Armenia Says Peace Is ‘Realistic’ With Azerbaijan but Awaits the Right Signals

Nov 26 2023

YEREVAN, Armenia — Since Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to office in 2018 on the heels of a democratic revolution in which he played a central role, his administration has faced numerous security and political crises. The protracted conflict in the formerly Armenian-controlled breakaway republic of Artsakh, also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh, burst into a full-blown war in September 2020.

The Azerbaijani government led by President Ilham Aliyev, who has been in power for 20 years after taking the reins from his father, Heydar Aliyev, seized the entire Artsakh republic in September 2023, forcibly displacing more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians from their ancestral homeland. Pashinyan and the European Parliament have labeled the act ethnic cleansing.

While Azerbaijan’s government has said that it wanted to return land to Azerbaijani citizens who were displaced during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, from 1988 to 1994, many Armenians see the September 2023 ethnic cleansing as the latest in a long series of violence committed by ethnic Turks against their community. The most-traumatic expulsion was the Armenian genocide of 1915.

In this tense geopolitical arena, the Armenian government is seeking to help the refugees from the Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as to rebuild its military, avoid more conflict with Azerbaijan and shore up allies in the West while maintaining relations with Russia. PassBlue spoke to Armenia’s deputy foreign minister, Vahan Kostanyan, in his office here in the Armenian capital of Yerevan in November about the delicate balancing act, the role of the United Nations in helping to walk such a tightrope and the successes and challenges of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. Armenia is a landlocked country of approximately three million people, located in the South Caucasus region. — JOE PENNEY

The interview has been edited and condensed for clarity and brevity.

PassBlue: How is the Armenian government working with international partners to ensure the welfare of refugees who have fled from Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh? What support is Armenia receiving and is it enough?

Kostanyan: After the Azerbaijan invasion of Sept. 19, 2023, the flow of forcibly displaced people is more than 100,000. Now the government is trying to take care of them and to provide all necessary social security assistance. What we’re doing is trying to solve the short-term issues, starting from accommodation, going to access to education, food, etc.

In the six months since the invasion, according to the decisions made, more than 100 billion drams are allocated, which is equivalent to about $250 million. But this is only to address short-term issues. Starting from the first day, we have been closely cooperating with our international partners, UN agencies and different countries. With UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], we made a joint humanitarian appeal to allocate some money; according to the UNHCR estimations, for the first six months, at least $97 million will be needed. Some of our partners have allocated money — United States, European Union, different EU member states. Some sent humanitarian aid to Armenia through different pipelines, through UN approval, ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], but there was also small, direct budgetary support.

What we are asking currently from our international partners is to provide direct budgetary support. Because in a couple of months, we will be dealing with much bigger issues — understanding that there is no conducive environment now for people to exercise their right of return [to Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh]. We need to understand how we’re going to accommodate people and provide long-term shelter. So big housing projects should be implemented, projects to increase opportunities in our labor market, to do some additional competence trainings.

We are ready to be transparent with our colleagues to show and report how the money is spent. Because till now, all the financial support that is provided to people from Nagorno-Karabakh, it’s done not with cash but with money transfer through online banking, with cards, to track how the money went from the government to the people, to be transparent and accountable for all possible donors. There are working groups set up in the government, and two deputy prime ministers are in charge of different components: one for realization of the projects we have and the other for donor coordination. We’re working closely with UNHCR on this matter.

PassBlue: Are you taking actions in the UN Security Council? Are you working with other UN bodies besides the refugee agency to address Armenia’s response to the Nagorno-Karabakh expulsion? I’m also thinking of the Oct. 5 statement about the UN resident coordinator based in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, visiting and the disappointment that you expressed with the visit. Did you receive feedback on it?

Kostanyan: We received some feedback, and this statement was deleted [from the UN website focusing on Azerbaijan]. Later, there was a visit by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to Armenia, to Azerbaijan and to Nagorno-Karabakh. We still closely follow the situation regarding the issue of the rights of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Unfortunately, the Security Council was unable to adequately react to the Nagorno-Karabakh ethnic cleansing, and now we have a fact that it happened. Some of the Security Council members are having some discussions on a possible resolution.

PassBlue: What other steps can Armenia take in the UN system to help you manage the response to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis?

Kostanyan: The UN Secretariat and UN agencies have quite big portfolios and toolboxes that can be helpful to address both short-term and long-term issues with people from Nagorno-Karabakh [NK]. Besides issues related to people of NK, the UN is a key development partner for Armenia, when it comes to implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Armenia is planning to submit its voluntary national review on the SDGs. We are one of the champions because not many states are already submitting the third one. UN is a partner for us in the fight against corruption.

The UN Human Rights Council has big importance for us. We believe that some of the issues are very relevant and they should be discussed at the Council. We were a member from 2020 to 2022. Now we’re going to run for another term in the Council in the upcoming year, because we believe this is an important platform for us and in general for tackling human rights issues. We believe that we have quite a good record on human rights protection, democracy and rule of law, which makes us a credible candidate.

PassBlue: There have been conflicting reports regarding the potential for more tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Prime Minister Pashinyan has recently said that a peace deal is “realistic.” Can you speak a bit about the strains and prospects for peace?

Kostanyan: When we say a peace deal is realistic, we are reaffirming our political commitment to sign a document on the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan. But to have it signed, we need reciprocate actions and signals from the Azerbaijani side. The principles which should be the basis to finalize this treaty are fully indicated in the Granada statement, which was endorsed by foreign leaders: not only Prime Minister Pashinyan but also the president of European Council, President Emmanuel Macron of France and Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany. When it comes to the possibility of tension, we’re living in a region and in a neighborhood where it’s always high, especially having a bad record of assurances from our neighbors that they are not going to use force.

