How Fowler’s Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day event came together

Your Central Valley
May 1 2026

How Fowler’s Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day event came together

by: Jason Takhtadjian

FOWLER, Calif. (KSEE/KGPE) – For the first time in city history, Fowler hosted an Armenian genocide remembrance day event.

What started as a private community effort grew into something much larger. On April 26, the power of the community came together to recognize Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day.

The goal was to make sure the story that has long been part of Fowler was finally told. Educational displays, cultural artifacts, and historical exhibits were all aimed at sharing Armenian heritage with the community.

“Regular citizens of Fowler joining together with the Armenian community to make something really very beautiful,” Chairman of the Fowler Recreation Committee and member of the Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee, Talene Kasparian-Cleveland, said.

Organizers said the event also became a revelation, even for members of the Armenian community who said they learned new details about their own history.

“I had no idea that between 1918 and 1920, the population of Fowler was 1,500 and there were 1,000 Armenians here,” Kasparian-Cleveland said.

That history stems from early Armenian immigrants who arrived in the US through cities like New York and Chicago before moving to the Central Valley to build new lives through agriculture.

“I felt the need immediately for people to be educated,” First Lady of Fowler Stephanie Mejia said.

The idea didn’t come from City Hall.

“A non-Armenian was very interested in putting together an Armenian genocide recognition event,” Kasparian-Cleveland said.

Groups of private citizens, along with the Mayor and First Lady, said simple conversations turned into action. 

“We went out to dinner… and Steph has the idea of what if we brought the remembrance or did an event for the genocide remembrance in Fowler,” Fowler Mayor Juan Mejia said.

From libraries to local church members and volunteers, the entire event came together in just about seven weeks. Now, plans are underway for a permanent genocide monument.

“We are working to try and secure the location. We do have an artist that we have been working with, Michael Aram,” Kasparian-Cleveland said.

Because the goal isn’t just remembrance, but to ensure Armenian history and culture remain part of Fowler’s future.

“In fact, there are many who have denied that it ever happened, which is obviously untrue. Fowler wasn’t about to be part of that message,” Stephanie Mejia said.

If you want to help bring an Armenian Genocide Monument to Fowler, click here, and here.


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32 Azerbaijani families have returned to the former Karabakh conflict zone.

Caucasian Knot
May 1 2026
32 Azerbaijani families have returned to the former Karabakh conflict zone.
135 members of Azerbaijani families who fled during the Karabakh conflict have returned to the village of Khojavend in the Khojavend district.

As reported by the “Caucasian Knot,” Azerbaijanis from Karabakh settlements were forced to flee their homes after the start of the First Karabakh War. The return of Azerbaijani displaced persons began after Azerbaijan took control of these territories. By March 11, 2026, 7,541 families (30,261 people) had returned to 41 settlements in the former Karabakh conflict zone.

The Khojavend region (the Armenian name for Khojavend is Martuni) has been controlled by the authorities of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic since 1993. On February 20, 2026, the first groups of former internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to the town of Khojavend and the village of the same name.

Another group of former IDPs arrived in the village of Khojavend in the Khojavend region. At this stage, the return of 32 families (135 people) to the village has been ensured. Thus, the number of families resettled in the village of Khojavend has reached 66 (277 people), according to the publication Report.

These families were previously temporarily resettled in various parts of the country, primarily in dormitories, sanatoriums, and administrative buildings. The families who arrived in the village were housed in houses that meet modern standards, according to AzerTaj.

The internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in the Baku lyceum dormitory complained about living conditions. More than 30 families from the Zangelan and Jabrayil districts were resettled in the building. The “Caucasian Knot” published a photo report by Aziz Karimov, “A Dormitory for Internally Displaced Persons from the Karabakh Conflict Zone in Baku.”

Following a meeting with the displaced families, employees of the Azerbaijan Mine Action Agency (ANAMA) briefed them in detail on the dangers posed by mines and unexploded ordnance. Families were advised to stay away from unknown objects and, if any were discovered, to report them to the appropriate authorities.

Earlier, Azerbaijani displaced persons complained about the difficulties of returning to Karabakh. In particular, they noted a shortage of jobs in Fuzuli. People are seeking opportunities to return to their homelands, but in the territories under Azerbaijani control, property issues have not yet been resolved, IDPs noted.

