Category: 2022

April 2022 was marked by significant developments around the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. When Russia launched a “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24, it seemed that all other post-Soviet conflicts would enter “silent mode,” as no one would care about Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. However, this was not the case, at least for Nagorno Karabakh. On April 6, 2022, the European Union organized an Armenia–Azerbaijan summit in Brussels. President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed to form a border demarcation/delimitation commission until the end of April and take concrete steps to start peace talks. The issue of border delimitation and demarcation also was among key priorities during the November 2021 Sochi meeting facilitated by Russian President Putin. However, despite the signature of the trilateral statement, no tangible moves have been made. After returning from Brussels, PM Pashinyan made a landmark speech in the Armenian Parliament. He stated that the international community offers Armenia to “reduce the threshold on Karabakh status,” which, if translated from the diplomatic language, means that Armenia should agree to see Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan with some level of autonomy. Pashinyan also argued that Armenia should sign the peace treaty with Azerbaijan as soon as possible and reiterated that Armenia accepts the five principles of the peace treaty shared by Azerbaijan. The critical message of those principles is the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, including Nagorno Karabakh, which goes in line with the idea “to reduce the threshold of status for Karabakh.”

The April 6 meeting in Brussels revealed the EU, and probably the US, approach to the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Armenia abandons its demand that Nagorno Karabakh will never be a part of Azerbaijan, while the West convinces President Aliyev to abandon his rhetoric that Nagorno Karabakh does not exist. As a mutual compromise, Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on Karabakh’s autonomy within Azerbaijan. No details are available regarding the borders of that autonomy (should it include the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region within its 1988 Soviet borders or only the territories currently under the protection of the Russian peacekeepers). There is uncertainty regarding the essence of autonomy (should it be a political-territorial unit, resembling the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijan, or only some sort of cultural autonomy in line with the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities).

Other issues remain obscure, including the citizenship of people living in that autonomy (should they have dual Armenian/Azerbaijani citizenship, or only Azerbaijani one). No details are available regarding the composition of local law enforcement bodies, the monetary system (should the deal allow circulation of both Armenian and Azerbaijani currencies), and should Azerbaijanis have the right to live in the territories currently controlled by Russian peacekeepers.

Among these uncertainties, one issue is, perhaps, clear. Suppose Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace treaty that fixes their agreement on the future status of Nagorno Karabakh. In that case, it will allow Azerbaijan and the West to demand that Russia withdraw its peacekeepers from Nagorno Karabakh either immediately or at least in November 2025. Azerbaijan and the West will immediately declare Russian troops in Nagorno Karabakh as an occupational force in case of Russian refusal. Given the complete rupture of Russia–West relations, the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno Karabakh is the primary motive for the West’s efforts to facilitate the signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This policy aligns with Russia’s containment and deterrence strategy, implemented by the US and its allies with the primary goal to weaken Russian influence in the post-Soviet space.

It is challenging to assess whether the West believes that it has the capabilities to secure the “prosperous life of Armenians within Azerbaijan” or it does not care about the fate of Karabakh Armenians. The West implements the classical “carrot and stick” policy toward Armenia. It offers increased financial and technical assistance if Armenia accepts the deal and threatens that in case of refusal, it cannot prevent Azerbaijan from launching another war against Armenia and cannot support Armenia if war starts. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan continues its policy of military blackmail against Armenia. During his April 22 speech, President Aliyev warned Armenia that this was Armenia’s last chance to make peace with Azerbaijan. If Armenia rejects recognizing Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, Baku will not recognize the territorial integrity of Armenia, opening the way for further military aggression against Yerevan.

Meanwhile, the second part of the equation, Russia, has its views on the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. The strategic goal of Russia is to have a permanent military presence in Nagorno Karabakh, and Russia understands that it needs an Armenian population (should it be currently 100,000 or even 50,000 or less is sufficient for that goal, is uncertain) there to secure this goal. Meanwhile, Russia is interested in seeing fewer tensions along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border and the line of contact in Karabakh. Russia believes that the West is pushing Azerbaijan to escalate, hoping to trigger a military clash between Russia and Azerbaijan. It will ruin Russia–Azerbaijan relations transforming Azerbaijan into another Georgia for Russia and will create tensions in Russia–Turkey relations. Meanwhile, if Russia does not answer to the growing Azerbaijani attacks against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, the West will use it to portray Russia as too weak. It remains to be seen how Russia can claim to be a global power or hope to win the war in Ukraine if the Kremlin has to swallow the humiliation by tiny Azerbaijan. 

