Category: 2022

South China Morning Post
By Gyorgy Busztin
Feb. 7, 2022
[As Russia seeks to re-establish its Soviet-era sphere of influence
and Turkey turns towards Central Asia, their opposing interests might
soon collide
For China, Russo-Turkish tensions would destabilise Central Asia. For
South and Southeast Asia, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman drive has bigger
repercussions]
Current events have provided two instances of history repeating
itself. The first, and indisputably more dangerous, instance is the
drive by President Vladimir Putin to restore Russia to the superpower
status it enjoyed in Soviet times.
What is happening on Ukraine’s border is not about Russia feeling
threatened but about Moscow seeking to re-establish its Soviet-era
sphere of influence. What does Russia have to fear from its neighbours
in Nato, a defensive alliance of countries that are preoccupied with
their own concerns?
To those who have followed Russian history across the centuries, this
pressure campaign is neither new nor surprising. Historically, Russia
has been obsessed with seeking access to warm seas. It succeeded in
reaching the Black Sea at the time of Catherine the Great, clinching
Crimea from its nominal suzerain, the Ottoman sultan.
But this was not enough. After occupying the entire Eurasian land mass
adjacent to its realm east of the Urals, swallowing up Turkish and
Persian vassal states and reaching the Pacific, Russia still dreamed
of ejecting the British from India, in a push to the Indian Ocean.
(Thus prompting the Great Game, the British Empire’s desperate
19th-century attempt to block Russian progress south in Afghanistan).
To keep Russia at arm’s length from the Mediterranean, England, France
and Turkey fought the bloody Crimean war.
Then came the Russian expansion into the Balkans, which pitted St.
Petersburg against two great powers of the age, the Austro-Hungarian
empire and Ottoman Turkey. The first of the two conflicts was
temporarily defused by the Congress of Berlin, which delineated the
spheres of influence of both empires.
But Russia found it difficult to abide by these arrangements and
stoked pan-Slav nationalism to grab more influence, leading eventually
to the pistol shots in Sarajevo, and the first world war.
Meanwhile, Russia’s conflict with Turkey kept brewing. It had
successfully pushed the Ottomans from their Balkan dependencies by the
last quarter of the 19th century. That the nations freed from Ottoman
rule were soon at each other’s throats (in the first and second Balkan
wars) mattered little.
What mattered was Russia’s drive to end the Turkish presence in the
Balkans altogether, by aiming to take hold of Istanbul, which it
referred to as Constantinople. Thus emerged the antagonism that
eventually pushed Turkey into the arms of Germany and Austria-Hungary
in the first world war, with catastrophic consequences for the Ottoman
Empire.
The second development, related to the first, is Turkey’s loud support
of Ukraine. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan travelled to Kyiv on
February 3 to announce a deal to send its highly-regarded drones to
the beleaguered nation.
For good measure, he used a phrase loaded with symbolism since
Ukraine’s troubles with Russia began in 2014: “Glory to Ukraine!” That
Turkey, a Nato member that has cosied up to Russia in recent years –
despite the anger this has aroused in its other ally, the United
States – has made clear which side it is on might surprise some.
But for those who remember the past, the reasons are clear. Both
Russia and Turkey are embarking on relentless drives to be great again
on the world stage. In the case of Russia, the driving force is what
Lenin condemned as “Great Russian chauvinism”, bolstered by military
might and hydrocarbon resources.
For Turkey, the European Union’s refusal to admit it to what Ankara
sees as a “Christian club” has motivated Erdogan to go it alone and
swap a European identity for one rooted in its glorious past. This has
seen it make a decisive turn towards the Turkic nations of Central
Asia and a claim to kinship.
All would be well if these ambitions have been playing out in opposite
corners of the world. But Russia and Turkey are neighbours, and the
risks of them colliding are increasing. They have opposing interests
in the Caucasus. Their spheres of influence overlap and breed
contradictions in Central Asia.
Their differences are manifest with respect to the GUAM countries
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), independent states
threatened by Russian expansion, but which Turkey resolutely stands
by.
