Category: 2022

By Lawrence A. Johnson

“Gems from Armenia.” Ani Aznavoorian, cellist; Marta Aznavoorian, pianist (Cedille). 

The talented Aznavoorian sisters—cellist Ani and Chicago-based pianist Marta—explore their Armenian heritage in the siblings’ first joint recording, recently released by Cedille. 

Except for Aram Khachaturian—and possibly Arno Babajanian—most composer names on this duo-recital will be unfamiliar even to aficionados. The majority of items in this 75-minute CD consist of arrangements for cello and piano, largely miniatures running less than five minutes.

The program opens with a suite consisting of five short pieces by the revered Komitas Vartabed (1869-1935) a priest who collected and annotated Armenian folksongs, in the manner of Bartok in Hungary. A ruminative melancholy tends to predominate in this music with the burnished timbre of Ani’s cello conveying inward contemplation. The more up-tempo “Al Ailux” offers welcome contrast, and pianist Marta brings a sensitive touch to the keyboard solo “Garoun A.” The final song, “Krunk” (The Crane) receives fine advocacy by both with Ani assaying a touching vein of pathetique _expression_.

Khachaturian is represented with two items, including Yerevan, his affectionate ode to Armenia’s capital. Arno Babajanian’s Elegy is a tribute to Khachaturian, his teacher, and Marta gives this piano solo strength as well as valedictory _expression_. Babajanian’s Aria is songful in feeling with the ensuing Dance providing a rare lighter item.

The largest work on the disc is Avet Terterian’s 20-minute Cello Sonata, written in 1956. The opening Andante offers a broadly romantic melody, with strong playing by the Aznavoorians bringing sweeping urgency to the music. More bleak rumination in the central Adagio, which is played with great feeling by Ani. The finale is a motoric Presto and the duo toss the rhythms back and forth deftly, leaning into a contrasting lyrical section before the fiery coda.

The Impromptu of Alexander Arutiunian—whose Trumpet Concerto enjoyed some popularity in decades past—is a lively folk melody with a lamenting middle section.

A trio of works by a younger generation of composers closes the disc with more bracing contemporary styles. Lebanese composer Serouj Kradjian offers an edgy arrangement of the song “Sari Siroun Yar.” Vache Sharafyan’s Petrified Dance is a searching work—more haunting than Terpsichorean—cast in a compelling impressionistic idiom.

The program concludes with Mount Ararat by Peter Boyer, composed for the Aznavoorian sisters. At nine-and-a-half minutes, this is the longest single movement on the disc, heard here in its premiere recording. The work begins with  a rhetorical flourish low in the cello and segues into an agitated section. The music is crafted with Boyer’s typical skill and thematic indelibility; the main lyrical melody is in the American composer’s most engaging vein, and the work echoes the folksong “Krunk” at the coda. One can easily see Mount Ararat —as well as the Terterian sonata—enjoying wide popularity in chamber recitals.

While a febrile, brooding melancholy tends to dominate in this program, interest is maintained by the superb playing of the Aznavoorians, who are expressive, technically poised and well blended throughout. The recording, taped at the Logan Center, is up to Cedille’s usual standard. 

“Gems from Armenia” is highly recommended for those looking for offbeat ethno-musical byways as well as cello-piano duos in the hunt for new repertoire.

The case against Sashik Sultanyan is based on bogus charges of ‘inciting ethnic hatred’. If the Yazidi human rights defender is convicted, it could have a chilling effect on the work of all rights defenders in Armenia. 

Public engagement is a key tool human rights defenders everywhere use to try to influence governments to be more rights-friendly. Sometimes it is the only tool we have. This also means publicly criticising the authorities, and in a democracy, the officials are required to tolerate it.

But little did Sashik Sultanyan, a human rights defender in Armenia, know that a conversation he had two years ago with a journalist criticising the authorities for their rights record, would become the basis of a criminal prosecution against him. 

The stakes are high in Sultanyan’s trial, which I’ve been observing since hearings started in November. Sultanyan has led a group working to protect the country’s Yazidi minority community, of which he is a member. He’s been under investigation since October 2020 on charges of inciting ethnic hatred, based on an article published in June 2020 that quoted him criticising alleged discrimination faced by Armenia’s Yazidi community. 

If convicted, he could face up to six years in prison. 

But the damage would be even higher for Armenia’s democracy, as Sultanyan’s conviction would be likely to have a chilling effect on free speech and possibly on human rights activism throughout the country.   

