Category: 2022

By Orkhan Amashov

Finally, after two weeks of vacillation and tasteless shilly-shallying in the form of less than crafty stonewalling, Yerevan has published its six-point offer, first alluded to on 5 May by Armen Gregorian, the Secretary of the Armenian National Security Council.

And what is this? To be brief, nothing but a reaffirmation of the old in its regressive mores. Since the document, the full content of which was revealed by Ambassador-at-Large Edmon Marukyan on 14 May, entails a minimum of two inadmissible points from the perspective of Baku, it is effectively a counter-offer, not a complementary list of considerations, as originally purported by Yerevan.

In a nutshell, the Armenian government still sticks to the formula whereby it claims to have no territorial pretensions on Azerbaijan and emphasizes the importance of addressing the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians in the context of “the final determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh”, attained under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group.

The package was poorly received in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The sensibility in Baku seems to be that the Armenian side is prevaricating over the inevitable, whereas the view prevalent in the anti-government quarters in Yerevan is that the document is ill-prepared and amounts to the surrender of national interests.

Ill-conceived inception

First things first. Before making further conclusive remarks, it behoves one to look into the respective provisions of the package and to determine the finer elements, if any, upon which a more detailed examination could be conceived and propitiated.

Point 1 is probably the most obscure element of the document. Baku’s five-point offer was designed as a collection of proposed precepts, aimed as a foundation for building a prospective peace deal around, and one would have reasonably assumed that an Armenian answer would also follow suit and be “principle-based”.

The point in question merely indicates the specific date on which the Azerbaijani offer was received – 11 March. Since Baku communicated its five-point proposal on 21 February, the intention here is likely to clarify that the document was submitted three weeks after, thereby placing the blame on an unnamed intermediary, the identity of which one can guess and make one’s own judicious conclusion.

Levon Zarubyan, the Vice-Chairman of the Armenian National Congress, led by former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was highly critical of Yerevan’s six-point package, believing that the document represents a futile and dilettantish attempt to respond to Baku’s proposal and that its first point is ultimately unconstructive.

Constructive ambiguity

Point 2 states that Armenia does not have, nor has ever had, any territorial pretension in relation to Azerbaijan. This, of course, should not be taken at a face value, but with an industrial-size vat of salt. The meaning ascribed to this provision is fluid and tends to acquire slightly modified proclivities, depending on the exigencies of a given time.

In principle, the original thinking behind this formula has been based on a construct, enabling Armenia to look plausible in the eyes of international law without renouncing its claims to Karabakh. When Yerevan felt strong and bolstered in the past, its interpretation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan did not include the Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast.

From December 2021, this provision gained a new meaning. On 26 December, The beleaguered and irrefutably quixotic Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged that, from the perspective of international law, Karabakh was Azerbaijan, and within the OSCE-mediated format no alternative provenance would ever be determined.

Whilst addressing the Armenian National Assembly after the 6 April Brussels summit, Pashinyan emphasised the critical importance of lowering the bar on “status expectations”, focusing mostly on the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians.

Against the backdrop of the rhetoric displayed from December 2021 to April 2022, the meaning of “we recognise and have already recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity” line could, of course, be interpreted in a way that would incorporate Karabakh. Yet the Armenian vision regarding this is a long way from crystallizing into a constant, and thus periodic modifications are yet to impinge upon the minds of those determining Yerevan’s foreign policy.

Point 3 is a clear example of the aforementioned. It does not merely emphasise the importance of addressing the subject concerning the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians, but specifies that this should be undertaken in the context of the final determination of the status of the region. Since, in Baku’s post-war vision, the conflict is over and the status subject is a relic of the past, this point has no chance of being of constructive value.

Point 4 does not amount to a principle either. In fact, it says nothing that could contribute to a peace treaty. Interestingly enough, if to judge by the Russian translation available, point 4 emphasises the importance of the 2020 ceasefire deal and the implementation of the 11 January and 26 November statements.

Article 4 of the 10 November deal states that “the peacekeeping forces of the Russian Federation shall be deployed concurrently with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops”. This remains unfulfilled due to Yerevan’s deliberate inaction, and it is of some import that, when referring to the ceasefire deal, the six-point proposal merely “emphasises its importance” in general, not “the importance of its implementation”, as was stated in relation to the 11 January and 26 November statements.

Point 5 refers to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights. Clairvoyance skills are unnecessary to appreciate that the latter is included with the purpose of connecting the question of the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians with political self-determination. Point 6 is also doomed to be opposed by Baku, as it ascribes the misbegotten and archaic OSCE Minsk Group with a central role in future peace negotiations.

