RFE/RL – Ter-Petrosian’s Party In Pre-Election Talks With Samvel Karapetian

March 10, 2026

Armenia – Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (left) and businessman Samvel Karapetian.

A top aide to former President Levon Ter-Petrosian said on Tuesday that his Armenian National Congress (HAK) is discussing with billionaire Samvel Karapetian’s opposition movement the possibility of joining forces for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

The Strong Armenia party spawned recently by the Mer Dzevov (In Our Way) movement is expected to be one of the main opposition contenders in the elections scheduled for June 7. The HAK publicly signaled an interest in forming an electoral alliance with it in late December. According to its deputy chairman, Levon Zurabian, negotiations between the two political groups are still going on.

“Our approaches were presented, naturally to Samvel Karapetian’s team as well,” he told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “The conversation is ongoing, let’s see where we get to.”

Ter-Petrosian has lavished praise on Karapetian in a series of social media posts which observers believe underlined the HAK’s desire to team up with the new opposition heavyweight. The 81-year-old ex-president effectively endorsed the Russian-Armenian tycoon on March 2. He went on to claim that the West will try hard to prevent the Karapetian-led opposition from winning the elections and to help Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian hold on to power.

“Pashinian’s Western masters will consider Samvel Karapetian’s victory as a re-establishment of Russian influence in Armenia, which is not at all part of their long-term plans,” he wrote. “Therefore, they will try to do everything to thwart such a development, ignoring the fact that the exclusive right to choose their own government belongs to the people.”

Karapetian’s political team has reacted cautiously to these overtures. The tycoon’s nephew and right-hand man, Narek Karapetian, said in December that none of Armenia’s former presidents should govern the country again. Zurabian said at the time that the statement “doesn’t apply to us anymore” because the HAK has officially made clear that Ter-Petrosian will not be its top election candidate.

Zurabian said on Tuesday that the HAK will run in the elections on its own if it fails to form an alliance with Strong Armenia or other opposition forces. Ter-Petrosian’s party did so in the last polls held in 2021, failing to win any parliament seats.

Ter-Petrosian, who had led Armenia to independence in 1991, is a vocal critic of Pashinian, having branded the latter as a “nation-destroying scourge” in the wake of Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. He has repeatedly denounced Pashinian’s attempts to depose Garegin II, the supreme head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, prompting insults from the ruling Civil Contract party.

Karapetian was arrested and indicted just hours after criticizing Pashinian’s campaign last June. He was moved to house arrest in late December.

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Yerevan Still ‘Assessing Proposals’ On New Nuclear Plant

March 10, 2026


France – Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian addresses the Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris, March 10, 2026.

Echoing statements by other Armenian officials, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian indicated on Tuesday that his government has still not decided which foreign country or company should build a new nuclear plant in Armenia.

Pashinian made no mention of a U.S.-Armenian nuclear agreement finalized last month when he addressed the global Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris organized by the French government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

“Armenia has made a decision to pursue small modular reactor technology,” he said in a speech. “Currently, we are carefully examining technologies and assessing proposals from international partners. The selection process is guided by the consideration of reliability, long-term sustainability and our commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.”

Pashinian and U.S. Vice President JD Vance signed a joint statement on the “completion of negotiations” on the agreement after their talks in Yerevan on February 9. It was widely construed as a further indication that the Armenian government wants to rely on the United States in its ambitious plans to replace Metsamor nuclear plant with a modern facility equipped with small modular reactors (SMRs), a new and relatively untested technology.

“American technology is going to be coming to this country,” Vance told reporters after the talks.

“That means up to $5 billion in initial U.S. exports, plus an additional $4 billion in long-term support through fuel and maintenance contracts,” he said, clearly alluding to the construction of the new Armenian nuclear plant.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian hold a joint press conference, in Yerevan, February 9, 2026.

Russian officials expressed concern at such a prospect in the following days. Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, argued on February 13 that the U.S. itself does not yet have a functioning SMR plant. He claimed that the possible construction of such a facility in Armenia would therefore pose an environmental threat to not only the South Caucasus country but also Russia.

Narek Apitonian, Armenia’s deputy minister of territorial administration and infrastructures, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service on February 16 that Yerevan is still weighing up various options for implementing its nuclear project. Pashinian similarly downplayed the nuclear agreement with the U.S. when he spoke to reporters on February 13. He said it will only give Armenia access to “complete information about the modular reactor technologies that the United States has.”