We still have continued occupation of our sovereign territory from September 2022, and the forces are located close to each other. That’s why we are suggesting to organize a mirror withdrawal of forces from the border line, which is indicated in the Alma-Ata protocols of 1991. So if we see a willingness to withdraw the forces, if we wish to accept the principles of the Granada statement, this can give hope that finalizing a peace deal is possible.

Another important component for stability and long-lasting peace in our region is the opening of communications. For this purpose, we introduced our vision. Prime Minister Pashinyan introduced in October to the European Parliament the Crossroad of Peace project, where the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the states where the roads are passing through should be fully respected. We also indicated our willingness to reconstruct and to relaunch a railway connection with our neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan. Not only the railway but also electricity, energy supplies. We have the ambition to become a transit hub. We believe that considering our geography, we can become a real crossroads between north and south and east and west.

If Nakhchivan [an autonomous exclave of Azerbaijan near Armenia’s southwestern border] is connected to the main part of Azerbaijan through the territory of Iran, we will not oppose this project. We believe that the Crossroad of Peace plan and this transit connection are not mutually exclusive. Because we believe that, especially considering the logistical problems, the developing logistical map in wider Eurasia and beyond and the tendencies of international trade, it can easily provide enough flow for mutually beneficial connections.

PassBlue: What kind of security guarantee would the transit link between the main part of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave require — to restore the railway or to provide economic links, which both seem to be in everybody’s interest as long as security is guaranteed?

Kostanyan: We need to have clarity and no room for misinterpretation. Because previously, we also heard Azerbaijan saying, “We are not claiming and asking for any extra territorial corridor.” But during the negotiations that we had, starting from 2021, even if they are not saying, “We are demanding an extra-territorial corridor from you,” the modalities they were suggesting and asking for were giving an extraterritorial sense and they were not ready to reciprocate, which is one of the principles that we believe should be in opening communications. On our side, we are ready to simplify procedures when it comes to customs, to passport control, because we believe that it will attract more international trade through our territory. In general, the whole world is using innovation and the technologies of today to simplify procedures, and we’re ready to do so.

PassBlue: Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev recently said that eight villages are “occupied by Armenia.” What is he referring to?

Kostanyan: If we agree on the border line, this issue can be solved simply. If our troops stand according to a border line when they will get their four villages, we’ll get our four villages. For our four, the legal background is quite questionable whether they are Armenian or are Azerbaijani, according to the USSR [former Soviet Union] procedures and whole legislation. This is an issue which should be discussed during the delimitation process. We also have an Armenian enclave, Artsvashen; in a same way, we believe that we should get our enclave that is under Azerbaijani control. But we believe this is an issue for not only us but also the Azerbaijani side. On the one hand, they acknowledge that this issue should be discussed within the delimitation commission. On the other hand, they are publicly raising some territorial claims, which are aggressive, to say the least. But for these first four villages — which are not enclaves but adjustments to the border — a couple of times the Armenian side formally, on paper, suggested organizing the near withdrawal of forces from the border. If Azerbaijan had agreed, that issue would have been solved a year ago, two years ago.

PassBlue: Pashinyan met with Macron in Paris on Nov. 10 and Armenia signed a deal with France to buy Mistral surface-to-air defensive missiles. The Armenian chief of defense staff met with the American European Command deputy. The Armenian government favors the Granada process, but Azerbaijani President Aliyev didn’t even attend the meeting in Granada. So there seems to be a divide between this pro-West opening that Armenia is promoting.

Kostanyan: I would say we are diversifying our relations because we are considering the realities and experience that we have faced during the last few years. When it comes to our military capabilities, we don’t have any intention to attack any of our neighbors. We’re not going to challenge or violate their territorial integrity. But we believe that we have our right to increase our defensive capabilities.

PassBlue: The diversification of relationships with other countries has sparked a negative reaction from Armenia’s traditional security partner, Russia. How can Armenia diversify while keeping the existing security partnership?

Kostanyan: We publicly shared that the security architecture and the security philosophy that we had didn’t work. When our sovereign territory was attacked, the traditional partners and the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance in Eurasia] were silent. They didn’t even come up with a political statement that our sovereign territory was attacked. In the same way, Russian peacekeepers, who had a duty clearly put on paper to protect the people of Nagorno-Karabakh from existential threat, acted as an observer when ethnic cleansing happened.

PassBlue: Iran, your neighbor to the south, has made statements about the need to respect Armenian territorial integrity. Iran suggested that this was a red line and that it could help Armenia defend itself if attacked. How does your government view the statements? More generally, what are your relations with Iran like?

Kostanyan: With Iran, we have a bilateral agenda that’s mainly economic. We are cooperating with our Iranian partners. This is very objective, as we need to cooperate with our neighbors with whom at least we have open borders, because two of our four borders are closed. [Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye] We also value the political statements coming from Iran on inviolability of the borders in the region and, in particular, of Armenia. On the other hand, as I mentioned, we are not interested in any escalation in the region, and we are committed to solving all the issues through political and diplomatic means.

https://www.passblue.com/2023/11/26/armenia-says-peace-is-realistic-with-azerbaijan-but-awaits-the-right-signals/

Contested Caucuses: Armenia, Azerbaijan, America, Russia, Israel, and Iran

Nov 27 2023

"There are no Armenians left in NK, though Russians have taken to defending them". Opinion about reasons

Nov 27 2023
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Russia’s role in the Armenian exodus

“Russia’s role in ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh indicates a weakening of its influence in the region,” says Rasmus Kanback, a Swedish anthropologist and expert on the Karabakh conflict. His article on Russia’s role in the exodus of almost the entire Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh was published by Insider.