In the final analysis, Yerevan’s proposal could be regarded as contributing to slackening the zeal engendered in April. It is true that Azerbaijani demands and Armenian acquiescence have not yet merged into a domain where the rubrics are firmly established.

Yet there is a clear framework within which an exchange leading to a peace deal could take place, and a sufficient degree of clarity on the principal terms to enable forward traction. However, this is not properly appreciated by large swathes of the Armenian public.

For instance, Alexander Iskandaryan, the Director of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute, believes Armenia should not rush to a deal and states that a peace treaty is not always a guarantee for lasting peace.

The latter part is, in a sense, true. A peace treaty that imposes unfair terms on the vanquished may indeed lead to even a greater crisis in the future, as demonstrated in the annals of history. The question arises as to whether Baku’s five points could lead to such an eventuality.

The point is that the Armenian disinclination to move towards a comprehensive deal is driven by a desire, dormant in Iskandaryan’s case, to reverse the consequences of the Second Karabakh War as extensively as possible and to achieve the zenith of obstreperousness.

Baku and Yerevan see the matter through the prism of different priorities. Azerbaijan’s five-point plan aims to normalise the fundamentals of interstate relations firstly and then move to the fate of Karabakh Armenians, and hence Baku views the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, non-use of force, the avoidance of territorial pretensions, delimitation, and demarcation of borders and the opening of communications routes as key steps.

For Yerevan, the starting point is the fate of the Karabakh Armenians, and thus classical normalisation within an interstate framework is something of which Pashinyan’s government has yet to convince itself. As ever, a peace treaty is so near, and yet so far.

The writer is an associate professor of history at Indiana University South Bend.

ISTANBUL

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a joint declaration on May 10, 2022 which aims to stipulate strengthening both military and geopolitical partnerships between the two countries.

The agreement has another implication that in the emerging multipolar world system, even medium-sized and presumably regional powers could stand against “grand states.” In this particular case, Turkiye could counterbalance Russia and change Kazakhstan’s geopolitical trajectory, increasing Kazakhstan’s drift from Russo-centric “Eurasianism.”

Kazakhstan: A drift from Eurasianism to Kazakh nationalism

Kazakhstan was the last republic to gain its independence from the USSR because comparatively, it had a strong connection with Russia. A significant ethnic Russian/Russian-speaking population, mostly living in northern Kazakhstan, was an essential reason for such a strong connection. The majority of Russians in Kazakhstan were not pleased to be reduced to a minority.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, the founder of the new state, tried to solve this problem by appealing to “Eurasianism,” a doctrine that had been forged by the groups of Russian immigrants in the 1920s. They were defending the idea that the USSR belonged neither to the civilization of Eastern Slavs nor to the West. From an ethnic standpoint, Eurasianists argued that Russia constituted a unique civilization built on the “symbiosis” of Orthodox Slavs and Muslims, particularly Turkic people.

Eurasianism was unknown in the USSR but had become quite popular by the end of the Soviet era. Nazarbayev appealed to it as a convenient ideological tool. On the one hand, Eurasianism provided him with an argument for a continued relationship with Russia. In 1994, Nazarbayev even proposed the creation of a “Eurasian Union”, a loose confederation that would include Russia, Kazakhstan, and some other states. On the other hand, he employed Eurasianism in dealing with internal problems. Kazakhstan was portrayed as a peculiar “Eurasian” nation built on the “symbiosis” of Turkic Kazakhs and minorities, primarily ethnic Russian/Russian-speaking people. However, this paradigm failed, and the ideology of Eurasianism, a legacy of the multiethnic USSR, began to crumble in both Russia and Kazakhstan.

From Eurasianism to Russian nationalism

Eurasianism was hardly the only ideology popular in the early post-Soviet Russia period. Russian nationalism, in its various manifestations, became an increasingly popular, complicated, and contradictory phenomenon at the time. It often combined two opposite drives. On the one hand, supporters claimed that Russia and Russians had taken advantage of the USSR’s numerous “brothers,” meaning the other republics. Those brothers despised Russians while demanding Russia’s resources.

On the other hand, the proponents of the creed were not against Russia’s imperial aggrandizement only if Russians would benefit from the conquest. Furthermore, they claimed that, like Nazi Germany, Russia should conquer the Sudetenland by seizing territories occupied by ethnic Russians. These are fair enough to define how Moscow’s approach to Kazakhstan was.

Increasing Russian threat

There have been an increasing number of claims that Kazakhstan was an artificial state created by the Soviet regime. Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed that Kazakhstan had emerged only after the collapse of the USSR. There were also continuous claims that northern Kazakhstan should be given back to Russia. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the famous Russian writer, public figure and Nobel laureate, made such statements even before the collapse of the USSR. The most recent of these statements is attributed to Viacheslav Nikonov, a Duma deputy. All of these gave Kazakhstan’s leaders pause.

