Category: 2022

By David Davidian

The following fictional Red Cell scenario is intended to stimulate alternative thinking and challenge conventional wisdom, tying together events in operational fiction with national realities.

The goal was to ensure there was no chance of an accidental activation of Armenia’s Samson Option.  After all, there is no way of reversing the effects of detonating Armenia’s Metsamor Nuclear Power Station (NPP) operating at full power. The Samson Option refers to the strategy whereby Israel would launch a massive nuclear retaliatory strike if the state itself was being overrun, just as the Biblical figure Samson is said to have pushed apart the pillars of a Philistine temple, bringing down the roof and killing himself and thousands of Philistines who had gathered to see him humiliated. 

An Armenian Samson Option would be the absolute last-ditch effort to deter capturing and eliminating what remains of the Armenian homeland and its people. Suppose an enemy of Armenia plans on attacking Armenia, destroying or cleansing its population and what remains of its culture. In that case, it will be met with so much radioactive contamination and fallout that the enemy will surely think hard about destroying what remains of Armenia and capturing its land. What remains of Armenia and surrounding lands will be uninhabitable for centuries. Armenia’s enemies are just outside of Armenian borders, and the radioactive contamination carried by prevailing atmospheric conditions will wreak havoc on them to such an extent as to make the Chernobyl nuclear disaster look insignificant. Chernobyl was due to blatant human error. Armenia’s Samson Option will be planned for maximum effect. 

Armenians either live on what remains of their once vast homeland, or nobody does. Two-thirds of Armenians in Asia Minor were exterminated in the 1915 Turkish genocide of the Armenians, with their lands carved up between Turkey and the Soviet Union. This genocide extended into lands outside of Turkish borders into Persia, Tsarist Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Armenian history is tragic, but the Armenians have decided to write their own epilogue. Is this option ethical? It is just as ethical as the Cold War nuclear standoff with the United States and the Soviet Union armed with almost 60,000 nuclear warheads, enough to destroy all life on earth hundreds of times over. That was tolerated. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Serbia, and Ukraine have all been justified, with many hundreds of thousands of innocent people murdered. All these actions were planned, justified and tolerated. The Armenian Samson Option is no different than any of these post-WWII examples of acceptable human behavior. The Armenians were finally serious and made friends with horror.

After a diasporan conglomerate purchased Armenia’s Metsamor NPP from Rosatom and the international intrigue died down after the theft of its spent nuclear fuel, ‘The Division’ was still looking for the twenty-four spent fuel assemblies that were unaccounted for in the aftermath of this heist. The Division was the moniker for Armenia’s National Security Services (NSS) branch that dealt with integrating advanced technologies in the country and investigating high-technology crimes. A new level of state security clearance was added to the existing Confidential, Top Secret, Of Special Importance levels. This new level was called the Black Level (BL). Anybody with a BL clearance doesn’t have much of a life, has a high IQ, and is highly multi-disciplined. A BL cleared individual undergoes periodic reinvestigation and, counter to its ancient Soviet-era counterpart, is mandated to independently undertake the most critical operational decisions. It is no surprise that those at this security level are neither married nor have a family. Armenia’s NSS was transformed from a top-down organization to something horizontal with constant checks and balances.

Armenia’s geopolitical situation is one where it cannot afford to make any strategic mistakes. BL’s overarching function was the continued updating and implementation of Armenia’s Grand National Strategy. BL operatives enabled the implementation of Armenia’s Samson Option. BL was crucial in planting targeted individuals in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its agents accompanied sanctioned IAEA inspections of the Metsamor NPP. Within BL’s charter was an active program to create and gather “kompromat” on foreign leaders of importance to Armenia’s national security.

Five issues had to be overcome to successfully design Armenia’s Samson Option, each with its challenges:

1) Secrecy.

2) Placing nano-thermite and a new experimental high explosive bis(1,2,4-oxadiazole)bis(methylene) dinitrate, or BOM for short, in strategic locations in Metsamor NPP’s infrastructure. This was the best performance per unit volume explosive available.

3) Ensuring there is no chance of a self-detonation (such as with nuclear weapons), being disabled or detonated by an enemy EMP class of weapon.

4) Addressing the diplomatic fallout upon the “denial of such capability.”

5) Purging, co-opting, or compromising spies.

