Armenian Prison Healthcare Staff Trained on Prevention and Control of Health Care-Associated Infections

Council of Europe
Oct 25 2021
ARMENIA 25 OCTOBER 2021

The 17 prison medical staff strengthened their knowledge and practical skills on prevention of infections conditioned by medical interventions in penitentiary medical facilities.

 

The training programme is based on a manual earlier developed by the project including inter alia the right to health care, medical confidentiality, monitoring and control of penitentiary health care services in Armenia in line with the Council of Europe and other international standards.

 

Two-day training took part in in-person on 20-21 October 2021. Overall, four sessions are planned to involve all medical staff of the penitentiary system

 

The training programme was developed under the framework of the project “Enhancing health care and human rights protection in prisons in Armenia” implemented by the Council of Europe and funded through the Action Plan for Armenia 2019 -2022.




​Iran’s Defeat In The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War – Part I: Geopolitical And Economic Ramifications

Oct 25 2021

Iran’s Defeat In The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War – Part I: Geopolitical And Economic Ramifications


| By A. Savyon
Iran, South Caucasus | Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1603

The second Nagorno-Karabakh war (September-November 2020) in the southern Caucasus ended with Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia, which had held the Nagorno-Karabakh area since the first war between the two countries (1991-94). Azerbaijan’s victory in the war has important geopolitical and economic ramifications for the southern Caucasus region and for the major players in it – Russia, Turkey, and Iran. This series of reports will discuss the ramifications of the war for Iran and its policy in the region.

The War’s Ramifications For Iran

Until the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Iran had been able to exert control over its ally Armenia and had direct land access to it, and through it to Europe, with the so-called North-South Corridor. Via this route, Iran was able to transfer goods from its industries, including those under Western sanctions. This land route was also used for the uninterrupted smuggling of goods of various kinds.

Following the November 2020 ceasefire, and Azerbaijan’s insistence,[1] with Turkey’s support, on creating an east-west corridor on Armenian soil – the Zangezur Corridor – linking the Azeri enclave on the Turkish border, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic – with Azerbaijan to the east, Iran no longer enjoyed free access to Armenia. The north-south corridor once controlled by Iran was effectively closed by Azerbaijan, with tax roadblocks for inspecting all cargo and charging customs for all trucks from Iran travelling northwards.[2]

This development, and particularly Azerbaijan’s inspection and taxation of northbound truck traffic from Iran, prompted rage in Iran, and in late September 2021 it conducted two surprise military exercises, dubbed “Conquerors of Khaybar,” to intimidate Azerbaijan. Iran’s ideological camp and regime circles issued a series of direct threats to Azerbaijan, inter alia underlining its ability to launch thousands of missiles against the Azerbaijan capital Baku and to direct ethnic populations against Azerbaijan and its patron Turkey.

For example, Hassan Hanizadeh, an Iranian political analyst who is close to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), hinted that Iran could use the Azeri, Shi’ite, and Kurdish ethnic groups against Azerbaijan.[3] Also, the IRGC unveiled, via its media outlets, the previously unknown “Hussainiyoun” Azeri Shi’ite militia  established in the Caucasus by the late IRGC Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani.[4] These media outlets also recently boasted of a Qods Force operation to kidnap Azeris on Azerbaijan soil in collaboration with this militia, and challenged Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, asking whether “Aliyev has the courage now to threaten Iran.”[5]

The region following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement. The green arrow indicates the Zangezur Corridor linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (dark green) with Azerbaijan. Map courtesy of CIA Fact Book, “Azerbaijan.”

In October 2021, operating in the diplomatic arena, Iran sent Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to high-level meetings in Russia in order to gain Russian political backing for Iran’s opposition to what it called border changes in the southern Caucasus. So far Russia has not complied with the Iranian demands, inter alia because it itself is party to the Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire agreement that it mediated – Russia is guarantor of the security of the transport arrangements set out in in the agreement.[6] Russia also does not want a stronger Iran or a stronger Armenia, Iran’s ally, whose prime minister Nikol Pashiniyan is known to be close to the U.S.

