Category: 2022

The construction of a new 32-km-long highway bypassing Azerbaijan’s liberated Lachin city is underway, the State Agency for Automobile Roads reported on April 21.

Under the project, the carriageway will be 7 meters wide, the roadbed will be 12 meters, and the shoulder sections will be equal to 5 meters in total (2×2.5), the report added.

The construction of the roadbed, as well as artificial facilities is underway, the state agency underlined.

Unsuitable soil and vegetation are being excavated in accordance with the “Construction Norms and Standards” in order to expand the roadbed. Special equipment is being used to widen and profile the road, and a new landfill is being constructed.

The construction of circular pipes and various artificial structures is also underway to ensure the transfer of water along the road, which passes through difficult terrain.

In this regard, the construction of a 139.5-m-long 4-span bridge on the 22nd km of the road is nearing completion.

The new highway is being built in accordance with the established timetable and technological sequence under the supervision of the State Agency for Automobile Roads.

The necessary forces have been mobilized in the area in order to finish the construction work this year.

One of the most important aspects of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh rehabilitation plan is the reconstruction of road infrastructure.

All roads in the territory of the Karabakh and East Zangazur economic regions are designed to bypass large settlements, ensuring the comfort of both residents and road users.

The construction of a new route bypassing Lachin was agreed upon in a trilateral agreement signed on November 10, 2020, by the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian leaders following Azerbaijan’s victory in a 44-day war over Armenia. The new road was conceived as an alternative to the Lachin corridor, which connects Karabakh with Armenia and is controlled by Russian peacekeepers temporarily stationed in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region. 

By Orkhan Amashov

After the 2020 ceasefire deal, Baku has successfully managed to take the subject of the Karabakh Armenians off the negotiation table. Originally, the mandate to address the issue was vested with the OSCE Minsk Group, which is no longer capable of activity, and is currently being dismantled or rather disintegrated. The trilateral formats mediated by Moscow and Brussels are mostly focused on the Azerbaijani-Armenian interstate peace agenda, at least, for now.

Prior to the Second Karabakh War, Yerevan fancied itself as a guarantor of Karabakh Armenians. Upon the signing of the 2020 ceasefire deal that ended the campaign, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government was no longer in a position to entertain this idea. 

Baku always viewed the then-ongoing conflict from the prism of its territorial integrity, and distinguished the Armenian inhabitants of the region from the illegal separatist entity based there. 

The former have always been viewed as Azerbaijani citizens, and in that sense, relations with them is an internal issue for Baku. Whereas the illegal entity based in Khankandi, by virtue of its genesis, is the intrusive element, and thus must be dispelled. 

Now we have the situation in which Baku is firmly and unequivocally of the opinion that the conflict is over, and the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process has, in a sense, moved into the domain of interstate relations, focusing on the issues pertaining to the opening of communication links, border delimitation and demarcation and humanitarian subjects.

Baku’s emphasis on the “conflict being over” is not a mere rhetorical device, but also a considered opinion and negotiating position within the post-conflict normalisation process. The crux of the whole matter is that the cause of the conflict – the status of the former Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast – is no longer on the agenda.  

In Azerbaijani diplomatic parlance, the term “status” used in relation to the mountainous part of Karabakh has become undesirable, and the discourse shifted into the cultural rights of the Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh. The Armenian government still employs the term, albeit in a different sense, somewhat detached from its territorial dimension, linked mostly with the people. In this vein, the parties are slowly approaching a framework, within the confines of which a sensible discussion on substantive issues could take place.

Demise of mandate holder

The ultimate fate of Karabakh Armenians remains an issue in relation to which exhausting and detailed arrangements are yet unknown. The OSCE Minsk Group, whose duty it was to coordinate the negotiations around this theme, despite being formally in existence, is no longer an institution to be reckoned with, for it is no longer capable of contributing to anything.