The article quoted Sultanyan alleging that Yazidis in Armenia cannot study their language or develop their culture and that they are underrepresented in local government. He also said that Armenians had seized Yazidi property, that authorities do not protect their rights, and that Yazidis live ‘in fear’.

These views fall completely within the boundaries of legitimate speech protected under international law. 

Regardless of whether Sultanyan’s discrimination claims are accurate, the opinion he expressed in 2020 was legitimate speech. Meanwhile, the fact that the prosecutor dismissed out of hand the notion that there is any ethnic discrimination against Yazidis in Armenia does not inspire confidence that state officials diligently investigate discriminatory practices. 

The authorities should have dropped the case against Sultanyan long ago, as experts from the Council of Europe and the United Nations have urged them to do 

The investigation was prompted by a complaint filed by Narek Malyan, the leader of the VETO Movement, a radical right-wing group that has built a reputation for aggressive hostility against human rights defenders and the Open Society Foundations in Armenia in particular. The latter antagonism appears to be linked to intense hostility among far-right groups around the world against the supposedly nefarious actions of Hungarian-born philanthropist George Soros, who founded the Open Society Foundations (OSF).

The evidence that I heard the prosecutor present at the trial leaves little doubt that the incitement charges are a flimsy cover for an ulterior motive behind the prosecution, where the apparent aim of the complaint was to discredit rights defenders and in particular those that get funding from the OSF. The prosecution, it seems, is indulging this approach. 

For example, the prosecutor played a recording from a 2020 news conference held by Narek Malyan, jointly with an ethnic Yazidi, who said that Sultanyan believed all was fine for Yazidis in Armenians until he received funding from the Open Society Foundations – Armenia in 2019. Yet in fact, Sultanyan has been advocating for Yazidi rights in and beyond Armenia since 2013, and in 2018 founded the Yezidi Center for Human Rights, a nongovernmental group. 

During the trial, the prosecutor implied that national minorities, especially Yazidis, do not face discrimination in Armenia and that Sultanyan was biased and sought to hoodwink Yazidis into believing otherwise. As evidence, he played for the court phone conversations between Sultanyan and his colleagues and friends. In one, Sutanyan talks about a village where Yazidis live relatively prosperously; in another, a colleague says that there are some Yazidis who criticise Sultanyan’s work. The prosecutor also used a public speech Sultanyan made about Yazidi rights in Armenia at an international human rights forum in September 2019. 

Among the other evidence that the prosecutor presented was a piece of paper the investigation found in Sultanyan’s documents, which had the word ‘discrimination’ circled and listed examples of possible discrimination against Yazidis. It is hard to know what this piece of evidence was supposed to prove. 

The fact is that Armenia has been struggling to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination law for almost a decade. Although discrimination is banned under Armenia’s Constitution, there is no legislation that defines equality standards, ensures safeguards against discrimination in education, and provides for awareness-raising, adequate protection, monitoring, and procedural safeguards for people at risk of discrimination. 

While the momentum for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation was renewed in 2019, the process has stalled again. The pending anti-discrimination bill package includes both the anti-discrimination law and a Law on National Minorities, to ensure the rights of national and ethnic minorities in Armenia. 

‘I wanted to fight discrimination, and I thought the state would back me on this’, Sultanyan told me before the hearing. ‘Who thought it would turn into this?’ 

It’s not too late for the authorities to withdraw the bogus charges against Sultanyan. Instead of wasting resources on this case, they should act to protect lawful speech and protect people from discrimination. A good place to start would be speeding up the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, with adequate, effective protection for everyone. 

https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/21/opinion-high-stakes-armenian-democracy-rights-defenders-trial

As Armenia and Azerbaijan seek ways in which they can normalise relations between them, the discussion on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, and particularly of the Armenian population living there is also gathering pace. On 8 June commonspace.eu published an op-ed by Kamal Makili-Aliyev suggesting autonomy may be one way of moving relations forward. In this counter opinion, Vahagn Avedian disagrees and says that governance problems in Azerbaijan make the prospect of an autonomy within that country unattractive for the Armenian population of Karabakh. He argues that “the only viable path forward is still what the Madrid Principles envisioned, namely granting the Karabakh population the right to determine their future.”

In an opinion article, published on commonspace.eu on 8 June, Kamal Makili-Aliyev argues for the “Åland model” as a guiding example for a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus.

Read it here

This idea is by no means new, and there is even a famous anecdote in this regard for those who are familiar with the conflict. The story goes that during an OSCE mediation conference on Åland in 1993, presenting the Åland model, the mediators asked the Karabakh Armenians whether this kind of autonomy would be an acceptable solution for them. “Yes, it could,” replied the Armenians to much of the mediators’ surprise. “But only if it is within the territory of Finland!”