Azerbaijani analysts interviewed by the “Caucasian Knot” pointed out that simply providing housing for IDPs returning to their cities is not enough. The authorities must create jobs and build infrastructure, they emphasized.

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Azerbaijan severs ties with EU Parliament over Nagorno-Karabakh resolution

OC Media
May 1 2026

A diplomatic storm has erupted after the EU Parliament adopted a multi-part resolution on Armenia that contained clauses about Nagorno-Karabakh on Thursday, resulting a Friday vote by the Azerbaijani Parliament to cut ties with the body, as well as the summoning of the EU’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan Marijana Kujundžić.

While the majority of the resolution pertained to ‘supporting democratic resilience in Armenia’, Azerbaijan took issue with the sections that called for the right of return for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who fled en masse in 2023 and the release of Armenian prisoners held by Azerbaijan.

The relevant text of the resolution read as follows:

‘[The European Parliament] Reiterates its support for the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, including the protection of their identity, property and cultural heritage, and their right to a safe, unimpeded and dignified return under appropriate international guarantees; calls for those responsible for the destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage to be held accountable, and for an international assessment mission’.

Satellite imagery suggests Stepanakert’s main church destroyed by Azerbaijan

The clause was referring to the entire Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, some 100,000 people, who fled after Azerbaijan’s final offensive into the region in 2023.

‘[The European Parliament] Condemns Azerbaijan’s unjust detention of Armenian prisoners of war, detainees and hostages; demands their immediate and unconditional release; notes the steps taken so far and calls for further confidence-building measures; calls for full respect for international humanitarian and human rights law’.

A total of 19 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are being held in Azerbaijan, some of whom are still on trial, and others have recently received lengthy prison sentences after being accused of committing war crimes and other associated charges.

Other sections of the resolution applauded the ongoing peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the efforts to normalise Armenia’s relations with Turkey, and also expressed support for growing Armenia–EU ties.

EU sanctions Azerbaijani bank, but removes five Azerbaijani vessels

Drawing particular concern over the two sections above, the Azerbaijani Parliament said on Friday that ‘at the core of the European Parliament’s activities lies a decisive rejection of the norms and principles of international law and the concept of justice’.

‘This body has consistently shown disregard for the 30-year occupation of our lands by Armenia, the destruction of hundreds of our cities and villages, our historical, religious, and cultural monuments, ethnic cleansing, and the human rights of more than 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons’, the parliament added.

Later in the statement, the parliament claimed that ‘the European Parliament, where democratic values have collapsed, corruption and bribery have taken deep root, and which serves lobbying groups and various circles of interest, has turned into a structure where Azerbaijanophobic and Islamophobic thinking is consistently expressed’.

As a result, the Azerbaijani Parliament decided to suspend cooperation with the European Parliament ‘in all directions’ and began the process of ‘terminating the membership’ of the Azerbaijani Parliament in the ‘Euronest Parliamentary Assembly’.

Separately, EU Ambassador Kujundžić was summoned by the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, where she was told that ‘the unfounded and biased provisions against’ Azerbaijan were ‘condemned’, as well as being handed a ‘note of protest’.

The Foreign Ministry’s statement further claimed that ‘Armenian residents left the region voluntarily’.

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Russia blocks the second batch of Armenian Jermuk water, affecting 1.1 million

OC Media
May 1 2026

Russia has suspended the sale of a second batch of Armenian Jermuk mineral water, this time affecting nearly 1.1 million bottles over alleged regulatory violations. Earlier this week, another smaller batch was blocked, bringing the total number of bottles under restrictions to around 1.4 million.

Citing Russian authorities, RBK reported that the restrictions followed inspections of batches produced between 23 October 2025 and 27 March, during which violations of mandatory requirements were reportedly found.

After this, measures were introduced ‘to prevent possible harm to the life and health of citizens’.

A previous similar case was announced on Tuesday, when Russian authorities suspended sales of Jermuk, totalling 338,000 bottles produced between 17 February and 5 March, citing ‘violations of mandatory requirements’.

Following the first report, Armenia’s Food Safety Inspection Agency swiftly responded to the statement, saying that it ‘has not yet received any official information’ from the relevant Russian authorities.

Russia reopens case against Armenia’s Jermuk water amid tensions with Yerevan

The Jermuk Group has yet to respond as of publication.

In its report, RBK cited information from Russian authorities providing further details on the first batch, stating that samples contained ‘elevated levels of bicarbonate ions, chlorides, and sulfates, which do not comply with labelling and the requirements of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) technical regulations’.

