Tbilisi’s largely forgotten and neglected Armenian heritage

Oct 8 2021

Tbilisi’s Armenian heritage is danger of being forgotten entirely, but there is some hope.

Armenian intellectuals, wealthy merchants and leading cultural figures have been an integral part of life in the Georgian capital Tbilisi for centuries.


Indeed, according to Finnish academic Serafim Seppälä, who has written extensively on Armenian culture and history, Tbilisi in the 19th century was “the most Armenian town in the world”, with Armenians accounting for more than two-thirds of the city’s population.

Today, while Tbilisi’s population tops one million people, Armenians constitute around just five per cent.

The decline has been steady, not precipitated by any one particular event, but the reduction in  size of the city’s Armenian population has meant that much of its Armenian heritage – residential buildings, schools, churches and other cultural monuments built by the Armenians of Tbilisi – has been neglected or simply forgotten entirely.

The Armenian Apostolic Church has borne the brunt. Where once there were 24 Armenian churches in Tbilisi, today just two remain.

Some of these were confiscated under Soviet rule, only to be handed in the 1990s to the Georgian Orthodox Church.

According to a report on international religious freedom published by the US Department of State, both the Roman Catholic and Armenian Apostolic Churches in Georgia “have been unable to secure the return of churches and other facilities closed during the Soviet period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox Church by the state”.

The same could be said for many other Armenian heritage sites in Tbilisi, such as the Armenian Drama Theatre, one of the most potent symbols of Armenian culture in the city.

Named after an outstanding Armenian actor and poet, Petros Adamian, the theatre was established in 1858 by the Armenian theatre figure George Chmshkian.

Rebuilt in 1936 and renamed the Stepan Shahumian Armenian Theatre after a leading Bolshevik, it is currently in poor condition, and has been closed for seven years.

Fortunately, there is hope.

The Kartu Group, a charity organisation founded by Georgia’s richest man and former prime minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili, has undertaken to restore the building. Armenia’s Ministry of Culture is also set to provide the theatre with funding.

However, while reconstruction was planned to be completed in 2020, Tbilisi City Hall recently announced that the date had been postponed until 2023.

Among the many Armenians who left their mark on Tbilisi few are greater than Mikael Aramyants, a man who in the latter part of the 19th century wanted to turn Tbilisi into the most beautiful city in Eastern Europe.

Originally from Karabakh, he made his home in Tbilisi in the 1860s and became a successful sugar and cotton trader, and later an oil magnate.

Part of his legacy is the magnificent renaissance and baroque Tbilisi Marriott Hotel, which he built at the beginning of the 20th century, calling it the Mazhestik, and the former Aramyants Hospital.

The Tbilisi Marriott, once the Mazhestik

And yet his name is all but forgotten. Although some older Georgians still call the hospital after its founder, it is officially today simply known as Central Hospital.

According to Anna Sarkisyan, president of the Georgian Association of Cultural Relations, neglecting the Armenian legacy in Tbilisi is nothing new.

“The process of abandoning Armenian heritage in Georgia started during the repression of Tsarist-era Russia,” she tells Emerging Europe.

And since then, little has changed.

“Unfortunately, the Georgian government is not usually interested in the preservation of [Armenian] heritage, which is systematically demolished.”

Also at least partially forgotten is the name of the Tamamshevs, a wealthy Armenian family of merchants.

The Tamamshevs played a significant role in Tbilisi’s cultural and educational development: Gavril Tamamshev funded the construction of the first opera house in Tbilisi in 1847 when the Russian Tsar’s treasury refused to do so.

Gavril Tamamshev also donated his library, containing thousands of volumes, on the establishment of the Georgian National Library.

In the 1850s, the Tamamshevs constructed a magnificent house in Tbilisi, which in 1876 was part of Elizaveta Tamamsheva’s dowry on her wedding to Mikhail Smirnov, a Russian botanist and ethnographer.

During the Soviet period, however, it was confiscated by the municipality. And while today the house is home to a museum that commemorates both the Tamamshevs and Smirnov, it carries the latter’s name.

Elsewhere in Tbilisi is Khojavank, an architectural complex in the north-eastern part of the Avlabari district of the city.

Integral to Khojavank was a huge memorial cemetery, which remains the burial site of many prominent Armenians, including writers Raffi and Hovhannes Tumanyans.

Parts were destroyed by the Soviets however in 1937, and what was left was taken over by the Georgian Orthodox Church in the 1990s, its heritage further erased by the subsequent construction of the huge Holy Trinity Cathedral. The tiny section that remains, together with some relocated gravestones, is preserved as the Armenian Pantheon of Tbilisi.

Sarkisyan says that Armenian heritage is viewed by many in Georgia as a “competing memory”.

“The most important thing is to realise that Armenian architecture and legacy, in general, cannot be taken away from Georgia. It is our [Georgian-Armenian] shared heritage,” she says.

“We can benefit mutually from its existence.”

Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group

US Embassy in Armenia
Oct 9 2021
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OSCE Logo
GENEVA, 8 October 2021 — The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Stephane Visconti of France, Andrew Schofer of the United States of America, and Igor Khovaev of the Russian Federation) released the following statement today:  

The Co-Chairs held consultations with UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Vice President Gilles Carbonnier in Geneva 7 and 8 October.  The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office (PRCiO) Andrzej Kasprzyk also participated in the meetings.  All participants stressed the importance of full, unimpeded access by international humanitarian organizations to carry out their work.  In light of the recent constructive meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the Co-Chairs welcomed Azerbaijan’s release of one Armenian serviceman and also discussed possible de-escalatory and humanitarian measures, including with regard to detainees, missing persons, and the voluntary return of all displaced persons.  The Co-Chairs emphasized their intention to continue working with the parties to find areas of agreement.

