RPA GM member Eduard Sharmazanov writes on his Facebook page: “Let’s see if any Russian official will comment on the warm meeting between Zelensky and Bayramov, or is it taboo to criticize Azerbaijanis?”

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Bayramov met with President Zelensky in Kyiv.

The latter thanked Azerbaijan for its assistance.

Let me remind you that in February 2022, just a few days before the start of the CSTO, Russia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of strategic alliance.

During these years, Azerbaijan has openly provided political and other support to the Zelensky regime, the enemy of its ally Russia.

Let’s see tomorrow whether the ambassador of Azerbaijan will be invited to the Russian Foreign Ministry to hand over a note of protest, or whether the Azerbaijanis are allowed to have warm contacts with Zelenak.

What did I say?

Yes, I criticize and criticize the uncalculated and harmful steps of the RA rulers against the Armenian-Russian alliance, but Aliyev’s regime behaves a thousand times worse with the Russian Federation, ceremoniously warming relations with the Kiev regime.

It is obvious that in case of such steps by official Yerevan, official Moscow would at least severely criticize it.

Should we now expect severe criticism from Moscow regarding official Baku’s anti-Russian actions? Or is the old Greek rule still valid here: “What is done to Zeus, not to the ox”?

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Iran’s strategic calculation and the new geopolitical significance of the strait

Introduction:

Middle power states and regional powers are rarely able to compete with superpowers in terms of military, economic or technological potential. For this reason, they strive to turn their comparative advantages – geographical location, political influence, economic opportunities or other strategic resources – into geopolitical influence.

Geopolitical experience shows that influence over a strategic area is not always determined by legal or military superiority over it. In most cases, it is more important to occupy such a position, without which it is difficult to imagine the stable and predictable activity of the given strategic area.

The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the clearest examples of this logic in recent decades. It continues to be one of the most important strategic sea hubs of the global energy system. According to various estimates, about one-fifth of the oil transported by sea routes passes through this strait.

However, its importance has long gone beyond the borders of the economy. Hormuz is simultaneously a key factor of strategic deterrence, regional power balance and international political influence, where the geopolitical interests of regional and international power centers intersect.

However, recent developments around Hormuz raise a more fundamental question. Much of the international discussion focuses on whether or not it will be possible to restore the shipping regime that existed before the Iran-US/Israel war. Underlying this approach is the assumption that restoring the status quo that worked before the war is in the interests of all major actors, including Iran. But is it really so? It is this assumption that requires re-evaluation.

The last war changed not only the balance of power in the region, but also Tehran’s strategic calculation. If in the past Hormuz was mainly considered as a platform of pressure used in crisis situations, after the war it began to be perceived as a platform of long-term strategic influence. Under these conditions, Iran’s strategic goal is not to close the strait, but to become such an actor in its security system, ignoring its decisive role and interests, it will be difficult to ensure the safety of international shipping.

This change changes the logic of evaluating the results of the war. The question is no longer whether Iran can disrupt shipping or not. It is more important to understand whether Tehran seeks to create such a security environment in which stable navigation in Hormuz will be difficult to imagine without its direct participation and taking into account its interests.

This approach leads to three interrelated questions: what is the place of Hormuz in Iran’s strategic thinking, what did the last war change, and what are the implications of that change for regional security and international shipping.

This logic changes the starting point for evaluating the developments around Hormuz. They are no longer limited to the framework of another regional crisis, but reflect the strategy of turning geographical advantage into long-term geopolitical influence. Therefore, the main question of the post-war period is no longer whether it will be possible to restore the shipping regime that existed before the war, but under what political conditions, in what power balance and with whose participation will the new security reality of Hormuz be formed.

The strategic importance of Hormuz for Iran

The strategic importance of Hormuz is usually evaluated from the point of view of global energy markets. At the center of the discussions are the volumes of oil and liquefied natural gas transported through the strait, the risks of supply disruptions and their impact on the global economy. Although these assessments are valid, they do not formulate the entire strategic logic, which is why Hormuz occupies a key place in Iran’s strategic thinking.

The strategic importance of Hormuz for Tehran is primarily due to its geographical location. Iran controls the northern coast of the strait, occupying a geographical position that cannot be replaced either by military power, economic resources, or technological advantage. In this sense, geography is not just a matter of favorable position for Iran, but the strategic advantage on which its national security and geopolitical influence are built.

It is this geographical advantage that formed the main logic of Iran’s naval strategy. Realizing that it cannot compete with the United States and its partners with classic naval capabilities, Tehran has developed an asymmetric naval strategy for many years. The purpose of that strategy is to create an environment where any regional or extra-regional actor would have to take into account Iran’s possible response in their political, military and economic calculations.

In this sense, Hormuz performs three interrelated functions in Tehran’s strategic calculations.