The detonation was accomplished with three independent circuits, each with digital controllers that, even before power was applied (a combination of line and battery backup) to the networked detonators, each ran a diagnostic on the detonator side. A result code was sent to The Division headquarters and several undisclosed locations, each with different transport mechanisms. The diagnostics ran on an average of once every hour. In reality, they ran randomly to avoid prediction. This redundancy was to ensure that it would work in case of a planned or auto-enabled detonation, with the chance of an accidental detonation being effectively zero. Months of testing were performed in a mock reactor building, including developing techniques for insulating detonators circuits from high temperatures in many vital locations.

Of course, autonomous systems would take over the detonation of Metsomor given an incapacitated state apparatus. This capability used a combination of social media, radio and electronic monitoring, AI algorithms, and the combination of several layers of redundancies, each based on mutually exclusive information. Several redundant systems connected The Division’s headquarters with the Metsamor NPP, including a human to press the final button inside Metsamor if all else failed. The NSS BL had nearly unfettered access to Metsamor and performed periodic and unannounced security inspections due to the heist of spent fuel. It was the perfect cover to place explosives, detonation components, and their networking.

Explosive devices would be planted and disguised, while others physically placed at the last minute. Some devices would be robotically placed, especially those near Metsamor’s VVER-440-230’s reactor vessel. Metsamor’s spent fuel heist allowed Armenia’s NSS special access to the refueling cranes, pullies, and rails. Suicide drones (UAVs) would also be used to ensure maximum destruction of Metsamor NPP’s cooling infrastructure and reactor building as a backup mechanism if something prevented either manual or auto-destruction of Metsamor. Specific details of the interaction of these and other redundancies were not available at the time of this writing.

The map below details the extent of nuclear contamination that would result from an accident at the Metsamor NPP. Ironically, it comes from a Turkish study. The effects of the destruction of Metsamor would be many times more devastating due to its planned optimization.

Projected Trajectories of Radioactive Contamination from a Metsamor NPP Accident Over a Period of Thirty Years. The dot shows the location of the Metsamor NPP.

BL and NSS agents with specific scientific backgrounds slowly secured positions within the Metsamor NPP, as many of those who worked at the NPP were purposely offered well-paid jobs outside of the NPP. 

During periodic NSS inspections of the Metsamor NPP, the best locations to place explosives were determined. It was not as difficult as one might expect. Primary systems were targeted, but what is known as a “secondary cooling contour” needed to be taken out. However, as difficult as it may be for some policymakers, some of these systems must not be entirely disabled. Their partial operation would contribute to more geographically dispersed radioactive contamination. In other words, planners had to optimize the destruction of the Metsamor NPP for maximum effect. In addition, a special operation was planned for what remained in the Metsamor’s spent fuel pool. BL planned to raise the reactor’s control rods to their maximum height without sounding alarms and overcoming mechanical safety features. This procedure would immediately increase the temperature of the reactor core, raising the pressure of the already superheated steam and begin the process of mechanically deforming the fuel assemblies. When the control rods are fully inserted, the reactor shuts down but is still hot. If the rods are fully extracted the reactor becomes supercritical (how supercritical depends mainly on the average age of the fuel) accompanied by an immediate spike in heat generation. Any mechanical deformation of the fuel assemblies would interfere with using gravity to drop the control rods into the fuel, typically putting the reactor in a sub-critical condition. Computer simulations are still ongoing, but this supercritical operation would have to be accomplished at the maximum speed the rods could be withdrawn, which was never designed to be fast. Even if this supercritical plan were impossible, the explosives would fulfill Samson’s goal. In any case, adding complexity to an already challenging operation is never desirable. Slowly and methodically devices were planted at specific locations through the Metsamor’s VVER-440-230 reactor infrastructure during the various security inspections performed by a specialist from NSS’s BL team. A classic positioning of explosive devices was done during the upgrading of the scores of temperature and pressure sensors scattered around reactor vessels, pumps, stream generators, etc. See accompanied layout of a VVER-440 Model 230 plant.