We publish the expert’s opinion on Russia’s role, its position in the region in recent years and the resulting situation – with slight cuts.


  • Baku has won, Armenians are leaving NK: Opinions of all sides of the conflict
  • The unrecognised NKR will cease to exist on 1 January by its own decision
  • “Armenia will receive our brothers and sisters leaving NK” – Pashinyan
  • Reintegration of Karabakh Armenians. “This is fantastic!”

The images of Russian military vehicles being transported by train from Azerbaijan are circulating on social media. Formally, the Russian military states that the vehicles are to be repaired in Russia. In practice, most observers of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh understand that these vehicles are not needed there.

Russia’s presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, or in Azerbaijan for that matter, was shorter-lived than anyone could have anticipated when a trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia three years ago. On paper, Russia was to have a five-year mandate with a clause for extension, deploying 1,960 troops to Nagorno-Karabakh.

The mission was intended to monitor the ceasefire, guarantee the safety of the local population, and ensure passage between the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Three years later, none of the hundreds of thousands of Armenians that the Russians were supposed to protect remain in Nagorno-Karabakh. It took less than a week for the entire population to flee in horror of Azerbaijani oppression while Russian troops stood quietly on the sidelines.

Azerbaijani authorities say that Armenians voluntarily left their homes in NK. The Armenian government calls the exodus of compatriots “forced resettlement” and believes that Baku has brought its policy of ethnic cleansing to its conclusion. Yerevan says that the safety of Karabakh Armenians’ residence in their homeland could not be guaranteed.

A recurring theory in Armenian discourse is that the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 was allowed by Russia. One argument maintains that Armenia, being in several formal alliances with Russia, approached the West, and Russia directly or indirectly lost interest in maintaining the prevailing security balance in the Southern Caucasus.

Another argument holds that Russia, through military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, advanced its geopolitical ambitions, also against Azerbaijan. As much as the peacekeeping forces were seen as a security function for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, they also served as a tool of power against both Baku and Yerevan.

With the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force, a vital part of Moscow’s leverage has disappeared. Russia’s position as a geopolitical actor in the region is weaker today than it was before the 2020 war.

But let’s rewind before the question of Russia’s role in the ethnic cleansing is fully answered. As the Armenian relationship, at least diplomatically, deteriorated with Russia, it steadily improved for Azerbaijan. Likelythe country’s president, Ilham Aliyev, quickly understood that the security vacuum left by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in recent years could be filled by Azerbaijan.

Just prior to Russia’s major invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev met in Moscow to sign a new alliance agreement consisting of 43 points. Particularly interesting for this article are the points on deepened military cooperation and cooperation in the energy sector.

At a meeting in early summer 2022, the leaders of the countries once again emphasized the validity of the agreement. A year later, in May 2023, Ilham Aliyev strengthened the rhetoric, calling Russia not only an informal ally but also one “de jure” – an ally in a legal sense. Note that this happened just a couple of months before Azerbaijan, on September 19–20, launched the final offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh.

The fact that Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev are authoritarian leaders who, to some extent, understand each other in a way that Nikol Pashinyan does not, adds to the course of events.

The weeks before the ethnic cleansing happened, the Armenian-Russian relationship deteriorated rapidly. The Russian side likely claims that it is due to Armenia’s actions. There are three significant events.

The first was when Armenia sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine on September 7. It was the first time it happened. Additionally, Russia was further irritated when Nikol Pashinyan’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, made a formal state visit to Kyiv. In Moscow, the Armenian ambassador to the Kremlin was summoned not only to present a protest but a sharp warning.

The second event is when Armenia held a ten-day joint military exercise with the United States on September 11. While it wasn’t the first military exercise Armenia conducted with the U.S. or NATO, the Armenian government made a big deal of conveying the exercise to the world. Once again, the Armenian ambassador was called for talks in Moscow, and this time the rhetoric escalated further.

The third event took place on September 13 when Nikol Pashinyan, in a lengthy address to the nation, declared that Armenia can no longer rely on Russia as a security guarantor. He referred to Russia’s war in Ukraine, stating that its presence in the Caucasus has proven unreliable.

As this happened, images and videos of Azerbaijani troop movements were published on pro-Azerbaijani social media channels.

The air raid sirens in the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, began sounding around 1:00 PM local time on September 19. 

While EU representatives, lacking physical presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, took a critical stance on what was happening, Russia assumed a considerably more passive position.

In the days before the offensive, Vladimir Putin stated that Armenia had itself to blame for “recognizing” Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. “If Armenia itself recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, what do we have to do with it?”

When the offensive began, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement in a similar vein. Armenia was accused of not only recognizing Azerbaijan’s territory but also of moving closer to Europe rather than maintaining loyalty to Moscow.

According to leaked documents to the Russian news outlet Meduza, the message in Kremlin’s instructions to Russian media is reflected. Russian regime-friendly media were instructed by the Russian leadership to emphasize that it is Armenia’s fault that Azerbaijan has been given the opportunity to attack Nagorno-Karabakh.

This narrative should be seen as an attempt by Vladimir Putin to legitimize an upcoming change in course rather than a truth.

Now we’ve come to Russia’s practical part of the ethnic cleansing. On the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh, events unfolded rapidly. After almost ten months of blockade, the Armenian population had run out of almost all necessities. In the weeks before the offensive, there were talks that if nothing changed, the population was heading towards a famine.

Multiple independent testimonies from border villages suggest that the Russian troops, in connection with the Azerbaijani attacks, began to withdraw or stayed quietly on the sidelines.