The two rounds of ban affecting Jermuk followed the recent reopening of an investigation against the company after tense talks between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 1 April.

The case against Jermuk dates back to 2024 and is connected to the death of North Ossetian businessperson Oleg Gusov, which reportedly took place after drinking allegedly contaminated Jermuk water. At the time, Russian regulators had suspended the sale of 2.5 million Jermuk bottles, but the blockage was later lifted after inspection.

Aside from the Jermuk case, immediately after the Pashinyan–Putin talks, Russia announced ‘stricter requirements’ on the import of Armenian products and accused Armenia of coming ‘very close to the point where we will have to restructure our economic relations with this country’.

Russia has previously been accused of using food health standards as a way to exert economic pressure on countries — including Armenia.

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AZERBAIJANI Opinion: Karabakh’s Heritage Controversy

Commonspace.eu
April 30 2026

Karabakh’s Heritage Controversy is an op-ed prepared for commonspace.eu by Vasif Huseynov

Since the early days of Azerbaijan’s restoration of sovereignty over the formerly occupied Karabagh region in 2020/2023, some Armenian political circles and diaspora networks have accused Baku of destroying Armenian cultural and religious heritage in the liberated territories. The recent claims about the demolition of some structures in Khankandi, Karabakh, have brought this issue back to the agenda, accompanied by assertions that Azerbaijan is attempting to erase an Armenian historical presence. These claims rest on a selective presentation of facts that omits the legal and historical context essential for understanding what is actually taking place.

At the center of the latest controversy are a number of buildings that are portrayed as part of an ancient and continuous cultural legacy. Yet the record shows that these structures are relatively recent and built during the period the region was under illegal occupation of Armenia’s Armed Forces. For instance, the Surb Hakob Church was constructed in 2007, less than 20 years ago and erected during the occupation period. The other churches that are mentioned in the latest claims are not any older. These churches are not medieval monasteries or long-standing heritage sites. They are modern constructions, built without the consent of the internationally recognized state authority.

This distinction is not a minor detail; it is the starting point for any meaningful legal analysis. The question is not whether religious structures deserve protection in general – they do – but whether structures built in violation of international law can subsequently claim the same legal protections as lawfully established cultural heritage. International law provides a clear answer.

Any honest legal assessment of these structures must begin with one of the foundational maxims of international law: ex injuria jus non oritur — “law does not arise from injustice.” This principle is not a technicality. It is a fundamental concept of the international legal order, holding that a legal right or entitlement cannot arise from an unlawful act or omission. A state which obtains land by non-defensive war or other aggressive action cannot claim any legal rights to the territory unlawfully obtained, nor can it generate, through its illegal occupation, derivative legal claims to the structures, settlements, or monuments it erects on that territory.

Applied to Karabagh, the principle is decisive and applies with equal force to every permanent structure built in the region during the occupation period — churches, cathedrals, civic monuments, statues, administrative buildings, and any other installation erected without the consent of the sovereign state. Each of these structures was raised in direct consequence of an unlawful military occupation condemned by four binding UN Security Council resolutions. No legal right — including any right of preservation, protection, or cultural heritage status — can flow from that unlawful foundation. The Armenian occupation did not produce legally recognisable facts. The structures it spawned are not legal facts. They are consequences of internationally wrongful acts and fall outside the protective scope of international cultural heritage law as a matter of first principle.

International cultural heritage law, including the 1954 Hague Convention, was designed to protect existing and lawfully constituted cultural property, particularly from damage inflicted by occupying powers. It was not intended to shield structures erected by those powers in violation of international law. To interpret it otherwise would invert its purpose, allowing unlawful acts to generate legal protections simply by attaching a cultural or religious label.

Nor does the religious character of a building alter this legal reality. Freedom of religion is a protected right, but it does not extend to constructing places of worship in violation of property rights or sovereignty. European human rights jurisprudence has made clear that religious function does not retroactively legalize unlawful construction.

The law of state responsibility further clarifies the consequences. Where an internationally wrongful act has occurred, the responsible state is obliged to remedy the situation, including through restitution – restoring conditions to what they were before the violation. In cases of occupation, this principle supports the removal of structures unlawfully established during that period once sovereignty is restored. Seen in this light, the demolition of such structures is not an act of cultural destruction but a legal consequence of ending an unlawful situation.