Not only did state-of-the-art enhanced sensor technology make operators in the control room happy, but because the mandated upgrade to the Metsamor NPP required external monitoring of vital system parameters, the NSS utilized miniature sensors within the same or slightly larger sensor units with the extra space filled with explosives, nano-thermite, digital controllers, detonators and networking hardware. Over eighty sensors were eventually “upgraded.” Of particular concern was the control rod positioning motors to prevent a gravity drop of the control rods, even if the plant to extract the rods could not be accomplished. A unique procedure was used near the control units and actuators for the control rods to at least keep them in their current positions, as the rest of the plant was destroyed. Finally, the BOM chemical explosives and nano-thermite were placed near the base of the reactor vessel, ensuring an atmospheric exposure to the fuel assemblies. Computer simulations would determine each sub-system’s detonation order and relative explosive intensity. Any nuclear engineer would know that destroying all six primary cooling loops and emergency cooling would be the minimum required while disabling control rod insertion to achieve Armenian’s Samson Option.

A Generic Diagram of a Russian VVER Nuclear Reactor

For millennia, it has been claimed that battles are won on the ground, but wars by diplomats. It took several years to replace Armenia’s business-centric, oligarch-serving diplomatic corps with one that enabled business and economic ties with the world while serving the interests of Armenian sovereignty. The former is not a guarantee of the latter, as was demonstrated through a generation beginning in 1991 when Armenia declared independence from the Soviet Union.

Armenia was somewhat irrelevant on the international scene. The prevailing thought was that the bullies would ignore you if you hid in the schoolyard of international relations. History has demonstrated such a myopic position is short-lived.  However, in stark contrast to past follies and naïve ideas about geopolitics, Armenia’s diplomats were now well prepared for what was to be an unprecedented global situation. Israel’s Samson Option was offensive – if you engage in our destruction, you will be destroyed with nuclear weapons with multiple delivery systems. Armenia’s Samson Option was defensive. If you engage in the destruction of Armenia, not only will Armenia be inaccessible for centuries, but most of the land area in a 1500 km radius will be heavily contaminated, and delayed cancer deaths from radiation would number nearly a hundred million. 

Rumors began to leak out about Armenia’s Samson Option, especially after the Metsamor NPP was declared a military facility. The international community demanded inspection as they did just after Metsamor’s spent fuel heist. It turned out to be a game of cat and mouse until Armenian diplomacy used the limited “kompromat” provided by the NSS BL. The Armenian diaspora learned much about such techniques in the aftermath of the Jeffrey Epstein affair. By offering sexual exploits on his private island to influential people and world leaders, Epstein had an enormous amount of damaging, embarrassing, and compromising (kompromat) information on powerful people and world leaders.

The developing synergy between the NSS and select disciplines available in the diaspora allowed the BL to purchase kompromat on a few regional leaders. This kompromat was used in diplomatic meetings demanded by Armenia’s existential enemies. The regional rhetoric died down rather quickly since it was not clear just how much kompromat was in the hands of the Armenian diplomatic corps. This was similar to Imperial Japan’s problem after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan had no idea how many atomic bombs were in the US arsenal. The US only had two more! How much more kompromat did Armenia have? Nobody would take the chance to find out. Armenia learned fast to use this newly acquired sovereignty projection to influence policies in neighboring countries as it set null and void all previous alliances, both military and economic.

Armenian authorities knew there would be immediate plans drawn up to “secure” Metsamor along the lines that would be used (by the US, Israel and India) to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if that country went rogue or its weapons fell in the hands of sub-state actors. Secret negotiations took place between Armenia and individual members of the UN Security Council and regional powers. Each agreement was as unique as Armenia’s Samson Option. Internationally, however, states with nuclear power plants signed a new agreement where each would declare their nuclear power plants weapons of mass destruction. Every state with nuclear power plants signed that agreement – except Armenia.

Yerevan, Armenia

Author: David Davidian (Lecturer at the American University of Armenia. He has spent over a decade in technical intelligence analysis at major high technology firms. He resides in Yerevan, Armenia

https://wgi.world/armenia-s-samson-option-a-fictitious-scenario/ 

Armenian Version

IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) – Iran

Tehran, IRNA – Iran Minister of Transport and Urban Development Rostam Ghasemi in a meeting with Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of the Republic of Armenia Gnel Sanosyan on Monday discussed the details of bilateral transit cooperation and joint infrastructural projects.