One of them, a Karabakh-Armenian soldier who fought in the city of Martuni, claimed that the Russian troops had already withdrawn from the frontlines in the morning. If true, this adds to the evidence that the Russian peacekeeping forces were aware of what was about to happen.

In cities and villages at the front, the civilian population tried to seek safety, mostly on foot or with animal transports as fuel had run out during the blockade. Thousands of people flocked to the airport outside Stepanakert, controlled by Russia since November 2020. The Russian troops are said to have urged the fleeing population to leave, causing them to gather in terrible conditions in Stepanakert.

During the critical days before the escape began, the blockade to the west towards Armenia was still active, and Azerbaijani armed forces were approaching from the east.

It was not until Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadership, under Russian surveillance, signed an agreement to dissolve the army two days later, on September 23, that the blockade was lifted.

More than 100,000 Armenians fled the region within a week. Not to forget, already as many as 50,000 Armenians had already been displaced from the war in 2020.

Russia’s role in the South Caucasus is undergoing a shift after the ethnic cleansing. The Russian relevance for the region can be seen through two different filters: one from a military perspective and the other from trade in the region.

The hasty withdrawal of most Russian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh, announced just weeks after the ethnic cleansing, shows how Russia is reducing its physical presence. In contrast to the diplomatic disputes between Armenia and Russia, trade continues to increase between the two countries.

Due to sanctions against Russia, Armenia has become an intermediary for high-tech equipment that Russia lacks. In 2022, Armenia imported 515 percent more circuit chips from the US and the EU than the previous year. Most of these were later exported to Russia. Additionally, trade from Armenia to Russia continues to increase rapidly, despite the political rhetoric.

A similar trend has been noted from Azerbaijan to Russia, where trade, according to dubious Russian and Azerbaijani sources, is increasing more than in many years, although not as dramatically as in the Armenian case.

What is more interesting is trade from Russia to Europe. Just as the Caucasian states are used to circumvent sanctions against Russia, the detour is also allowed by Europe to circumvent its own sanctions.

The need for gas is so great that the EU overlooks Azerbaijan’s diluting its gas exports with shares of Russian gas and that Russia benefits from the gas trade with Azerbaijan.

In 2015, the same year the European Commission made the final decision to fund a new gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe, Russian Lukoil invested in long-term contracts in Azerbaijan’s gas fields. Today, Lukoil owns 20 percent of Shah Deniz, the largest gas field.

Furthermore, Russia and Azerbaijan signed new short-term gas agreements in the fall of 2022. Formally, they were supposed to expire in the spring, but EU diplomats lack transparent answers about how much of the Azerbaijani gas is actually Russian, which the European Parliament has reacted to.

In the end, it is difficult to see what Russia has gained geopolitically from the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh. What can be observed is that while the diplomatic relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia is in better shape today than two months ago, it is significantly worse between Armenia and Russia. However, Russia’s leverage has decreased with both countries.

Azerbaijan has proven to be a more reliable partner for Russia than Armenia, despite public opinion in Azerbaijan being against Russia. The peacekeeping forces that entered Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia are now leaving the region through Azerbaijan. Appropriately, it symbolizes the shift in relations that has occurred in the last three years.

In practice, it can be argued that if Russia had fulfilled the ceasefire agreement from November 2020, the ethnic cleansing would not have taken place in September. Even though Vladimir Putin tries to blame the Armenian leadership for the humanitarian catastrophe, it was, in fact, the Russian troops that were both present in Nagorno-Karabakh and responsible for safety — not Armenian.

The decision to let the Russian troops passively watch as Azerbaijan, an authoritarian state, displaced over a hundred thousand people in flight was made by no one else but Moscow.

https://jam-news.net/russias-role-in-the-armenian-exodus/

EBRD expands cooperation with HSBC in Armenia

European Bank
Nov 27 2023

By Loretta  Martikian

  • Risk Sharing Framework agreement signed today in Yerevan
  • Framework to help HSBC expand local firms’ access to funding
  • EBRD to co-finance individual sub-loans

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has signed a funded Risk Sharing Framework (RSF) agreement with HSBC Bank Armenia (HSBC Armenia) to facilitate Armenian firms’ access to finance.

Under the agreement – signed today in Yerevan by Francis Malige, the EBRD’s Managing Director for Financial Institutions, and Irina Seylanyan, the HSBC Armenia’s Chief Executive Officer – the EBRD will co-finance individual loans provided by HSBC Armenia to eligible borrowers.

The RSF is one of three core financing frameworks of the EBRD’s Small Business Initiative a programme dedicated to supporting and developing local private companies. The EBRD offers partner banks funded or unfunded risk participation mechanisms in foreign or local currency by co-financing and guaranteeing the partner bank’s loans to eligible companies.

“We are pleased to partner with HSBC Armenia to expand financing opportunities for growing companies. The EBRD’s risk-participation mechanism will enable HSBC Armenia to manage capital and risk concentration and facilitate credit growth for the benefit of the real economy,” said Francis Malige.

“This partnership marks a new chapter in our longstanding relationship with the EBRD. Through this collaboration, we look forward to enhancing our financing opportunities for local businesses,” said Irina Seylanyan.

HSBC Armenia is one of the EBRD’s key partner banks in Armenia, with cooperation particularly focused on supporting investments in sustainable energy. HSBC Armenia has distinguished itself as a leading provider of corporate and investment banking services in the country.

