Freedom House Again Blasts ‘Degradation Of Democratic Norms’ In Armenia

A man is dragged by Armenian police during an anti-government protest in Armenia in Feb, 2021

YEREVAN (Azatutyun.am)—U.S. democracy watchdog Freedom House has criticized the Armenian authorities for continuing to prosecute citizens accused of insulting state officials.

In a weekend statement, it again said that the practice testifies to a “clear degradation of democratic norms” in Armenia.

Amendments to the Armenian Criminal Code passed by the country’s government-controlled parliament last summer made “grave insults” directed at individuals because of their “public activities” crimes punishable by heavy fines and a prison sentence of up to three months. Those individuals may include government and law-enforcement officials, politicians and other public figures.

The Armenian police have launched more than 260 criminal investigations stemming from the amendments that took effect in September amid strong criticism from local and international human rights groups. Many of those cases reportedly target people accused of offending Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

One of them became last week the first person convicted under the new legislation. A court fined him 500,000 drams (just over $1,000) for swearing at Pashinyan in a phone call with a police officer.

“We are concerned with the first conviction of an Armenian citizen under a new law criminalizing ‘serious insults’ of government officials,” read the Freedom House statement. “This shows a clear degradation of democratic norms and creates a chilling effect for free _expression_ in Armenia.”

The U.S. watchdog already called for a repeal of the Criminal Code articles shortly after the authorities began enforcing them in September. Armenian officials dismissed those calls.

Vladimir Vartanyan, the pro-government chairman of the parliament committee on legal affairs, again defended the amendments on Monday.

“We have to understand that freedom of speech has limits,” said Vartanyan. “We have to understand that there are some expressions that absolutely do not fit into the legitimate boundaries of free speech. Insults definitely don’t.”

The controversial amendments have also been condemned by the Armenian opposition. Opposition leaders say that Pashinyan himself has relied heavily on slander and “hate speech” before and after coming to power in 2018.

All forms of slander and defamation had been decriminalized in Armenia in 2010 during then President Serzh Sarkisian’s rule.

Finding in Little Armenia the roots my parents tried to bury

Los Angeles Times
Feb 8 2022

BY LORI YEGHIAYAN FRIEDMAN
FEB. 8, 2022 3:01 AM PT

Growing up in the 1970s and ’80s, I spent Sundays and holidays at my medzmama’s house in East Hollywood. Two decades ago, the city designated my grandmother’s neighborhood as “Little Armenia,” where the first significant wave of Armenian immigrants settled in the mid-20th century.

Most arrivals had roots in western Armenia, Armenians’ homeland for many thousands of years until a genocidal campaign left more than 1 million dead, and hundreds of thousands displaced ― my medzmama, Herminé, among them.

Both of my parents were Armenian. In a marked departure from many first-generation Armenian immigrants, however, I wasn’t raised in an Armenian community. I didn’t grow up speaking the language. I didn’t attend Armenian schools. I went to public school and my friends were non-immigrant Americans.

My parents sent a mixed message: Being Armenian was central to our identity yet obscured. Between cultural continuity and belonging, they chose the latter.

My medzmama’s house and her neighborhood returned some of what was lost. I caught the sights, smells, tastes of my culture. Grizzled old men in trousers smoking cigarettes and playing Tavlou (backgammon) in their driveways. Mournful dirges resounding at St. Garabed’s Armenian Apostolic Church services, and recordings of men singing sentimental ballads, siroones, siroones (“my love”) spilling out of cars and shops. Za’atar and basturma wafting the moment we opened the door to Bezjian’s Market, and the khorovats smoking from backyard barbecues, including ours. My medzmama expertly and lovingly making dishes: manti, yalanche, yogurt soup, dolma, kufte and kadayif.

Still, it could feel like visiting a foreign country, strange and sometimes uncomfortable, like when old people would tsk their tongues and wag their fingers at me. “Amot,” they’d say, “shame,” when they learned I didn’t speak the language.

As a teenager, I had moments of curiosity. I asked my father why I didn’t grow up speaking Armenian. He said he’d wanted me to speak English without an accent. When I expressed interest in learning my mother tongue, he said: “Why learn Armenian? We’re not going back.”

My father came to America to attend the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1950. Perhaps having a foreign accent wasn’t such a boon and speaking Armenian was of no help to his career ambitions.

