from negotiations. President Aliyev canceled his visit to Granada, citing France's decision to sell weapons to Armenia and the discussions at the European Parliament about Nagorno-Karabakh as the main reasons. Arguably, he demanded participation at the Granada meeting of President Erdogan, an offer rejected by France and Germany. Then President Aliyev rejected the EU offer to hold a leaders' summit in Brussels by the end of October 2023 in the "original Brussels format" and also canceled the meeting between Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers scheduled for November 20, citing the anti-Azerbaijan statements by the US State Department officials during November 15 hearings in the US Congress. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan hinted at its readiness to resume negotiations in Moscow, within the 3+2 platform, or at the bilateral level. On November 30, the Armenian and Azerbaijani Commission on delimitation and demarcation met on the Armenia – Azerbaijan border and agreed on its charter. On December 7, 2023, Armenia and Azerbaijan made a significant step forward by adopting a bilateral statement on pushing forward the peace process, exchange of POWs, and also Armenia's support to Azerbaijan to host the COP 29 conference in Baku in 2024.

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Meanwhile, the US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, James O'Brien, visited Baku and met with Azerbaijani President Aliyev on December 6. According to different sources, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to hold a foreign ministers meeting in January 2024 in Washington, while bilateral negotiations will probably continue. On February 7, 2024, Azerbaijan will hold snap Presidential elections, and a landslide victory of President Aliyev seems assured.

Thus, despite hopes, Armenia and Azerbaijan failed to sign a peace agreement by the end of 2023. However, since the text of the document seems to be, by and large, already agreed, there are hopes that an agreement may be signed in the first half of 2024. Otherwise, the EU and US election cycles in the Summer and Autumn of 2024 may push the South Caucasus out of the West's radar. If this happens, Russia may resume its leading role as a negotiation platform between Armenia and Azerbaijan, pushing the two sides to sign a peace agreement in Moscow by the end of 2024.      

On September 19th, Azerbaijan launched an intense military offensive in the contested Nagorno – Karabakh region, which killed over 200 ethnic Armenians and dozens of Azerbaijanis. After just 24 hours of fighting, a ceasefire was agreed upon between Armenian forces and the Azerbaijani military. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, separatist authorities announced that the break-away region would officially be incorporated into Azerbaijan on January 1st, 2024. After decades of Armenian defiance, the hopes for an independent Republic of Artsakh have finally ended. According to the BCC, approximately 100,000 Armenians have fled the region since the military operation and subsequent capitulation. While Baku has maintained that Armenians would be treated as equal citizens, the mass exodus indicates fears of ethnic cleansing. 

Although Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic tensions have persisted for centuries, the current Nagorno – Karabakh dispute is a relic of Soviet occupation. In 1923, the Soviet Union established that Nagorno – Karabakh should be an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, despite the population being roughly 95 percent Armenian at the time. Whether intentional or not, Stalin’s odd land distribution increased the potential for ethnic violence following Armenian and Azerbaijani independence. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, the Republic of Artsakh was declared following a referendum in the region in 1991, which ultimately led to a three year war. After the death of roughly 30,000 people, a bilateral ceasefire was signed in 1994 and officially remained in effect until 2020. Despite international recognition of Nagorno – Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Artsakh remained a breakaway region for several decades due to the military and economic support of both Armenia and Russia. 

While Armenia initially gained territory in the 1991 conflict, the tide turned in Azerbaijan’s favor in the following decades. This was mainly driven by Azerbaijan’s superior alliances, largely created by their vast reserves of petroleum and liquified natural gas. One of Azerbaijan’s most important allies is Turkey, which has provided significant military and diplomatic support to the country. Azerbaijan’s supply of petroleum alongside their shared Turkic identity has solidified Turkey’s support for Baku. According to Reuters, 80 percent of Azerbaijan’s oil exports flow through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to Turkey, which strategically circumvents Armenia by passing through Georgia. Furthermore, Armenia and Turkey were already geopolitical rivals due to Ankara’s denial of the Armenian genocide in 1915. Many European countries, alongside the United States and Israel, have benefitted from Azerbaijan’s exports as well, effectively isolating Armenia from the world. 

Armenia’s main allies are limited to Russia and Iran, which both lack significant geopolitical clout at the moment. According to TRT World, Russia’s support for Armenia is derived from their shared Orthodox-Christian identity and Slavic heritage. Without Russia’s military and economic support, Armenia was unlikely to win the war in 1991. Armenia’s alliance with Iran is mainly derived from Tehran’s tensions with its Azerbaijani minority. Iran is home to over 12 million Azerbaijani’s, more than the population of Azerbaijan itself. Tehran does not want its own separatist movement, which is why it seeks to undermine Baku to decrease the probability of a unification movement of all Azerbaijani people. One way to do this is to support Armenia so that Baku’s attention is fixated on another matter. According to Modern Diplomacy, Iran has supplied Armenia with extensive weaponry, including 500 units of anti-tank missile systems. While these allies have been helpful to Armenia in the past, Russia and Iran have been more concerned with their own internal matters in recent years. 