Bolstering firms’ competitiveness and supporting financial-sector intermediation through risk-sharing products are among the EBRD’s key priorities in Armenia. As one of the largest institutional investors there, the EBRD has invested more than €2 billion in 207 projects in the country, with the majority in the private sector.

https://www.ebrd.com/news/2023/ebrd-expands-cooperation-with-hsbc-in-armenia.html

Defeated Armenia Looks to a New, Post-Russia Foreign Policy

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Nov 27 2023
Yerevan does not want to repeat the mistakes of the past by relying too much on a single ally.
Mikael Zolyan

Armenia is on the brink of formulating a new foreign policy. Moscow’s silent acquiescence during September’s one-day war, in which Azerbaijan seized the long-disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting the flight of all Karabakh Armenians, means most Armenians no longer see Russia as an ally, never mind a security guarantor. Armenia is likely to both turn to the West and make overtures toward other major powers, particularly India and Iran.

At the same time, Yerevan will be looking to retain constructive relations with Moscow. And despite the trauma of losing Nagorno-Karabakh, there will be continuing efforts to solve the long-standing conflict with Azerbaijan and normalize relations with Turkey.

For both the Armenian elite and the broader population, events in Nagorno-Karabakh—which they see as nothing short of ethnic cleansing—have destroyed the idea of Russia as a security guarantor: an idea that had been common currency since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century, even becoming a part of the Armenian national identity. Now, however, even if the immediate crisis is resolved, Armenians will never see Russians the same way again.

Of course, there were always Armenians who called for closer ties with the West, including through joining the EU and NATO, but they were outliers until at least the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Even the Velvet Revolution of 2018 that swept Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power did not alter the elite’s foreign policy outlook. While Pashinyan found common ground with young Western leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, there was no attempt to chart a more pro-Western course. Pashinyan even irritated the United States by sending military doctors and engineers to Syria as part of Russia’s military intervention in support of President Bashar al-Assad.

While the 2020 war revealed Yerevan to be internationally isolated on Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia managed to partially preserve its reputation among Armenians by preventing the total destruction of Nagorno-Karabakh forces or ethnic cleansing there, and deploying peacekeepers. Only when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 did it dawn on Yerevan that the status quo was untenable.

Yerevan began distancing itself from Moscow in the spring of that year, seeking closer ties with the West and expressing a readiness to compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh. There was a growing awareness that something was going to have to give. While the West offered diplomatic support to Armenia during clashes with Azerbaijan in September 2022, Russia pointedly stayed neutral.

Some Armenians, most fatefully the de facto government of Nagorno-Karabakh, remained stuck in the old paradigm, believing Russian peacekeepers were a genuine safeguard against a renewed Azerbaijani offensive. But this year’s one-day war and the ensuing exodus of Karabakh Armenians proved to even the most ardent pro-Russian Armenians that Moscow was either unwilling or unable to protect them.

Russia did not even step in to help Nagorno-Karabakh politicians seen as pro-Russian. As it took over the region, Azerbaijan arrested three former presidents of the self-proclaimed republic—Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, and Arayik Harutyunyan—as well as the prominent Russian-Armenian tycoon Ruben Vardanyan. They all remain in jail in Azerbaijan.

Contrary to expectations, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh did not lead to the fall of Pashinyan. Instead, it has weakened Armenia’s pro-Moscow opposition, and helped shape an emerging consensus that a continued alliance with Russia is impossible.

What would a “post-Russia” Armenian foreign policy look like? The most serious problem, of course, is still the conflict with Azerbaijan and its Turkish backers. Azerbaijani officials have been less aggressive in their rhetoric since the seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh, but President Ilham Aliyev is in no hurry to sign any documents that would normalize relations.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh has convinced Yerevan that solving the conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey is more urgent than ever. Such peaceful rhetoric faces some internal opposition, but most of the Armenian elite believe it is the only option. Any other position would simply lead to a fresh escalation, and another defeat.

Armenian officials have ramped up contact with their Western counterparts, and Yerevan insists it wants to discuss a peace agreement with Baku somewhere in the West—not in Russia. In October, Armenia even signed an agreement with France for the delivery of military equipment.

Still, Yerevan does not want to repeat its past mistakes by relying too much on a single ally. As a result, it is unlikely to limit its search for new partners to the West alone.

The most obvious choice for Armenia when it comes to a non-Western ally is Iran, which has said repeatedly that it supports the territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran has also expressed opposition to an extraterritorial corridor through southern Armenia that would link Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhichevan.

The other partner from the Global South that Yerevan is hoping to recruit is India. New Delhi took note of Armenia after the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan was also backed by Pakistan. Ties have grown ever since, up to and including arms deliveries.

None of Armenia’s theoretical new partners can replace Russia as a security guarantor, however. Armenia also remains dependent on Russia when it comes to other issues like energy and transport. It would be naïve to think that the West can simply be a substitute for Russia in all these areas—particularly while wars are raging in Ukraine and the Middle East. Many in Yerevan repeat the mantra: “If we lose Russia as an ally, we must at least ensure it doesn’t become an enemy.”

Unfortunately, any Armenian steps toward the West tend to be perceived as a hostile act in Moscow. And the Kremlin still has plenty of ways to exert influence over Yerevan: it could give the green light to Baku to launch another military operation, halt natural gas exports, or deport ethnic Armenians from Russia, for example.

While such radical measures would harm Armenia, they would not return the country to the Russian fold. Instead, they would only strengthen anti-Russian feeling and intensify Yerevan’s search for new partners.

