On April 1, Maria Zakharova, the Spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated at a briefing that Moscow is not engaged in negotiations with either Astana or Yerevan regarding the transfer of the concession for managing Armenia’s railways to Kazakhstan. Referring to remarks made on March 30 by Andrei Nikitin, the Transport Minister of Russia, she emphasized the importance of considering expert-level assessments. “It is very important to take into account what was made at the expert level—I mean, at the level of the relevant department… this expert statement,” Zakharova stated.
She also recalled that the concession agreement for the South Caucasus Railway, signed in 2008, has a duration of 30 years with the possibility of a 10-year extension. According to her, South Caucasus Railways CJSC has consistently fulfilled its obligations, while Russian investments in Armenia’s railway infrastructure have exceeded 30 billion rubles. Commenting on potential high-level negotiations, Zakharova added that such matters are traditionally addressed by the presidential administration.
Addressing another issue, Maria Zakharova stated that Russia is ready to cooperate with Armenia in countering “hybrid threats” if there is mutual interest from the Armenian side. She made this remark in response to comments by Ararat Mirzoyan, the Foreign Minister of Armenia, who did not rule out benefiting from Russia’s experience in this field.
Zakharova подчеркнула that Russia possesses significant capabilities in this area, but effective cooperation requires willingness from both sides. She noted that Moscow stands ready to respond to any such request, including in areas such as information security, combating cyber fraud, and engagement on international platforms. The spokesperson added that Russia is prepared not only to provide expert assessments but also to develop practical cooperation mechanisms, supported by specialized departments within the Foreign Ministry and other relevant agencies.
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Civil Society and Armenia’s 2026 Elections: Oversight, Trust, and Practical C
As Armenia prepares for its parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2026, civil society organizations are once again expected to play an important role in the public sphere. Elections are not only moments of political competition. They also test the quality of institutions, the credibility of public information, and the strength of oversight mechanisms. The Central Electoral Commission has already opened the 2026 election framework online, including procedures for accrediting observer organizations and media representatives, which underlines how early the institutional preparations have begun.[1]
A Watchdog Role Within an Established Legal Framework
Artur Sakunts, head of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor Office, views civil society’s role during elections as closely connected to its broader democratic function. In his words, “Civil society’s role during elections is to observe, assess, and contribute to transparency within the framework of the law.” This framing place civil society within the institutional environment rather than outside it. Its role is not to replace formal institutions, but to observe how electoral rules are implemented, to follow developments attentively, and to raise concerns through professional and lawful channels when necessary. In this sense, the watchdog function is primarily about oversight and procedural accountability within the existing legal structure. At the same time, Mr. Sakunts underlines that election observation should not be limited to procedural compliance alone. In his view, it also requires attention to the broader democratic content of the electoral process, including whether political actors participating in elections uphold democratic values in practice. This aspect becomes particularly important in the context of hybrid threats, where the quality of democratic competition may be shaped not only by formal procedures, but also by the extent to which public discourse and political conduct remain consistent with democratic principles.
Observation Is Professional Practice
Election observation in Armenia is conducted by licensed organizations operating with trained teams and established methodologies. It is structured work that requires preparation, coordination, and adherence to clearly defined standards. Zara Hovhannisyan, co-founder of New Justice Culture NGO and board member of Transparency International Armenia, emphasizes this professional dimension. “Professional election observation requires trained teams, licensing, and consistent methodology,” she notes. Public materials from the Central Electoral Commission indicate that observer accreditation procedures are underway, underscoring the institutional character of the process. At the same time, Ms. Hovhannisyan observes that the number of organizations engaged in systematic election monitoring remains limited. Ensuring broad geographic coverage requires considerable resources, making organizational capacity an important consideration.
Both interviewees also refer to concerns about individuals or groups participating in the election environment whose accreditation status or methodological standards may not always be clear. Such situations can create confusion and potentially affect public perceptions of monitoring efforts. Maintaining professional standards therefore contributes not only to the quality of observation itself, but also to the broader credibility of the process.