This is not a finger wag, an amot to my parents. I cannot regret their choices without regretting who I turned out to be, which I don’t. I acknowledge the loss inherent in my assimilation. Now with young kids of my own, I’ve come to see their choices as driven by a parental desire to shield your child from pain and to give to them what you lacked.

I lost my parents early ― my father died of a heart attack when I was 23. When my mother passed away from cancer, I was 33 and unmoored by my sudden parentlessness. Haunted by a feeling that something was missing in my life, and a lingering sense that I hadn’t known either of them as well as I could have, I immersed myself in all things Armenian.

I moved from a studio apartment in Silver Lake to a one-bedroom in Glendale and started volunteering as a mentor to Armenian youth. For the first time, I made Armenian friends and took Armenian language classes at Los Angeles City College. I even traveled with a young professionals’ group to the Republic of Armenia. I always stood out as different and sensed that I wasn’t Armenian enough for some. But I found the people who accepted me and eventually, settled on a way to integrate my Armenianness into my life in a way that felt right for me.

The fragmented pieces of my families’ histories finally formed into a narrative, as I began to comprehend each generation’s losses and find my place in the story.

“When I was 40 days old, we got out,” my medzmama used to say, in her succinct style. Her family fled Aintab, an ancient city now in Turkey, to escape violence. My grandfather, who died before I was born, was from Kessab, in present-day Syria. They met in Jerusalem, Palestine, and when the Israeli-Palestinian war began, they lost everything ― again. My maternal grandparents and their four kids ― my mother, the oldest ― went to Beirut and eventually secured passage to the U.S. through a special refugee quota. My father was born and raised in the Armenian community of Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. His parents had ended up in Africa after escaping massacres and genocide.

We sold my medzmama’s Little Armenia house a few years ago. The neighbors are gone too. Bezjian’s Market and other stores have closed. It’s not the hub it once was. I do what I can to give my kids a little of Armenia, including visits to the old neighborhood and to new centers of Armenian culture, like Glendale, where recent waves of Armenian immigrants have settled.

Last summer, I took my kids to an Armenian church near us to celebrate Vardavar, a life-affirming holiday where people soak each other with water. I didn’t grow up celebrating it, and only heard of it as an adult. They absorbed the sounds of the language, the smells of the khorovats and the sight of men playing Tavlou. I felt the loss of all that was erased by violence and assimilation — the last 150 years of Armenian history marked by impermanence. And yet, watching my children also renewed my hope that the culture will endure even when the places do not.

Lori Yeghiayan Friedman is a writer living in Oregon.

Iran, Armenia to develop scientific, technological co-op

Tehran Times
Feb 8 2022
  1. Society
February 8, 2022 – 17:29

TEHRAN – Iranian Minister of Science Mohammad Ali Zolfigol and his Armenian counterpart Vahram Dumanyan emphasized the need to develop scientific and technological cooperation in an online meeting on Monday.

Zolfigol expressed interest in strengthening scientific and technological cooperation with Armenia, helping each other to be on the path of scientific growth and development.

“Iran has made good progress scientific research and technological activities in the world, in addition to being one of the top 15 countries in the world in terms of scientific production, and currently about 49 science and technology parks are active in the country.

In the field of basic sciences, holding scientific competitions between Iranian and Armenian students in basic sciences such as mathematics can be a field of cooperation,” he stated.

Establishing university branches to utilize the capacity of the technical and vocational education, as well as establishing a joint science and technology park and awarding a number of scholarships to Armenian students in priority fields for this country are among the areas that can be mentioned in the joint cooperation memorandum, he further said.

Dumanyan for his part said that progressive and high-level relations with the Islamic Republic are very important for the Armenian government, because Iranian universities have a high position in terms of science, and universities such as the Sharif University of Technology are world-famous.

The presence of Armenian students in the form of student camps or study opportunities in Iran is one of the areas of cooperation, and the collaboration of professors and faculty members can also be considered in the context of scientific cooperation, he explained.

He further considered the world programming competition in Armenia as one of the examples that can increase scientific interactions and Iranian students can participate in these competitions.

Iran’s science diplomacy at highest level in 20 years

Data from the Scopus International Citation Database show that Iran’s scientific diplomacy has reached more than 34 percent since the beginning of 2021, the highest level in the past 20 years.