Following the 1994 ceasefire, the state of Nagorno – Karabakh remained fairly stable with infrequent clashes occurring over the subsequent decades. However, emboldened by significant weapon imports from Turkey, Israel, and Belarus, Azerbaijan has become increasingly aggressive in the last decade. According to the Center for Eastern Studies, Azerbaijan launched a military operation known as the four days war in 2016, in which Baku enjoyed miniscule territorial gains. In September 2020, fighting once again broke out along the Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh border, which saw the most intense violence since 1994. Lasting roughly six weeks, the Second Nagorno Karabakh war claimed thousands of lives before a peace deal was finally brokered by Russia on November 9th. Azerbaijan reclaimed the majority of its lost territory and Armenia only retained a small portion of the Karabakh region. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the peace deal established the Lachin corridor, which was a designated passage protected by Russian peacekeepers connecting Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh. 

In December 2022, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of using the Lachin Corridor to supply weapons to Nagorno Karabakh and subsequently blocked the transit line. Armenia denied the allegations and accused Azerbaijan of isolating the region for its own agenda. Whether the Armenians supplied weapons or not, the Lachin Corridor was a vital route for supplying essential resources such as food and medicine. According to the BBC, residents reported severe food shortages and human rights violations were thrown at Baku. However, Azerbaijan maintains that any supply shortages were the fault of the Armenians as they refused to accept Azerbaijani aid when offered. In any case, Nagorno Karabakh’s isolation combined with a weakened Russian ally meant the break-away region had little means of defending itself in the recent military operation. 

Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of Nagorno-Karabakh, signed a decree to dissolve the Republic of Artsakh and all of its institutions on January 1st, 2024. While this specific territorial dispute seems to be resolved for now, it remains to be seen what these developments mean for the Armenian diaspora and Armenian – Azerbaijani relations. According to the AP, Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister, reaffirmed that all ethnic Armenians will be guaranteed full rights and freedoms. While these statements cannot be confirmed, the reality of the situation will become more apparent in the coming weeks. According to Aljazeera, a UN team of approximately a dozen people recently arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the majority of its citizens have already fled the region, this team will be able to assess the claims of the Azerbaijani government. 

While it is too early to assess the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, should the Azerbaijani government pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing there are various actions the international community could take. First, while Azerbaijan’s oil reserves gives it diplomatic leverage, it also makes its economy very dependent on exports. Should the international community want to retaliate against the Azerbaijani government for any reason, decreasing imports of Azerbaijan oil would greatly undermine Baku’s economy. Also, Azerbaijan relies completely on weapons imports from a few countries. This allows for significant leverage over the state should grave human rights atrocities be committed. 

• Armenia has been ordering more weapons, turning to France and India for air-defense systems.
• Armenia is a longtime ally of Russia, but it has leaned away from Moscow in recent years.
• With its focus on Ukraine, Russia has offered Armenia little help in its conflicts with Azerbaijan.

In recent weeks, Armenia has ordered air-defense systems and radars from France and was reported to have ordered anti-drone systems from India.

Those orders come amid heightened tensions with neighboring Azerbaijan, with which Armenia has fought several conflicts, including a short clash in September that ended with Azerbaijan conquering the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, causing its 120,000 ethnic-Armenian residents to flee.

The acquisitions are notable not only for their timing but also because they show Armenia is taking tangible steps to lessen its dependency on military hardware from Russia, a longtime ally that has offered Yerevan little support against mounting pressure from Azerbaijan.

Armenia's six-week war with Azerbaijan in 2020 captured worldwide attention for Azerbaijan's use of aerial drones. At a press conference to announce the sale in October, France's defense minister said air defenses were "absolutely key" and that Paris was aiding Yerevan with sales of three Thales GM 200 radars and an agreement on the future delivery of short-range Mistral air-defense missiles.

"Armenia's choice to order air-defense systems from France is a significant one," James Rogers, an expert on drones and precision warfare, told Business Insider. "Not only does it highlight to Russia that Armenia has options when it comes to defense cooperation, but it marks a major leap forward in Armenia's attempts to modernize its military."

Reports in early November indicated Yerevan was also buying more weaponry from India, including Zen anti-drone systems, which are designed to detect and bring down enemy drones. Armenia previously bought four Indian-made Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers in 2022, the first foreign order of that system.

Nicholas Heras, the senior director of strategy and innovation at the New Lines Institute, told Business Insider that Armenia was advancing its foreign and national security policies on two tracks.

"One track is to build defense alliances with more powerful outside actors in Eurasia, and the second track is to improve the Armenian military's ability to defend against Azeri airpower in tactical engagements," Heras said. "India, in particular, is a prized defense partner with Armenia because India has a large defense industry that can also arm and improve Russian weapons platforms which Armenia deploys."

Armenia's military arsenal has long been predominantly Russian, but Yerevan has attempted to change that as its relations with Moscow have soured, especially after its devastating defeat in the 2020 war, during which Azerbaijan used Israeli- and Turkish-made weapons.