There are, therefore, considerable grounds to hope that Moscow and Yerevan can overcome their current difficulties and build a new relationship—or at the very least have a civilized divorce. But the history of Russia’s relations with other post-Soviet countries shows that Moscow does not always behave rationally in such matters. 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Pashinyan’s statement expressing support for Georgia’s unity has stirred outrage in Abkhazia

Nov 27 2023

Pashinyan angered Abkhazia

Prime minister Nikol Pashinyan recently stated, “In my public statements, I have reiterated multiple times that we fully and unequivocally support the unity and statehood of Georgia.” His remarks faced criticism from several ethnic Armenian members of the Abkhazian parliament, as they issued a statement expressing disapproval of the Armenian Prime Minister’s words.


Pashinyan answers Armenian citizens’ questions for eight hours: main points
“Guarantee of equal rights, including to property”: How to solve the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, VIDEO


“After the tragedy in Artsakh, where the current Armenian leadership condemned 120,000 of its own citizens living in Nagorno-Karabakh to eviction, one might have chosen to leave Pashinyan’s recent speech uncommented. However, the assertion of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia appeared too cynical.

Cynical not because the Republic of Abkhazia is an independent state with no affiliation to sovereign Georgia, but because just a couple of years ago, Yerevan was vehemently asserting that Artsakh is Armenia and would not permit any Azerbaijani encroachment on Karabakh’s territory,” stated MPs Galust Trapizonian, Levon Galustian, Ashot Minasyan, and Eric Rshtuni.

Abkhazian president Aslan Bzhania remarked that “Pashinyan’s endorsement of Georgia’s “unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and democracy” fundamentally conflicts with Abkhazia’s sovereignty.”

He further noted that the Armenian community in Abkhazia is present across various aspects of life, encompassing politics to culture.

“Armenians in Abkhazia have everything that Nikol Pashinyan could not ensure for the Armenians of Karabakh, who, due to his policies, experienced the tragedy of statehood collapse and a mass exodus from their homeland. Furthermore, a consequence of Nikol Pashinyan’s policies was the breach of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia itself.”

Originally, Bzhania’s statement contained a paragraph asserting that “Abkhazia, unlike Armenia and Georgia, controls its entire territory.” This stance did not find favor with the opposition RESPUBLICA Telegram channel.

“Georgia regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of its territory, a perspective we do not share. However, given that Aslan Bzhania acknowledges the existence of ‘his’ uncontrolled territories within Georgia, it implies recognition of their presence. We anticipate clarifications from the Presidential Administration,” states RESPUBLICA.

No clarification was provided, but the paragraph mentioned earlier disappeared from Bzhania’s statement.


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Citibank discriminated against customers with Armenian names, lawsuit alleges

Los Angeles Times
Nov 27 2023

When Mary Smbatian started hearing rumors a few year ago that Citibank was closing the accounts of Armenian Americans in the San Fernando Valley, she thought it impossible the giant Wall Street bank would ever shutter hers.

A residential loan broker who also runs an apartment management business, the Encino resident had been a Citibank client for more than a decade, with both company and personal accounts, as well as credit cards issued through the bank.

Then, on Feb. 1 of last year, she got a letter from Citibank informing her that all of her accounts and cards were being closed — without any reason provided. What ensued was chaos, as Smbatian scrambled to get her money back, open new accounts elsewhere and save her businesses.

“This was a mess. This was horrible. This was so depressing,” said Smbatian, 42, a mother of five who said she was still shaken by the events. “I was so stressed out, I literally started crying.”

Smbatian and others whose accounts were closed suspected discrimination was at play — and say they were proven correct when Citibank signed a consent order Nov. 7 with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, agreeing to pay $25.9 million to cover alleged violations of fair lending laws from at least 2015 to 2021.

The agency alleged that a unit responsible for issuing store-branded credit cards from Home Depot, Best Buy and other retailers had discriminated against applicants whose surnames ended with “ian” or “yan,” and particularly those who lived in and near Glendale.

The bank suspected that applicants seeking new cards or credit increases would be more likely to commit fraud and not pay their charges, with some employees referring to them as “Armenian bad guys” or the “Southern California Armenian Mafia.” The applicants were subjected to higher scrutiny and many were turned down, approved credit on less favorable terms or subject to possible account freezes and closures, according to the order.

The agency also also found that the bank took “corrective action” against employees who failed to identify and deny the applications. Employees were ordered not to tell customers the real reasons for their rejections or to discuss it in writing or on recorded lines.

The bank agreed to set aside $1.4 million for victims of the discrimination, but the vast share of the penalty is going into a pool that compensates all consumers harmed by violations of federal consumer financial protection laws.

Now, Smbatian is a lead plaintiff in a proposed class-action lawsuit filed Nov. 17 in Los Angeles federal court on behalf of victims of Citibank’s discriminatory practices. The suit alleges far greater harm than is detailed in the CFPB’s order.

“The fine is actually minuscule compared to the damage done, and it’s very significant from what we are hearing from our clients,” said attorney Tamar Arminak, whose Glendale firm filed the lawsuit. “It really wrecked them.”

Los Angeles County is home to nearly 190,000 people of Armenian descent, according to the 2020 census, making it the largest diaspora community in the country.

The lawsuit seeks to compensate the plaintiffs due to losses suffered from a wide range of alleged injustices, including damage to credit scores and the financial hardship arising from account closures and the inability to access their money. It is also seeking punitive damages due to “the indignity of discrimination.”

Arminak said she had heard from Smbatian, a friend, and others in the Armenian community about the closed accounts and decided to proceed with the lawsuit after the CFPB action was announced earlier this month. After advertising the class action on social media and her firm’s website, she said she was deluged with responses and has signed up more than 100 clients who want to participate.