Science diplomacy is the use of scientific collaborations among nations to address common problems and to build constructive international partnerships. It is a form of new diplomacy and has become an umbrella term to describe a number of formal or informal technical, research-based, academic, or engineering exchanges, within the general field of international relations.

Comparing the rate of 2020 with 2019, Iran with a growth of 12.5 percent and with a slight difference with India has gained second place in the world in terms of the growth of world science diplomacy, Mohammad Javad Dehghani, head of the Islamic World Science Citation Center (ISC), said.

In 2011, the share of Iranian articles with international participation was about 16.5 percent, which increased to 19.7 percent in 2016 and gradually in the following years, so that in 2020 and 2021, reached up to 30.5 and 34.2 percent, respectively, he further stated.

The share of Iranian articles with international participation has had significant growth of 209 percent during an eight-year period (2013-2020), becoming the Islamic world’s leading country in science diplomacy, according to the Scopus International Citation Database.

FB/MG

Sports: Paris FC set to add Armenian investor as club pushes for Ligue1 promotion

Feb 8 2022
8th February 2022

February 8 – Ligue 2 club Paris FC is poised to announce a new investor from Armenia in a reshuffle of their ownership structure.

In an interview with French daily Le Parisien, the club’s president Pierre Ferracci said: “It’s nearly secured and I’ll make it official very soon. It’s also a foreign group that’s coming with a sponsor. We continue to reinforce the capitalist structure of Paris FC.”

The group reportedly represents Armenian interests and will be accompanied by the sports betting company Vbet.

Ferracci, the founder of the Alpha Groupremains the main shareholder of the club, but in 2020 the Kingdom of Bahrain acquired a 20% stake to provide new funds for Paris FC. Last year, Anglo-Sri Lankan telecommunication company Lyca Mobile obtained a 10% stake.

After 23 match days, the club sit in second place in the Ligue 2 table, on 44 points, a point behind league leaders Toulouse.

Paris FC last played in the top flight in the 1978-1979 season. Across town, Paris Saint-Germain have spent hundreds of millions in a bid to win the Champions League ever since the club was acquired by QSI in 2011.

Freedom House calls on Armenian parliament to repeal ‘Grave Insult’ law


Feb 8 2022


  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Freedom House concerned by Armenia’s ‘grave insult’ law

The human rights organization Freedom House has called on the Armenian Parliament to repeal the law on “grave insult”. This refers to the abolition of Article 137.1 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes insulting persons engaged in “public activities”. A “grave insult” is punishable by a fine or arrest.

This is not the first warning from Freedom House regarding this particular legislation. The human rights organization believes that it threatens Armenia’s achievements in the field of democracy and law.

Local experts and journalistic organizations also opposed the adoption of this article by the ruling majority of the Parliament. They stated that the political force that carried out the revolution and came to power with democratic slogans legislates restrictions on freedom of speech.


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Freedom House’s statement refers to the verdict handed down in Armenia in early February. According to the court decision, an Armenian citizen will be fined 500,000 drams ($1,000) for insulting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the ruling party’s presidential candidate, High-Tech Industry Minister Vahagn Khachaturyan.

“We are extremely concerned about the first verdict convicting an Armenian citizen under a new article of the Criminal Code, which provides for criminal liability for insulting government officials”, the statement said.

The citizen was charged under article 137.1 of the RA Criminal Code, for “a grave insult committed in connection with the public activities of persons.”

By “public activity”, the authors of the law mean journalism, performance of official duties, public service, public or political activity. A harsher punishment is envisaged if the insult was addressed to the “elected persons” – that is, a politician, journalist, public figure, or civil servant.

Parliament passed a bill to criminalize grave insults on 30 July 2021. By the end of the year, 263 criminal cases had already been initiated on the fact of insulting civil servants. On February 3, the court made the first decision on one of them.

According to the human rights organization, this indicates “a clear regression of democratic norms in the country and a threat to freedom of speech”.

The organization calls on the National Assembly to repeal article 137.1 of the criminal code, as it violates the principles enshrined in the Armenian constitution and the provisions that are part of the country’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The first warning from Freedom House on the same issue was issued in August last year, immediately after the bill was passed. The organization described the new article of the criminal code as a law threatening freedom of speech.