The short but bloody war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in
Nagorno-Karabakh last year brought Russo-Turkish tensions to the
surface, as both backed opposing sides – a situation similar to that
in Syria and Libya, and now Ukraine.
For us in Asia, the Russian push for rejuvenation seems remote.
Turkey’s drive, on the other hand, is taking place in our backyard.
The history that binds them, however, should interest even the casual
observer.
The world is rife with inherited tensions that can easily be
channelled to feed new conflicts. Conflicting nationalisms – Russian
Orthodox neo-imperialism here, Turkish neo-Ottomanism there – fall
into this category, even if the risk of tensions spilling over remain
remote.
For China, protracted Russo-Turkish tensions would destabilise Central
Asia. For those further south, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman drive has bigger
repercussions.
For many South and Southeast Asian countries with Muslim populations –
Malaysia foremost among them – Turkey remains a beacon and a model for
how Islam can fuse with modernity. It is no secret that it is vying
with the other Muslim axes – chiefly those led by Saudi Arabia, and
Iran – for leadership of the Islamic world.
A Muslim nation standing up to a European power will no doubt be
applauded in this region, giving the political Islam which Ankara
champions a fillip, and boosting the neo-Ottoman drive.
The 64,000-dollar question for those watching history repeating itself
is this: have the lessons of their bloody pasts been learned by Moscow
and Ankara?
*
Dr Gyorgy Busztin is a visiting research professor at the Middle East
Institute of the National University of Singapore. A career diplomat,
he served as Hungary’s Ambassador to Indonesia and Iran, among other
postings
 

AL-Monitor
[War would bring Turkey under intense pressure from its Western allies
to join putative sanctions against Russia, a critical trading partner
and supplier of natural gas.]
By Amberin Zaman
Feb. 7, 2022
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Feb. 3 meeting with his
counterpart Volodymr Zelensky in Ukraine yielded a string of accords
aimed at deepening economic and military ties between Ankara and Kyiv
and significantly raising the stakes for both sides should Russia
attack the former Soviet state.
Russian land and naval forces remain massed around Ukraine as Western
leaders scramble to find a diplomatic solution to defuse the crisis.
Erdogan has offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine and for good
reason.
War would bring Turkey under intense pressure from its Western allies
to join putative sanctions against Russia, a critical trading partner
and supplier of natural gas. Turkey will do its best to remain
neutral, as signaled anew by Erdogan in comments to reporters en route
home from Kyiv. He accused Western governments of making the
Ukraine-Russia crisis “worse” and rued the absence of former German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, long accused of appeasing the Kremlin. He
said Europe was suffering “serious issues at the leadership level”
after her departure. US President Joe Biden had failed to “demonstrate
a positive approach,” he added.
His comments echoed Moscow’s accusations that the United States and
NATO are escalating tensions including through their deployment of
additional troops to eastern Europe and continued arms deliveries to
Ukraine. Many believe Erdogan’s comments are meant in part to assuage
Moscow over Turkey’s sale of combat drones and other military
equipment. During Erdogan’s visit the Black Sea allies agreed to
jointly produce Bayraktar TB2 combat drones in Ukraine and build a
maintenance and training center for operators alongside the planned
facility.
Ukraine has bought at least 20 drones from Turkey since 2018 and has
used one only once in combat against Russian-backed separatists in
Donbass in October 2021, eliciting growls from Moscow.
However, Turkey’s worries go beyond having to balance its NATO
commitments with Russia, a key economic partner and since 2016
security partner in Syria. An actual war could have crippling
consequences for Turkey’s battered economy.
The national currency, the lira, shed 44% of its value last year and
spiraling inflation hit an annual 48.69%, the highest in two decades,
according to official data released on Feb. 3.
Sharp hikes in utilities, notably electricity, have unleashed a wave
of protests across the country amid power shortages and blackouts in
major cities.
“Commodity prices, particularly oil and gas, are a lead indicator for
inflation and Turkey has struggled even without these headwinds due to
the government’s eccentric policies regarding interest rates,” said a
London-based banker who closely monitors Turkey. The banker, who
requested anonymity, was referring to Erdogan’s stubborn refusal to
raise interest rates based on the idea that it would fuel inflation,
while most economists hold that the opposite is true.