Further strengthening its claims against Azerbaijan, Iran accused it of allowing Israel to establish a military presence on its soil, in the form of military bases at the Azerbaijan-Iran border. This presence, it said, was aimed against Iran. Iranian regime officials and the Iranian media leveraged this claim to warn and threaten Azerbaijan, lest it allow what they called enemy forces from outside the region to impact the balance of power and impose geopolitical change at the borders.

Iran sees itself as an influential regional force with troops that is spreading its vision of a ruling order with the values and ideology of its Islamic Revolution, and prides itself on its glorious imperial heritage. As such, it takes a negative view of Azerbaijan’s geopolitical and economic gains on its border at Iran’s expense. It also finds infuriating the fact that Azerbaijan – its younger, smaller neighbor established on land torn away from the Persian Empire whose largely Shi’ite population, albeit secular, has a great deal in common culturally and historically with Iran, and which Iran thinks should by rights be closer to it – is shifting the balance of power in its own favor and in favor of Turkey, Iran’s greatest rival for areas of influence in the Caucasus.

Iran’s apprehensions about losing political influence and trade supremacy in the region following its loss of the north-south corridor to the Azerbaijan-Turkey axis are growing even more in light of the potential ethnic threat that Azerbaijan poses as the Azeri nation-state. Two-thirds of the Azeris in the world live in Iran’s north and constitute 24% of that country’s population; the other third lives in Azerbaijan itself. Iran fears stronger Azeri nationalism and separatism, as well as possible demands by the Azeri regions of northern Iran to secede and join Azerbaijan – as was hinted at during and after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.[7]

These fears, together with what Iran considers the Israeli-Turkish scheming against it, along with many Iranians’ sentimental links to Persian Empire territories lost to Czarist Russia due to Persian weakness, were described accurately by Ahmad Dastmalchian, a former senior official in Iran’s Interior and Foreign Ministries and former ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan, and former head of the Iranian consulate in Saudi Arabia. On October 17, 2021, he warned Azerbaijan President Aliyev not to challenge Iranian sovereignty, and even threatened his survival and the survival of his regime:

“What Azerbaijan is doing together with Turkey and Israel is an Israeli project… The Zionist regime wants a presence at Iran’s borders. Israel seeks to create a domino effect by inciting ethnic minorities in the region, if it can manage to foment unrest – thus harming the authority of the governments of the states in the region and establishing autonomous minority governments… The Zionist regime seeks a war between the border cities of Iran and Azerbaijan, [countries] that were [once] actually one single [state – i.e. the Persian Empire], and for Turkey too to help with this plan…

“Obviously, Iran has taken strategic deterrent [measures – i.e. the Conquerors of Khaybar military exercise] and in my view this is the best response that resulted – [a response] with strength. Iran has sent a good message to the neighboring countries, i.e. that it does not accept any geopolitical change of borders, and this is a firm stand.

“[President] Aliyev in Baku must know that [if] he takes a step, [even] the smallest step, against Iran’s security, he will receive a powerful slap. Iran has proven that it does not compromise on its security. Aliyev must know that [the ground] is shaking under his feet. Therefore, he must emerge from this delusion [of carrying out activity against Iran]. If he wants to play with Iran’s sovereignty, he is playing with his own life and existence. Iran’s political and military leaders have done a good job of clarifying this.”[8]

In effect, Iran is trying today to change the outcome of the war, or at least to influence the shaping of the new power relations in the southern Caucasus that are emerging following the war. Along with its military threats in the form of exercises at its border with Azerbaijan, and the escalating declarations, it appears that the Iranian regime is seeking to obtain its goal primarily via direct pressure through diplomatic channels with Azerbaijan and also with its rivals in the region, Turkey and Russia.