The Co-Chairs have taken positive note of President Aliyev’s and Prime Minister Pashinyan’s public statements expressing their readiness in principle to meet with each other under the auspices of the Co-Chairs.  The Co-Chairs look forward to engaging the sides on modalities and details of such a meeting and reiterate their willingness to visit the region in the near future to discuss next steps in the process.

An Azerbaijani-Iranian War Will Lead to a Regional Conflagration

The National Interest
Oct 9 2021

The United States should join Israel and support the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Pakistani axis as a counterweight to Iran and Russia in the South Caucasus and greater Middle East.

by Taras Kuzio

Iran is escalating its military rhetoric against Azerbaijan as Tehran holds its largest military exercises in three decades on its border with Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, patriotism in Azerbaijan, which is already high following its recent victory in the Second Karabakh War, is being mobilized to counter the Iranian threat.  

A military conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan would lead to a regional conflagration. Given that Turkey just formed a security pact with Baku by signing the Shusha Declaration in June, Turkey will be certain to support Azerbaijan. Pakistan, an ally of Turkey and Azerbaijan, would also increase military pressure on Iran’s eastern border. Meanwhile, Armenia, which has been unwilling to accept its defeat, could be tempted to use the distraction of an Azerbaijani-Iranian war to retake what nationalists call “Eastern Armenia,” leading to another war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, a regional conflagration would be detrimental for Russian security policy in the South Caucasus because it would jeopardize Russia’s so-called “peacekeeping” operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Kremlin could no longer pretend to be neutral if its regional allies—Iran and Armenia—were involved in military operations.

Not coincidentally, renewed regional tensions and the threat of an Azerbaijani-Iranian war came after Iran’s recently appointed president, Ebrahim Raisi, inherited an established regional geopolitical order that is in opposition to Iran. Part of this configuration is a pro-Western military and security group that consists of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan. On July 27, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan signed the Baku Declaration, a strategic partnership that created a new format for political and military cooperation between the three countries. The Baku Declaration reaffirmed support for the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan and expressed solidarity with Pakistan’s position on the disputed Jammu and Kashmir regions. In early September, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan held the Three Brothers joint military exercise in Baku which Azerbaijani military leaders used to thank their two allies for their support during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Israel, which has had a security partnership with Azerbaijan since the early 2000s, belongs to this geopolitical group as well. On August 2, during a period of warming relations between Turkey and Israel, Azerbaijan opened an office to promote trade and tourism in Israel that is a prelude to opening a formal embassy. Israel opened an embassy in Baku as early as 1993.

In competition is another geopolitical group consisting of Russia, Armenia, and Iran. While Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose to attend Raisi’s inauguration, Azerbaijan’s Aliyev did not. In addition, Armenia supported India in its territorial dispute with Pakistan.  

Not surprisingly, Raisi’s appointment is leading to a deterioration of relations between both geopolitical groups. Iran’s saber-rattling toward Azerbaijan is not new; in 2007, Aliyev said that Iran was a “significant problem” and resembled a “cornered, wild animal.” Aliyev also declared that “there is no effective international mechanism to counter the threat posed by Iran.”

Last month, after describing Azerbaijan as a “Zionist entity,” Iran held its largest military exercises in thirty years on the Azerbaijani border. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said that Iran “will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist entity (Israel) near its borders and will take what security measures it deems necessary.” Former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza stated that “While Iran is not trying to be ‘hostile,’ it is still showing the three countries its uneasiness over their [earlier] joint drill.” In response, and representing the third military exercise in only two months, Turkey and Azerbaijan held the Steadfast Brotherhood military exercise in early October in Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani enclave squeezed between Armenia and Iran. 

Five factors are impacting the deterioration of Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan.

The first factor is Azerbaijan’s security partnership with Israel. Over a decade ago, Iranian chief of staff Major General Hassan Firuzabadi sent a veiled threat to Azerbaijan for permitting a visit by Israeli president Shimon Peres in 2009. Firouzabadi ominously warned Aliyev that he “will face a dark future since people’s awakening cannot be suppressed” for “giving freedom to the Zionist regime to meddle in its country’s affairs,” claiming this would lead to “bans on Islamic rules.”

Although Shiite Azerbaijan’s security partnership with Israel is unusual and unique, Baku has pointed out that Shiite Iran’s cooperation with Christian Armenia, “which has occupied Azerbaijani territory,” also “contradicts the solidarity of the Islamic world.” As an American diplomatic cable reported, Iran never condemned the Christian country’s (Armenia) occupation of its Shiite neighbor’s (Azerbaijan) territory. During a May 2002 summit between former President Heydar Aliyev and Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, the latter refused to condemn the occupation, nonchalantly stating that “Armenia is not Israel, and the Azerbaijanis are not the Palestinians.”

While Iran and Azerbaijan are both majority Shiite countries, they have an important difference: Azerbaijan inherited and has maintained a secular culture from its seven decades in the Soviet Union; Iran is unwilling to accept that Azerbaijan’s secular identity is grounded in Turkic culture and is frustrated and bitter at Turkey’s growing influence inside its neighbor’s borders. 