First, it is a tool of restraint. The geographical features of the strait allow to significantly increase the risk and price of any external intervention, even in the conditions of disproportionate military capabilities. The goal is not to defeat the enemy militarily, but to increase the value and risks of his strategic decisions.

Second, Hormuz is a source of political and economic influence. Developments around Hormuz have shown that even limited security incidents can affect not only shipping, but also insurance markets, energy prices and the international political agenda. For this reason, the importance of the strait has long gone beyond the boundaries of the purely military sphere.

Thirdly, Tehran considers Hormuz as a key component of the Persian Gulf security system. For this reason, he consistently claims that the long-term security of the region cannot be built without the participation of the main regional actors, first of all, his own participation. This approach has become one of the fundamental principles of Iran’s foreign and security policy in recent decades.

Together, these three functions form the strategic logic within which Hormuz is considered not only as a geographical advantage, but also as a structural basis of geopolitical influence. For Iran, its value is determined not so much by direct control over the strait, but by the fact that its geographical position gives an opportunity to influence the strategic calculations of other actors.

In fact, this geographical advantage has existed for a long time. Therefore, it is necessary to understand why it acquired a new political significance after the last war. The answer should be sought not so much in the military results of the war, but in the strategic conclusions reached by Tehran.

The impact of the war on Iran’s strategic calculations

The strategic importance of wars is not always determined by military success or territorial changes. Often, their most important result is not the immediate change in the balance of power, but the strategic conclusions reached by the participants in the conflict after the end of the war. In strategic thinking, war is not only the use of force, but also a process of strategic re-evaluation.

From this point of view, the last war became the test stone on which Tehran practically tested its long-term strategic calculations regarding Hormuz.

The war showed that the global maritime trade system is extremely sensitive to even limited security disruptions. The problem was not only the safety of the ships. No less important were the indirect consequences: the increase in insurance premiums, the redirection of transportation, the change in market expectations and the reassessment of business risks. All this proved that the vulnerability of world trade is caused not only by actual military operations, but also by the influence of uncertainty.

If even limited security disruptions in Hormuz are sufficient to change the behavior of international markets, the strategic impact can be ensured not by the complete closure of the strait, but by the maintenance of constant security uncertainty around the strait. In such conditions, the normal activity of shipping is no longer perceived as completely stable and predictable. In these conditions, the logic of exerting influence also changes.

A complete closure of the strait is an extreme measure that will almost inevitably lead to widespread international opposition and reduce Tehran’s strategic flexibility. Therefore, the main instrument of influence becomes not the interruption of communications, but the maintenance of such controlled security uncertainty around Hormuz, which forces other actors to constantly take into account Iran’s possible reaction in their political, military and economic calculations.

Thus, the main strategic result of the war was not the formation of a new balance of forces, but the reassessment of the geopolitical value of the geographical advantage. What changed was not Iran’s geographical advantage, but the strategic understanding of how to use this advantage more effectively.

The decisive factor is no longer whether the previous shipping system will be restored, but what strategic conditions the new system will be formed under.

It follows from this logic that even with the continuation of navigation and the unchanged preservation of the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic reality of Hormuz may change qualitatively, if international actors always take into account the possible reaction of Iran in their political, military and economic calculations.

Thus, the most important consequence of the war is not only the transformation of the military balance, but also the reinterpretation of the geopolitical role of Hormuz. The strait is no longer considered exclusively as a potential source of crisis, but as a platform for long-term geopolitical influence. It is this new strategic logic that creates the basis for understanding what kind of strategy can be formed under the conditions of such a calculation.

The transformation of Iran’s strategy towards Hormuz

After the war, the reassessment of the possibilities of Iran’s influence around Hormuz naturally raises one fundamental question. what is the strategic purpose of that influence? If even limited security influence is sufficient to change the behavior of international actors, the problem is not the fact of that influence, but the strategic purpose it serves. The answer to this requires a clear distinction between the means and the goal of Iran’s naval strategy.

Over the past three decades, Tehran has consistently built and developed a disproportionate array of naval capabilities: fast attack boats, coastal anti-ship missiles, sea mines, drone systems, electronic warfare, and selective pressure tactics against commercial shipping. This entire system was created for one main purpose: to increase the price of any foreign intervention and limit the freedom of action of other regional and extra-regional actors.

In this sense, the war did not require the transformation of either Iran’s military capabilities or the tools for their use. Their strategic function was transformed. what was once seen as a deterrent turned into a tool of long-term geopolitical influence after the war.

If in the past these capabilities mainly served the purpose of exerting pressure in crisis situations, after the war they became a tool of long-term geopolitical influence strategy. The goal of that strategy is no longer periodic pressure, but the formation of such a strategic dependence, under the conditions of which the security and stability of Hormuz become practically inseparable from the role and decisions of Iran.