The Geopolitical Historical Basis For Iran’s Claim And Involvement In The Southern Caucasus

The Caucasus region, where Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are now located, were part of the 19th century’s Qajar Persian Empire. Following the empire’s defeats at the hands of Czarist Russia, the subsequent humiliations of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), the areas north of the Aras River were handed over to Czarist Russia’s control, and later became the independent states of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The territories south of the Aras remained under Iranian control. However, the territories lost by the Persian Empire due to its weakness are perceived by many Iranians to remain connected to Iran.

Persian territorial losses after the Gulistan and Turkmenchay treaties (source: U.S. Department of State)

The Treaty Of Gulistan, 1813

The Gulistan Peace Treaty was signed between Czarist Russia and the Persian Empire of the Qajar dynasty in October 1813, in the village of Gulistan in Nagorno-Karabakh, following the Persian defeat in the Russian-Persian war (1804-1813). As part of the treaty, Persia was required to hand over most of the territories that make up today’s Georgia and Azerbaijan: the khanates of the south Caucasus – Karabakh, Ganja, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, and Baku – and to relinquish any claim to the regions of Dagestan, Georgia, Mingrelia, and Abkhazia. In addition, Persia lost all maritime rights to the Caspian Sea, and was forced to grant Russia free trade access across all Persian territories. The treaty enraged the people of Persia, and was one of the factors leading to the fall of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar.

The Treaty of Turkmenchay, 1828

The treaty of Turkmenchay, which ended the Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828 with a Persian defeat, cemented the borders between the two until the early 20th century, and set the borders of the independent states of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the Persian village of Turkmenchay, in February 1928, it was decided that the territory of the Nakhichevan khanate would be absorbed into the Yerevan khanate (which comprises most of Armenia’s territory today), and handed over to Russia. Due to some clauses of the Turkmenchay Treaty, the authorities of Czarist Russia encouraged Armenians to migrate from Persia and Turkey to Nakhichevan, causing tension between the Christian Armenians and local Muslims. In addition to losing the territories of the south Caucasus to Russia, Persia lost maritime rights to the Caspian Sea, and was forced to allow a Russian trade delegation access to all Persian territory, and to allow Russian merchants access to conduct trade in all areas of Persia. It was also required to issue an apology for its violation of the Treaty of Gulistan.

The khanates of Nakhichevan circa 1800 (Source: Armenica.org, prior to May 27, 2006)

 

*A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iran Studies Project

 


[1] Azerbaijan President Aliyev said on April 20, 2021: “We are implementing the Zangazur corridor, whether Armenia likes it or not. If they do, it will be easier for us to implement, if not, we will enforce it… The Azerbaijani people will return to Zangazur, which was taken away from us 101 years ago.” En.president.az/articles/5121, April 20, 2021. The Azeri demand is based on Paragraph 9 of the ceasefire agreement of November 2020; Armenia opposes the Azeri interpretation: “All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections. As agreed by the Parties, new transport links shall be built to connect the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and the western regions of Azerbaijan” Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation.” En.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384, November 10, 2020.

[2] For more on the unfolding of events since August 2021, see Iranian Foreign Ministry mouthpiece Tehran Times, September 24, 2021, “Iran warns of third-parties malign influence over Tehran-Baku ties.”

[3] ISNA (Iran), October 7, 2021.

[4] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 9600, Azeri Shi’ite Militia ‘Hussainiyoun’ Founder Tawhid Ebrahimi: Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani ‘Issued Orders That Paved The Way For Us’, October 20, 2021.

[5] Tahririeh.com, October 12, 2021.

[6] Russia is meant to guarantee freedom of transport at the border crossings that are set out in the ceasefire agreement.

[7] MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1546, Anti-Turkey Statements In Iran – Part III: Erdoğan Is Undermining Iran’s Territorial Integrity, January 11, 2021.

[8] ISNA (Iran), October 17, 2021.

Iran reaches agreement with Armenia on new transport routes

Tehran Times, Iran
Oct 25 2021
  1. Economy
– 15:39

TEHRAN – Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) Mehdi Mirashrafi said good agreements have been reached with Armenia on the development of customs cooperation as well as the use of alternative routes for the transport of goods.