Iran, meanwhile, has attempted—but failed—to spread the Shiite revolution to Azerbaijan. In the 2000s, Sepah-e Pasdaran, the Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, trained and illegally infiltrated Al Qaeda and Hezbollah terrorists into Azerbaijan to undertake bombing campaigns against Israeli, American, and Western diplomatic facilities, police stations, and schools. Aliyev, the Israeli ambassador, Jewish teachers, and rabbis serving the ancient Mountain Jewish community were targeted for assassination.

The second factor is Iran’s unwillingness to accept a secular Shiite state that it views as belonging to Persia’s traditional sphere of influence. Iranian Shiite fundamentalism has literally no support in Azerbaijan as religion is important to only one-third of Azerbaijan’s population. Meanwhile, only 8 percent of Azerbaijani citizens—the lowest number in the Muslim world—support Sharia being made official law in their country.

Iran faces two additional obstacles in promoting its Islamic revolution to Azerbaijan: the absence of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in Azerbaijan. Israeli and American Jewish organizations routinely praise Azerbaijan for its absence of anti-Semitism. Tehran’s insecurity is exacerbated by its Azerbaijani minority exhibiting pro-Israeli sentiments. This is because they correctly believe that Baku’s military victory over Armenia was a product of Israeli and Turkish modern weaponry. As a member of Iran’s Azerbaijani minority wrote anonymously to Gunaz TV, a channel that caters to the Azerbaijani population in Iran, “whoever is against the Iranian regime is our friend.”

A modernizing and secular Azerbaijan also provides sustenance to the Iranian opposition by showing them an alternative path for their country to take. Azerbaijan’s example for discontented Iranians is, therefore, similar to the role that democratic Ukraine plays for the Russian opposition to Vladimir Putin‘s regime.

The third factor is Iran’s fears of separatism among the Azerbaijani minority that accounts for upwards of one-quarter of its population. The Azerbaijani minority supported Baku in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, a position which was diametrically at odds with Tehran’s support for Armenia. In 2021, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank which had close ties to the Trump administration, and Israel’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies both called for the “dismantling” of Iran (i.e., backing Azerbaijani and other minority separatism within the country). On the Iranian-Azerbaijani border, Israel has listening posts and uses unmanned aerial vehicles to collect intelligence on Iranian military affairs. The Azerbaijani minority in Iran is an important source of human intelligence for Israel.

The fourth factor is growing Turkish influence in Azerbaijan. In the last three decades, the Azerbaijani economy and energy infrastructure have been massively developed, making it the dominant country of the three South Caucasian states, a development that is not to Iran’s liking. As an American diplomatic cable explained, “it should be understood that for a number of reasons Iran may not be objectively interested in strengthening Azerbaijan. Tehran has specific objectives related to its national security and territorial integrity and, therefore, will never allow the strengthening of independent Azerbaijan.”

Turkey clearly gained from Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war. But so too did Azerbaijan, both from regaining control over one-fifth of its territory and by cementing a strategic partnership with Turkey through the 2021 Shusha Declaration. Iran is concerned that Azerbaijan will become a conduit for growing Turkish influence in Central Asia, where four out of five nations are Turkic speaking. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are already developing energy export outlets through Azerbaijan and Turkey to bypass Russia’s control of regional pipelines.

The Shusha Declaration was the first occasion where two countries, one from the former USSR and the other a NATO member, signed a strategic partnership which amounts to a de facto security pact. In 1994, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum with three declared nuclear powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia—whereby Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances. Two decades later, when Russia occupied Crimea, these security assurances were seen to be worthless when the United States and the United Kingdom watched Russia flout them.

The Shusha Declaration is far more clear-cut than the Budapest Memorandum because Azerbaijan, which is not a NATO member, has security guarantees from a NATO member. A threat to Turkey under Article V of the Washington Treaty is a threat to all NATO members. Like the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed in 1997, the Shusha Declaration states that “if there is a threat or an act of aggression from a third state or states against their independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability or security of their internationally recognized borders, the parties will hold joint consultations.”

But following these “consultations,” the Shusha Declaration goes an important step further by declaring that “After determining through urgent discussions the volume and form of such possible assistance, a decision will be made to secure defense needs for the adoption of joint measures and coordinated activities will be organized of power-wielding and administrative agencies of the Armed Forces.” 

Military, security, and economic cooperation is growing between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Media reports talk of the possible opening of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan, which Russia has raised concerns about. Turkish companies are involved in rebuilding infrastructure in western Azerbaijan that was destroyed after three decades of Armenian occupation. The Shusha Declaration spells out future cooperation in developing military technology, joint military exercises, enhancing cyber security, and combatting terrorism against Turkey.

The fifth factor is Iran’s frustration with the outcome of the 2020 war that, following the return of occupied territory to Azerbaijan, reduced the Iranian-Armenian border to less than 50 kilometers. This provides Azerbaijan with a highly effective chokehold on Iranian road supplies to the Armenian separatist minority in Karabakh.

Until 2020, Iran’s trade with Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan had not incurred customs duties. Rising tensions came after Azerbaijan began imposing duties and inspecting cargoes. Iranian cargo is mistakenly labeled, perhaps deliberately, as destined for “Stepanakert, Armenia,” the capital of the former separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh which was returned last year to Azerbaijani control.

Azerbaijan is also “concerned that Iranian trucks might also carry military equipment, which could end up in the hands of Armenians.” During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iranian trucks sent military supplies to Armenian forces. Aliyev declared that “We have already had knowledge that Iranian trucks illegally entered the Karabakh region many times during and prior to the War.” 

The United States should join Israel and support the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Pakistani axis as a counterweight to Iran and Russia in the South Caucasus and greater Middle East. This is strategically imperative after the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and the ascension of Iran’s anti-American president.  