To avoid this choice between bad and worse, Russia wants to launch and coordinate the Armenia–Azerbaijan border delimitation and demarcation process to facilitate the opening of regional communications and the start of Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations on a peace treaty. However, the West wants to see the signature of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty no later than the end of 2022 with a mutual agreement on the status of Karabakh. But Russia is not in a hurry. It believes that the complicated conflict with a history of more than 100 years cannot be finally settled during several months of negotiations.

The Armenian leadership faces a critical choice. It may accept the West’s offer and quickly sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, recognizing Nagorno Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. As the second option, Armenia may start the negotiations on different tracks (border delimitation/demarcation, restoration of communications and peace treaty) but not hurry to sign the treaty. If Armenia chooses the second option, Azerbaijan may escalate against Armenia and Karabakh. Again, Russia is not interested in large-scale escalation, but Russia cannot prevent Azerbaijan from launching an attack. So, Azerbaijan will not seek to occupy Kapan, Yerevan or Stepanakert but may launch weekly subversive actions. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, the EU and the US should understand that putting too much pressure on the current Armenian government to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan may trigger a political crisis in Armenia, resulting in a change of government. It is difficult to argue that in that scenario, the next government of Armenia will be more Western neutral or more inclined to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.  

In ANCA testimony submitted on April 26th, Government Affairs Director Tereza Yerimyan urged US House appropriators to allocate $50 million in US aid to Artsakh to help its families “rebuild their lives and resettle in safety upon their indigenous Armenian homeland.”

WASHINGTON, DC – Government Affairs Director Tereza Yerimyan outlined the Armenian National Committee of America’s (ANCA) policy priorities in testimony submitted today to the US House panel drafting the FY23 foreign aid bill – with a sharp focus on ending all US military aid to Azerbaijan and delivering an urgently needed $50 million aid package to Artsakh.

In testimony submitted to Chairwoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) and Ranking Member Hal Rogers (R-KY) of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations, Yerimyan made the case that, in the wake of Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) and amid Baku’s ongoing occupation of sovereign Armenian territory, the Congress should hold the Aliyev regime accountable by cutting off all US military aid to its armed forces. She also pressed for a long-term developmental investment in Artsakh, to help its families “rebuild their lives and resettle in safety upon their indigenous Armenian homeland.”

Speaking to the need for increased aid to Armenia, Yerimyan prioritized US aid programs aimed at materially strengthening Armenia’s security and sovereignty in the face of escalating Turkish and Azerbaijani threats.

Similar testimony will also be submitted for Senate consideration.

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The Armenian American Community & U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy
For Fiscal Year 2023

presented by
Tereza Yerimyan, Government Affairs Director
Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)

for the

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives

Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, for your strong leadership of this Subcommittee and your long history of support for the national and democratic aspirations of the Armenian nation.

In the wake of Azerbaijan’s ethnic-cleansing of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh), and amid Baku’s ongoing occupation of sovereign Armenian territory, we ask this Subcommittee to hold the Aliyev regime accountable by cutting off all U.S. military aid to its armed forces and to help meet pressing humanitarian and developmental needs in Artsakh with a robust assistance package.

As you know, both Artsakh and Armenia continue to endure the brutal consequences of the unprovoked attack launched on September 27th of 2020 by dictatorial Azerbaijan – backed by its ally Turkey – against democratic Artsakh. USAID has estimated that 90,000 Armenians have been displaced from their ancestral homes, describing their situation as an “acute humanitarian crisis.” Azerbaijan has destroyed countless homes, churches, and hospitals. It has targeted civilians, used prohibited cluster munitions and white phosphorus, illegally detained and abused Armenian prisoners of war, and continues to desecrate Armenian Christian holy sites and cemeteries. Shockingly, Azerbaijan has yet to be held to account.

Neither the Trump nor Biden administrations have investigated Turkey’s role in Azerbaijan’s aggression, including Ankara’s recruitment of jihadist mercenaries from Syria and Libya to fight against Armenians. Nor has either administration investigated reports of Turkish F-16s having been used in Azerbaijan’s attacks. Closer to home, we have yet to see either the Pentagon or Department of State look into potential violations of U.S. arms export laws related to the discovery of U.S. parts and technology in Turkish Bayraktar drones deployed by Azerbaijan against Artsakh.