The Information Environment
Elections are shaped not only by procedures, but also by the information environment surrounding them. Media coverage, political messaging, and digital platforms influence how voters interpret events. The interviewees point to misinformation and polarized media dynamics as recurring features of election periods. Armenia is not unique in this regard. Regional experience shows that election campaigns often coincide with heightened narrative competition and intensified public debate. International observation of Armenia’s 2021 parliamentary elections noted significant political polarization in the campaign environment, while also describing the overall process as competitive and generally well administered.[2] For this reason, civil society engagement extends beyond polling station observation. It also involves public communication, clarification of procedures, and contributions to fact-based discussion. This broader emphasis is reflected in international cooperation frameworks as well. For example, the Council of Europe’s Action Plan for Armenia for 2023–2026 includes measures aimed at strengthening media literacy and countering disinformation in the pre-election context.[3]
Cooperation and Institutional Development
Both experts note that cooperation between civil society organizations and state institutions has developed in several areas, including electoral legislation, anti-corruption strategies, police-related policy frameworks, and human rights initiatives. This cooperation, however, tends to be issue-specific rather than part of a comprehensive coordination mechanism. Such a pattern is not uncommon in transitional democratic contexts, where interaction between public institutions and civil society often evolves gradually through targeted engagement rather than permanent institutionalized partnership. Regional examples such as Moldova and Romania were mentioned as cases where sustained professional monitoring practices and capacity-building initiatives have contributed to strengthening electoral oversight. These experiences may offer methodological insights relevant to Armenia’s ongoing institutional development.
Armenia’s electoral framework provides formal procedures for oversight and participation, and civil society operates within this established legal structure. The effectiveness of oversight mechanisms therefore depends not only on legislation, but also on the practical quality of cooperation and professional practice over time.
Funding, Capacity, and Continuity
Like many civil society sectors in the region, Armenian NGOs operate within financial and organizational constraints. Election monitoring requires trained personnel, logistical coordination, and continuity across electoral cycles. Funding thus becomes a structural factor shaping what is feasible. International donors have historically played an important role in supporting civil society initiatives in Armenia. At the same time, changes in funding priorities and reductions in certain forms of support have introduced a degree of unpredictability. State grant mechanisms also exist, though they remain limited relative to the scope of societal issues addressed by civil society actors. Sustaining professional expertise and institutional memory beyond a single election cycle is therefore a central challenge. In this respect, continuity and organizational stability matter as much as financial resources.
Public Trust Across a Diverse Sector
The interviews also highlight that public perception of civil society is not uniform. Levels of trust may vary depending on the thematic focus of individual organizations. Groups engaged in election monitoring and transparency-related activities often operate within clearly defined legal frameworks, which may facilitate broader public recognition of their role. Organizations addressing issues that intersect with social, cultural, religious, minority, or other sensitive areas may encounter more complex public reactions. These variations do not necessarily reflect questions of institutional legitimacy; rather, they illustrate how societal context shapes the reception of civic engagement. Civil society in Armenia therefore represents a diverse field of actors rather than a single unified entity. Differences in visibility, public acceptance, and thematic focus are part of that diversity.
Beyond Observation
Taken together, these interviews suggest that civil society remains an integral part of Armenia’s electoral environment. Its contribution includes observation, monitoring, communication, and participation in policy dialogue. At the same time, its role is shaped by practical realities: organizational capacity, funding conditions, coordination practices, and the broader information environment. Civil society does not determine electoral outcomes, but it contributes to transparency, public confidence, and institutional accountability within the existing legal framework. In Armenia, as in many democratic systems undergoing institutional development, elections are influenced not only by formal procedures, but also by the broader relationship between institutions, professional oversight actors, and public trust. Civil society’s engagement forms part of that wider ecosystem.
This article draws on interviews conducted with Armenian civil society representatives in March 2026.
About author: Siranush Grigoryan is a PhD candidate in International Law.
[1] Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia (CEC). Parliamentary Elections 2026 – Official Information Portal.
[2] OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). International Election Observation Mission to the Republic of Armenia: Parliamentary Elections, 20 June 2021 – Final Report.
[3] Council of Europe. Action Plan for Armenia 2023–2026.
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Russian Deputy Prime Minister Warns Armenia’s EU Aspirations And Actions Agai
On April 2, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk warned that Armenia’s EU-oriented policies and actions against Russian businesses may force Moscow to reconsider economic ties, citing risks to investments, transit routes, and nuclear cooperation.
Overchuk stated in an interview with TASS that Armenia has approached a threshold at which Russia may be forced to revise its economic ties with the country. He noted that although Armenian officials consistently affirm their friendship with Russia and commitment to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) during bilateral and multilateral meetings, “comparing words with actions” suggests otherwise. According to him, Moscow maintains open and respectful dialogue, yet observes discrepancies between Yerevan’s statements and its policies.