Mirashrafi who visited Moscow on Sunday to attend an international customs conference noted that Iran has diversified its international routes so that no single route could impose a limitation on the country’s international trade.

Earlier this month, Deputy Transport and Urban Development Minister Kheirollah Khademi had announced an agreement between Iran and Armenia for establishing new transit routes, as the two countries are facing problems in trade exchanges through Azerbaijan.

“The alternative transit route for Iranian trucks in Armenia will be asphalted within the next month, and there will be no need to use the previous route which passes through Azerbaijan and requires us to pay tolls to the country,” Khademi said.

Azerbaijan is controlling and claiming ownership for approximately 20 km out of a 400 km route between Iran and Armenia and has imposed strict regulations on Iranian drivers which are posing major problems for them passing through the 20-kilometer section of Armenia’s Goris-Kapan Road including paying tolls levied by Azerbaijani border guards.

Mirashrafi further pointed to the positive talks held with the members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) during the conference, saying: “The volume of trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union has taken an upward path, and with the agreements reached, we will soon see a leap in trade relations with the member countries of this union.”

Referring to the importance of land crossings for the export and import of goods between Iran and Russia, the official said: “Completing the maritime and road infrastructure and providing more customs facilities, especially in the Caspian Sea region, can increase trade [between the two countries].”

In addition to ground roads, Iran has routes in the Caspian Sea through Ro-Ro ships to Azerbaijan Republic, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, Mirashrafi added.

EF/MA

‘Baku’s Road Toll on Iranian Truckers Against Karabakh Truce Deal’

Iran Frontpage
Oct 25 2021

Iran’s ambassador to Armenia says the toll imposed by the Azerbaijan Republic on Iranian trucks, travelling through Nagorno Karabakh, goes against the three-sided truce agreement among Moscow, Yerevan and Baku that ended last year’s conflict in the region.

The truce deal handed control over part of the region, previously held by Armenia, to the Azerbaijan Republic. That includes a 21-kilometer length of road Iranian truckers use.

Abbas Badakhshan Zohoori said based on the deal, the Azerbaijan Republic should have waited for an alternative road through Armenia to be completed before charging Iranian truckers.

He said Baku’s failure to fulfill the agreement means Iranian truckers have to pay a road toll upon entry into Armenia and pay another road toll for the short length of road, which is now controlled by the Azerbaijan Republic. 

He said Tehran and Yerevan are both pushing to fast track the construction of the new alternative road that connects Kajaran to Sisian, in southern Armenia to clear up the problem created by Baku’s move.

Armenia’s Human Rights Defender faces off with government

Oct 25 2021
 

Arnab Tatoyan. Official photo.

The already hostile relationship between Armenia’s Human Rights Defender Arman Tatoyan and the Pashinyan administration has deepened in recent weeks with both Tatoyan and government authorities openly trading barbs.

On 22 October, Tatoyan repeated his assertion that the Azerbaijani military was carrying out ‘active engineering work’ and building fortifications on the territory in the eastern Armenian province of Gegharkunik. 

The claim was immediately followed by a statement from the Ministry of Defence refuting Tatoyan’ assertion and stating that the ‘engineering work’ was carried out ‘not in the territory of Armenia, but ‘next to it’. The Ministry also called on Tatoyan to refrain from spreading ‘unverified information’.

That same day, in an interview with RusArminfo, Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, stated that Tatoyan has never been ‘unbiased’ in his position as Human Rights Defender. He also accused Tatoyan of repeatedly ‘speaking against the revolution’ — referencing the 2018 revolution that deposed then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan and the long-ruling Republican Party, bringing Nikol Pashinyan to power.  

Tatoyan was appointed by a Republican Party-led parliament in 2016 for a 6-year term. Grigoryan claimed that as Tatoyan’s tenure as Human Rights Defender is coming to an end it is ‘obvious’ that he is seeking to start a ‘political career’. 