“The adoption of the draft law on criminal liability for insulting a public figure proves that Armenia’s achievements in recent years in the field of democracy and law are under threat”, the organization said in a statement.

In the Freedom House report “Freedom on the web 2020” Armenia was included in the list of “free” countries, in the report “Freedom in the world 2021” – already in the “partially free”. And in the “Countries in Transition 2021” report, Armenia was already included in the list of “half-formed authoritarian regimes”.

Deputy Justice Minister Grigor Minasyan, in response to an appeal by Freedom House, said that the criminalization of grave insult was appropriate, since “there was an abuse of the right to freedom of speech” in Armenia. According to him, the solution to this problem was a change in legislation:

“As for the fears of our partners, they have been heard. In the future, if any changes are planned, we will all be their witnesses, but we must take into account that there was a problem and it had to be solved. At the moment, this is the solution to prevent such manifestations in our country”.

According to human rights defender Arman Tatoyan, the most important laws concerning the rights of citizens are adopted in Armenia with gross violations. He stated that the country’s authorities are abusing their ability to restrict human rights:

“This was one of the most inadmissible articles that has ever been passed and now it has caused serious problems for people. I am convinced that it created problems for law enforcement agencies as well.”

According to the Ombudsman, the project was developed for political reasons, without regard to human rights. Arman Tatoyan believes that “insults and swearing are absolutely unacceptable,” but he does not agree with the methods of struggle of the authorities. According to him, in the summer of 2021, during the election campaign of early parliamentary elections, “hatred and insults were brought to the highest point,” and then they decided to limit them with the help of the criminal code.

Op-ed: Azerbaijan may conduct a counter-terrorist operation in Karabakh [Azeri Opinion]


Feb 8 2022


Azerbaijan may carry out counter-terrorist operation in Karabakh

Baku again once again cited the non-implementation of one of the conditions of the tripartite statement of November 10, 2020. According to one of the clauses of the document, the Armenian armed forces must leave the part of Karabakh, where the Russian peacekeeping forces are temporarily stationed. Political observer Agshin Kerimov believes that in order to fulfill this condition, Azerbaijan can conduct a counter-terrorist operation.


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The other day, the Azerbaijani media published a video in which, allegedly, the Armenian armed forces stationed in that part of Karabakh, where Russian peacekeepers are temporarily stationed, are digging trenches. They carry out these works under the guise of the Russian peacekeepers. The video was filmed near the Agdam region, which returned under the control of Azerbaijan as a result of the second Karabakh war.

It is noted that the Azerbaijani side protested about the incident and demanded that the peacekeeping forces stop similar illegal actions.

According to Azerbaijani political observer Agshin Karimov, such incidents leave official Baku no other way but to make the Armenian armed forces withdraw from Karabakh by force.

“In fact, nothing is being done to implement the conditions of the 4th paragraph of the tripartite statement of November 10, 2020.

According to that clause, the Russian peacekeeping forces were to be deployed in Karabakh in parallel with the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces.

But more than a year has passed, and not only do we not see the withdrawal of illegal armed forces from the zone of responsibility of the peacekeepers, on the contrary, they are building up their forces.

I think this is happening for two reasons:

  • The Armenian armed forces in Karabakh do not obey the will of the Armenian leadership. And this state of affairs plays into the hands of Yerevan;
  • The illegal Armenian armed forces in Karabakh are under the patronage of the Russian peacekeeping contingent.

Regardless of the reason that led to this state of affairs, Azerbaijan’s patience is not unlimited, and, at some point, Baku may resort to the use of military force.

The Russian peacekeepers themselves claim that the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from Karabakh is not their responsibility. This condition is stipulated by the tripartite statement, but the peacekeeping contingent is not authorized to implement it.

This factor also indicates that the 4th paragraph of the document, which put an end to the second Karabakh war, can be implemented directly by the Azerbaijani side. It will be impossible for illegal Armenian armed formations to resist the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

I think that in the future it is impossible to exclude the need to conduct a counter-terrorist operation in Karabakh”, Kerimov said.