The $9 billion in total funding cited by Vance nearly matches Armenia’s entire state budget for this year. Pashinian’s domestic critics say a U.S.-led nuclear project is therefore too expensive for the country. Some of them claim that Pashinian is using the issue for geopolitical purposes.

The Metsamor plant’s sole functioning reactor produces around one-third of the country’s electricity. It is due to be decommissioned in 2036.

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Armenian Authorities Allege Foreign Meddling In Elections

March 10, 2026

Armenia – Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian chairs a meeting of the Security Council, Yerevan, March 5, 2026.

In an apparent reference to Russia, Armenian authorities claimed on Tuesday that security services of a foreign state are pressuring Armenians doing business there to support opposition forces during Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections.

In a statement to the official Armenpress news agency, Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) said they are being told to take financial, “organizational” and other actions for that purpose. The FIS did not name that country or Armenian opposition groups allegedly supported by the foreign power. Nor did it give other details.

The Interior Ministry said a few hours later that that the Armenian police have already looked into the FIS statement and submitted a relevant “report of an apparent crime” to another law-enforcement agency, the Investigative Committee. The latter declined to say whether it has launched a formal criminal investigation and identified any suspects.

A deputy chairman of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s Civil Contract party hinted, meanwhile, that Russia is the source of the alleged meddling in the elections scheduled for June 7. Vahagn Aleksanian claimed that Armenians living abroad will be ordered to travel to their home country to vote in the polls.

Pashinian himself spoke at the weekend of rumors that “they will be bringing people from Russia” to vote for the opposition.

“Let them bring [such people] because 84.5 percent of those who will come, according to the polls we have conducted there, will vote for us,” he said during a campaign trip to Gyumri.

The allegations came almost one month after Pashinian’s government formally asked the European Union to send a “hybrid rapid response team” to Armenian ahead of the elections. The EU seems intent on deploying such a mission to counter possible Russian interference.

Yerevan’s request added to Armenian opposition concerns about the freedom and fairness of the vote. Opposition leaders say that under the guise of countering Russian “hybrid threats,” Pashinian is trying to secure an EU blank check for winning it through fraud or foul play.

The EU sent a similar mission in Moldova during parliamentary elections held there last September. Two Moldovan opposition parties deemed pro-Russian were barred from running in the elections won by the former Soviet republic’s pro-Western leadership. Armenian opposition groups fear that some of them may likewise be disqualified from the race with the EU’s backing.

In recent weeks, senior members of Pashinian’s party have signaled concerns that three such groups led by former President Robert Kocharian, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetian and another wealthy businessman, Gagik Tsarukian, may collectively win a majority in the next Armenian parliament and form a coalition government. They have said that the Armenian authorities “will not allow” such an outcome.

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RFE/RL – Armenian Genocide Memorial’s Director ‘Forced’ To Resign After Vance

March 10, 2026
Armenia – U.S. Vice President JD Vance and his wife Usha are accompanied by Edita Gzoyan (right), director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Yerevan, as they visit it on February 10, 2026

Just weeks after showing U.S. Vice President JD Vance around the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute (AGMI) in Yerevan, its director, Edita Gzoyan, has resigned under reported pressure from Armenia’s government.

Vance and his wife Usha visited the memorial at the end of an official trip to the Armenian capital on February 10. After they laid flowers by its eternal fire dedicated to the victims of the 1915 genocide, Gzoyan escorted them to other parts of the complex, including cross-stones placed in memory of Armenians killed in pogroms in Azerbaijan that followed the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

According to an AGMI press release, Gzoyan noted “the connection between those events and the Armenian Genocide.” She went on to present Vance with “books about the Armenian Genocide and the Artsakh issue.”

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, who stopped using the Armenian name of Karabakh a few years ago, indicated his dissatisfaction with the organization of Vance’s visit to the memorial when he spoke in the Armenian parliament later in February.

“There happened things that should not have happened, but that’s a topic for another conversation,” he said without elaborating.

Gzoyan tendered her resignation aftewards. According to some media outlets, the Armenian government ordered her to step down because of what she told and showed Vance.