Our specific requests related to the FY23 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs bill fall into three categories:

1) Aid to Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh):

Through the leadership of this Subcommittee, since Fiscal Year 1998, direct U.S. aid to Artsakh has provided its peaceful inhabitants with maternal health care, clean drinking water, and life-saving demining by the HALO Trust. In the wake of Azerbaijan’s 2020 attack, this aid program must be meaningfully expanded to meet the humanitarian and development needs confronting the families of Artsakh – estimated at well over $250,000,000 – helping them rebuild their lives and resettle in safety upon their indigenous Armenian homeland. In this spirit we ask the Subcommittee to support a long-term investment in Artsakh, and, in order to meet the most urgent needs facing Artsakh, request the following language to be included in the body of this Act:

Of the funds appropriated under this act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs not less than $50,000,000 shall be made available for global health, humanitarian, and stabilization assistance for the Armenian population in Artsakh:

Refugee Relief: $20,000,000
Housing: $10,000,000
Food Security: $5,000,000
Water/Sanitation: $5,000,000
Healthcare: $5,000,000
Rehabilitation: $3,000,000
Demining/UXO: $2,000,000

2) Azerbaijan

We remain troubled that the Administration – even in the wake of Azerbaijan’s attack on Artsakh – has chosen, recklessly and irresponsibly, to waive Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act. Compounding this error, the General Accountability Office has confirmed that the Administration has demonstrably failed to meet its statutory reporting obligations under this law.

U.S. military aid to Baku – including Section 333 (Capacity Building), Foreign Military Financing, and International Military Education and Training – should not materially add to Baku’s equipment stores, tactical abilities, and offensive capabilities, or free up its state resources for renewed cross-border action against both Artsakh and Armenia. Moving forward, the Administration should strictly enforce Section 907. Congress, for its part, should rescind the President’s authority to waive this provision of U.S. law, and enact statutory prohibitions on any new U.S. military or security aid to Azerbaijan.

We request the following language to be included in the body of this Act:

No funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan for U.S. military or security programs.

3) Armenia

Armenia – an ancient Christian nation deeply rooted in Western democratic values – has, despite the crushing economic impact of Turkish and Azerbaijani aggression and blockades, stepped forward as an ally and partner for the United States on a broad array of complex regional challenges. Armenia is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Armenian military has been among the highest per capita providers of peacekeepers to U.S.-led deployments, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Kosovo, and Mali.

Moving forward, the U.S. aid program to Armenia should focus on Armenia’s security and sovereignty. As such, we request the following language to be included in the body of this Act:

Of the funds appropriated by this Act, not less than $100,000,000 shall be made available for assistance for Armenia to support Armenia’s security and sovereignty in the face of regional threats from Turkey and Azerbaijan.

We commend the Subcommittee’s commitment to American Schools and Hospitals Abroad, and encourage continued support through this program for the American University of Armenia and the Armenian American Wellness Center. We also ask the panel to prioritize supporting Armenia’s role as a regional safe haven for at-risk refugees.

In closing, we would like to underscore, once again, our urgent calls for robust aid to Artsakh and a statutory prohibition on U.S. security or military aid to Azerbaijan.

The ANCA, as always, thanks you for your leadership and looks forward to working with the Subcommittee to help save Artsakh, defend Armenia’s sovereignty, strengthen the U.S.-Armenia alliance, and advance American interests and our shared democratic values.

FRANKLIN, Mass. — The AYF Camp Haiastan Board of Directors is pleased to announce that Nareh Mkrtschjan of Cranston, Rhode Island has been selected as the 2022 Summer Camp Director. Ani Changelian will return to AYF Camp Haiastan this summer to direct the week-long day camp for the younger children.

“We are pleased to have Nareh lead the overnight camp and Ani the day camp this summer. Their extensive knowledge and experience with the Camp and our youth will be of great benefit to the Camp,” stated Board chairman Hratch Najarian.

Nareh Mkrtschjan

Mkrtschjan has a long history with Camp Haiastan, first as a camper through the 2000s, then a  participant in Staff in Training in 2011, a camp counselor in 2012, and an Armenian school teacher from 2012 to 2014. Last spring and summer, she was the assistant to the executive director. In addition to her clerical responsibilities, Mkrtschjan worked on incoming Sundays to help with the complicated registration process due to COVID regulations.