This legal perspective stands in contrast to the narrative of deliberate cultural erasure. Azerbaijan’s broader record debunks such claims. An Armenian church in central Baku has been preserved as a protected cultural monument for decades. Following the 2020 war, Azerbaijani authorities undertook the restoration of the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha using state funds. Across the country, sites belonging to different religious communities, including Christian and Jewish heritage, continue to be maintained. These examples do not support the portrayal of a state pursuing a policy of religious or cultural targeting.

What the current controversy ultimately reveals is not only a legal dispute but also an asymmetry in how cultural heritage issues are framed and received internationally. The destruction of Azerbaijani cultural and religious sites during the decades of occupation received limited global attention. By contrast, the removal of recently constructed structures built under conditions of occupation has generated widespread discussions.

According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture, more than 400 cultural and religious monuments, including 65 of the 67 mosques, were destroyed in the occupied territories during the years of Armenian occupation. The pattern was not confined to the Karabagh region. It extended into the territory of present-day Armenia itself — where Azerbaijanis constituted a major component of the population of cities like Yerevan for centuries, and from which about 300,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave in the late 1980s. Many of the cultural heritage, cemeteries, mosques, and other monuments belonged to these people have been destroyed or reattributed.

Set against this thirty-year record, the current accusations against Azerbaijan acquire a particular character. The distinction at the heart of this issue is neither obscure nor controversial in legal terms.

Cultural heritage that is historically rooted and lawfully established merits protection, regardless of its origin.

Structures built in violation of international law do not acquire legitimacy simply because they serve a religious function. The principle ex injuria jus non oritur captures this logic in its simplest form: unlawful acts cannot produce lawful rights.

Understanding the current situation in Karabagh requires moving beyond rhetoric and examining the legal framework that governs it. When that framework is applied consistently, the events in Khankendi appear not as acts of cultural erasure, but as part of the legal and material consequences of bringing an unlawful occupation to an end.

source: This op-ed was prepared for commonspace.eu by Dr Vasif Huseynov, a Senior Advisor at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan. 
photo: Karabakh – Cathedral in Karabakh before its recent destruction
The views expressed in opinion pieces and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the position of commonspace.eu or its partners

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Azerbaijan destroys historic Christian churches in Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘Cultural

Christian Post
April 30 2026

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Sports: Armenia’s strong volleyball ambitions to shape the federation’s next

May 1 2026

LAUSANNE, Switzerland, April 30, 2026.- For the first time in history, the Volleyball Federation of Armenia’s leadership visited the Volleyball House, as the newly elected President Karen Asmaryan, a former setter of the national team, outlines an ambitious roadmap for the sport’s future in the country.

At the heart of the vision lies a bold objective: to host the country’s first-ever Age Group World Championships, with the matches being played at the backdrop of iconic Yerevan’s downtown locations. This innovative concept reflects both confidence in the future of Armenian volleyball and a desire to bring the sport into the very heart of the country.

On the road to this inspiring vision – in alignment with the FIVB Strategic Vision 2032 – Armenia aims to continue benefiting from FIVB Volleyball Empowerment projects to elevate the performance of its national teams and enhance the availability of equipment across the country. At the same time, plans are underway to establish a Centre of Excellence, underlining a clear commitment to nurturing the next generation of volleyball and beach volleyball talent.

These ambitions come at a landmark moment in the federation’s history. In 2026, the Volleyball Federation of Armenia celebrates its 100th anniversary, with the centenary marked across national championships and competitions throughout the year. With a shared strategic direction with the FIVB and ambitions that stretch from grassroots development to a World Championship in the heart of Yerevan, the next 100 years of Armenian volleyball are off to an exciting start.

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Syriac MP in Turkey George Aryo in response to Sayfo denial in National Assemb

April 30 2026

ANKARA — During a speech before the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Syriac MP George Aryo of the Peoples’ Equality and Democratic Party (DEM Party), whose state-imposed surname is Aslan, challenged remarks made by Turhan Çömez of the Good Party (İYİ Parti), who had described the victims of the 1915 Sayfo Genocide and Armenian Genocide as terrorists.

Speaking during the parliament’s 87th session, Çömez stated, “The Ottoman Empire was forced to take this decision against armed terrorist organizations backed by imperialists, and this decision was not a genocide.” He added that efforts to commemorate the events of 24 April as genocide — both domestically and internationally — misrepresent what he described as a historical process.