Turkey opens new dispute over sovereignty of east Aegean islands

Al Jazeera
[Turkey for the first time disputes Greece’s sovereignty over its east
Aegean islands which were meant to remain demilitarised.]
By John Psaropoulos
Feb 8, 2022
Athens, Greece – As NATO confronts Russia over security in Europe,
renewed tension between Greece and Turkey is gnawing at the alliance’s
eastern heel.
In letters sent to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres last July and
September, Turkey for the first time disputed Greece’s sovereignty
over its east Aegean islands, “over which sovereignty was ceded to
Greece on the specific and strict condition that they be kept
demilitarised,” in the words of Turkey’s permanent representative,
Feridun Sinirlioglu.
Greece absorbed the islands of Limnos, Samothrace, Lesvos, Samos,
Chios and Ikaria from the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars of
1912-13. It was officially awarded sovereignty over them in the Treaty
of Lausanne of 1923.
Another treaty drawn up in London in 1914 had made Greek possession of
the islands conditional on their demilitarisation.
Turkey says that since the Lausanne Treaty makes reference to the 1914
treaty, it implies the same conditionality. Greece rejects that
interpretation.
Has Greece militarised the islands?
The Lausanne Treaty said Greece could not build naval bases,
fortifications or large concentrations of troops on the islands.
Greece has never built naval bases on the islands, and has denied it
has placed disproportionate forces there.
But Greece did start putting forces on the islands in the 1960s, as
inter-communal relations broke down on Cyprus between Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots, complicating Greek-Turkish relations.
In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus after a Greek-backed coup attempt on
the island. Greece reacted by reinforcing the troops on its Aegean
islands.
“You have a revisionist neighbour who’s invaded every adjacent state.
It’s sat in Cyprus for 48 years. It’s illegally invaded Syria and
Iraq. I don’t think Turkey’s record suggests we can drop all concern
that it can do the same [in the Aegean] if it thinks it can get away
with it,” Konstantinos Filis, director of the Institute of Global
Affairs at the American College of Greece, told Al Jazeera.
According to Lieutenant General Andreas Iliopoulos, former commander
of the Supreme Military Command of the Interior and Islands (ASDEN),
“Turkey is annoyed that Greece has forces on the islands at all, and
hasn’t left them vulnerable to invasion.
“The only weapons there are defensive, short-range weapons of the
national guard in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty, which can’t
harm anything in Turkey. Greece can’t launch any offensive action
against Turkey from the islands.”
Iliopoulos says it is Greece that has reason to worry.
“Turkey has formed the 4th Army in [Izmir], with landing units capable
of invading the islands. This has created an obvious threat. Greece
has to have enough security forces to ensure that there is a deterrent
to a Turkish invasion.”
Is it really about security?
Greek-Turkish differences are not presently about land, but water.
They currently each have six nautical miles (11km) of territorial
water in the Aegean, but the UN Convention on the International Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), concluded in 1982 and ratified by 158 countries,
says states may claim up to 12 miles (about 20km).
Greece, with its thousands of islands, would find itself in possession
of 71.5 percent of the Aegean.
“Any extension by Greece of its territorial waters beyond the present
six [nautical] miles in the Aegean would have serious implications for
Turkey. As such, any decision by Greece in that direction cannot be
taken in a vacuum, as if Turkey does not exist,” said Turkish
ambassador to Athens Burak Özügergin, in written responses for this
article.
Greece has said territorial water is a sovereign right under UNCLOS