Taras Kuzio is a Professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War published by Routledge in January 2022.

Christian Dior names French-Armenian perfumer Francis Kurkdjian as new creative director

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 9 2021

Dior has appointed French-Armenian Francis Kurkdjian as its perfume creation director. He is succeeding François Demachy, among the world’s most famous perfumers, who was Parfums Christian Dior’s first in-house perfumer and is retiring.

Kurkdjian will also remain artistic director of his own Maison Francis Kurkdijan, which he co-founded in 2009 with Marc Chaya and inaugurating him to prominence as a boundary-pushing fragrance artist.

“It is a great honor for me to join Christian Dior Parfums, a House with an inspiring history and driven by a creative spirit resolutely turned towards the future,” Kurkdijan said in an Instagram post.

“Today, I am delighted to bring my vision to it with my olfactory creations. Working for Maison Dior while continuing to support my own Maison is a huge privilege,” he added.


“On a more personal level, I think madly of my mother who is watching over me. I thank my family for their support, my friends and all those who know how much I think of them at this time,” Kurkdijan said.

Francis Kurkdjian rocketed onto the fragrance scene in 1995 at age 24, after creating the blockbuster Le Mâle for Jean-Paul Gaultier.

He embarked on his first artistic collaboration that same year with Sophie Calle who tapped him to compose L’odeur de l’argent, “the smell of money,” and granted him freedom to create with no restriction.

The perfumer went on to work with Burberry and Calvin Klein, as well as olfactory exhibits and performances at opulent venues such as The Grand Palais and The Château De Versailles.