Gzoyan has still not publicly commented on her decision which has upset the 74 other employees of the AGMI. They protested against her exit in a joint letter to Pashinian.

“It was the first time in the history of our museum that all employees, without exception, appealed to a higher authority,” Mihran Minasian, an adviser to the AGMI director, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service on Tuesday.

“We expected that our director will on the contrary be rewarded for her good work,” said Suren Manukian, who runs one of the AGMI divisions.

Manukian said he and his colleagues were unofficially informed by the Armenian Ministry of Education, Culture and Youth Affairs, which supervises the AGMI, that Gzoyan was told to quit because of failing to ensure proper oversight of a controversial reconstruction of the genocide memorial that began last summer. He dismissed that explanation as “unserious,” arguing that the reconstruction work is directly overseen by the ministry.

Education Minister Zhanna Andreasian has personally inspected it during her regular visits to the site. Gzoyan no longer accompanied her during those inspections after Vance’s visit.

Andreasian’s ministry on Tuesday declined to give a reason for Gzoyan’s resignation, saying that it will only reply to written questions from RFE/RL’s Armenian Service later on. It also noted that the AGMI’s director is appointed by its board of trustees.

The board’s chairman, French-Armenian genocide scholar Raymond Kevorkian, and several members resigned last week. Pashinian promptly replaced them on March 6.

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California Courier Online, March 9, 2026

California Courier Online, March 9, 2026
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3- Pashinyan faces unusual request from a woman

Panorama

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan faced an unusual request from a citizen during a meeting in Ashtarak, Aragatsotn Province, as part of his regional tour on Saturday.

A local woman told him she had three sons, the eldest aged 30, and asked whether the government had any programs to help young people get married. Pashinyan replied that no such initiative existed.

The woman then pointed out that Pashinyan himself has three daughters and asked if he might consider one of them for her son.

Pashinyan laughed off, saying: “I won’t, because they are mature people. It’s for them to make their own decisions.”

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4- Haifa Municipality restores damaged street sign marking Armenian Genocide Square

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Trade as Leverage: Russia’s Enduring Economic Role in Armenia

Special Eurasia
Mar 11 2026

Trade as Leverage: Russia’s Enduring Economic Role in Armenia

Executive Summary

This report evaluates Armenia’s trade relationship with Russia, focusing on economic interdependence and its strategic implications.

Moscow remains Yerevan’s principal trading and investment partner, accounting for over 35% of external trade in 2025, with cooperation concentrated in consumer goods, food production, and key industrial sectors.

Political distancing between Yerevan and Moscow contrasts with sustained economic integration. The situation reflects a structural gap between Armenia’s economic realities and its foreign policy repositioning.

Key Takeaways

  1. Russia continues to exercise significant economic influence through trade dominance and sectoral investment.
  2. Armenia’s economic cooperation with Russia persists despite political mistrust and security disagreements.
  3. Economic interdependence limits the speed and scope of Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation.

Background Information

According to Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Economy Narek Hovakimyan, Russia accounted for over 35% of Armenia’s total external trade in 2025, confirming its role as one of the country’s most important trading partners.

Economic ties between the two nations have grown lately, especially in food and consumer items. These areas stimulate job creation, boost local spending, and improve the economy. Armenian officials emphasise cooperation in the food industry, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural production chains, supported by state and private modernisation programmes aimed at expanding output and improving quality.

Russian Ambassador to Armenia Sergey Kopyrkin reaffirmed Moscow remains Yerevan’s major trade, economic, and investment partner. The Russian capital maintains a firm presence in mining, energy, metallurgy, transport and logistics, banking, and information-communication technologies.

The current situation underscores a history of economic interdependence, according to the Russian diplomat, amplified by Armenia’s eleven years within the Eurasian Economic Union, which has facilitated increased trade and industrial partnerships through its established frameworks.

Why Does It Matter?

Strategically, Russia views Armenia as a key geopolitical foothold in the South Caucasus, rather than an ideological partner. As part of its blizhnee zarubezhe (near abroad), the Kremlin views Yerevan as structurally dependent because of geography, infrastructure links, and economic integration.

Russia’s aim is not absolute dominance but preventing hostile regional consolidation that could exclude Moscow’s influence from transport routes, mediation processes, and security arrangements.