and not subject to negotiation with third parties.
What Greece will talk about is the continental shelf, which grants a
country sovereign rights beyond territorial waters to mine undersea
mineral wealth.
This has been a bone of contention since 1973, when Greece discovered
the Prinos oilfield in the north Aegean.
Tension rose again in 2014, when a seismic survey in the Ionian Sea
and south of Crete suggested that Greece could be sitting on 70-90
trillion cubic feet (2-2.5 trillion cubic metres)  of natural gas,
with recoverable reserves estimated at $250bn at today’s high prices.
In 2016, Greece leased four major offshore concessions and three
onshore to oil majors ExxonMobil, Total and Repsol, with Greece’s
Energean and Hellenic Petroleum included as partners.
During the same period, Turkey spent almost a billion dollars buying
or building two seismic survey ships and three drill-ships – a clear
indication that it was not going to be left behind in the race to
hydrocarbon wealth.
Greece’s proposal is to settle boundaries by arbitration at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. Turkey has rejected
the proposal, because the ICJ enforces UNCLOS, and Turkey is one of a
handful of countries that have not signed it and do not abide by it.
Turkey has claimed that since Greek sovereignty of the islands is
disputed, Greece cannot claim a continental shelf for them either.
“Greece cannot, vis-à-vis Turkey, rely on its title under the
[Lausanne Treaty] for the purposes of a maritime boundary
delimitation,” wrote Sinirlioglu.
Greek observers believe Turkey’s disputation of sovereignty is an
elaborate way of avoiding a Hague arbitration.
“The issue of demilitarisation of Aegean islands is being put forward
for the first time as a precondition to go to The Hague. It is also
being connected to sovereignty for the first time,” Greek former
Foreign Minister Yiorgos Katrougalos told Al Jazeera.
“Turkey is piling on the issues in order to avoid talking about the
real issue, which is maritime zones,” Katrougalos says. “Turkey has an
irregular view of international law, and because it knows it’s in a
minority of one … it spends its time exerting pressure through power
moves.”
Such a power move came on on January 31, 2020, when the Turkish
seismic exploration ship Oruc Reis entered what Greece considers its
continental shelf, northeast of Crete. A Greek frigate monitored it
for about 24 hours before it left.
The government downplayed the incident, saying foul weather had caused
the Oruc Reis to veer off course, but the Oruc Reis returned
repeatedly in the summer of that year, conducting what experts
considered a comprehensive sounding of the seafloor between Crete and
Kastellorizo.
The Turkish move had military consequences.
The full Greek and Turkish navies deployed across the Aegean, and a
collision of frigates in August of that year, could have sparked a
conflict.
Since then, Greece and Turkey have pursued mutually incompatible
settlements with third parties.
In 2019, Turkey and Libya claimed maritime jurisdiction over the sea
bed between them, claiming a swath of what Greece considers its
continental shelf – a deal the United States denounced as “unhelpful”
and “provocative”.
The following year, Greece and Egypt concluded a maritime boundary
agreement over the same waters. While it followed the precepts of
international law, Ankara claimed the move was “null and void”.
A senior Greek diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity said
Turkey’s east Aegean gambit is a legal dead-end with a political aim.
“Turkey is trying to redefine its relationship with Greece in a way
that suits its interests. Greece seeks to settle maritime borders. In
return, Turkey is attempting to create an asphyxiating situation for
Greece by disputing Greek sovereignty in the east Aegean,” the
diplomat told Al Jazeera.
As long as maritime borders remain an open issue subject to political
and military grandstanding, the potential for a Greek-Turkish
conflagration, deliberate or accidental, is also likely to remain.
 