The relationship between Armenia’s Human Rights Defender and the Pashinyan administration soured in the wake of Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Tatoyan has been particularly critical of government actions in the wake of Azerbaijani troops crossing Armenia internationally recognised border this past spring.

 [Read more Border crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues]

Tatoyan also caused consternation in the government for his criticism of violent rhetoric used during the 2021 snap parliamentary election campaign by both ruling authorities — including Nikol Pashinyan specifically —  and the opposition.   

In April of this year, the Armenian government proposed abolishing a provision in the Armenian Constitution that stipulated that the office of the Human Rights Defender cannot receive less funding in any given year than the amount it had received the previous year. The measure has not yet been voted on in parliament.

Tatoyan condemned the move as ‘discrimination’ that would ‘abolish’ the independence of the office, by making it vulnerable to financial pressure from the authorities. 

The government denied any political motives behind the bill.

In March, a month before the draft constitutional amendment was announced, Tatoyan also accused the ruling authorities of no longer inviting him to weekly government briefings. 

Pashinyan’s spokesperson Mane Gevorgyan replied to the accusation by claiming that Tatoyan had not been attending the briefings ‘for a while’ and had instead sent employees of the Human Rights Defender’s Office in his stead — and that even more recently, his office had sent no one at all. 

In a statement, Tatoyan’s office stressed that invitations to government sessions are a right rather than an obligation of the Human Rights Defender.

‘For objective reasons, the Human Rights Defender was unable to personally attend several government sessions due to a sharp increase in the amount of work and complaints, frequent trips to the Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, which are necessary to draw up reports for international organisations’, the statement reads.


​REC: EXIAR Stands Ready to Support Armenia’s Infrastructure Projects

Sputnik
Oct 20 2021

REC: EXIAR Stands Ready to Support Armenia’s Infrastructure Projects

© Sputnik / Pavel Bednyakov 

The Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance (EXIAR JSC) is ready to provide support to major infrastructure projects in Armenia, Nikita Gusakov, senior vice-president of the Russian Export Centre (REC) and CEO of EXIAR, said.
“Support for infrastructure projects is one of the most important areas of EXIAR’s work. Insurance coverage provided by EXIAR provides for more efficient financing of such projects. We are also ready to provide support to Russian-Armenian export projects on the supply of Russian goods and services (non-resource-based, non-energy exports) to Armenia”, Gusakov said.
During a meeting with representatives of Yerevan Municipality, the parties discussed the renewal of the bus fleet in the Armenian capital, which currently requires about 250 new large-sized buses.
In addition, the Russian side expressed great willingness to support other projects of the Mayor’s Office to modernise the city’s transport infrastructure.

EXIAR is also prepared to provide insurance coverage for the construction of two new metro stations in Yerevan. The Russian company “Metrogiprotrans” was declared the winner of the competition for the construction of the facilities.
The meeting was attended by Pavel Anosov, managing director for customer service at EXIAR, and Hrachya Sargsyan, first deputy mayor of Yerevan.

Armenia: AMPTV [Armenia] confirms participation at Eurovision 2022


Oct 20 2021



CONFIRMED COUNTRIES

by Sanjay (Sergio) Jiandani 


AMPTV, the Armenian national broadcaster, has confirmed that Armenia will compete at the forthcoming 2022 Eurovision Song Contest in  Italy.

Thus Armenia joins the list of countries who have so far confirmed their participation at the 2o22 Eurovision in Italy. The country will be returning to the competition after a year’s absence.

Armenia was slated to compete at the 2021 Eurovision Song Contest but was forced to withdraw from the competition due to the latest events afflicting the country.

Armenia debuted at the Eurovision Song Contest in 2004 and is yet to win the competition. The country’s achieved its best result in the event in 2008 (Sirusho) and 2014 (Aram Mp3) when it placed 4th in the Grand Final.

Armenia has partaken in the contest 13 times and has competed every year since its debut with the exception of 2012 and 2021 when the country decided to withdraw from the competition.