Making Sense of SADAT, Turkey’s Military Company

War on the Rocks
Making Sense of SADAT,  Turkey's Military Company
By Matt Powers
Oct. 8, 2021
Alternately described as “cannon fodder” and “terrorists,” Syrian
fighters working at Turkey’s behest have generated headlines from the
Maghreb to the mountains of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Turkey continues to
employ these proxies in conflicts abroad, it’s important to examine
the close alignment between the administration of President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and an enigmatic private military company called SADAT
International Defense Consultancy.
Despite a diverse and often provocative body of reporting, SADAT is
best understood as a modern example in the evolution of the privatized
military industry, serving as an indigenous Turkish alternative to
both Western and Russian companies. Appropriately scoping SADAT not
only identifies its strengths and vulnerabilities, but also the
broader risks accompanying Turkey’s employment of mercenaries.
SADAT is a facilitator between Ankara and Syrian proxy fighters,
complementing the efforts of the Turkish military and security
services while affording it opacity and seemingly limitless
protections. This dependency on the state and Erdoğan’s favor,
however, constrains the company’s autonomy and entrepreneurialism.
Moreover, SADAT’s close association with Syrian proxies of varying
discipline, credibility, and volatility could expose Ankara to a
variety of unintended consequences. Understanding these factors is
critical to evaluating the company’s potential role in future security
situations.
Turks, Mercs, and Networks
A number of Turkey watchers have been warning about SADAT and its
controversial founder, Adnan Tanrıverdi, for years. Some have compared
the company to state-sponsored irregular revolutionary armies, like
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while others believe
Turkey’s use of mercenaries harkens back to the Ottoman Empire’s
Janissaries. In 2018, a network analysis of presumed Erdoğan proxies
stated that pseudo-military groups like SADAT “function formally as
security contractors … and informally as secretive armed forces.” And,
as part of a broader study early this year, the conservative Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security stated “SADAT can be considered
the continuation of the pre-Erdoğan period’s ‘deep state’ informal
units.”
There has been a recent boom in Turkey’s private security market and a
trend toward industry indigenization. But SADAT is distinct from
traditional Turkish private security companies, which focus on
executive protection, transportation, and risk assessments. According
to its website, the firm was founded in 2012 and boasts to be “the
first and the only company in Turkey, that internationally provides
consultancy and military training services at the international
defense and interior security sector.” SADAT promotes itself as a
military enterpriser, advertising consultancy services, conventional,
unconventional, and special forces training, and ordinance and
maintenance expertise. However, it does not appear to publicly offer a
direct action or combat arms capability, like the former Executive
Outcomes or the existing Wagner Group. And, while it is assumed most
private military companies are driven by economic motivations, SADAT
is an outlier because of the overt political and religious aspirations
of Tanrıverdi himself.
A retired brigadier general in the Turkish armed forces, Tanrıverdi’s
Islamist views reportedly led to his dismissal from active service in
the late 1990s and are captured in a corporate manifesto marketing
SADAT services alongside indictments of foreign hegemony and Muslim
persecution. Deeming the privatized military industry as “under the
control of Western Capitalism,” the manifesto details SADAT’s
aspiration to be an alternative to the “colonist countries of crusade
mentality.” Its original cadre were retired commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, “who will attach primary importance to the
national interests of such countries and the joint interests of the
World of Islam, [and] who have the profound experience of [the Turkish
Armed Forces].” In the long term, the company will “contribute to the
emergence of the World of Islam as a Super power and to promote an
environment of cooperation in [the] field of Defense and Defense
Industry among Islamic Countries.”
Under the Erdoğan administration, Tanrıverdi has sought to fulfill his
vision. Indeed, both men’s relationship extends back to 1994, when
Tanrıverdi served as a brigade commander in Istanbul during Erdoğan’s
mayorship of the city. Reflecting on that time, Tanrıverdi remarked,
“I found that his achievements in politics and state administration
have clearly the qualities of courage, foresight, consultation, and
determination, which are the most important ones of leadership
qualifications.” But Erdoğan is also a fellow Islamist whose control
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) platform has transitioned
Turkey away from the Kemalist tradition of secularism while embracing
his own version of highly militarized nationalism. Whether it’s
neo-Ottomanism or not, Erdoğan has set Turkey on a foreign policy
course motivated by overtly Islamist themes, a desire for increased
regional influence, and a consistent antagonism to American and
European interests. Thus, it is unsurprising that men like Tanrıverdi
would offer Erdoğan a unique base of support, thereby positioning
SADAT to serve as an extension of regime security and influence.
Following the attempted coup in 2016, Erdoğan appointed Tanrıverdi his
chief military counselor, effectively granting Tanrıverdi both a
private and government role. Reinforcing security institutions with
trusted agents is characteristic of many autocratic regimes and, by
elevating his public association with Tanrıverdi and his network,
Erdoğan enabled SADAT to bolster the offshore viability of his own
agenda.
An Expanding Presence…
Consider Libya. In summer 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense’s lead
inspector general released its quarterly report to Congress on
counter-terrorism operations in the U.S. Africa Command theater. Its
findings included an assessment of the eroding security situation in
Libya, following the Turkish military intervention to reinforce the
ailing Government of National Accord (GNA). With Turkish-supported
mercenaries being one of the key destabilizers, it notes, “U.S. Africa
Command estimated that several dozen military trainers from a Turkish
private military company, [SADAT], were deployed to Tripoli to train
both GNA-aligned militias and Syrian fighters. Sadat maintains
supervision and payment of the estimated 5,000 pro-GNA Syrian fighters
in Libya.”
Yet, the company’s roots in the country actually extend back to at
least 2013, as evidenced by a photo of Tanrıverdi shaking hands with a
Libyan military officer while holding a plaque depicting the Ottoman
coat of arms. Though these connections may have shaped Erdoğan’s
decision to deploy forces, they also reflect a baser capability:
first-mover advantage. By establishing brand recognition, customer
loyalty, and/or early purchase of services, SADAT has the potential to
enter conflict markets and set conditions for follow-on Turkish
actions. Prior to Libya, the company was routinely dogged by
allegations it was training Syrian proxies on behalf of Turkey,
charges it refuted. Regardless, the company’s explicit involvement in
North Africa, alongside Syrian proxies, confirmed that the company was
prepared to be a regional, expeditionary private military company.
In 2020, Tanrıverdi is believed to have signaled a greater role for
SADAT in Africa when he noted Turkey’s success in signing several
defense cooperation agreements with African states to train their
troops. He’s also advocated for Turkey to create a private military
contractor — akin to Blackwater or Wagner — for dedicated foreign
operations, capable of providing a force more useful than the Turkish
military in select situations. Understandably, the company’s actions
in Libya, the increasing Turkish military footprint in Africa, and
Tanrıverdi’s aspirations justify concerns that Erdoğan is using SADAT
as one means to export military force abroad.
SADAT’s reputation has also led it to be implicated in other regional
conflicts. In October 2020, news outlets detailed the deployment of
Syrian fighters to support Ankara’s interests in Azerbaijan.
Ostensibly serving under generous contract terms with the promises of
doing benign guard duty for a private Turkish security company, these
proxies were quickly embroiled in fighting on the ground in the
contested Nagorno-Karabakh region. Reports allege Syrian fighters
suffered anywhere from dozens to hundreds of casualties. In November
2020, the U.N. Working Group on the use of mercenaries affirmed these
reports, including “Turkey’s large-scale recruitment and transfer of
Syrian men to Azerbaijan through armed factions, some of which are
affiliated with the Syrian National Army.” While correlation is not
causation, the similarity in Turkey’s deployment of Syrian mercenaries
to both Libya and Azerbaijan prompted allegations of SADAT’s role in
the conflict. Despite the company’s denial of involvement and a lack
of a direct evidence to the contrary, an Armenian investigative group
(using Russian reporting) stated the company used its own planes to
transport fighters. Another media asserted “SADAT … might have played
a role in the recruitment operations,” although the original source it
quoted merely claimed “It seems likely that the recruitment is being
carried out by a Turkish private security company that is also
involved in shipping Syrians to fight in Libya.”
Likewise, in Afghanistan, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