Turkey’s Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia

Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Aaron Stein
Feb. 8, 2022
On February 3, 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan traveled
to Kyiv, where he met with his Ukrainian counterpart, President
Volodymyr Zelensky, for a pre-planned meeting to co-chair the tenth
High-Level Strategic Council between the two countries. The two sides
signed a series of bilateral agreements, including a deal on the
co-production of drones and a free trade agreement. The
Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is mutually beneficial and
serves as the core component of a rapidly expanding bilateral
relationship.
The relationship took on new importance in 2019, following Turkey’s
downturn in relations with the United States and the imposition of
sanctions for Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile
defense system. Ankara is keen to explore non-American suppliers for
export-controlled items or American-origin technologies that are
subject to U.S. end-user agreements, while Ukraine’s Motor Sich hopes
to alleviate funding shortages. This relationship is slated to be the
lynchpin of current and future Turkish aerospace efforts, beginning
with cooperation on drones and helicopters and, potentially, on
jet-powered drones and fighter jets. However, all of this progress may
be upended by a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the outcome of a
large-scale conflict could threaten the regime in Kyiv and upend the
security situation in the Black Sea.
The Russian military has positioned enough forces and equipment on
Ukraine’s borders to topple the regime in Kyiv. Moscow has significant
military overmatch and could choose any number of military options
ranging from punitive air and artillery strikes, a limited military
incursion in the Donbas, to the toppling of the Zelensky government.
The Turkish position has been to balance its relations with Kyiv and
Moscow. This policy is grounded in Turkish affirmation of Ukrainian
sovereignty, balanced against Ankara’s ongoing effort to retain
cordial and functional ties with Moscow. As Erdogan explained to
pro-government media on his plane ride home, Ankara’s ideal outcome in
this crisis is for Russia to de-escalate and to agree to direct,
bilateral talks with Kyiv with a Turkish mediator. Erdogan has been
explicit and has repeatedly offered to mediate leader-to-leader talks.
He has also cast blame on the United States for mishandling the crisis
and the West, more broadly, for making it worse. Erdogan’s opinion on
the topic fits with the Zelensky government’s handling of the crisis
and Kyiv’s criticism of the West for overhyping the threat of invasion
and exacerbating Ukrainian economic woes.
The Kremlin has managed to shroud its ultimate ambitions in secrecy,
leaving outside observers to guess about the ultimate intent of a
potential military operation. Ankara has attached considerable
significance to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s potential visit to
Turkey after the Winter Olympics in Beijing and views the invitation
as part of the government’s broader effort to mediate the crisis by
engaging with both sides. This visit—should it happen—may coincide
with Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, so the trip could be
delayed or cancelled outright. In any case, one potential outcome is
that Ankara hosts a victorious war leader who would use the
leader-to-leader visit to lend credibility to the military campaign
and position Turkey to affirm a military victory, rather than find an
off-ramp to current tensions.
The broader challenge that Ankara now faces is that a large-scale
Russian operation in Ukraine will upset the fragile balance in the
Black Sea region. Turkish elites have made a series of political
decisions over the past decade that suggests Erdogan’s circle believes
that great power war is unlikely in Europe and Turkey’s near abroad.
In December 2017, Ankara has made the decision to purchase the Russian
S-400 air and missile defense system, despite being told that such
action would lead to the country’s removal from the F-35 co-production
consortium. The F-35 serves as the backbone of Western tactical air
power and was slated to serve as Turkey’s front-line fighter. Ankara
was removed from the consortium in 2019 and has since invested heavily
in comparatively low-tech (and low cost) unmanned platforms, some of
which are now partly produced in Ukraine.
A Russian invasion of Ukraine would upend Ankara’s assumption about
regional, large-scale conflict and could have a series of cascading
consequences for Turkey, ranging from negative economic effects to
increased tensions in the Black Sea. Ankara’s agreements with Kyiv
could also be at risk. If Moscow opts for regime change, it is unclear
what a pro-Russian government in Ukraine would do vis-à-vis the
aerospace agreements with Turkey. The suspension of any agreement
could have secondary effects on Turkey’s future drone development and
could even extend to its design efforts for an indigenous jet fighter.
In the past, Ankara has sought to decouple from the United States on
the purchase of aerospace products. This decision stems from Turkey’s
removal from the F-35 consortium and broader Western discomfort about
how Western-origin technological products are used in the Turkish TB2
drone in regional wars, ranging from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ethiopia.
Turkish elites have adopted an autarkic vision for the future of the
country’s defense products in order to insulate the country from
Western pressure. The relationship with Ukraine is a pillar of this
policy precisely because the country manufactures the engines that
Ankara is interested in using to power its next generation of drones.
In short, Ankara has a vested interest in retaining cordial ties with
the current government in Ukraine. If these agreements were suspended,
then Ankara would have to consider a different approach. Its
leadership could continue to invest in indigenous products, or it
could once again turn to the United States or suppliers in the West.
The Turkish government has also flirted with Russia although the
United States has promised to impose sanctions on Moscow in the event
of war, which could complicate any further Turkish-Russian
cooperation.
The Turkish-Russian relationship is multi-faceted, so Ankara faces an
equally difficult challenge in severing ties with Moscow. Ankara,
therefore, may not join the United States and Brussels in sanctioning
Russia and, instead, continue to position itself as a potential
arbiter between the two sides, even after a Russian invasion. The
tensions between Ukraine and Russia have obvious implications for
Turkish security. Ankara has ample incentives to “fence-sit” in the
near term. This policy does not preclude defense cooperation with
Ukraine, or even supporting broader NATO responses to reassure member
states and to punish Moscow for an invasion. However, it does not mean
that the United States should expect Erdogan to second U.S. actions
and seek to engage with Russia continuously, even in the event of a
conflict. The broader challenges that Ankara will face, though, are
going to be outside of its control. The scope and size of a Russian
military response depends on thinking in the Kremlin. For now, the
signs point to a large-scale offensive. The Turkish relationship with
Ukraine may, in fact, be at risk in such a scenario, and, beyond this,
the security environment in the Black Sea could degrade and negatively
impact Turkish interests. The Ukrainian-Turkish relationship is
nuanced and complicated, but it also impacts Ankara’s thinking about
its place in the world, as well as its defense relationship with the
United States.
The security situation in Turkey’s near-abroad can change rapidly and
at any moment. Ankara has few good options to manage Russian actions,
but it appears committed to trying to meet with Putin and to mediate a
solution. The Russian government, at this time, appears to have no
interest in any Turkish role. A large-scale war would test recent
Turkish elite assumptions about the future of great power conflict and
could have broader implications for the defense industry. Only time
will tell, but, at some point, Ankara may have to make broader
decisions about its future foreign policy that either risk its
relations with Moscow or strain its ties with the West.
*
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish
well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and
national security priorities.
 