The Armenians have enjoyed much success in Eurovision, garnering a total of 7 top 10 placings in their 13 year Eurovision history.

Athena Manoukian was set to represent Armenia at the 2020 Eurovision Song Contest in Rotterdam with her entry ‘Chains on you‘, but due to the cancellation of the event she was not able to grace the Eurovision stage.

REC’s Support for Exports to Armenia Amounts to $72 Million Since Early 2021

Sputnik
Oct 20 2021




The Russian Export Centre’s (REC) support for exports to Armenia in 2020 amounted to over $84 mln, and has exceeded $72 mln since early 2021, Nikita Gusakov, senior vice-president of REC and CEO of the Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance (EXIAR), said at the plenary meeting of the 8th Russian-Armenian Interregional Forum.
“In 2021, we have already provided support for exports to Armenia amounting to $72.4 million. On the one hand, these figures are still rather low, but we can see really positive trends”, Gusakov stated.
“We have already implemented a project on the delivery of wagons for the South Caucasus railway, which was supported by the REC group this year. Financial support for the supply of domestic buses for the needs of Yerevan as well as the construction of new underground stations is also discussed”, he said.
The REC Group (part of VEB.RF) provides financial support to Russian companies engaged in export activities in Armenia. The REC supports major infrastructure projects, including the supply of wagons for the South Caucasus railway.
Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Maxim Reshetnikov and Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Armenia Gnel Sanosyan delivered their statements at the plenary session of the 8th Russian-Armenian Forum, organised by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure of Armenia.
The forum also hosts a business mission to Armenia, organised by the Russian Export Centre together with the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Armenia, the “Investment Support Centre” fund, and the Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in Armenia. As part of the business mission, there will be more than 250 meetings between representatives of Russian and Armenian companies. A total of 24 Russian exporters and more than 70 companies from Armenia will take part in the mission.
https://sputniknews.com/20211020/recs-support-for-exports-to-armenia-amounts-to-72-million-since-early-2021-1090078543.html

Turkish press: Flake’s nomination as US ambassador to Turkey approved

Former Republican Senator from Arizona and nominee for ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake (R) walks with his wife Cheryl Flake, on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., U.S., Oct. 19, 2021. (EPA Photo)

The nomination of former senator Jeff Flake as Washington’s ambassador to Turkey was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday.

The committee voted to approve 33 nominees for the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other critical foreign policy positions.

Among the ambassador nominees chosen by President Joe Biden are Thomas Nides for Israel, David Cohen for Canada, Claire Cronin for Ireland and Steven Bondy for Bahrain.

“The nominations move favorably to the Senate Floor for consideration by the full Senate,” said a statement by the committee.

Nominated in mid-July, Flake was a key Republican ally for Biden during last year’s White House race and endorsed the Democratic then-nominee after establishing himself as a Republican long at odds with former President Donald Trump.

Flake served in both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his time in Congress, which spanned nearly two decades.

In September, he said Turkey would face more sanctions if it purchases additional S-400 missiles from Russia.

Flake, who had rejected the so-called Armenian genocide during his term as a senator, said he would recognize it if he is appointed as ambassador.

Biden described the killings of Ottoman Armenians during World War I as “genocide” in April.

“We remember the lives of all those who died in the Ottoman-era Armenian genocide and recommit ourselves to preventing such an atrocity from ever again occurring,” Biden said. “And we remember so that we remain ever-vigilant against the corrosive influence of hate in all its forms,” he said.

“We do this not to cast blame but to ensure that what happened is never repeated,” Biden said.

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was quick to condemn the statement.

“We have nothing to learn from anybody on our own past. Political opportunism is the greatest betrayal to peace and justice. We entirely reject this statement based solely on populism,” Çavuşoğlu said in a Twitter post.

With the acknowledgment, Biden followed through on a campaign promise he made a year ago. Mainly hailing from Ottoman Armenians, Armenians in the U.S. constitute significant communities in the East Coast and California.