Overchuk emphasized that despite assurances from Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, that Russian businesses face no risks in the country, developments indicate the opposite. He recalled that during discussions last summer, Pashinyan directly denied any threats to Russian investors, but subsequent actions have raised concerns. “We see that we are being told one thing, while in reality, something completely different is happening,” Overchuk stated, pointing to alleged violations of property rights involving a Russian businessman in the electricity sector and pressure on a Russian state-owned company to sell its railway concession.
He further underlined that Moscow is aware of both external and internal forces in Armenia seeking to reduce cooperation with Russia. Referring to Armenia’s adoption of a declarative law expressing its aspiration to join the European Union and efforts to align with EU standards, Overchuk argued that recent actions against Russian economic interests should be viewed within this broader political context.
Addressing regional infrastructure, Overchuk stated that the United States is interested in establishing a transport corridor through Armenia—referred to as the “Trump Route”—to facilitate the export of critical minerals from Central Asia and to strengthen oversight of Iran’s northern border. He added that various regional actors attach different strategic importance to the route, including Azerbaijan’s interest in reconnecting its territory and expanding access to Turkey.
Overchuk also drew attention to developments surrounding the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, stressing that Russia is closely monitoring decisions regarding its extension and Armenia’s broader nuclear energy policy. He remarked that explanations provided by Armenian authorities regarding dissatisfaction with an electricity company’s services remain an internal matter, yet emphasized that “property rights are primary” and that state seizures undermine investor confidence. According to him, such precedents increase perceived risks, reduce asset values, and encourage short-term profit strategies among investors.
Discussing regional transport cooperation, Overchuk stated that Armenia halted engagement with Russia on unblocking routes after previously agreeing in 2023 on principles such as sovereignty and reciprocity with Azerbaijan. He argued that this shift has exposed Armenia to “new, very serious threats” that did not previously exist. At the same time, he stressed that both Moscow and Yerevan share an interest in reopening transport links, particularly through the Meghri route, which could enhance connectivity with Iran, Turkey, and other EAEU markets.
Overchuk claimed that Armenia is being prepared for EU membership, which Russia considers a hostile bloc, warning that such a course would entail significant long-term consequences. He linked this trajectory to decisions regarding railway concessions and broader economic policy, asserting that these moves align with Yerevan’s declared rapprochement with the EU.
He also criticized plans for Western data center construction in Armenia, arguing that such projects generate minimal employment and complicate tax collection, while contributing to rising electricity prices that would affect both households and businesses.
Turning to the regional balance, Overchuk stated that the agreement on the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” has disrupted longstanding stability in the South Caucasus. He referenced the historical framework established after the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, noting that recent developments have altered established geopolitical dynamics. According to him, Russia’s participation in trilateral negotiations had previously ensured a balance of interests among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other regional actors.
He noted that Armenia’s decision to proceed with the project without Russia, alongside Turkey’s ongoing railway construction toward Nakhichevan, has reduced clarity regarding the future of the Meghri section and increased pressure on Armenia. Overchuk described the exclusion of Russia from negotiations as “a big mistake.”
According to Overchuk, Armenia agreed to retain only 26% of transit revenues under the new route, effectively ceding 74%, which he characterized as a sovereign but potentially disadvantageous decision. He argued that continued participation in the trilateral framework could have ensured full ownership and near-completion of the project under more favorable terms.
He also questioned the long-term viability of the corridor, citing reliance on cargo transported across the Caspian Sea, which is shrinking due to climate change. This, he stated, introduces significant investment risks and may necessitate reliance on Russian rail infrastructure or costly dredging operations. “This is not fantasy,” Overchuk emphasized, referencing the rapid environmental decline of the Aral Sea as a precedent.
Additionally, Overchuk pointed out that Turkey is already constructing a direct railway connection to Azerbaijan, regardless of Armenia’s involvement, thereby limiting Yerevan’s ability to influence future cargo flows. He warned that if Russia’s economic interests in Armenia diminish, transit through Armenian territory may also decline, further restricting the country’s negotiating leverage.
Addressing nuclear energy cooperation, Overchuk stated that Russia’s state corporation Rosatom could extend the operation of Armenia’s nuclear power plant until 2036, provided certain conditions are met. However, he criticized Armenia’s preference for European contractors, arguing that they lack experience in seismically active regions and fail to coordinate adequately with the plant’s original designers. He stressed that Rosatom’s involvement must constitute at least 70% of the work to ensure safety guarantees.