The attorney said clients have told her that they didn’t just have store accounts closed but checking, savings and business accounts, with the money tied for up weeks or months. Some business people told her their SBA loan funds were frozen for years. Meanwhile, they had trouble accessing their banks records and couldn’t get a straight answer about what was happening.

“People suffered far more than a Macy’s account not being approved,” she said. “And I don’t think the fine addresses the humiliation involved.”

Despite the consent order focusing on a period through 2021, Arminak said, the stories she has heard from clients indicate account closures actually accelerated last year.

Smbatian’s lawsuit is the second proposed class action arising from the fallout surrounding the CFPB’s order. It follows a narrower lawsuit filed Nov. 13 by a San Mateo law firm on behalf of a Grenada Hills woman of Armenian descent who held a Citibank Costco-branded card and alleges she was turned down for a credit line increase this year. A New York law firm announced it is looking into potential breaches of fiduciary duties by the bank’s officers and directors.

Citibank did not respond directly to request for comment regarding the lawsuit but directed The Times toward a statement it previously issued about the CFPB settlement, in which it did not deny or admit the agency’s findings.

“Regrettably, in trying to thwart a well-documented Armenian fraud ring operating in certain parts of California, a few employees took impermissible actions. While we prioritize protecting our bank and our customers from fraud, it is unacceptable to base credit decisions on national origin. We sincerely apologize to any applicant who was evaluated unfairly by the small number of employees who circumvented our fraud detection protocols,” it said.

The alleged Citibank credit denials and account closures follow decades of increasingly tough “know your customer rules” that aim to reduce financial crimes. They were first imposed in 1970 and strengthened after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. Banks violators have been subjected to sometimes huge fines totaling in the billions of dollars domestically and abroad.

Lauren Saunders, associate director of the National Consumer Law Center, said banks have a responsibility to look out for illegal activity such as accounts being used by drug cartels and for money laundering and perpetrating fraud — but it has gone beyond that.

“What we are seeing right now is that some are overreacting or indiscriminately freezing or closing accounts based on supposed red flags, catching innocent people in the process and without giving them any clear procedure or remedy or timeline to get their money back when they, in fact, are not criminals,” she said.

Among the most high-profile recent example, she noted, was that of Bank of America, which froze the debit-card accounts of Californians receiving unemployment benefits at the height of the pandemic using a crude algorithm to detect fraud — and then holding on to the money as customers fruitlessly called for weeks. The bank paid fines totaling $225 million to two federal agencies last year.

Saunders said that regulations need to be strengthened to require banks to provide a reason for shutting accounts and to have a consumer dispute process in place. “I think we need to make sure that banks aren’t closing accounts for discriminatory reasons. And right now, they are not being required to give any reasons, and that can be a cover for discrimination,” she said.

The consent agreement prompted Rep. Maxine Waters, (D-Los Angeles) to call for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the bank’s regulator, to revisit an “outstanding” performance rating Citibank received in 2021 for its compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act. The 1977 law encourages banks to take steps to improve access to credit and other banking services in minority communities.

The CFPB would not comment on what prompted it to investigate Citibank, but the consent order states that it discovered the alleged discrimination through a statistical analysis of credit applications in the retail services unit from 2015 to 2021. Citibank must now develop a plan to identify and compensate harmed customers, who will not have to apply for compensation.

Under federal rules governing proposed class actions, any related lawsuits would be combined and a lead counsel appointed. The cases also would have to meet certain criteria to be certified and proceed, a process that could take at least six months to a year. Successful class actions typically result in settlements.

Karl Asatryan, a real estate agent and developer, is the other named plaintiff in the case. The lawsuit alleges he received a letter from bank in May of last year stating his accounts would be closed in 30 days. No reason was given and his line of credit also was shut down.

He said he had been a Citibank client for some 20 years and had even refinanced his home mortgage with the bank.

“That’s disrespect toward the customer,” said Asatryan, 44, of Valley Glen. “And for a customer like myself, that’s ridiculous.”

https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2023-11-27/citibank-discriminated-against-customers-with-armenian-names-lawsuit-alleges

Concert calls on Mainers to support displaced Armenians

News Center Maine
Nov 26 2023
A church in Bar Harbor filled with the sound of folk music amid pleas to help Armenians who fled the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region.
 8:38 AM EST

BAR HARBOR, Maine — Dozens joined together at St. Saviour’s Episcopal Church in Bar Harbor on Sunday for a concert to benefit Armenian refugees.

The event, hosted by the band Kotwica, aimed to raise money and awareness for families displaced by Azerbaijan’s September offensive against the self-governing and ethnically Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.

“If situations like this are not called out, then countries and dictators are emboldened to do things against people.” Carolyn Rapkievian, who is Armenian herself and plays guitar for Kotwica, said Sunday.

The songs reflected a mix of Armenian, Greek, and Eastern European folk music, with a hearty dose of dance tunes. At one point, members of the audience joined hands with performers, waltzing around the pews.

To Carolyn’s husband David, the playing of a people’s music is an essential part of cultural preservation — for Armenians and others. 

“I think celebrating the music of these culture helps keep the cultures alive,” David Rapkievian said. 

With a basket full of cash donations, it was clear the crowd was enthralled—if not inspired—by the concert of Armenian folk music.

Still, it comes at a unique moment. With wars ongoing in Gaza and Ukraine, the appetite to involve oneself in another humanitarian cause—of helping Armenian refugees—was daunting to some. 

For Weslea Sidon, who attended Sunday’s concert out of support for friends, a limit of emotional exhaustion has been reached. 