In response, Aryo posed a pointed question: “Under Ottoman rule, the population stood at 13 million, including 3 million Armenians, Syriacs, and other Christian peoples. What happened for only a small number of them to remain today?”



Çömez replied that some people died during relocation but insisted that the Ottoman authorities had taken necessary precautions, describing the events as decisions made within the empire’s own territory. He further accused Armenian groups of forming armed organizations allegedly backed by foreign powers, claiming these groups contributed to unrest and violence during World War I.

He argued that the Ottoman government’s actions in 1915 — such as dissolving Armenian political organizations and relocating populations — were driven by wartime conditions, as the empire was fighting on multiple fronts, including Gallipoli, the Caucasus, and Syria.

Aryo repeated his question, noting that while the population of Armenians, Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans), and other Christian communities should have grown into the millions over the past century, their numbers have instead dwindled to a fraction of that. “What happened to these people?” he asked. “Why did their numbers not increase? Where did they go?”

Çömez reiterated his earlier claims, again attributing deaths to wartime conditions and relocation, without directly addressing the demographic collapse raised by Aryo.

Aryo then shifted focus, asking, “Let us leave the Armenians aside. What did the Syriacs do? What was their crime?”

In response, Çömez argued that Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans) had emigrated from the region for various reasons and suggested that raising the issue in parliament could be linked to political agendas. He also accused certain groups of supporting what he described as terrorist organizations, reiterating his position that the historical narrative is being distorted.

Following the exchange, Sezai Temelli, also of the DEM Party, intervened, criticizing Çömez’s interpretation of history. He argued that Ottoman-era archives have not been fully opened and challenged claims about Armenian political groups, noting that some had legal status within the empire at the time. Temelli emphasized that preserving history requires acknowledging the experiences of all peoples who lived in Anatolia and warned against reducing complex historical events to accusations of terrorism.

Despite the passage of 111 years since those tragic events, the same rhetoric still persists from the perpetrator who has turned the victim into the accused. By insisting on denying his crime, he adds a new wound to the memory of peoples who continue to seek recognition and justice.

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Israel’s New Ambassador to the ‘Christian World’ Served as Envoy to Azerbaija

April 30 2026

US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said on Thursday that he met with Israel’s new ambassador to the “Christian World,” as Israel is attempting to repair its global image among Christians.

The man assigned to the position, George Deek, was the first Christian to serve as an ambassador for Israel when he was appointed envoy to Azerbaijan, a role he held from 2019 to 2025, one of the darkest periods for Christians in the region in recent history.

During his time in Azerbaijan, Israel was arming Baku with drones and other military equipment amid its war to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, known to its former Armenian Christian residents as Artsakh, a historically Armenian territory that is within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, which were drawn by the Soviet Union.

The Israeli-supported military offensive led to the ethnic cleansing of the entire Armenian Christian population, more than 100,000 people, and the end of an ancient Christian community. Today, Azerbaijani authorities are destroying churches in the territory.

Israel appointed Deek to the new position after facing significant backlash over a photo of an IDF soldier smashing a statue of Jesus Christ taken from a crucifix in a Christian town in southern Lebanon. In response to the global outrage, Israel said that two soldiers, the one who destroyed the statue and the one who filmed him, were being jailed for 30 days.

The IDF also claimed that it worked in coordination with the local community to replace the crucifix, but it turned out that Italian troops in Lebanon, as part of the UNIFIL peacekeeping contingent, donated the real replacement and helped erect it.

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TCHAKAROV: Inside the seductive complexity of Armenia’s election maths

Intellinews
May 1 2026
By Ivan Tchakarov of GlobalSource Partners May 1, 2026

At first glance, Armenia’s upcoming elections may seem easy to dissect. They are anything but. Below the surface is a tangle of thresholds, partnerships and swing voters that makes this race a conundrum of political maths – one that, at least for now, is still tilting toward the incumbent. Two new polls released in recent weeks provide a fresh and updated look at where things stand. Crucially, they follow a two-month hiatus since the previous batch of surveys was produced, thus allowing sufficient time for alliances to harden and preferences amongst voters to coalesce. 