In 2015, she traveled to Armenia with the AYF Internship Program and worked at the widely praised TUMO Center for Creative Technology. She designed and implemented the Center’s first music theory workshop, which later became a permanent course offering. Prior to her tenure at TUMO, she was a counselor at Camp Javakhk, located in the Armenian-populated region of the Republic of Georgia, (Akhalkalaki). Mkrtschjan also served on the AYF Central Executive for four years. During that time, she was the AYF representative to the AYF Camp Haiastan Board of Directors. She was a major contributor to the syllabus and resource catalog produced by the Board’s Educational Committee and helped with the implementation of the Armenian educational and cultural program. “Nareh exemplifies the AYF Camp Haiastan tradition of giving back. This position is the culmination of her two-decade-long affiliation with the Camp,” said AYF Camp Haiastan executive director Kenar Charchaflian.

In 2016, Mkrtschjan received a Bachelor of Education and Music degree from Rhode Island College.  She has been teaching violin, recorder, orchestra, chorus and other small instrumental ensembles at the Blackstone Valley Prep Elementary 1 School since 2017. Mkrtschjan also works with the Blackstone Valley Prep Upper Elementary School’s after-school band program. Ultimately, it is the interaction with the students and helping them gain an understanding and appreciation for music that she finds satisfying. “I am grateful for the opportunity extended to me by the Board of Directors. I look forward to helping create a positive, memorable experience for all of the campers and staff. We will continue the Camp’s tradition of mentoring, teaching and nurturing our youth, as well as help them develop and strengthen their Armenian identity,” said Mkrtschjan.

Ani Changelian

Changelian was the co-director of the summer program at AYF Camp Haiastan for the past three years. Prior to that position, she had served as day camp director for several years. She received her Masters in Education from the New York Institute of Technology, Downing College. Changelian lives in Bedford, Massachusetts with her husband Andrew and their two children, who have attended Camp Haiastan and served on staff. She previously worked as a kindergarten teacher at St. Stephen’s Armenian Elementary School in Watertown, MA.

A boy in Vaghatur, Syunik takes fruit trees home to plant

Armenia Tree Project’s (ATP) work at Armenia’s borders is active as ever. We are invested in supporting the residents living in these communities by providing them trees as well as engaging the local youth via our Environmental Education (EE) programs.

In Armenia’s northeastern province of Tavush, ATP’s Community Tree Planting (CTP) program has supplied trees to several border villages, including Ayrum, Bagratashen, Dovegh, Kirants, Koti, Paravakar, Voskepar, Aygepar, Chinari, Movses and Nerkin Karmir. The EE team visits the schools in many of these villages several times a year teaching classes about Armenia’s water resources, waste management, climate change and biodiversity.

Tatev Khachikyan, a principal from a border village, shares that her school is in the direct line of sight from an Azerbaijani military post on the hillside above. “Living in constant danger has made our people even more resilient and fearless,” said Khachikyan, “We want to live in peace in our mountains.”

Another border village of Tavush protects its schoolyard with thick perimeter walls. This April, in addition to providing barrier trees for more security, ATP contributed decorative trees and fruit trees to barren yards. What is not eaten fresh can be dried or made into jams and become a source of income to the school.

Leaders from another neighboring border village requested trees for the community cemetery located on the slope of a hill. Currently, villagers bury their dead under cover of darkness because the daytime is too dangerous, too exposed. ATP provided trees for perimeter use that can grow quickly to form natural barriers and mask the daily life of the community, shielding residents.

This week, ATP teams distributed apple, pear and cherry trees to families in Vaghatur and Khoznavar villages located on the border in the southern region of Syunik. Among the 110 beneficiaries who received the fruit trees were a handful of families who relocated from Artsakh after the war. Artur of Vaghatur says he was encouraged by ATP’s visit and gifts of fruit trees. Pointing to the majestic mountains, he said, “Our families remain proudly, steadfast on our land.”

ATP also distributed fruit trees in Artsakh last week. Fifty Backyard Greenhouse Program beneficiaries from Herher, Karmir Shuka, Taghavard villages and the city of Martuni, as well as villagers who showed interest, received 1,200 fruit trees for their personal gardens. 

In July, ATP’s EE team will host a camp for the children and youth of the border villages from Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat and Syunik regions. There are plans underway for the children of Artsakh as well, including a summer camp for the children of Stepanakert, Askeran and Martuni.

ATP’s Eco-Clubs put environmental education into action. Eco Clubs are operating in villages in Ararat and Gegharkunik that unfortunately feel the constant presence of danger. Eco Club programs strengthen the environmental spirit of Armenian youth while teaching leadership skills. The environmentally friendly projects also build self-esteem and pride in the community, which impact their will to remain in their village.

The tenacious wish of families living in these border villages is to simply live their daily lives in peace and on their land. ATP’s commitment to Armenian youth and border communities have multiple effects on the protection of the land and the people, today and into the future.