“I don't know if I can feel any more moved about it because I'm in despair all the time at the state of the world,” Sidon said.

https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/nation-world/ways-to-support-armernia-concert-bar-harbor-maine/97-18d9adb0-0b43-47c2-ac34-cda40fe82217

Bzhania Lashes Out at Armenian PM Pashinyan for Backing Georgia’s Territorial Integrity

Civil Georgia
Nov 27 2023

On November 26, the de facto president of occupied Abkhazia condemned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on November 24 that Armenia “unequivocally and fully” supports “the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and democracy of Georgia”. The Armenian Prime Minister said this while answering a question in a live broadcast on whether his country was ready to recognize Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region as Russia-occupied territories.

According to Ekho Kavkaza, Pashinyan further noted that Armenia’s votes in the UN have changed since 2019. Before 2019, Armenia had voted against the UN resolutions recognizing the right of Georgian internally displaced persons to return to their homes in occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Since 2019, Armenia has abstained from voting.

In his statement, Aslan Bzhania blames the Armenian leadership’s statements on “Western influence,” claiming that Prime Minister Pashinyan’s recent statement “fundamentally contradicts the fact of sovereignty” of occupied Abkhazia.

“Today, the Armenian community in Abkhazia is represented in the central and local authorities, the Armenian language and culture are supported by the [ed. de facto] state, and the structures of the Armenian Apostolic Church function freely,” adding that “the Armenians in Abkhazia have everything that Nikol Pashinyan could not guarantee to the Armenians of Karabakh, who, as a result of his policies, faced the tragedy of the collapse of statehood and a mass exodus from their homeland.”

Bzhania called on the Armenian government to “abandon indoctrinated rhetoric and begin to take into account the actual state of affairs in the implementation of its foreign policy”.

Ethnic Armenian members of the so-called parliament of occupied Abkhazia, Ashot Minosyan, Galust Trapizonyan, Eric Rshtuni and Levon Galustyan, also reacted to Pashinyan’s statement, calling it “too cynical.” In their statement, the four representatives of the de facto legislature criticized the Armenian prime minister for “easily changing positions” and blamed him for the disappearance of Nagorno-Karabakh from the “political map of the world”.

“Unlike Pashinyan, there are no politicians in Abkhazia who would question the people’s choice and liquidate with a stroke of a pen a country that was conquered with the blood of sons and daughters,” the so-called deputies concluded.

https://civil.ge/archives/571441

Film Review: ‘Amerikatsi’ Celebrates Much More than Armenian Culture

Awards Radar
Nov 27 2023

Connecting to your roots can be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Personally, being from Germany, Ireland, Norway, and other European countries that I have yet to visit, it can feel impossible. For others in this position, the United States undoubtedly becomes home. But what if we explored ourselves further, and visited our homelands to feel a sense of self? And what if when we did, the worst possible outcome occurred? A new film channels this idea and so much more on the big screen.

Amerikatsi follows Charlie, an adult Armenian American who returns to Armenia to tap into his cultural roots and brief history in the country. What follows is an unfortunate misunderstanding that lands Charlie in an Armenian jail. Charlie takes a roundabout way to connect to his heritage when he begins observing a young couple in their home from his cell. The plot is loosely based on director Michael A. Goorjian’s grandfather’s real life story involving him fleeing Armenia for the United States at the turn of the century.

A directorial debut for actor Goorjian, Amerikatsi is a film the talent should be proud of in numerous aspects. Goorjian wrote, directed, produced, and portrayed lead Charlie. Off screen, the film has a very fluid and clear plot formation. The writing is painfully human, emotive, and memorable. Visually, the movie is beautiful, capturing vast Armenian landscapes, animals, and cultural aspects. Even pieces filmed in Charlie’s cell are whimsical and fun, which is a testament to the picture itself. The shots are edited together concisely, with a clear idea of what viewers should see and when. What this communicates to audiences is that Goorjian has a directorial eye that should not be overlooked. On screen, Goorjian is extremely likeable. Viewers will cheer from their seats for Charlie as well as tear up for his misfortunes. Furthermore, to succeed in every role he took on to craft this picture while also connecting it to a storyline that is personal to Goorjian is admirable. The sky is the limit for the well known talent turned new director, and this endeavor feels very different from Goorjian’s past acting roles. 

Actor Hovik Keuchkerian and actress Narine Grigoryan take on the roles of Tigran and Ruzan, the couple that lives across from Charlie’s cell window. Throughout the film—with the exception of a few moments with Tigran—the two are acting strictly from a wide view of their home with windows between them and the cameras. This means very little to no smothered dialogue can be heard, forcing the talents to rely on their body language and a more theatrical acting style to get their storyline across. However, they do this wonderfully. The duo shows the flaws and joys of being human without those watching ever questioning what they are trying to show us. It’s nearly impossible to not become invested in their lives, just as Charlie does. Keuchkerian is given a short amount of time on screen from another perspective for one of the more emotional sequences of the entire picture and shows off his acting chops as well.

With a 116 minute runtime that doesn’t feel nearly that long, Amerikatsi is enjoyable from start to finish. Some moments may feel less enticing than others, but those are very short lived and viewers are thrown back into the heart of the storyline once again. The important thing to note about this piece is that it has a very compassionate feel to it, highlighting exactly what it means to be human and all that comes with that. A roller coaster of emotions in the best way, Goorjian shines a spotlight on the lowest point in one’s life and finds beauty in it.

All in all, Amerikatsi is a triumph whichever way you look at it. To see a film such as this receive acclaim would be justified. Regardless of whether or not it achieves this, Goorjian is one to watch, both on and off screen. Keep an eye out for Amerikatsi and leave a comment with your thoughts on the film.

https://awardsradar.com/2023/11/27/film-review-amerikatsi-celebrates-much-more-than-armenian-culture/