reported in July that Turkish intelligence and Syrian faction leaders
reached a deal to transfer Syrian fighters to Afghanistan under
official private security company contracts. With the Taliban’s
seizure of the state and NATO’s withdrawal of forces, Turkey
subsequently scrapped its plans to take over security for the Kabul
airport. It’s not a stretch, however, to assume SADAT could have
played a supporting role under more favorable conditions.
…With Exceptions
In sum, SADAT’s actions abroad — both proven and purported — seemingly
demonstrate sufficient private military capabilities to warrant
concern. However, some of the company’s underlying strengths also
reveal vulnerabilities that may curb SADAT’s potential.
The company’s opaque profile is one perceived advantage, affording
SADAT greater flexibility in how it pursues objectives. For example,
reports of an “unnamed Turkish security company” in Nagorno-Karabakh
follow a pattern of accusations that SADAT masks recruitment and
training through front companies and local partners. Paradoxically,
Tanrıverdi denies SADAT’s involvement in foreign conflicts and
training Syrian proxies, while boasting of the company’s early efforts
in Libya and its potential to serve in new client states.
The company’s opaque nature makes it hard to accurately assess its
relationship with other elements of Turkey’s security services. In
Syria, the company supposedly helped recruit, quickly train and
provide logistical support for proxy fighters — but the significance
of SADAT’s role compared to other Turkish agencies involved is
unclear. In Libya, SADAT facilitated operations with Syrian mercenary
recruitment, training, and potentially transportation — but only after
Turkey had overtly committed military forces in support of the
Government of National Accord. Moreover, beyond simply supporting
Turkish military and proxy forces, there is likely a nexus between
SADAT and Turkey’s national intelligence organization. Despite
Tanrıverdi’s attempts to distance the company from the intelligence
service, his son — and SADAT’s current CEO — publicly admitted the
company coordinates with Turkish intelligence, in addition to the
Ministry of Defense and Foreign Ministry, when considering requests
from potential clients.
The company’s protections within Turkey is another perceived
advantage. Internationally, Turkey is not a party to agreements or
codes of conduct seeking to regulate mercenaries. These include 1949’s
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, specifically
Article 47; 1989’s International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (the U.N. Mercenary
Convention); 2008’s Montreux Document; and the growing International
Code of Conduct Association. Domestically, SADAT stresses its
compliance with Turkish national security laws as its activities
technically fall outside the scope of acceptable defense industry
production. More important, however, is Tanrıverdi’s personal
relationship with Erdoğan, whose authority lends an air of legitimacy
to the group while likely shielding it from attribution and legal
scrutiny. A recent case in point: Sensational accusations of SADAT’s
role in equipping al-Nusra Front terrorists spurred attempts by
Turkish parliamentarians to investigate SADAT. These attempts failed,
though, due to rejection by the AKP and Erdoğan’s political allies.
Unilateral patronage and protection create dependency, though, eroding
the company’s autonomy and its vision. The company seeks to assess
“the threats against the countries it serves, by considering the
geopolitical status of such countries, and organizes the Armed Forces
of the same with the aim to ensure the national defense by meeting the
most efficient and contemporary needs.” Yet, by and large, SADAT’s
publicly known operational history in other countries has been solely
in support of Ankara’s objectives, not independent of, or even
parallel to, it. With close ties to the military and potentially the
intelligence service, can future clients trust SADAT to act as a
legitimate broker in their interests if not unequivocally aligned with
Turkey?
Tanrıverdi’s relationship to Erdoğan also creates potential political
complications for the company. There are dark allegations that SADAT
deployed a network of armed affiliates onto the streets in support of
the administration during the attempted coup and, with Tanrıverdi’s
subsequent ascension into Erdoğan’s inner circle, these unresolved
charges have provided consistent fuel for critics of both the company
and its founder. Furthermore, Tanrıverdi’s outspoken religious beliefs
have inflamed tensions with Israel and have drawn unnecessary
attention to the company, ultimately forcing him to resign from his
security advisor position. And this all comes at a time when Erdoğan
is trying to carefully court retired senior military officials’
support while countering their own ambitions when contrary to his
agenda.
Additional Risks
It is also possible that the risks associated with SADAT could
eventually lead Ankara to distance itself from the company. The
Turkish government might rethink its use of proxy groups, or
conversely take over managing them more directly.
What are the risks? First, introducing private military companies into
conflicts with low barriers to entry may not always yield desired
effects. In Libya, the injection of Syrian mercenaries reinforced the
ailing Government of National Accord, but was also met with a
corresponding increase in Wagner mercenaries and Russian military
equipment, aiding both the Government of National Accord’s opposition
and prolonging the conflict. And, despite often being managed by
former military personnel, private military companies and the proxies
they support don’t always possess effective command and control
mechanisms. Coordination between headquarters and advisors can be
misconstrued, ignored, or exceeded by mercenaries or proxies on the
ground. This risks unintended military confrontations with competing
states operating in the same area. Wagner’s disastrous engagement in
eastern Syria in February 2018, when Russian mercenaries miscalculated
the resolve of threatened American military and partner forces,
illustrates this danger.
Second, the recruitment of future proxies rests on the credibility of
private military contractors as militarily effective and disciplined
organizations. Of course, one of the attractive features of these
organizations for clients is their perceived deniability. This
includes select governments, particularly those wary of domestic
concerns about military casualties or unpopular campaigns abroad. But
company reputations defined by mismanagement and high casualties will
likely not endure, undercutting the immediate utility of these groups
for authoritarian regimes. State sponsors must also contend with the
fallout from private military company-associated tragedies. Beyond
temporarily stymieing Russian objectives in Syria, Wagner’s 2018
defeat provoked a small, but unnecessary, domestic distraction prior
to another assured presidential electoral victory for Putin. For
Turkey, its proxies in Syria have been accused by U.N. investigators
of war crimes including hostage-taking, torture, rape, and unlawful
deportation of prisoners back to Turkey.
Third, disenfranchised mercenaries can turn volatile. Reports of
Syrian proxies betrayed by failed Turkish promises not only strain
future recruiting for expeditionary campaigns but can warp volunteers’
underlying motivations and ideologies. Already facing domestic recoil
to over 3.5 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Erdoğan can
ill-afford for jaded extremists to cause problems at home. This is
also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for extremists returning to
North American or European states of origin, undercutting Turkey’s
attempts to bolster its image as a credible NATO partner in
counter-terrorism.
An Uncertain Future
SADAT is part of a new race for private military capabilities. As seen
in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the proliferation of conflicts
with negligible Western engagement may create continued opportunities
for Turkey to employ mercenaries. And, if Turkey’s mixed domestic
appetite for military interventions abroad persists, it is easy to see
the appeal in augmenting Turkish military forces or its partners with
Syrian proxies. But this should not lead Turkey watchers to exaggerate
SADAT’s reach or ignore the constraints it faces.
Despite its Islamic orientation and private military capacity, SADAT’s
narrow operational history and opaque relationship with the Turkish
security services may encumber outreach with wary client states.
Barring a diversification of Turkey’s private military industry,
Western and Russian private military companies will still continue to
offer competitive services to potential clients while Ankara’s sole
patronage (and de facto control) of SADAT will limit the company’s
ability to exercise any true “mercenary” spirit. Additionally, the
performance and conduct of those mercenaries even loosely associated
with SADAT could potentially result in embarrassing failures abroad,
unintentional military escalation, and increased instability at home.
SADAT’s viability, and by extension Erdoğan’s tolerance for the
company, is directly linked to its success in managing these risks.
**
Maj. Matt Powers is an active duty Army officer currently assigned to
the Joint Staff. He has served in various Army and interagency
assignments covering Russian, European, and Eurasian portfolios. He
earned master’s degrees from the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University and the National Intelligence
University. He would like to thank Col. Doug Jones, Maj. James Kwoun,
and others for their guidance and support in drafting this article.
The views in this article are entirely the author’s and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. government.
 