This is where the main difference of the new strategic logic is manifested. Under these conditions, the source of influence is not the possibility of closing the strait, but the fact that even under the conditions of its normal operation, the Iranian factor turns into a permanent variable in the strategic calculations of international actors. Therefore, the strategic goal is not the disruption of shipping, but the formation of such a position where a stable security system in Hormuz is practically impossible to imagine without the role of Iran and taking into account its strategic interests.

This strategic logic has wider geopolitical significance. Influence in modern international relations is often determined not so much by the use of force as by strategic irreplaceability. An actor whose participation is perceived as a necessary condition for stability achieves a structural influence that is often more lasting and durable than dominance based on the direct use of force.

Creating such a strategic environment allows Iran to expand its geopolitical influence without a new legal status, additional military presence, or revision of international treaties. Legal regulations may remain unchanged, while the strategic reality around them and the behavior of actors may be significantly transformed.

This strategic logic also changes the perception of the post-war status quo. Since the strategic goal is not to close the strait, but to maintain influence over security, the complete restoration of the previous navigation regime cannot be considered as a primary interest of Tehran. More likely is the formation of an equilibrium in which Hormuz continues to operate, but its security is no longer perceived as an automatically assured reality.

Thus, the main strategic result of the war is not the formation of a new military balance, but the establishment of a new logic of influence. If before the geographical advantage was mainly used as a means of pressure, after the war it turns into a structural basis of long-term geopolitical influence.

However, the viability of any strategy is determined not only by its goals, but also by their implementation mechanisms. Therefore, the next problem concerns the tools through which such a strategy can be turned into a practical policy.

The architecture of Iran’s new strategy

If the strategic goal of Iran is not the interruption of international maritime communications through the Strait of Hormuz, but the formation of the position of an irreplaceable actor in its security system, then the key question concerns the practical implementation of that strategy. It is about what kind of combination of political, security, economic and informational mechanisms can create such an environment where the normal activity of Hormuz will be practically impossible to imagine without the role of Iran and taking into account its strategic interests.

The answer to this question should be sought not in individual steps, but in a complete system of interconnected strategic components.

The first component is redesigning the security environment. For many years, Iran consistently claims that the stability of the Persian Gulf should be ensured by the states of the region, not extra-regional forces. After the war, this approach acquires a new strategic content. If before it was mainly a political position, now it turns into a practical demand, according to which the long-term security of Hormuz is impossible to imagine without taking into account the role of Iran and its strategic interests.

The second component is informational and operational engagement. Monitoring of ship movements, security communication mechanisms, regional coordination formats and maritime situational information exchange may at first glance have a purely technical meaning. In fact, they are gradually turning into important levers of political influence. An actor participating in the collection, processing and circulation of security information also becomes involved in the security decision-making process over time, expanding its political influence.

The third component is the formation of economic interdependencies. Geographical advantage reveals its full potential when it is transformed into practical services and infrastructural opportunities. The development of logistics, port and security services can turn Hormuz’s geographical position into not only political influence, but also a source of economic interdependence, strengthening Iran’s role in the international maritime communications system.

The fourth component is security uncertainty management. Recent military developments have shown that world markets react not only to actual military operations, but also to their probability. In those conditions, the main source of influence becomes not the direct use of force, but the controlled management of security uncertainty. In such a situation, even limited incidents or strong political impulses can change the behavior of states, shipowners, insurance companies, and energy markets without large-scale military escalation.

The fifth component is the systemic redesign of the security system. The ultimate goal of this strategy is not only to maintain actual influence. It is aimed at creating such a political reality around the security of Hormuz, under which Iran’s participation will no longer be considered as a political demand or situational necessity, but as a natural and necessary component of the regional security system. In that case, Iran’s influence will be based not only on the recognition of its systemic role.

Each of these components, taken separately, would have a limited effect. However, their combination forms the strategic system under which geographical advantage turns into long-term geopolitical influence. Here, the main source of influence is not military superiority, but the formation of such security, informational, economic and political interdependencies, under the conditions of which the normal activity of Hormuz gradually begins to be connected with the role of Iran.

Thus, the core of the new strategy is not only the complete control over the strait, but the formation of such a political reality around the security of Hormuz, under which international actors are constantly forced to take into account the role and strategic interests of Iran in their political, military and economic calculations.

Continued

Aram Shahnazaryan

Political analyst-expert on Iran issues

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Lawyer, businessman Armen Sakapetoyan sounds the alarm about what happened to him and his family, which, however, concerns all RA citizens and potential investors in Armenia.

“I am Armen Sakapetoyan, lawyer, businessman. I decided to address the public and the media, because the problem I faced has gone beyond the personal domain. it refers to the case of mass leakage of bank secret information.