“A Russian incursion or, worse still, a full-scale invasion,” the
banker said, “would add further price pressure on commodity inputs,
which would only spur more inflation.”
It was not surprising, the banker noted, that some Western banks were
forecasting that the Turkish lira would slump to 20 to the dollar or
even lower this year, “with the myriad of dangers that lie ahead and
with Erdogan being seen to have played his last card on linkage of
Turkish lira deposits to US dollar rates last year."
Under the scheme, the state compensates Turkish lira depositors for
any loss incurred by a drop in the national currency that exceeds the
deposit rates paid by their banks. Since its December launch, the lira
has stabilized at around 13.5 to the dollar but would likely melt anew
in the event of a Russian invasion.
According to data published Monday, Turkey’s Central Bank sold its
state-run energy importer, BOTAS, a record $4.15 billion in foreign
currencies in January alone. The trade deficit, in turn, soared to a
decade high of $10.44 billion, a year-on-year increase of more than
240%, largely due to ballooning energy imports.
In Ukraine, Turkey’s flourishing defense cooperation would likely
suffer in a Russian attack as well. Motor Sich, one of the world’s
largest manufacturers of engines for airplanes and helicopters, has
been supplying engines for the Turkish drones along with Ivchenko
Progress, a stated-owned Ukrainian company, since 2020. That is when
the US Congress began blocking military sales to Turkey over its
acquisition of Russian-made S-400s and Canada over the use of Turkish
drones against Armenia in support of Azerbaijan. Experts reckon that
Ukraine’s defense industry would be an obvious target for Russian
forces.
In the event of a full-scale invasion by Russia, “defense industry
facilities as well strategic industrial and infrastructure elements
would be primary targets for the Russian military," independent
defense analyst Arda Mevlutoglu observed in the most recent issue of
the Ankara-based weekly English-language Anka Review. "The destruction
of manufacturing facilities as well as the loss of skilled personnel
would deal a devastating blow to the Ukrainian defense industry as
well as to Turkish defense projects."
“Developing defense industry relations between Kyiv and Ankara should
not be perceived as a direct threat by Moscow. However, Turkey’s
possible increase influence and activity in Ukraine would be an
undesirable outcome for Russians,” Mevlutoglu told Al-Monitor. “It’s
also a fact Russia puts great emphasis on cyber and electronic warfare
operations. Based on these premises, there is considerable risk that
Russia might conduct kinetic and/or cyberattacks on Ukraine’s defense
industry base, which in turn would affect the supply of products to
Turkey.”
Recent deals between Turkey and Ukraine include the supply of gas
turbines for Turkish-designed naval vessels by Ukraine’s Zorya
Mashproekt. Ukraine has ordered four of the MilGem class corvettes for
itself.
Tourism, which Erdogan is banking on to help with an economic recovery
ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections that are scheduled
to be held by 2023, is also at risk.
In the event of war, Russian tourists may well continue to flock to
the Turkish coast this summer. But what of the millions of Ukrainians
who jostle with them on Turkey’s Mediterranean beaches? Will they want
to share the same space?
When Russian President Vladimir Putin banned chartered flights to
Turkey in retaliation for its shooting down of a Russian air force jet
over Syrian skies in November 2015, many Ukrainians were delighted.
“We had a perfect time, no Russian tourists in Turkish hotels,”
recalled Yevgeniya Gaber, a leading Ukrainian scholar of Turkish
affairs and a senior fellow at Carleton University’s Center of Modern
Turkish Studies.
As for Erdogan’s chances of brokering peace between Zelensky and
Putin, they are pretty slim, Gaber predicted. Putin’s planned official
visit to Turkey, which the Kremlin said would take place after the
Beijing Olympics though it gave no date, is more about “testing the
waters, seeing how far Turkey can accommodate Russia in its standoff
with Ukraine and who can compromise on what,” and not about
acquiescing to Erdogan’s proposal to mediate, Gaber told Al-Monitor.
At best, Turkey can provide the two sides with “an optional diplomatic
channel of communication” through which their respective messages are
relayed.