Category: 2021

Thus, the Kremlin is seeking the mantle of Belarusian crisis solver in the eyes of the West, while simultaneously developing a new model of interference that will legitimize Russian strategic intentions to expand its influence in Belarus. In short, the Kremlin’s formula is to facilitate regime change in Minsk in exchange for authorization to deploy Russian military bases in Belarus by the country’s new leadership as well as Western acceptance of Belarus as a “legitimate” part of Russia’s privileged zone of geopolitical interests. Such a grand bargain would put an end to Belarus as a sovereign and independent country, all while ignoring the positions of different parts of Belarusian society and the interest of other geopolitical actors present in the region, including China.After the West extended additional sanctions against Belarus and following Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s big press conference on August 9, the Kremlin began signaling its readiness to implement the so-called Armenian model to resolve the political crisis in the country.

During Lukashenka’s press conference last month, the president once again rejected the need to deploy permanent Russian military bases on Belarusian territory and dismissed any further deepening of political-military integration with Russia. Additionally, he reaffirmed Belarus’s security guaranties toward Ukraine, refused to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and demonstrated Minsk’s openness to negotiations with the West without preconditions (President.gov.by, August 9). A day later, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Fyodor Lukyanov, published an article that offers important hints about the Kremlin’s evolving position on the Belarusian crisis (Russia in Global Affairs, August 10).

First, Lukyanov admits that all external (including Russia and the West) and internal actors of the Belarusian crisis have reached a complete stalemate, additionally noting that the political crisis itself was caused by the mistakes of the Belarusian leader and the regime’s inability to offer “an attractive image of the future” for the population, rather than by the actions of the West. To move beyond this situation—which is aggravated by the risk of new sanctions against Russia for supporting Lukashenka—Moscow is ready to promote regime change in Minsk in return for geopolitical guarantees from the new democratic leadership that Belarus will remain in the Russian sphere of influence, the Moscow-based writer argues. Belarusian consent to the deployment of a Russian military base could serve as such a guarantee, according to Lukyanov. He emphasizes that “for the Kremlin, to keep the ‘external contour’, i.e., to set the framework for the foreign policy of a country that is its important neighbor, leaving all internal activities to its own people and their understanding of democracy, is not a bad alternative to integration or unification.” Notably, he supports his argument by raising the Armenian case (Russia in Global Affairs, August 10). The Kremlin did not explicitly interfere in Armenia’s domestic affairs during the 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution, despite the fall of the nominally pro-Russian regime of Serge Sarkisian and the rise of the nominally pro-Western Nikol Pashinyan, because Russia’s permanent military presence in that country guaranteed that no radical geopolitical reorientation from Moscow would happen.

The current debate on what the Kremlin should do with Lukashenka in the context of the political crisis in Belarus is not new. Since the start of the anti-Lukashenka protests a year ago, Russian strategists with intellectual influence over the Kremlin—ranging from Andrey Kortunov, the director general of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs (Russiancouncil.ru, August 17, 2020), to Dmitry Trenin, who heads the Carnegie Center in Moscow (Carnegie.ru, August 17, 2020)—have emphasized that the Belarusian leader would not be able to return to the pre-crisis status quo and Russia had to consider other options. These views reflected the atmosphere apparently prevailing in the Kremlin at that time.

In late 2020, a set of documents was leaked from the Russian Presidential Office’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, headed until March 2021 by Russian Intelligence Service (SVR) Major General Vladimir Chernov. This “Chernov dossier” allegedly reproduced the Kremlin’s plans to exploit the Belarusian presidential campaign and the subsequent political crisis as a favorable pretext to interfere in Belarus’s internal affairs: including shaping the crisis, creating new pro-Kremlin political forces in Belarus, buying up available/ready-made political assets from the government and opposition, and imposing key parameters of constitutional reform to transform Belarus from a super-presidential republic into a parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential one. All these active measures would evidently facilitate the expansion of Russian interests and influence in Belarus in a post-Lukashenka environment (Theins.ru, December 25, 2020).

By (indirectly) raising the prospect of applying the Armenian model now, the Kremlin is not only resuming its approach to the Belarusian crisis but also signaling to both Western countries and the Belarusian opposition that it is ready for a dialogue as long as they take into account Russian strategic interests and concerns. Indeed, Lukyanov’s reference to Armenia in his aforementioned article is no accident. Immediately after the outbreak of the Belarusian political crisis last year, former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt published a piece, “The Armenian Model for Belarus,” in which he implicitly admits that Belarus is part of Russia’s sphere of influence (like Armenia) and the Belarusian revolution was not precipitated by geopolitical motivations such as a public desire to join Euro-Atlantic structures (unlike the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine) (Ecfr.eu, August 19, 2020).

The Kremlin had essentially been trying to force the Armenian model of political and military integration on Lukashenka’s Belarus without success since 2015, when, in addition to deploying permanent Russian military bases, Moscow insisted on subordinating the Belarusian Armed Forces (as part of the joint Regional Group of Forces) to the Western Military District of Russia (see Jamestown.org, March 2, 2020). But Lukashenka successfully withstood this pressure then and continues to preserve his strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Russia (see EDM [1] [2], May 11, August 19).