As far as one can tell, at present, it is being disintegrated. The co-chair countries have an option of appointing their special representatives – the U.S. and Russia have already followed this pattern. Washington has sent Andrew Schofer to the region, in the capacity of Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations. Moscow appointed Igor Khovaev as a special representative for the Azerbaijani-Armenian normalisation process. In other words, those who were formerly co-chairs now are special representatives, and the institute of co-chairmanship is out of the question.

In the case of France, by all appearances, the EU has replaced it on the international stage, which was in many ways a logical step, as the inclusion of Paris within the process in 1997 was aimed at ensuring European representation. However, the pro-Armenian political rhetoric emanating from the Élysée Palace has rendered it a spent force.

In a functional sense, subsequent to the 2020 ceasefire deal, one multilateral OSCE format was replaced with two separate platforms mediated by Moscow and Brussels, and the U.S. has, to a certain extent, lost its clout over the process, as there is no specific Washington-mediated format.

Where do we stand now?

The specific nature of the present state of the affairs is that the conflict is over, and the cause that was at its heart, has been removed, but not everything is dusted and done. In addition to the issues falling strictly within the interstate domain, there are some leftover matters pertaining to the Armenian inhabitants of the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan that are to be addressed.

Yerevan has by now understood that the jurisdiction over the territory inhabited by Karabakhi Armenians should rest with Azerbaijan. In Pashinyan’s words, the status is no longer an object, but a method to guarantee the security and rights of the population in question. Yerevan’s official line is largely centred upon ensuring the physical presence of the Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh.

Since, by virtue of its military and diplomatic triumph, it is Baku that happens to be the driving force of the peace process, it is vital that the Azerbaijani government’s red lines and the progress made in the context of Armenian acquiescence are properly understood.

The central question here is what Baku may offer in return for Armenian recognition of Azerbaijani territorial integrity. There is no clear answer to this question, as far as one can tell. But Baku has a principled vision on an exclusionary basis. Neither status nor an administrative entity inside Azerbaijan with an explicit Armenian character could be contemplated. Nothing that could be deemed as remotely militating against the victor’s territorial integrity and unitary governance system will be touched with a barge pole.

Prior to the Second Karabakh War, Baku was content with keeping the old administrative division of the region on a formal level. In July 2021, two units – Karabakh and the East Zangazur Economic Regions – were created in the liberated lands, with the former’s geographic scope being inclusive of the territories which are currently under the temporary zone of influence of the Russian peacekeepers. In other words, Baku has made its intentions clear in advance.

No space seems to have been left for territorial Armenian autonomy inside Karabakh. It may not be as simple as that. The foundations of the institutional future of the region have been laid down, but the emergent administrative landscape could be altered and moulded to suit the overriding needs.

Autonomy, if one may use the term in its vaguest possible sense, if offered to the Armenian inhabitants of the region, is neither going to be political in nature nor in no way amounting to the creation of a territorially delineated structure. It may certainly be a cultural autonomy, which could generally be perceived, as a legal regime which will ensure rights of a cultural nature, by which one could surmise as rights to have Armenian schools, media and other entities.

These cultural rights are likely to be considered for the inclusion in a prospective peace deal, and accompanied with security guarantees. Whatever may emerge out of this currently nascent mode of deliberation, the future of the Karabakh Armenians will be largely centred upon the principle of their maximum integration into a wider Azerbaijani society as fully-fledged citizens, protected by guarantees concerning the protection of their separate cultural identity.  

The question as to the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians is not new. But academic literature on the subject is scarce, as the present discourse is about the post-war reality. And, as far as one can tell, the Azerbaijani government’s bespoke policy in relation to this undeniably complex subject is still very much emerging.

Since both the tempo and agenda of the process is largely dominated by Baku, and Yerevan seems to be in a position of gradually acquiescing and expecting some fundamental guarantees, the future could be understood alongside the lines of what will or may happen, or what is out of the question.