A subtle shift toward the incumbent

The latest EVN poll is particularly useful as it uses the same methodology as its February edition, and it shows that Civil Contract is gaining ground. Support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashiyan’s party has risen from 26.1% to 33.6%, while opposition numbers have barely nudged. Importantly, the share of undecided voters has declined somewhat, from 42% in February to (a still large) 37% in April, but remains uncomfortably high. 

This combination matters. The slight increase in backing for the incumbent indicates some consolidation of power rather than erosion of attraction. Crucially, the still-large share of undecided voters keeps the race open, suggesting a positive trend for Civil Contract, but also an outcome that is not locked in.

The three diverse simulations with final seat assignments

The most under-appreciated factor in this election is not voter sentiment, but the opaqueness of the electoral system. Armenia’s rules create a structural advantage for larger, more cohesive players. Thresholds matter. Single parties need just 4% to enter parliament while alliances face higher barriers — 8% or even 10%, depending on their size. That’s a problem for the opposition, which remains fragmented across several blocks. While three forces are almost certain to make it into parliament — Civil Contract (party), Strong Armenia (alliance), and Prosperous Armenia (party) — a fourth, the Armenia Alliance (alliance), is hovering right on the edge. Moreover, the stable majority rule dictates that 52% of seats are required for the formation of a stable government. There is still another rule that says that at least a third of parliament seats must be held by the opposition.

And this is where things start to get interesting.

In the baseline simulation, which I centre on the average of released 2026 polls, Civil Contract and the three main opposition forces make it through to the National Assembly. The exact figures indicate that, while it may not be a perfectly even split, it certainly favours the incumbent (Table 1). Civil Contract would be expected to win 54 out of the total 101 parliamentary seats — a clear majority, yet a far cry from its dominance in 2021 when it won 71 seats.

Table 1: Simulation based on average of 2026 polls suggests that four entities will enter parliament

But if Armenia Alliance slips below the threshold in a second scenario, which I generate mechanically by removing a mere 0.3% off its showing in the baseline and assigning it to the “Other” category, the maths shifts, albeit not dramatically (Table 2). Civil Contract’s seat count jumps to 60, strengthening its majority in a single-party government. 

Table 2: Simulation assumes that borderline Armenia Alliance does not enter parliament

The wild card in the elections are the undecided voters, and there are many of them — roughly 35-40% of the electorate. In theory, undecided voters could swing the election. In practice, the bar for doing so might be prohibitively high. 

Hence, I calculate the break-even point for the undecided voters that would allow the united opposition to claim just enough seats for a majority. Assuming a 90% voter turnout (the April EVN poll suggests that many people intend to vote), I infer what percentage of undecided voters would need to cast their lot with the opposition, so that, if united, it would get the law-mandated 52% of parliament seats. Table 3 shows that, if 73% of the undecided voters who intend to vote end up siding with the opposition, the ultimate distribution of seats will be the following: 48 for Civil Contract and 53 in total for Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia and Armenia Alliance. 

Table 3: 73% of undecided voters need to lean to the opposition for it to stand a chance of forming a government

This strikes me as unlikely, albeit not impossible. It may also be structurally difficult. Even if such a shift were to occur, there is no guarantee that a government can be formed as the three opposition forces may not be able to coalesce around a single programme to lead Armenia. In this case, a runoff may be necessary between the two leading contenders, Civil Contract and Strong Armenia, to determine the final winner. 

What this means for policy and investors

For markets and policymakers, the message is relatively clear: continuity remains the base case, although with less political comfort and room for manoeuvre. A Civil Contract-led government is still the most likely outcome, and this would imply broad policy continuity, continued engagement with the EU and Western partners, and gradual reform rather than abrupt shifts.

Even the alternative, as unlikely as it might appear at this stage, may not be as disruptive as generally feared. Armenia’s course is pretty clear for anyone who follows the geopolitics of the region. The country is now facing a fait-accompli in the necessity of completely normalising its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan even at conditions that it deems unjust and unfair. Losing the 2020 war, the emptying of Artsakh, and the weakening of its ally Russia may have essentially taken any suspense out of the elections. Even if the opposition wins, it will have to more or less continue the policy of this government. The 4th republic and Real Armenia slogans represent the varnished and well packaged submission of Armenia to its eastern and western neighbours, and one should not necessarily be critical of it as it has little other choice. This is arguably best Armenians can get (if they are lucky) at this point in history.

Ivan Tchakarov is partner for the Caucasus and Central Asia at GlobalSource Partners.

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