 

The Ukrainian crisis has prompted many initiatives in the international arena and the situation in the South Caucasus is one of them.
One chapter of the South Caucasus file is Russia’s relations with Georgia or its fait accompli to declare Georgia’s two autonomous republics — Abkhazia and South Ossetia — independent. Russia is not likely to backpedal from these initiatives unless there is a tectonic change in the region. On the contrary, it may continue to press more countries to recognize the independence of the two autonomous republics. It may be aiming at a scenario in which these two republics will seek to join the Russian Federation as it now is planning to do for Donetsk and Luhansk. Georgia is reluctant to become part of cooperation among three South Caucasus countries — Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, because of Russia’s involvement in the initiative.
The second chapter is Georgia’s interest in becoming a member of the EU and, if possible, of NATO. Russia acquiesced without much resistance to Ukraine’s EU membership, so we may conclude that it may not strongly oppose Georgia’s EU membership either. However, NATO membership is a more sensitive issue. It will probably raise stronger objections to Georgia’s NATO membership. It may do so even if it emerges weaker from the Ukrainian crisis.
Because of the Ukrainian crisis, Sweden and Finland have become uneasy about Russia’s interest in expanding its zone of influence. Moscow is already active in Transnistria and Moldova. These countries have every reason to be worried. We will see the ultimate outcome if and when a new defense architecture is worked out in Europe.
The third chapter in the South Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh. While Turkey is not part of the South Caucasus, it is part of the regional security architecture because of its close relations with Azerbaijan.
Russia was and still is to a large extent the game-maker in the South Caucasus, but it may have moved this question to the backburner, because most of its energy is being absorbed by the Ukrainian crisis.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continue to work on a framework initiated by Putin. It would become a good precedent if they could continue this pattern without Putin’s supervision or intervention.

Despite goodwill on all sides, stabilization in the South Caucasus may not be expected soon.

Yasar Yakis

Azerbaijan and Armenia do not agree on all issues, but their leaders give positive signals. A contention with roots going back centuries may not be solved easily. Putin has laid the foundations for negotiations by persuading the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. He did this to keep the situation in the Caucasus under Russia’s control. There may be pitfalls on the road, but reasonable decision-makers on both sides seem to be aware that if the present negotiations derail, they may grind to a halt. Bearing in mind the uncertainties created by the Ukrainian crisis, it would be difficult to foretell where the present Azerbaijani-Armenian efforts will lead.
The Artsakh (Karabakh) lobby is influential in Armenia’s domestic politics. It is composed of far-right nationalist Armenians who seek to annex Karabakh to Armenia, whereas if a stable administration could be established in Karabakh, Armenians may benefit from oil-rich Azerbaijan’s economic resources in their capacity as full-fledged citizens of Azerbaijan.
The fourth chapter of the South Caucasus file is the relations between Turkey and Armenia. Armenians and Turks have lived in the same geographical area for more than 1,000 years. There is a high degree of appreciation for Armenians among the Turks. They enjoyed similar fortunes and faced similar hardships. They helped each other in difficult times.
After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Turkey was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to Armenia — together with Azerbaijan and Georgia. It sent humanitarian assistance to Armenia and invited it to join as a founding member of the newly established Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.
After Armenia’s occupation in 1993 of the autonomous Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, Turkey closed its borders with Armenia. There were several attempts to mend relations between the two countries. On Oct. 10, 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed a protocol to establish diplomatic relations and open the borders. The Armenian church and Armenian nationalist political parties reacted against the protocol and the Armenian government had to refrain from submitting the protocol to parliamentary approval. Therefore, the protocol remained a dead letter.
Pashinyan sees the advantages of normalization with Turkey. The 2009 attempt at reconciliation failed for emotional reasons. Turkey had not taken Azerbaijan on board before embarking on a rapprochement with Armenia. This time, Ankara is closely coordinating with Baku, but this does not mean that it may not fail again for other reasons. Irrelevant third parties may step in and spoil the process.
Despite goodwill on all sides, stabilization in the South Caucasus may not be expected soon.

• Yasar Yakis is a former foreign minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling AK Party.

 

“The problem is not new. Armenia has raised and discussed it many times in a working order. This issue needs further discussion. The issue of rapid response is important for Armenia. As you know, last year these days the Azerbaijani army infiltrated into the sovereign territory of Armenia. Armenia applied to the CSTO for the use of mechanisms envisaged by crisis response procedure.

 

Unfortunately, the organization’s response was not the one Armenia had expected. Also for a long time we were raising the issue of CSTO member states selling weapons to the countries unfriendly to Armenia and used against Armenia. The response of the CSTO member states during and after the 44-day war in 2020 did not make Armenia and the Armenian people very pleased,” he said.