We know what the red lines are. We know the aspects that are unacceptable to Baku. We also know what Baku may agree to, in general. But what we are yet to establish is what Baku will be perfectly comfortable with and that Yerevan will finally be compelled to agree. Once we know the answer to the latter, we will also have a fair idea as to the exact nature of cultural rights and subsequent legal regime applicable to the Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh.

By Ayya Lmahamad

The first round of the French presidential election was held on April 10. The final results of the first round demonstrated that the Armenian lobby’s attempt to interfere in the elections and elect a leader more sympathetic to Armenian interests was a complete failure.

The Armenian lobby made large bets on candidates with questionable backgrounds, such as Marine Le Pen, Eric Zemmour, and Valerie Pecresse. However, the current president, Emmanuel Macron, who took first place in the first round with 27.84 percent of the vote, and the leader of the extreme right-wing National Front, Marine Le Pen, who took second place with 23.15 percent, advanced to the second round of elections.

With the announcement of the French elections, these three candidates began to make all kinds of unrealistic promises to the local Armenian diaspora, particularly regarding Karabakh. All in the name of getting their votes. Zemmour and Pecresse even decided to travel to Armenia and illegally to Azerbaijan’s Kabarakh, and Le Pen especially distinguished herself during the election campaign. She stated that it had been a long-held childhood dream of hers to see Nagorno-Karabakh rejoin Armenia. It is very interesting how she dreams of reigniting a conflict that has recently ended rather than ending wars and conflicts that are killing people.

It’s quite a strange logic for someone running for president of France to think about unrealistic Armenian fantasies but not about the French people. By the way, the French did not approve of the candidate’s behavior, and as a result, she received fewer votes than Macron.

Marine Le Pen has long been known for her Islamophobia and hatred of all Turkic peoples, as her entire ideology is based on the notion that non-Christian nations and peoples cannot be a part of European culture. She is primarily popular among conservative residents of small towns and the countryside who are upset that migrants are bringing their traditions into the traditional foundation of French society. That is why the National Front program she leads is based on limiting migration into the country and achieving the country’s exit from the EU.

France now has much more pressing issues than the Armenian lobby’s whining – social problems, and the French people tend to vote for the candidate who promises to solve them. According to pre-election polls in France, voters are concerned about a decline in the population’s standard and quality of life, religious and ethnic contradictions, an increase in the number of offenses, crime, problems with migrants and the demographic situation, and issues of social infrastructure.

Given this, the provision of food to the population ranks first among the current president Emmanuel Macron’s social promises. Macron stated during his election campaign that if re-elected, he intends to develop and implement a “food stamp program” to protect the poor and middle class from rising food prices and a new crisis. Macron’s entire attention will be focused in these areas. He’ll have to explain why he’s running for a second term.

Furthermore, unlike Le Pen, President Macron campaigned on the themes of strengthening Europe’s unity and active participation in NATO.

It is worth noting that The Economist predicts President Emmanuel Macron will win easily in the second round of the presidential election. The statistical model predicts that he will receive 74 percent of the vote, while Marine Le Pen will receive only 26 percent.

The results show that voters are not concerned with global processes or fictitious Armenian problems, but rather with France’s domestic social problems that must be addressed.

In a nutshell, the results of the first round of presidential elections revealed that Armenians have suffered another fiasco. The Armenian lobby’s hopes that the new French president will support their claims against Azerbaijan are unlikely to come true. When it comes to electing a president, ordinary French citizens want the most dignified candidate who will prioritize them.

The failure of the Armenian candidates hit the Armenian lobby hard, demonstrating that its influence is not as strong as it claims. The talk of a powerful Armenian lobby has nothing to do with reality.

By Trend

The results of the first round of the presidential election in France, questions addressed to the candidates during the debates before the first and second rounds, and the answers to these questions proved once again the non-significance of global processes for the country’s citizens and the absence of any interest in the “Armenian issue” among them, Azerbaijani expert Elchin Mirzabayli told Trend.