In 2021, there was an illegal leak of bank data concerning me and my family members, which came into the possession of a police officer, without criminal proceedings and without a court order.

All the banks operating in Armenia deny the provision of data by them, and the law enforcement agencies refused to initiate a criminal case, which I am now appealing to the court.

This alert is not just about my family or business. If today it is possible to bypass the law, violate bank secrecy and illegally paralyze business activities, then tomorrow any citizen, businessman, investor living in Armenia may find themselves in the same situation.

I am attaching a video where I present the details of the case. I am ready to answer your questions in any format and provide additional information and legal documents in the near future.”

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“Two Fronts” podcast next issue Davit Sargsyan and the special guest of this issue, Hakob Avetikyan, editor-in-chief of “Azg” weekly newspaper they discuss the first sessions of the parliament of the new convocation, the behavior of the opposition, compare it with the National Assemblies of the previous convocations, and also discuss what the opposition needs in order to eventually remove the regime.

 

Details in the video

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On June 28, 2026, the Israeli government approved the country Foreign Minister Gideon Saari of the presented formula to the projectofficially to recognize the Armenian Genocide։

This decision had to be finally approved by the Israeli Knesset, but on July 13, the Knesset suspended the parliamentary vote on recognizing the Armenian Genocide.

Israeli sources immediately reported that the Armenian issue was removed from the Knesset agenda after a call from Baku.

More specifically, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu blocked the vote after Azeri presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev contacted his office on Aliyev’s behalf.

This information the other day confirmed Hajiyev himself.

“We have conveyed our position to the Israeli side. the adoption of such a decision would first of all be unfair, would not reflect the historical reality, and we consider it unacceptable. The positive thing is that the Israeli side has taken Azerbaijan’s messages seriously. We consider that the further advancement of this issue has been prevented,” he told Haber Global TV channel, adding that Turkey’s interests are a priority for Azerbaijan.

And today from the Azerbaijani APA agency we find out that Israeli ambassador to Azerbaijan Ronen Krauss visited the Ganja memorial built after the 44-day war, the purpose of which is to remind about the “Ganja incidents” and “missile attacks of the RA armed forces from the territory of Armenia”.

“This memorial visit is a very touching and emotional moment for me. Because this place is extremely important in terms of preserving the memory of those who died and were injured during the attacks on Ganja. As a person from Israel, I know that unfortunately we also suffer from such terrible events.

This spiritual connection between the pain that Azerbaijan feels and the pain that Israel feels is a feeling that both countries deeply understand and appreciate. We will always honor the memory of the fallen.

It was a great honor for me to visit this memorial. I believe that for Azerbaijan, “investments” are extremely important in preserving the memory of the fallen and passing on their stories to the new generations who have not seen war and conflict.

Preservation of historical memory is a matter to which great attention should be paid. I am very happy and deeply flattered to have the opportunity to visit this place and see firsthand Azerbaijan’s efforts to preserve this history and bring it to the international community. And in the memorial complex, I was particularly impressed by the scene of destroyed buildings with teddy bears on them.

And the realization that children have suffered here, including the six children who died as a result of terrorist attacks, is one of the most moving moments for me as a father. We all look forward, hoping to build a better future for our children and families. Unfortunately, what I saw left a very deep and personal emotional impression on me,” said the Jewish diplomat in an interview with the Azerbaijani “APA” agency.

An interesting thing turns out. Hikmet Hajiyev, born in Ganja, calls the Prime Minister of Israel to prevent the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, shortly after the Israeli ambassador visits Azerbaijan.m: is the memorial complex of Ganja and tries to accuse Armenia of carrying out a “terrorist act”.՝ asserting that the “Ganja incidents” should not be forgotten, the pit’s behind to the international community. And in all of this, the focus is on the children in a subtle way.

And during the Armenian Genocide of 1915, the children killed in their mothers’ wombs are not taken into account, or the orphans, those who saw the brutal death of their own parents, or the US-Israel strikes on the girls’ school in the Iranian city of Minaba, as a result of which more than a hundred children were killed, why not also the innocent children killed by the Israeli strikes in Gaza? Isn’t this genocide? Let’s not forget what happened in the 44-day war in Artsakh by Azerbaijan with the military and military-technical support of Israel.

But the saddest thing in this whole story is that there will be no response from the Armenian authorities, as in other similar cases.

Moreover, the RA authorities themselves are trying to forget the fact of the Armenian Genocide, the war crimes of Azerbaijan, but, as we have written many times, there was no mirror step from Baku, and the organization of the visit of the Israeli ambassador and what he said on his lips is another proof that Aliyev will not give up the “historical memory” and demands related to the “Khojalu Genocide” or the “Ganja incidents”.

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