Armenia’s economy remains closely tied to Russia, even when its leadership seeks diversification toward Western partners. Because disrupting economic ties with Russia would have a direct impact on jobs, investment, and industrial output, concentrated trade makes it difficult to enact swift policy changes. Moscow maintains influence via its capital’s involvement in key industries and through economic frameworks associated with the Eurasian Economic Union.

For Russia, maintaining economic primacy supports broader strategic goals without requiring overt political alignment. Economic integration maintains access to logistics networks, financial channels, and regional influence despite deteriorating military and political relations.

Politically, Armenia attempts to reduce dependence while avoiding economic shock. Deterioration of confidence in Russia-dominated frameworks has occurred after the capitulation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh under an Azerbaijani military offensive, though economic divestment presents prompt internal hazards.

A two-pronged policy emerges, characterised by a divergence between political pronouncements and economic implementation. The imbalance increases exposure to pressure from external actors, including Azerbaijan and Turkey, which monitor Armenia’s strategic positioning during this transition.

Indicators to Monitor

  • Share of Russia in Armenia’s total external trade volume.
  • Russian investment levels in Armenian strategic sectors.
  • Development of joint agricultural and industrial cooperation chains.
  • Policy signals regarding Yerevan’s participation in Eurasian Economic Union mechanisms.
  • Changes in logistics, banking, or commercial programmes supporting bilateral trade.

Outlook

Armenia is likely to maintain deep trade relations with Russia in the near term because of structural economic dependence and existing industrial integration.

Political distancing will continue, especially if the current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wins the parliamentary elections in June 2026, driven by security concerns and diversification efforts, yet economic disengagement will remain gradual. Moscow expects to tolerate political friction while preserving economic footholds and awaiting clearer signals from Yerevan’s domestic political cycle, including the 2026 parliamentary elections.

The most probable scenario involves sustained economic cooperation and controlled geopolitical competition, rather than a rapid strategic rupture.

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Azerbaijan resettling Azerbaijanis in formerly Armenian-inhabited villages of

Panorama, Armenia
Mar 11 2026

Azerbaijan has begun actively resettling Azerbaijani citizens in villages of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) that were historically inhabited exclusively by Armenians, according to a report by the cultural heritage monitoring group Monument Watch.

The organization, which tracks the condition of Armenian cultural heritage in the region, said the policy is part of Azerbaijan’s government program known as the “great return to the territories liberated from occupation” launched in 2022.

According to the Monument Watch, the initiative envisions the return and settlement of Azerbaijani residents in what Baku describes as “liberated historical territories”. In practice, the group said the policy involves resettling Azerbaijani citizens across Nagorno-Karabakh.

The resettlement process accelerated after 2023, when Azerbaijan seized full control of Artsakh and the Armenian population left the territory following a military offensive.

The Monument Watch said Azerbaijani authorities have prioritized settlements that were historically Armenian-populated and had no Azerbaijani residents in the past, particularly in the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast during the Soviet era.

Between 2024 and 2025, Azerbaijanis have reportedly been resettled in several villages and towns, including in Vank, Haterk, Chapar, Kolatak, Drmbon, Horatagh and Nerkin Horatagh of the Martakert district, the town of Martuni and the villages of Karmir Shuka and Sos in the Martuni district, the town of Hadrut in the Hadrut district, as well as Aygestan, Patara, Astghashen, Khachen, Noragyugh, Khnapat, Khnatsakh and Shosh in the Askeran district.

The policy has also extended to Stepanakert, including the suburb of Krkzhan, according to the report.

The Azerbaijani authorities present the resettled residents as “displaced indigenous inhabitants,” the Monument Watch said. The monitoring group disputes this characterization, arguing that Soviet-era demographic records show that many of the villages now being resettled had no Azerbaijani population.

The group said Azerbaijani media frequently present renovated Armenian houses as newly constructed homes and portray schools, kindergartens and apartment buildings built during the Soviet period or under the Artsakh authorities as new infrastructure.

The Monument Watch also said Azerbaijani officials and media have begun assigning new Azerbaijani place names to settlements and promoting historical narratives that omit Armenian historical and cultural presence.

The group cited the historic region of Khachen, including the village of Vank, as an example where such efforts intensified in 2024.