According to Mirzabayli, the absolute majority of the promises made in the election campaigns in both the first and second rounds of the election regard social problems, which indicates that these problems in France have reached a critical level in recent years.

“The main problem of voters in France now is the rapid rise in food prices and forecasts about their inaccessibility to middle and poor segments of the population,” he said. “Given this factor, provision of the population with food ranks in the first place among the promises on the social sphere made by the incumbent president and at the same time presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron.”

“As part of the election campaign, Macron told the France Bleu television channel that food stamps could be introduced due to the rising prices. Macron noted that in case of his re-election, he plans to develop and implement a “food stamp program” to protect the poor and middle classes from rising food prices and a new crisis,” the expert further said.

He noted that according to the results of pre-election polls in France and according to experts, voters are concerned about such issues as a decrease in the level and quality of life of the population, religious and ethnic contradictions, an increase in the number of offenses, crime, problems with migrants and the demographic situation, issues of social infrastructure.

According to him, the “Armenian issue” hasn’t been mentioned among these problems, which indicates that the Armenians living in France are only used by the political authorities as an insignificant geopolitical pretext if such a need arises.

Mirzabayli also noted that the election campaign has shown that the possibilities of the influence of the Armenian lobby in France have significantly decreased and have no significance for the country. In this context, the hopes of the Armenians regarding Anne Hidalgo and Valerie Pecresse, the candidates for the presidency of France, weren’t justified.

As the expert pointed out, this proves that talks about a “strong” Armenian lobby have nothing to do with reality, just like the “history” of Armenia, consisting of myths and legends.

The Armenian lobby, in fact, has influence only at the municipal level, but in reality, its capabilities are quite low, he said.

According to Mirzabayli, the analysis of the comments in the Armenian press and the noticeable points in the mainline of the ongoing propaganda has shown that the political leadership of Armenia, the Armenian diaspora and the lobby didn’t expect Macron to reach the second round.

“In fact, the participation of Armenians in the election campaign of these candidates was not particularly noticeable, and in the election marathon of Macron, they were not noted at all,” the expert noted.

According to him, Armenians most likely believed that Marine Le Pen and Pecresse or Hidalgo would compete in the second round.

“As for Macron, he most likely won’t be able to continue to pay much attention to the “Armenian issue”, given the concern of his voters with internal social problems, as well as the weakness and unscrupulousness of the Armenian lobby,” added Mirzabayli.

By Orkhan Amashov 

In the wake of the new phase in the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process, which is riddled with uncertainties, reciprocal mistrust and accusations as to the preconditions, the date of 24 April remains a focal point around which emotions continue to swirl incessantly. 

This is a day on which Armenians at home and abroad throw a retrospective glance at their past, replete with genuine and imagined pain, contemplate the present and think of a future, filled with imaginary successes. This is also a day on which the chances for Turkish-Armenian normalisation pass through their annual test of emotional sustainability.

Armenia is nowhere near exorcising the so-called “genocide” demon from its body. The spirit and aspirations of the nation are still moulded and driven by a hopeless desire to make the whole human race accept that what happened to the Armenian population of Eastern Anatolia during the First World War was an act of ‘genocide’, deliberately perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire.  

When the first signs of the new phase of normalisation were imparted to the general public and media in December 2021, the initial reaction was one of clear optimism, grounded on the assumptions that the circumstances were auspicious for a fresh start. That initial optimism has by no means faded away, for the conditions underpinning it are still consequential.

The key feature of the situation, which has been in slow evolution since December, is that the Karabakh obstacle that was tied to the abortive Turkish-Armenian normalisation process in 2009, has been curtailed, if not completely removed. But there are some new circumstances, which have hitherto been out of the equation. 

After the Second Karabakh War, the Zangazur corridor emerged as one of Baku’s key projects, wholeheartedly supported by Ankara and opposed by Yerevan, which sees it as an encroachment into its sovereignty. Since Turkey has made it manifestly clear that all steps will be agreed with Azerbaijan, one could expect that the Zangazur element will be integral to the process.