Overchuk highlighted Russia’s global leadership in nuclear construction, noting its extensive portfolio of projects worldwide. He added that while Armenia has shown interest in small modular reactors, only Russian technology currently offers viable solutions, a fact well understood by Armenian specialists.
He further warned that discussions about limiting the presence of Russian companies in Armenia could prompt reciprocal considerations regarding Armenian businesses operating in Russia. Emphasizing that economic relations are a “two-way street,” he suggested that restrictions on one side would inevitably affect the other.
Overchuk also expressed skepticism about Armenia’s prospects in EU markets, particularly for agricultural and beverage exports, urging businesses to realistically assess these opportunities. He noted that expectations of replacing EAEU trade with EU trade may not align with actual European market access.
Finally, Overchuk stated that discussions about Armenia’s EU integration have already had tangible economic consequences. He noted that mutual trade between Russia and Armenia declined from $11.5 billion in 2024 to approximately $6.4 billion in 2025, attributing a $5.1 billion loss to uncertainty surrounding Yerevan’s geopolitical orientation. “How do you think Russian entrepreneurs will react,” he asked, “if Russian businesses are forced out of Armenia while Armenian companies continue operating in Russia?”
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Iranian Ambassador to Armenia: “Iran Will Not Preemptively Take Position On Tr
On April 2, Khalil Shirgolami, the Iranian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Armenia, noted that Tehran does not wish to preemptively take a position or draw conclusions regarding the Trump Route (TRIPP).
Shirgolami emphasized that Iran has previously expressed support for Armenia developing its potential as a transit route, including discussions on lifting the blockade, the North-South corridor, and connecting the Black Sea with the Persian Gulf. At the same time, he noted that Iran is attentive to ensuring these developments do not create security concerns.
The ambassador also referenced US intentions toward Iran, mentioning statements by former President Donald Trump and Pentagon Secretary Pete Hegseth about returning Iran “to the Stone Age.” He contrasted this with Persian history, highlighting that “when many were still living in caves, Persia, led by King Cyrus the Great, published the first declaration of human rights.”
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Kremlin Warns European Politicians Will Recycle Interference Claims Ahead Of A
On April 2, Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary of the President of Russia, stated that European politicians habitually attribute interference to Moscow and are likely to repeat such claims regarding the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia.
Responding to a question about the Kremlin’s view on these accusations, he remarked that European officials tend to see Russian involvement “everywhere and in everything.” “It’s an old song, and they’ve mastered the notes to perfection. Naturally, they’ll sing it again in the Armenian elections,” Peskov stated.
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Armenia’s Pashinyan Says Railway Issue With Russia Remains Under Negotiation
By PanARMENIAN
Yerevan and Moscow have agreed to continue discussions on the concession management of Armenia’s railway network, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said during a briefing.
He noted that during his visit to Moscow, he discussed with Russian counterparts the possibility of transferring the concession management of Armenia’s railway system to a third country friendly to both Armenia and Russia, Armenpress reports.
“Yes, this issue was discussed in detail. We had an in-depth conversation, presented our positions and views, and listened to those of our Russian partners. We agreed to continue the discussions. The essence of these talks is simple: under current conditions, Armenia is losing its competitive potential advantages.
Our goal is to ensure that Armenia can fully realize its competitive potential. We not only have no problems with Russia, but we highly value our friendly relations and do not want to harm Russia’s interests in any way. At the same time, the current situation does not allow us to utilize our competitive advantages, and together we must find a solution,” Pashinyan said.
Earlier, Pashinyan had proposed transferring the concession management of Armenia’s railway network to a country acceptable to both Armenia and Russia, arguing that under Russian management the railway loses certain competitive advantages, as some countries avoid using it due to Russia’s involvement.
On April 2, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk stated that there are no objective reasons to transfer the concession management of Armenia’s railway network to a third country.
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Russia applies ‘stricter requirements’ for Armenian goods following tense Pas
Russia has announced ‘stricter requirements’ on the import of Armenian products, a measure that came a day after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had a tense meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Wednesday.
‘The range and the quantity of products that are being delivered give us grounds to believe that not all of the products entering [Russia] are from Armenia’, Sergei Dankvert, head of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision, told Vesti.
Highlighting the difference between EU and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) procedures, Dankvert said that Armenia allows ‘simplified access’ to EU goods within its market, which ‘does not comply with the requirements’ of the EAEU.