Azerbaijan Walks Back Plans to Erase Armenian Traces From Churches

Moscow Times
Feb. 8, 2022
Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture has responded to controversy
resulting from its earlier announcement that it intended to erase
Armenian inscriptions from churches located in territories the country
reclaimed as a result of the 2020 war against Armenia.
On February 7, the ministry published a statement addressing what it
called "reports circulated by some biased foreign mass media outlets
over the past few days." It emphasized that "Azerbaijan has always
been respectful of its historical and cultural heritage, regardless of
religious and ethnic origin."
Four days earlier, Minister of Culture Anar Karimov told a press
briefing that it would be forming a working group tasked with removing
“the fictitious traces written by Armenians on Albanian religious
temples.”
That referred to a theory, which has become prominent in Azerbaijan
but is dismissed by mainstream historians, that Armenian inscriptions
in churches on Azerbaijani territory were later additions to churches
built under Caucasian Albania, an ancient Christian kingdom that ruled
the territory that is today Azerbaijan.
The new statement reaffirmed that "a working group has been set up to
study this heritage" and that "[s]hould any falsifications be
identified, they will be documented with the participation of
international experts and presented to the international community."
But it did not mention removing any Armenian traces, as Karimov’s
earlier announcement did.
That news had attracted widespread criticism.
"We are deeply concerned by Azerbaijan's plans to remove Armenian
Apostolic inscriptions from churches. We urge the government to
preserve and protect places of worship and other religious and
cultural sites," the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom tweeted, quoting its chair, Nadine Maenza.
TV Zvezda, a news outlet run by Russia’s Defense Ministry, published a
piece on February 8 in which it pointedly referred to the Dadivank
Monastery, in Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar region, as "one of the greatest
monasteries of medieval Armenia." A 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping
contingent is currently stationed in Karabakh. In earlier comments,
Karimov had claimed that the monastery was Albanian.
After an initial period of conspicuous silence, Armenia’s Foreign
Ministry issued a statement on February 8 condemning Karimov’s
comments: "It once again demonstrates the fact that the cases of
vandalism and destruction of the Armenian historical, cultural and
religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 44-day war and the
following period, are deliberate and pre-planned, and are part of the
policy of annihilating Nagorno-Karabakh’s indigenous Armenian
population."
The announcement occasioned widespread public anger among Armenians.
“It's time to take the government of Azerbaijan at its word when it
says it intends to erase all traces of Armenians beginning with their
churches and ancient heritage sites,” wrote Elyse Semerdjian, a
professor of Middle Eastern history at Whitman College, on Twitter.
In Azerbaijan, meanwhile, there has been near silence around the news.
Pro-government media, which in comparable cases often actively
publicizes plans announced by the government, barely covered the
announcement or responses to criticism of it. Commentators and
activists, pro-government or otherwise, devoted little attention to
it.
A rare exception was Javid Agha, a social media commentator who
researches Caucasian Albanian heritage in Azerbaijan, speculated that
the plan may have been motivated by corruption, which is endemic in
Azerbaijan.
“There is no logic behind it. No tourist will come to see barren
churches, Azerbaijanis won’t care about it, nobody will applaud the
government for it from outside. Just another excuse to write some
checks,” Agha tweeted.