Civilian killed in Artsakh in Azerbaijani shooting

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 9 2021

A civilian resident of Artsakh’s city of Martakert has been killed in sniper shooting from the Azerbaijani side, the Police of the Republic of Artsakh report.

“According to preliminary information, Aram Tepnants, 55, was killed by a sniper in the pomegranate orchard near Martakert at 1:15 p.m today,” the Police said said.

Investigators are currently working at the scene. The information has ben passed on to the Russian peacekeepers.

Sports: 2022 World Cup qualification: Iceland 1-1 Armenia

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 9 2021

Armenia played a 1-1 draw with Iceland in a 2022 FIFA World Cup qualifier.

Kamo Hovhannisyan opened the score in the 35th minute.

Isak Bergmann Johanesson made it 1-1 in the 77th minute.

Armenia will next face Romania on October 11.

Armenia are currently third in Group J with 12 points. Germany are group leaders with 18 points.

Sports: Armenia’s Malkhas Amoyan named World Wrestling Champion

PanArmenian, Armenia
Oct 9 2021

PanARMENIAN.Net – Armenia’s Malkhas Amoyan clinched gold in the 72 kilogram division on the first day of Greco-Roman finals at the United World Wrestling (UWW) World Championships in Oslo.

Amoyan earned the under-72kg title as he won 3-1 in the gold medal bout against Sergei Kutuzov of Russia, the Armenian National Olympic Committee reports.

Lithuania’s Kristupas Šleiva notched a 10-1 victory by superiority over Iran’s Mohammad Reza Hojatollah Mokhtari to take bronze, with Poland’s Gevorg Sahakyan – who is of Armenian descent – defeating Cengiz Arslan to finish joint third.

Saturday, October 9 features three Greco-Roman finals in the under-60kg, under-97kg and over-130kg, with two Armenian athletes left to fight for medals.

Sports: Romania vs Armenia prediction, preview, team news and more | 2022 FIFA World Cup qualifiers

Oct 9 2021
Armenia beat Romania 3-2 at home in March
Sachin Bhat 
ANALYST

Romania host Armenia at the Stadionul Steaua in Bucharest on Monday in the 2022 FIFA World Cup qualifiers.

The Tricolors are looking to bounce back from a 2-1 loss to Germany earlier in the week, having led the match just 10 minutes into it.

Second-half goals from Serge Gnabry and Thomas Muller, who scored the winner in the 81st-minute, condemned Mirel Radoi’s side to a third defeat of the campaign.

With 10 points in seven games, they’re now fourth in Group J, but can leapfrog Armenia should they beat the visitors.

The Havak’akan started their campaign with three wins on the trot, but have failed to win any of their next four, including a draw with Iceland on Friday.

Joaquin Caparros’ side will be eager to return to winning ways as time runs out, with only three more gamesremainingn in this qualifying round.


Romania have won four of their previous six clashes, losing just once.

That defeat came in the first leg of these qualifiers as the Tricolors went down 3-2 in Armenia.

Romania Form Guide (all competitions): L-W-W-D-L

Armenia Form Guide (all competitions): L-D-L-D-D


Romania

The Tricolors will have Dragos Nedelcu back from suspension after the midfielder sat out their clash with Germany on Friday.

He may come back into the XI, with either Razvan Marin or Nicolae Stanciu dropping to the bench.

George Puscas may continue to lead the line as centre-forward. He hasn’t scored for Romania since November 2020, and will be desperate to end the drought.

Injured: None

Suspended: None

Unavailable: None

Germany 🇩🇪 2-1 Romania 🇷🇴Painful ending to a beautiful start, good opportunities through Hagi & even Stanciu diagonal shot, but Puscas very wasteful with one on one awful attempt and not passing for clearer opportunities twice.. Ratiu & Chiriches close in end too#GERROU #WCQ
2:21 AM · Oct 9, 2021

Armenia

Lucas Zelarayan made his debut for Armenia after winning eligibility and marked the occasion with a sensational assist for Hovhannisyan.

Head coach Joaquin Caparros may reward him for the same with another start on Monday.

Khoren Bayramyan came off the bench against Iceland and is gunning for a start here.

Injured: None

Suspended: None

Unavailable: None


Romania (4-2-3-1): Florin Nita; Andrei Ratiu, Vlad Chiriches, Ionut Nedelcearu, Nicusor Bancu; Nicolae Stanciu, Dragos Nedelcu; Ianis Hagi, Alexandru Cicaldau, Alexandru Maxim; George Puskas.