He said that the Russian side has ‘addressed this issue’ over the past several years after observing an ‘illogical increase’ of supplies of some products from Armenia.
Noting that there is a ‘simplified access procedures to EAEU countries’, Dankvert said in his interview on Thursday that Armenia’s export of flowers increased ‘from 36 million to over 100 million in three years’.
‘During inspections we saw that these products are accompanied only by consignment notes, that is, movements approved by the European Commission’, which ‘forced [Russia] to take measures’.
‘In terms of livestock products, we’ve seen shipments of untraceable products, such as butter, cheese, and trout. The trout must be Armenian, from mountain rivers or aquaculture, but it shouldn’t be in any way similar to Norwegian trout’, Russian state-run media TASS quoted Dankvert as saying.
He claimed these findings had led Russia to start applying stricter requirements on Armenia.
Armenian authorities have yet to respond to these latest accusations.
However in 2025, in response to a similar set of allegations, the spokesperson for the Armenian Food Safety Inspection Body, Anush Harutyunyan, told Armenpress that ‘the volume of flowers imported into Armenia is not large enough to allow for re-export’.
Following this, the parties also introduced joint online video surveillance at greenhouse farms of Armenian flower producers to decide whether to issue export licenses to Russia.
The Russian announcement came a day after Putin stated that Russia views the developing relations between Armenia and the EU with ‘complete calm’. At the same time, Putin underscored the impossibility of being in a customs union with the EU and the EAEU.
Following the meeting, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk accused Armenia of coming ‘very close to the point where we will have to restructure our economic relations with this country’.
Russia has previously been accused of using food-health standards as a way to exert economic pressure on countries, including Armenia, with several similar incidents taking place throughout 2024.
That year, sanctions were imposed on Armenian mineral water producer Jermuk, and Russia revealed violations in the supply of red caviar, fruits, and vegetables, and decided to temporarily limit their supply.
In 2023, Russia banned the import of Armenian-produced dairy products, deeming them unsafe for Russian consumers. The decision came shortly after Russia criticised Armenia’s ratification of the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, under which Russian President Vladimir Putin is wanted.
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The future of nuclear energy in Armenia: debate, risks and strategic choices a
Issues surrounding Armenia’s only nuclear power plant are as much about politics as energy. With related infrastructure now in need of reform, the plant has become a central part of attempts by outside actors to gain influence in the South Caucasus.
April 3, 2026 – Anna Vardanyan
The operation of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant—commonly known as the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant—remains one of the most debated energy and environmental issues not only in Armenia but throughout the South Caucasus region. As the only nuclear power plant in the South Caucasus, Metsamor occupies a critical place in Armenia’s energy security architecture, supplying a significant share of the country’s electricity. At the same time, the plant has long been the subject of international scrutiny due to its age, Soviet-era design, and geographic location in a seismically active region.
Located approximately 30 kilometres west of Yerevan and just 16 kilometres from the Turkish frontier, the facility’s potential environmental and safety implications extend beyond Armenia’s borders. Over the years, European institutions, international nuclear experts, and neighbouring states have repeatedly raised concerns about the plant’s safety profile.
The facility originally had two VVER-440 reactors, which were commissioned in the late 1970s. Following the devastating Spitak Earthquake, the plant was shut down due to safety concerns. However, the energy crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union forced Armenia to make a controversial decision: restart one of the reactors.
Unit 2 resumed operations in 1995, becoming a cornerstone of Armenia’s electricity system. Today it generates roughly 30 to 40 per cent of the country’s electricity, making it the single most important power source in the national energy mix.
For many policymakers in Yerevan, that fact alone settles the debate.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly emphasized the strategic role of nuclear energy in Armenia’s economy.
“Nuclear energy stands as a cornerstone in our strategy, ensuring both the energy security of our nation and the mitigation of climate change,” Pashinyan said at an international nuclear energy summit.
In another statement, he stressed that the government views the safe operation of the nuclear power plant as a strategic priority, noting that the facility remains a vital component of Armenia’s electricity balance.
For a landlocked country with limited fossil fuel resources and complicated regional geopolitics, nuclear power has become synonymous with sovereignty.
The debate around Metsamor has never been purely technical. It is about energy security, geopolitics, environmental risk, and the difficult choices facing a small state navigating an uncertain regional environment. Today, as Armenia considers extending the life of the plant while simultaneously planning its replacement, the discussion has intensified.