The Monument Watch warned that the resettlement process could place Armenian cultural and historical sites at risk, including churches, monuments, cemeteries and other heritage sites located within or near the settlements.

According to the group, a monument in Vank dedicated to victims of World War II and the Artsakh liberation war has already been dismantled.

In the village of Khnatsakh, the monitoring group said monuments commemorating World War II and the Karabakh war were removed and replaced with a sign displaying the village’s newly assigned Azerbaijani name, “Xanyurdu kəndi”.

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Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addresses MEPs on peace efforts with

European Parliament
Mar 11 2026
Press Release

On Wednesday, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed MEPs, highlighting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and his country’s EU membership aspirations.

Pashinyan opened his address by saying that, since his last visit to the European Parliament in 2023, changes of centennial — if not millennial — significance have taken place in Armenia and in the South Caucasus. “The most memorable of these changes is the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, formalised on 8 August 2025 in Washington DC, when President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and I signed a Joint Declaration in the White House, effectively securing peace between our two nations”, he said.

Pashinyan also highlighted the Armenian government’s intention to take the next steps as regards the US-brokered TRIPP infrastructure programme, which is intended to establish unimpeded, multimodal transit connectivity on Armenian territory and connect the main part of Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

Latest developments in Armenia

The Armenian Prime Minister touched upon the latest political developments in Armenia, ongoing efforts to resettle Armenians who fled the previous conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the Republic of Armenia, attempts by certain clergy and political opposition forces to undermine peace efforts, and attempts to secure the freedom of Armenian prisoners of war still held captive in Azerbaijan.

Addressing those issues is critical to the current peace process, he said: “We are criticised for the fact that the peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not perfect. But I ask you: Where is peace perfect? Where has perfect peace ever existed, and when? (…) On the contrary, it is the will to care for peace that can bring it as close to perfection as possible (…).”

Continue reforms with support from European partners

Pashinyan further highlighted his country’s adoption of the law on the “Launch of the Process of the Republic of Armenia’s Accession to the European Union”, which initiates the process of Armenia’s accession to the EU. (…) Now, after the adoption of this law, many in Armenia ask: When will Armenia become a member of the European Union? Our answer is very clear: No country can become a member of the EU without meeting its standards. Therefore, our task is to continue the path of reforms with the support of our European partners and first objectively meet the EU’s accession criteria.”

He also said that one of the biggest obstacles on Armenia’s path to EU integration at this moment is the frozen state of political dialogue between the EU and Georgia. “Georgia is our path to the European Union, and we adopted the law on the Launch of the Process of the Republic of Armenia’s Accession to the European Union after Georgia received EU candidate status. This made Armenia’s EU membership perspective tangible, and our expectation and request is that the constructive EU-Georgia process will develop. This is as important for Armenia as it is for Georgia.”

The Armenian Prime Minister concluded by saying that the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia on 7 June must serve to cement peace. “Our democracy must make peace irreversible, and then peace will make democracy irreversible.”

You can watch the speech again here (11.3.2026)

Contacts:

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260306IPR37529/prime-minister-nikol-pashinyan-addresses-meps-on-peace-efforts-with-azerbaijan

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TRIPP project is in the crystallization stage, Armenia ready to ensure Azerbai

Aysor, Armenia
March 11 2026

“In the near future, Armenia and the United States will sign a relevant agreement, which will mark the practical launch of the project. It will create new transport opportunities for communication from east to west and vice versa, and from south to north and vice versa. This is an epoch-making change,” Pashinyan said. 

According to Pashinyan, these developments open up new opportunities for the European Union and Armenia to deepen and further specify cooperation in the field of transport connectivity.

“Armenia has neither the intention nor any reason to delay the implementation of the TRIPP project, as it fully corresponds to the short-term, medium-term, and long-term interests of the Republic of Armenia. It does not in any way undermine Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or jurisdiction. Armenia is ready to provide a road connection between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through the Kornidzor, Goris, Yeghegnadzor, and Yeraskh routes using the infrastructure currently in operation,” Nikol Pashinyan stated. 

According to him, just as Azerbaijan expects the establishment of a connection to Nakhichevan through the territory of Armenia, Armenia also expects the establishment of a railway connection between the southern and northern parts of the country through the territory of Nakhichevan. 

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