However, on the whole, amongst other provisions, due to Baku’s warm reception of the reconciliation, one could assume that the current process is mostly on the Turkish-Armenian front. Two aspects loom large, both of which hinge on Armenian efforts to secure worldwide recognition for the events of 1915 as so-called “genocide”.

Firstly, it is Yerevan’s phantasmagorical foreign policy ambition to make all nations under the Sun, including Turkey, accept its reinterpretation of what was undoubtedly a tragic affair, yet the idea of compelling humanity to acquiesce on this has always appeared to be a mission impossible. Secondly, Yerevan believes it should be possible to achieve progress without renouncing its territorial claims on eastern Turkey.

When it comes to actual normalisation, Armenia’s oft-stated view is that the process regarding these two issues should be set in motion without “preconditions”.

Ankara views the entire matter through the prism of sheer pragmatism. In order for diplomatic relations between the two nations to be established, inter alia, there should be mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity. Once this stage is complete, contemplations on the possible legal consequences of the so-called “Armenian genocide” will become of lesser import. Yerevan knows this, and keeps emphasising the importance of avoiding preconditions.  

The alleged “genocide” rhetoric is still central to the story of modern Armenian nationhood. Imagined glories and tragedies of the past still feed today’s toxic ambition. This will undoubtedly continue for some time. But certain things may and should change.

Some elements of the Armenian establishment have come close to recognising that there is something deeply wrong with the national psyche. Being something akin to a tin-pot little Eurasian country, Armenia has long imagined itself within an unrealistically expansive dimension, focusing on the myth of “Great Armenia”. This normalisation may induce the healthy self-appraisal of the country’s true position within the grand scheme of life and the reappreciation of its ambition. 

Not all regional actors are genuinely interested in the Turkish-Armenian thaw. Driven by different interests and priorities, the so-called sceptics share one common trait:  they have benefited from the status quo. Over the past 30 years, for example, Georgia has become a critical transport hub and a new situation may cast aspersions on its uniquely advantageous position.

Iran and Russia may have circumstantially different, but substantively similar concerns. If the normalisation attempts reach a new phase, Tehran’s energy leverage on Yerevan may substantially decrease.

Although the current phase of the process is being deliberated under the Kremlin’s auspices, and its leverage both on the normalisation in general and Yerevan is considerably potent, the Russian attitude is far away from being straightforward. Moscow has also benefited from Yerevan’s isolation, and the new opening with Turkey may curb its sway over Armenia. 

In the final analysis, for all the challenges and some of the seemingly intractable blots, this is still the most opportune time for the thaw between Ankara and Yerevan. 

The promise is fragile. But the chances for real progress are considerably greater than ever before. Special envoys have been appointed, and the geopolitics of the present time is relatively conducive to positive developments.

By Trend

Azerbaijan has created a new reality in the South Caucasus, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan – Head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration Hikmat Hajiyev said, Trend reports.

Hajiyev made the remark at a panel meeting named “Tasks facing Azerbaijani diaspora in post-Soviet period, action plan/road map” within the framework of the 5th Congress on April 22 in Shusha city.

According to him, this new reality is the peace agenda of the region, and the five-point principles prepared by Azerbaijan [within a future peace treaty] were presented to Armenia.

“If Armenia and the Armenian people want to look to the future, they must appreciate these opportunities,” he explained.

The speeches of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the 2020 second Karabakh war played a big role in preventing the information blockade, the president’s assistant said.

“In the post-Karabakh war period, the Armenian lobby continues to carry out anti-Azerbaijani campaigns,” he noted. “According to the resolution recently adopted by the European Parliament, Armenian material and cultural monuments were allegedly destroyed in the territories liberated from Armenian occupation [in the second Karabakh war].

“But why the European MPs who adopted this resolution don’t see the destroyed cultural and historical monuments of the Azerbaijani people?” Hajiyev asked.