Turkey’s position on the 1915 events is that the death of Armenians in eastern Anatolia took place when some sided with invading Russians and revolted against Ottoman forces. A subsequent relocation of Armenians resulted in numerous casualties, added by massacres from militaries and militia groups of both sides. The mass arrests of prominent Ottoman Armenian politicians, intellectuals and other community members suspected of links with separatist groups, harboring nationalist sentiments and being hostile to Ottoman rule were rounded up in then-capital Istanbul on April 24, 1915 are commemorated as the beginning of later atrocities.

Turkey objects to the presentation of the incidents as “genocide” but describes the 1915 events as a tragedy in which both sides suffered casualties.

Ankara has repeatedly proposed the creation of a joint commission of historians from Turkey and Armenia plus international experts to tackle the issue.

The list of disagreements is unusually long for the two NATO allies, including the U.S. support for YPG terrorists, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot in Syria, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system and Biden’s declaration of the 1915 events regarding the Ottoman Armenians during World War I as “genocide.”

Turkish press: Ottoman Istanbul in flames: Fire towers of the coveted city

A general view from the Beyazıt or Serasker Tower in Istanbul University’s Beyazıt Central Campus, November 2020. (Shutterstock Photo)

“Istanbul is the land of sparkling lights and beautiful fragrances; Bosporus the blue lace filter of these lights and fragrances that flow from one side to the other between Europe and Asia; the Golden Horn, the Inner Harbor, the pool where the beauties flowing in from the Bosporus have their last bath. This city, no doubt, is a corner of paradise. I am staying here because I love the Turks. They are a matchless people befitting this matchless land, which is a corner of paradise. Their nature has a heavenly dignity, and their kindness is more modest than of the angels. I am afraid of forgetting my fatherland amongst this great nation. Fatherland, thou art dear, very dear! Yet the Turk, thou too art dear, very dear!”

An old photo of the Beyazıt or Serasker Tower in Istanbul in 1855. (Wikimedia Photo)

This poetic piece about the Turkish metropolis of Istanbul was written by Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval, a noble of France’s Limousin province who converted to Islam and went by the name Ahmed. Many fell in love with the city over the centuries and penned poems and memoirs to describe its magnificence. Istanbul’s glory comes from its geographical position, beauty, richness and cosmopolitan atmosphere. However, as everything has its price, while the city is beautiful it has suffered through many disasters including famine, plague, earthquakes and fires.

The quote “Fire was the calamity of wooden built Istanbul. Istanbul’s fire, Anatolia’s plague” demonstrates how the city and fire were inseparable phenomena. Fires were such a regular occurrence in the city that miscellaneous writer James Dallaway wrote they were so frequent one could not go two months without witnessing one. As recounted in chronicles, traveler accounts and court records, Ottoman Istanbul appeared to suffer greatly from fires. Other than the firefighters and their provided equipment, the city had another key tool to fight flames: fire towers. These tall structures played a crucial role in detecting where fires were located and announcing them to the people. Thanks to the fire towers, those on watch were able to warn people in advance, saving their lives and belongings, before the fire spread.

A view from the Galata Tower, Istanbul, Turkey, circa 1900s.(Shutterstock Photo)

There were two fire lookout towers in the city up until the 19th century, namely, the Galata Tower and Beyazıt Tower, also named the Serasker Tower referring to a title formerly used in the Ottoman Empire for a vizier who commanded an army. In the second quarter of the 19th century, a third tower, the Icadiye Tower, was constructed in the Üsküdar district on the Asian side of the city.

The Galata Tower was erected by the Genoese in the 14th century. Undoubtedly, it was not built to watch for fires. However, that evolved into one of its functions in Ottoman Istanbul. Though the tower itself was unable to escape fires and had to be repaired from time to time, it continued to be used as a fire tower until the end of the 19th century.