Armenia’s leadership insists that nuclear energy remains indispensable. Critics argue that relying on a decades-old reactor in a seismic region is inherently risky. Meanwhile, the emerging idea of building small modular reactors (SMRs) has added a new layer to the debate — one that divides experts almost as sharply as the question of Metsamor itself.
European concerns about safety
Despite its importance to Armenia, Metsamor has long been criticized by international institutions and neighbouring states.
The European Union has previously classified reactors of the VVER-440 V230 type — including the one operating at Metsamor — as belonging to the “oldest and least reliable” category among Soviet-built reactors in Eastern Europe. For years, the EU encouraged Armenia to close the facility and even offered financial assistance to support its shutdown. However, Armenian authorities rejected those proposals, arguing that closing the plant without a viable replacement would endanger the country’s energy stability.
Environmental organizations have also raised concerns about the plant’s design and its location in a seismically active region. However, officials in Yerevan point to decades of safe operation and to numerous modernization programmes implemented with international support. According to Pashinyan, Armenia operates the plant “in line with the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency”. He has also highlighted that no nuclear or radiation accidents have occurred in the plant’s history.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has carried out multiple inspections and safety assessments at Metsamor, encouraging continued upgrades while acknowledging the improvements implemented by Armenian specialists.
Still, critics argue that modernization can only go so far.
“The fundamental design limitations of early Soviet reactors cannot be fully eliminated,” some nuclear analysts have argued, pointing to the absence of modern containment structures typical of newer nuclear facilities.
Concerns from neighbouring Turkey
Because of its proximity to international borders, Metsamor has also become a regional political issue. Officials and experts in Turkey have periodically raised concerns about the plant’s safety and potential environmental risks. Turkish analysts often point out that the facility is located only a short distance from the border and sits within a seismically active region. Some Turkish policymakers have called for the plant’s closure or for stronger international monitoring. In previous years, Turkish officials raised the issue in diplomatic and international forums, arguing that a potential nuclear accident would have consequences far beyond Armenia.
However, the Armenian authorities reject the idea that Metsamor poses an exceptional regional risk.
They point out that the plant has operated for decades without a serious incident and that safety upgrades have been implemented in accordance with international standards.
Georgia’s energy perspective
Regional voices from Georgia often frame the issue somewhat differently. While Georgian environmental groups have expressed concerns about the aging reactor, some energy experts in Tbilisi acknowledge that Metsamor plays an important role in maintaining electricity stability across the South Caucasus. Armenia and Georgia maintain close cooperation in electricity trade, and disruptions in Armenia’s power generation could potentially affect regional energy flows. Some Georgian analysts argue that debate should focus less on closing the plant immediately and more on ensuring that Armenia successfully transitions to a modern nuclear facility.
Extending the plant’s life
Facing these competing pressures, Armenia has adopted what might be described as a pragmatic strategy: extend Metsamor’s operation while preparing for its replacement. The current plan foresees the reactor operating until 2036, following a series of modernization programmes.
During a parliamentary session, Pashinyan confirmed that the government is already examining the possibility of extending the plant’s life even further if necessary.
“We are now in the process of extending the operation period of the Metsamor nuclear power plant until 2036,” he said. “After that, another phase is expected to extend its operation for another ten years.”
At the same time, Armenia is searching for partners to build a new nuclear facility.
Several countries have expressed interest in the project, including the United States, Russia, France, China and South Korea.
The stakes are enormous: building a new nuclear power plant in Armenia is estimated to cost between three billion and five billion US dollars, making it one of the largest infrastructure projects in the country’s history.
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Putin issues ultimatum to Armenia over closer ties with EU
In a rare blunt exchange at the Kremlin, Russia’s president issued a public warning to Armenia, telling Yerevan to choose between the EU and Russia. The Armenian prime minister responded that in his country, the people of Armenia run a democratic political process.
Moscow will not tolerate Armenia’s closer ties with the EU, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during a rare and tense meeting at the Kremlin on Wednesday, issuing a not-so-veiled threat over Russian gas supplies to the neighbouring country.
“We see that there is a discussion in Armenia about developing relations with the European Union,” Putin said at the meeting with Pashinyan, adding that Moscow treats it “absolutely calmly”.
“But it should be obvious and honestly stated upfront that membership in a customs union with both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible,” Putin told Pashinyan on camera.