Armenia (4-4-2): David Yurchenko; Kamo Hovhannisyan, Taro Voskanyan, Varazdat Haroyan, Davit Terteryan; Khoren Bayramyan, Lucas Zelarayan, Artak Grigoryan, Sargis Adamyan; Tigran Barseghyan, Henrikh Mkhitaryan.


Both teams have a strong defensive unit, so don’t expect too many goals in this game.

Romania made Germany work hard for their victory while Armenia shared the spoils with Iceland.

However, with a victory on both teams’ minds, they may well cancel each other out.

Prediction: Romania 1-1 Armenia

Asbarez: Governor Newsom Launches Council on Holocaust and Genocide Education

Governor Gavin Newsom is flanked by leaders and advocated who were on hand when he announced the launch of Council on Holocaust and Genocide Education on Oct. 6 (Photo by Ara Khachatourian)

BY ARA KHACHATOURIAN

“The very city of Shushi, from where my grandparents were forced to flee because of Ottoman attacks was attacked just last year [by Turkey] in concert with the Republic of Azerbaijan. So, when we say ‘never again,’ we take a hard stop and mean what it means.”

These were the words spoken by Assemblymember Adrin Nazarian on Wednesday during an event at the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles, where Governor Gavin Newsom announced the launch of the Governor’s Council on Holocaust and Genocide Education.

By referencing Azerbaijan’s aggressive attack—aided by Turkey—on Artsakh last year, Nazarian illustrated the importance of education in abetting the end to the cycle of violence, which has gripped the world, as well as emphasizing that unchecked acts of genocide historically have been repeated.

The newly created Council will be tasked with identifying instructional resources and will teach students about the lessons of genocide, and will support students, teachers and families when acts of anti-Semitism or bigotry occur on school campuses.

“We find ourselves in a moment of history where hate pervades the public discourse,” said Newsom. “National surveys have indicated a shocking decline in awareness among young people about the Holocaust and other acts of genocide. But in California, we are offering an antidote to the cynicism that this is how things are, and responding to that hate the best way we know how – with education and empathy.”

The creation of the council stemmed from an initiative by State Senator Henry Stern, who marshaled a bill through the California legislature addressing the need for education on the matter. The Armenian National Committee of America-Western Region worked closely with Stern and other lawmakers on the passage of the measure.

“The ANCA-WR has worked tirelessly to ensure that the Armenian Genocide is properly taught in public schools, and we have closely collaborated with Senator Henry Stern and his colleagues to find ways to accomplish this goal. As the congressional resolutions specifically stated, it is US policy to encourage public instruction on this issue,” said ANCA-WR Board chair Nora Hovsepian, Esq.

“Governor Gavin Newsom has put words into action and we look forward to playing an integral role on his Council to bring Armenian Genocide curricula to California students. We are grateful to Governor Newsom, Senator Stern and all those who are committed to the principle that such painful lessons of history must never be forgotten,” added Hovsepian.

In his remarks on Wednesday, Stern made a poignant observation, saying that his daughter might not have been born, if his grandparents did not survive the Holocaust, adding that while he and many others grew up with stories of survival, many people lack the first-hand stories that inform them about the horrors of genocide.

“I applaud Senator Stern for his leadership to create this important educational opportunity,” said State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond.  “Education has the power to be a great equalizer and to help us grow, understand, and find a pathway to healing. It is the way to build inclusive and welcoming school environments. This is why, at the California Department of Education, I have created the Education to End Hate Initiative and why I am so proud to co-sponsor Senator Stern’s bill; now we look forward to partnering in the implementation of the $10 million that has been allocated for the Anti Bias Education Grant program in the state budget.”

In his remarks, Thurmond also thanked the ANCA-WR for its efforts to advance genocide education in the state. The ANCA-WR has worked closely with Thurmond who, along with the California Board of Education, has categorized Armenian Genocide education as both a critical and necessary part of the history curriculum. The California State Social Studies Framework will be the key to making certain that the Armenian Genocide is taught.

Newsom has long made the eradication of discrimination and hate a priority, governor’s office said. Newsom has also allocated $110 million for a multi-year grant program, of which $10 million will fund the Anti-Bias Education Grant Program to prevent and address racism and bias in all California public schools and promote inclusivity; and $5 million will support a peer social media network project for children and youth, with an emphasis on K-12 students who have experienced bullying, or who are at risk of bullying based on race, ethnicity, language, or country of origin, or perception of such

Governor Gavin Newsom with ANCA-WR Board Chair Nora Hovsepian (right) and ANCA-WR Executive Director Armen Sahakyan (Photo by Ara Khachatourian)

The Council will be responsible for developing a volunteer speaker’s bureau of individuals that can engage teachers and students in conversation about the lessons of genocide, providing best practices and resources to support schools throughout the state that are dealing with acts of bigotry or discrimination, and hosting educational events and seminars for educators, students and other interested parties, Newsom’s office said.

Stern and Thurmond will be joined by Attorney General Rob Bonta as Co-Chairs of the Council. Also serving on the Council as members are Nazarian, Assemblymembers Jose Medina, James Ramos and Rebecca Bauer-Kahan, and Senators Scott Wiener, Connie Leyva, and Susan Rubio. Based on community feedback, the Council will also include academics, advocates and community organizations reflecting the wide diversity of communities impacted by genocide throughout history, according to the governor’s office.

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