The sarcastic reply referred of course to the elephant in the room which Makili-Aliyev conveniently avoids to mention: Azerbaijan is by far not a Finland when it comes to governance and democratic credentials, and according to a Freedom House report actually ranked as an authoritarian state second only to Belarus in Europe. Had Finland been one of the worst authoritarian states in Europe, implemented policies of ethnic cleansing, eradicating cultural monuments, it is very unlikely that the Åland Swedes would have opted for a future under Helsinki’s suzerainty.

If one even disregards the historicity of the conflict and how a region with over 90% Armenian population artificially became an enclave in Soviet Azerbaijan as part of  Joseph Stalin’s policy of divide and rule, there are the modern international laws and norms to take into consideration. But yet again, Makili-Aliyev withholds essential details which don’t align with his argumentation. He writes that “International law does not envision the right to self-determination for minorities per se.” One could say that the subtle play with words (minorities vs people), is in itself correct, but then again, the international law speaks of people in general terms without distinction between majorities and minorities. In addition he asserts that the Helsinki Final Act is “the international agreement that came the closest to establishing a concept of internal [emphasis added] self-determination.” The addition of “internal” is quite conspicuous in this context as it only serves the rhetoric of Baku (insisting that a referendum must be about the determination of status within the territory of Azerbaijan) when the Charter in fact explicitly mentions the “external status,” as we will shortly see.

People’s right for self-determination is actually enshrined in both the UN Charter (Article 1.2) and the OSCE Charter, the Helsinki Final Act (Item 8). The Helsinki Final Act (1975) consists of ten mutually equal guiding principles for relations between states and peaceful settlement of disputes. The fourth item of the Charter is about respecting the territorial integrity of states. Inter alia, it mentions, that states must “refrain from making each other’s territory the object of military occupation […] in contravention of international law.” The latter part is indeed quite relevant in regard to the Karabakh Conflict, acting as an amendment reserving the right for, e.g. humanitarian intervention. The eighth item in the Helsinki Final Act describes the peoples’ right to self-determination. It establishes, among others, that “all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status [emphasis added], without external interference.”

It is worth emphasizing yet again that these principles have no order of precedence and none supersedes the other. The same is true about the UN Charter in regard to the question of people’s right to self-determination (Article 1.2) and territorial integrity (Article 2.4). In theory, these are equal principles which can be implemented peacefully and without using power. In reality, however, it is the state’s political and military power which safeguards its territorial integrity, overriding peoples’ right for self-determination. Thus, it is often sheer political pragmatism and power, not international law, which decides conflict outcomes, especially in cases where the democracy and respect for its values and international law are ailing.

Thus, using existing norms and laws, the international community, through OSCE, could have resolved the Karabakh Conflict peacefully, but failed to do so due to realpolitik. Once the issue of mediation reached a standstill, the OSCE could, as the international community did in the case of Kosovo, resort to arbitration by implementing its own charters, articulated in the form of the Madrid Principles.

In accordance with the Madrid Principles, OSCE could have demilitarized the adjacent districts outside Karabakh, deployed a peacekeeping force, reinstating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan while guarantying a referendum for the Karabakh population to determine their “external political status” as stated in the Helsinki Final Act while respecting the “norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.” It should be pointed out that the latter is by no means contradictory to the former as we have seen in many other democratic cases such as Spain and United Kingdom, where both principles are respected so that the people in Basque Country and Scotland can hold referendums about their “external political status” without Madrid or London resorting to violence. The same was true about Sweden and Finland in regard to Åland back in 1921. The same can hardly be said about Azerbaijan.

Confidence-building is a key factor in conflict resolution, and transparency is one of the main stepping-stones in that process. Failing to mention such a significant factor in the equation such as Azerbaijan’s democratic deficit not only diminishes the very induction base the subsequent theory on hypothetical autonomy is based upon, but it also erodes whatever trust there is towards the asserted benevolence of the otherwise oppressive counterpart.

Based on past experience, many fear that the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan will quickly result in total ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population. The notion of autonomy had been offered back in 1997 and rejected or obvious reasons. The current state of democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan are lacking in many respects, and there is unfortunately little which points to any improvement in the foreseeable future. The only viable path forward is still what the Madrid Principles envisioned, namely granting the Karabakh population the right to determine their future. One thing is for sure though: borders are virtual, have always been and will continue to be subject for alternation. The people on the ground are very real and the 21st century legislation is supposed to safeguard their democratic and human rights.