The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) created in 2015 includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and it is meant to enable the free movement of goods, capital and labour among its members.
During the meeting at the Kremlin, Putin followed up on Moscow’s gas supplies to Armenia, saying that Russia now sells gas to its neighbour at a “substantially” lower price than the EU does.
“Gas prices in Europe exceed 600 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, whereas Russia provides gas to Armenia at 177.5 per 1,000 cubic metres,” he told Pashinyan, adding that “the disparity is vast, the difference is substantial.”
Ever since it made peace with Azerbaijan, Armenia has increasingly said it is seeking closer ties with the EU, with Pashinyan even declaring an intention to join the 27-member bloc in the future.
In a series of countering answers which underline Armenia’s new positioning in the South Caucasus and in Russia’s former sphere of influence, the Armenian premier told Putin that he realised that his country could not simultaneously be a member of both blocs, and that for now it could combine its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union with developing cooperation with Brussels — and that as long as Yerevan can balance the two agendas it intends to do so.
The Armenian leader made it clear that when the time comes to make a choice, it will be solemnly made by the citizens of Armenia, without any interference.
“And when the processes reach the point where it will be necessary to make a decision, I am sure that we, I mean the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision,” Pashinyan told Putin, not mincing words.
With its long-standing influence in the South Caucasus fading and what appears to be the Kremlin’s ongoing intent to have a say in Armenia’s political decision-making, Putin told Pashiyan that Moscow hopes pro-Russian forces will be allowed to compete freely in Armenia’s parliamentary elections set for June.
Without mentioning names, Russia’s president claimed that some of their representatives have been put in custody, saying, “Some are in detention despite having Russian passports.”
Putin referred to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested last year after calling for the ouster of the government.
Pashinyan, also without naming Karapetyan, noted that Armenian law requires political candidates to hold exclusively Armenian citizenship, adding that “no restrictions” are being imposed on political opposition under such circumstances.
“Persons with Russian passports, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, cannot be either a candidate for deputy or a candidate for prime minister,” Pashinyan explained to Putin.
Pashinyan also firmly stated to Putin that “Armenia is a democratic country”, where the political processes are ongoing at all times.
“In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections, which are also very politicised, because as a result of our political reforms, people there also vote for or against political parties,” Pashinyan said.
The Armenian prime minister then referred to the internet outrage in Moscow and the Kremlin-introduced restrictions on the popular Telegram messaging app.
“Our social networks, for example, are 100% free, with no restrictions at all,” Pashinyan told Putin on camera.
He also added that unlike Russia there are no political prisoners in Armenia, stating that “in the general context, to be honest, we do not have participants in political processes in places of detention.”
“We have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us,” Pashinyan said.
Yerevan’s balancing act
Armenia’s relations with Russia have grown increasingly strained after Azerbaijan fully reclaimed the Karabakh region in 2023.
Decades of bloody conflict ended as the two former bitter rivals embarked on a historic peace process, launching an economic revival in the region amid new stability in the South Caucasus.
In 2024, Armenia suspended its membership in the Russia-led Yerevan Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) after Moscow failed to support Yerevan during the 2022 Karabakh escalation.
“In my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated (in 2022),” Pashinyan told Putin, adding that “they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO.”
He confirmed that Armenia is currently not participating in the CSTO for what he described as a “simple reason”.
“We are still unable to explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO did not respond, and did not respond despite the obligations that exist under the Collective Security Treaty,” the Armenian leader told Putin.
Putin called Armenian concerns “certain grievances” as he argued that Moscow’s decision not to intervene was on Yerevan and Russia did not see a point in stepping in.
“It is obvious that after you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention in this process, which has acquired an intra-Azerbaijani nature, was simply absolutely wrong in this matter,” Putin told Pashinyan.
“This is not an assessment, I am not saying that this is good or bad, from the point of view of organising peaceful life, I think that, probably, it made sense,” the Russian president added.
“Here we simply need to look for ways to further strengthen relations. But it seems to me that here too we need to finish here,” Putin concluded.
Since reaching an agreement to put an end to almost four decades of a bloody conflict in Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been working on normalising and strengthening their bilateral relations, as well as the cooperation in the region, with one exception.
Russia has been notably absent from the Karabakh peace process, both during and after the agreement was reached, and both Yerevan and Baku have been distancing themselves from Moscow while jointly redirecting their foreign policy focus toward the EU and the US.
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‘Armenia could become a small transit hub’: economist on developments around I
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