Known by different names, the first fire tower of Istanbul was built to watch and announce fires within the walled city. The Beyazıt or Serasker Tower, which is about 61 meters (200 feet) high, affords a landmark view of the city. However, the city’s first tall structure was constructed out of wood and built on the third hill of Istanbul, once home to the Old Palace. Turkish historian Reşad Ekrem Koçu named this tower the “Yangın Köşkü” (“Fire Mansion”). While the date of its construction is unclear, it does coincide with the fire of Küçükpazar avenue, which occurred in February of 1750 according to Izzi Süleyman Efendi, chronicler of the 18th century. Therefore, it seems more accurate to say the fire tower was constructed in 1750.

A close-up of the Beyazıt or Serasker Tower, Istanbul, Turkey. (Sabah File Photo)

This structure was originally built of wood in Beyazıt Square, now home to a tower made of stone, but it burned down in the fire of 1774 that swept the Cibali neighborhood and was later rebuilt. Journalist and writer Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu argues that the wooden tower was burned by the Janissaries, members of elite infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan’s household troops. Their main intention was to kill certain individuals they expected to be at the scene, but since their aim was known, the plan did not work and resulted in the burning of the tower. After this fire, “one of the Süleymaniye Mosque’s minarets was used for watching.” In 1826, the tower was destroyed with the abolition of the Janissaries, but when a fire occurred two days later, it was decided to rebuild the structure. That tower was also made of wood and set alight within in a short period of time. Then, a stone tower was built in 1828. The architect of this iteration of the tower was Senekerim Balyan, a member of the Balyan family of Armenian origin, who had great influence on the architecture of the Ottoman Empire.

Before the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826, watchers called “dideban” alerted announcers known as “köşklü” about the locations of fires. Köşklü announcers then informed the “gece bekçisi” (night watchmen) to spread the word to the people. English author Julia Pardoe’s notes provide us insight into the outlook and functions of this tower. If her remarks can be believed, Serasker Tower had windows on all sides and fire watchers would change guard once every two hours. She writes that no matter how far they were, one could hear their shouting because there was always a fire. “In high towers of the city, there were night guards and used a kind of instrument to announce a fire’s spot. There was not a single week you could stay in your bed without hearing the shouts of fire watchers such as ‘fire in Galata!’ Or ‘fire in Üsküdar!'”

A general view from the cityscape shows the Galata Tower in Istanbul, Oct. 11, 2018. (Getty Images)

In 1849, the tower took on its present form. Three more floors with round windows were added. Thus, the tower now comprised of a total of four floors, namely, the starboard floor, the basket floor, the signal floor and the watch floor. With these additions, the height of the tower reached 118 meters. There is a wooden staircase consisting of 180 steps leading from the entrance to the watch floor. The other three floors are reached by a wooden staircase consisting of a total of 76 steps. It has a total of 256 wooden steps. The watch floor, decorated with 12 windows, offers a magnificent 360-degree view of Istanbul.

The tower continued to serve its function until the proclamation of the republic, that is, until 1923. The monument was renovated twice, once in 1997 and again in 2010. The renovation in 2010 was carried out within the scope of the Istanbul 2010 Capital of Culture project. The tower was registered as a private museum on July 23, 2013, with the approval of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the General Directorate of Cultural Heritage and Museums.

When the Beyazıt or Serasker Tower is red, that means it will be snowy the next day. (Photo by Zeynel Yaman)

Today, the building is used for daily weather forecasts. During the evenings you can tell the weather forecast from the different colors of the lights. When the lights of the tower are blue, the weather will be clear the next day; when green, the weather will be rainy; when yellow, the weather will be foggy; when red, that means it will be snowy. In Turkish, the first letters of the colors of the lights correspond to the weather term, making it easy to remember. For example, yellow translates to “sarı,” which corresponds to foggy, which is “sisli” in Turkish, just as red is “kırmızı” and snowy is “karlı.”

The tower has undergone a brief period of maintenance and is now open to visitors between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. every weekday. Visiting is free but an appointment is required. To make an appointment, simply send an e-mail with the date and time you wish to visit to [email protected] or [email protected].