More recently, Kremlin-linked strategists have acknowledged that, under current geopolitical conditions, this model cannot be implemented without first changing the political status quo in Minsk, as otherwise it would provoke the introduction of new sanctions against Russia for undermining the independence and sovereignty of Belarus (according to the US Congress’s 2020 Act on Human Rights, Democracy and Sovereignty of Belarus). And Moscow at this stage does not intend to expose itself to such economic penalties solely for the sake of its Belarusian ally, particularly since any agreements concluded with Minsk at present—including those to deepen integration within the Union State—would have minimal legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Potential Armenia-Turkey rapprochement could have a major influence on South Caucasus geopolitics. The opening of the border would allow Turkey to have a better connection with Azerbaijan beyond the link it already has with the Nakhchivan exclave. Moscow will not be entirely happy with the development as it would allow Yerevan to diversify its foreign policy and decrease dependence on Russia in economy. The process nevertheless is fraught with troubles as mutual distrust and the influence of the third parties could complicate the nascent rapprochement.

Over the past month Armenian and Turkish officials exchanged positive statements which signaled potential rapprochement between the two historical foes. For instance, the Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan said that he was ready for reconciliation with Turkey “without preconditions.” “Getting back to the agenda of establishing peace in the region, I must say that we have received some positive public signals from Turkey. We will assess these signals, and we will respond to positive signals with positive signals,” the PM stated. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Ankara could work towards gradual normalization if Yerevan “declared its readiness to move in this direction.”

On a more concrete level Armenia has recently allowed Turkish Airlines to fly to Baku directly over Armenia. More significantly, Armenia’s recently unveiled five-year government action plan, approved by Armenia’s legislature, states that “Armenia is ready to make efforts to normalize relations with Turkey.” Normalization, if implemented in full, would probably take the form of establishing full-scale diplomatic relations. More importantly, the five-year plan stresses that Armenia will approach the normalization process “without preconditions” and says that establishing relations with Turkey is in “the interests of stability, security, and the economic development of the region.”

So far it has been just an exchange of positive statements, but the frequency nevertheless indicates that a certain trend is emerging. This could lead to intensive talks and possibly to improvement of bilateral ties. The timing is interesting. The results of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war served as a catalyzer. Though heavily defeated by Azerbaijan, Armenia sees the need to act beyond the historical grievances it holds against Turkey and be generally more pragmatic in foreign ties. In Yerevan’s calculation, the improvement of relations with Ankara could deprive Baku of some advantages. Surely, Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance will remain untouched, but the momentum behind it could decrease if Armenia establishes better relations with Turkey. The latter might not be as strongly inclined to push against Armenia as it has done so far, and specifically during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The willingness to improve the bilateral relations has been persistently expressed by Ankara over the past years. Perhaps the biggest effort was made in 2009 when the Zurich Protocols were signed leading to a brief thaw in bilateral relations. Though eventually unsuccessful (on March 1, 2018, Armenia announced the cancellation of the protocols), Ankara has often stressed the need of improvement of ties with Yerevan without demanding preconditions.

Beyond the potential establishment of diplomatic relations, the reopening of the two countries’ border, closed from early 1990s because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Turkey’s solidarity with and military and economic support for Azerbaijan, could also be a part of the arrangement. The opening of the 300 km border running along the Armenian regions of Shirak, Aragatsotn, Armavir, and Ararat could be a game-changer. The opening up of the border is essentially an opening of the entire South Caucasus region. The move would provide Armenia with a new market for its products and businesses. In the longer term it would allow the country to diversify its economy, lessen dependence on Russia and the fragile route which goes through Georgia. The reliance on the Georgian territory could be partially substituted by Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey route, though it should be also stressed that the Armenia transit would need considerable time to become fully operational.

Economic and connectivity diversification equals the diminution of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In other words, the closed borders have always constituted the basis of Russian power in the region as most roads and railways have a northward direction. For Turkey an open border with Armenia is also beneficial as it would allow a freer connection with Azerbaijan. Improving the regional links is a cornerstone of Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus. In a way, the country has acted as a major disruptor. Through its military and active economic presence Turkey opens new railways and roads, thus steadily decreasing Russian geopolitical leverage over the South Caucasus.

As mentioned, both Ankara and Yerevan will benefit from potential rapprochement. It is natural to suggest that the potential improvement between Turkey and Armenia, Russia’s trustful ally, would not be possible without Moscow’s blessing. Russia expressed readiness to help Armenia and Turkey normalize their relations, saying that would boost peace and stability in the region. “Now too we are ready to assist in a rapprochement between the two neighboring states based on mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests,” the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, said. Yet, it is not entirely clear how the normalization would suit Russia’s interests. One possibility is that the Armenia-Turkey connection would allow Russia to have a direct land link with Turkey via Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, here too the benefits are doubtful. The route is long and will likely remain unreliable. For Russia trade with Turkey via the Black Sea will remain a primary route.

Presenting a positive picture in the South Caucasus could however be a misrepresentation of real developments on the ground. The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is far from being guaranteed because of ingrained distrust between the two sides. Moreover, there is also the Azerbaijani factor. Baku will try to influence Ankara’s thinking lest the rapprochement goes against Azerbaijan’s interests. Moreover, as argued above, Russia too might not be entirely interested in the border opening. This makes the potential process of normalization fraught with numerous problems which could continuously undermine rapport improvement.

Thus, realism drives Turkish policy toward Armenia. Ankara needs better connections to the South Caucasus. Reliance on the Georgian transit route is critical, but diversification is no less important. The results of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war present Turkey and Armenia with an opportunity to pursue the improvement of bilateral ties. Yet, the normalization could be under pressure from external players and deep running mutual distrust. Moreover, the two sides will need to walk a tightrope as a potential blowback from nationalist forces in Turkey and Armenia can complicate the process.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.