Eurasianism as a trend has subsided or at least has become more Kazakhstan-centered, paralleling a similar process in Russia. Astana’s apprehension increased in 2014 when Russia annexed the predominantly Russian-speaking Crimea and supported Lugansk and Donetsk republics. The direct invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022 and led to even more concern. While engaged in “multivectorism” a long time ago, Astana has become especially eager to find an additional geopolitical backup in case of a Russian threat. Eurasianism, in its original interpretation, has started to lose its popularity and has been increasingly replaced by pan-Turkism. Consequently, Turkiye has arisen as a geopolitical alternative. The question is why Kazakhstan is becoming closer to Turkiye?

Turkiye: role of a regional power in multipolar universe

One might assume that Turkiye and Kazakhstan would make a good match due to their ethnic similarities. Both countries are Turkish, and Kazakh and Turkish leaders have pointed out common ancestral roots. Still, ethnic and cultural similarities often have little implication for actual geopolitical posture. Indeed, while Russians and Ukrainians are pretty close to each other ethnically and linguistically, this does not preclude brutal conflict. Kazakhstan may be turning its back on Turkiye for a variety of reasons. One of them is the role of the nature of emerging multipolarity.

It is usually assumed that only the great powers, such as China and Russia, could challenge the USA’s vanishing “unipolarity.” Even medium-sized countries can threaten a hegemon, and Turkiye, with its counterweight function exhibited in a variety of ways, could be one of them. To start with, Turkiye’s ability to become a global center is demonstrated by its successful relations with great nations, one of which is Russia. Secondly, during the Azerbaijan-Armenian war, Turkiye supported Azerbaijan against Russian support for Armenia regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Finally, Turkiye’s defense technological investments debunk the popular belief that only great powers can develop complex weapons.

By producing Bayraktar, an autonomous combat aerial vehicle, on par with similar devices created by any great power, including Russia, Turkiye has shown that this is not the case. Bayraktar played a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the war with Armenia. As a result, Turkish military, technological, and geopolitical power has become the fundamental reason why Kazakhstan has sought closer ties with Turkiye and replaced Russia-oriented Eurasianism with pan-Turkism.

Conclusion

Kazakhstan’s growing interest in Turkiye could not be explained solely by cultural, linguistic, or ethnic similarities between the two countries, but also by other, more significant factors. This alliance shows that a medium-sized and, presumably, regional power may act as a geopolitical center in its own right, protecting other states from global powers.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.

Famous Azerbaijani artist Nigar Helmi Abbasbayli’s solo exhibition dedicated to the heritage of Karabakh has been opened at Istanbul’s iconic Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM). “The Legacy of Karabakh” comprises paintings reflecting the endless sky of Karabakh along with the ruins left behind and jewelry that are the culmination of traditional and modern trends.

The exhibition was launched in AKM by Deputy Minister of Tourism Özgül Özkan Yavuz, Consul General of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Istanbul Narmina Mustafayeva, and artist Nigar Helmi Abbasbayli. Important names from business, art, politics and social life also attended the opening.

Among the works that Abbasbayli dedicated to Karabakh at the exhibition, “Govhar Agha Mosque,” “Ruins of the Nightingale’s House,” “Panakh Ali Khan Palace Ruins” and “Varazgun Temple” attract the attention. Boldly and vividly depicted through the eyes of the artist, these paintings reveal the heartbreaking ruins of Karabakh’s vast skies.

In her speech at the opening of the exhibition, artist Abbasbayli said, “After our homeland war, which ended with the great victory of my country, we started to rebuild our lands liberated from the occupation. As you know, 2022 was declared by the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev as the “Year of Shusha” in Azerbaijan. It is a great honor for me to bring this exhibition to life in the year of Shusha, which was declared as part of the liberation of the city of Shusha in Karabakh from the Armenian occupation. The exhibition is on display in Turkey for the first time as a whole collection. I see the ‘The Legacy of Karabakh’ exhibition, which I prepared for the victory of our people, as another symbol of the spiritual unity, common historical and cultural roots of Turkey and Azerbaijan.”

Consul General Mustafayeva also said, “We are very happy that our esteemed artist Abbasbeyli exhibited her entire collection in Istanbul for the first time. Her paintings are very important symbols for Azerbaijan and Karabakh. As Shusha is the cradle of our civilization, recapturing it was a great victory for us. This is why this exhibition dedicated to our victory by Abbasbeyli is very valuable for us.”

Noting Turkey has always supported Azarbaijan during the recapturing of Karabakh, Mustafayeva continued: “We would like to take this opportunity to thank the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”