Russia has failed to aid Armenia despite Yereven's membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. In addition to being tied down by the war in Ukraine, Russia is most likely irked by Armenia moving closer to Washington and the West under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has long questioned the value of CSTO membership.

"Armenia's partnership with Russia is at a low ebb, and Pashinyan is pushing forward, slowly but surely, to bring Armenia closer to NATO, including the prospect of normalizing Armenia's relations with Turkey," Heras said.

Heras added that over the past two years, the US had been sending "a strong signal" that it "would like to test out the prospect for a more strategic US-Armenian security relationship."

Washington and Yerevan seemed to demonstrate mutual interest in closer defense relations in September when Armenia hosted a bilateral exercise focused on training for peacekeeping operations.

Eighty-five US troops trained alongside 175 Armenia personnel during the drill, which was "a testament to our longstanding partnership with Armenia and builds upon decades of successful peacekeeping and security cooperation," the US Embassy in Armenia said in a statement.

Russia, predictably, opposed the exercise, and Yerevan has kept its distance since then. Pashinyan skipped the organization's summit in mid-November, a move Russia accused the West of orchestrating.

Armenia under Pashinyan has tried to move away from Russia "by building a web of strategic partnerships," Heras said. "Fundamentally, Pashinyan does not want to depend on Russia to ensure Armenia's territorial integrity and security, and his effort to build the relationship with the United States works toward this goal."

Acquiring weaponry from other countries serves a similar purpose, but Armenia's recent purchases also reflect the sensitivity of its international position.

The Mistral missile has a relatively short range of 4 miles, suggesting the sale is meant to bolster Armenia's arsenal but was made with potential political backlash in mind. Turkey has criticized French arms sales to Yerevan. (Azerbaijan has also criticized the recent French and Indian arms sales to Armenia.)

Rogers said that "range is important in war" and that it enabled strikes on a wider set of targets. "In order not to destabilize the region or risk an outbreak of hostilities, therefore, Armenia and France have agreed to these short-range yet effective air-defense systems."

Heras said that the main quandary facing Armenian foreign policy was it could not afford to sever ties with Russia despite recent tensions, but it also could not trust Russia to intervene on its side if there's another war with Azerbaijan. The need to strike a balance between Russia and new partners while bolstering its small military with limited resources complicates Armenia's task.

"Armenia needs to purchase weapons that improve its ability to pursue a 'porcupine strategy,'" making itself a more threatening target for Azerbaijan if the two countries go to war again, Heras said.

Buying French and Indian short-range air-defense weapons that could be used by small infantry units is "a potentially cost-effective way to impose higher costs on Azerbaijan's drone airpower," Heras added.

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about Middle East developments, military affairs, politics, and history. His articles have appeared in a variety of publications focused on the region.

Defense News December 2023 Global Security army industry

Armenia is presently in the process of modernizing its military, partly due to the conflict it experienced with Azerbaijan in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. For instance, Armenia has acquired from France Bastion 4×4 APCs, three Thales Ground Master 200 radars, a Mistral short-range air defense system, and night vision goggles from Safran. Armenia's other acquisitions from India encompass MArG 155 wheeled self-propelled howitzers, Pinaka MLRS, ATAGS 155mm towed guns, anti-tank missiles, and ZADS anti-drone systems. Furthermore, there have been sightings of a Chinese WM-80 MLRS within the Armenian Armed Forces.

The Akash air defense system, developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is a short-range surface-to-air missile system primarily designed to safeguard vulnerable areas and critical installations against potential aerial threats. It is currently in active service with the Indian Armed Forces, with a total of 48 systems deployed as of 2022.

One of its notable features is its capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously in either Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. The system is equipped with Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) capabilities, enabling it to counteract electronic deception systems that adversaries might employ.

The Akash missile system comprises various components, including launchers, missiles, a control center, an integrated mission guidance system, and C4I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) centers. Each missile battery is accompanied by a radar system known as Rajendra. The system is reported to be 96 percent indigenized, with an enhanced version offering a smaller footprint, 360° engagement capability, and advanced seekers.

In terms of specifications, the Akash Weapon System (AWS) has an operational range spanning from 4.5 kilometers to 25 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes ranging from 100 meters up to 20 kilometers. It is designed for swift response, from target detection to neutralization.

The Akash Weapon System is characterized by its open system architecture, which allows for adaptability to various Air Defense environments. It is also known for its resistance to active and passive jamming, ensuring its effectiveness in challenging conditions. Additionally, the system features a secure mode of communication between combat elements and is self-sufficient in terms of electrical power, thanks to its built-in power sources. Its transportability by road and rail allows for rapid mobilization and deployment, further enhancing its operational flexibility. The system incorporates built-in safety features, including an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, contributing to its overall reliability and effectiveness in air defense.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/defense_news_december_2023_global_security_army_industry/armenia_to_purchase_indian_akash_air_defense_systems_in_$720_mn_deal.html