Category: 2021

Armenian President declared impossibility of border demarcation without Russia

Karapet Navasardian
Oct 28 2021

According to Sargsyan, difficulties in defining the border have arisen, in particular, with the villages that find themselves on the border, as well as with the territories owned by the companies. For example, in relation to one of the mining enterprises, it is not clear where “the mine part is now – to the left or to the right”.

Last week, President Vladimir Putin, speaking at a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, also said that Russia could play a key role in defining the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “We probably don’t need anyone here, except for the two sides and Russia. There are very simple and pragmatic things: yes, because there are maps in the General Staff of the Russian army, which show how the borders of the union republics passed during the Soviet period, ”he said.

According to the Russian president, you need to “calmly sit on both sides” and, using the data of Soviet maps, “somewhere to align something, somewhere to exchange something.”

Territorial results of the peace agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Map

The parties concluded a trilateral agreement on stopping hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020 with the mediation of Russia. As a result, the Kelbajar, Aghdam and Lachin regions ceded to Azerbaijan, while Armenia retained the Lachin corridor, which provides communication with Nagorno-Karabakh. It was also decided to send almost 2,000 Russian peacekeepers along the line of contact between the parties.

A year later, the delineation of territories and demarcation of borders are still not completed. On October 2, Yerevan announced that it was ready to delimit the borders with Azerbaijan through the mediation of Russia.

Armenia, Russia discussing ways to normalize Yerevan’s relations with Ankara — official

Garnik Tadevosian
TASS, Russia
Oct 28 2021
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said on numerous occasions that his team is willing to bring relations with Turkey to normal, reopen borders and unblock communication routes

YEREVAN, October 28. /TASS/. Armenia is ready to normalize relations with Turkey and is in talks with Russia on the matter, Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan said on Thursday following a Security Council meeting.

“We have repeatedly said that we are ready to normalize relations with Turkey. We are in consultations with our Russian colleagues on ways to move forward on the matter. Like Turkey, we have stated that there are some positive signs and we can start normalizing relations,” he pointed out.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said on numerous occasions that his team is willing to bring relations with Turkey to normal, reopen borders and unblock communication routes. According to Pashinyan, the move will bring peace and stability to the region.

Although Armenia and Turkey share a common border, they don’t have diplomatic relations. In 2009 in Zurich, the two countries’ foreign ministers signed protocols on the establishment of diplomatic ties and the principles of relations but neither of the parties ratified those documents. On March 1, 2018, Armenia rescinded the protocols. The Armenian authorities have repeatedly said that Turkey provided assistance to Azerbaijan during military activities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone in the fall of 2020. Yerevan also claimed that Ankara had transferred militants from the Middle East to the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Turkish Press:Turkey’s first Armenian sub-governor expected to take office

Talar Tumanian
BIAnet.org, Turkey
Oct 28 2021
Turkey’s first Armenian sub-governor expected to take office

Berk Acar passed all the exams to become a sub-governor.
İstanbul – BIA News Desk28 October 2021, Thursday 17:28

For the first time, a person from Turkey’s Armenian community will become a sub-governor, Agos newspaper reported.

Berk Acar passed all the exams to become a sub-governor and is expected to be appointed to a district in the coming period, according to Agos.

Districts are the second-largest administrative zones in Turkey. The country has 81 provinces and 519 districts. (EMK/VK)

Armenia Inter-agency Response Plan Update 2021 (October 2020 – December 2021)

Maral Chavushian
Relief Web
Oct 28 2021
Format
Appeal

 

Source
  • UNCT Armenia

    •  

 

Posted
28 Oct 2021

 

Originally published
28 Oct 2021

 

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Introduction

The initial Inter Agency Response Plan (IARP) was for a period of nine months (October 2020 – June 2021) to coordinate the response to meet the needs of 90,000 persons in a refugee-like situation who arrived in Armenia as a consequence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since then, many of these individuals have returned and, as of end of June 2021, 36,989 individuals remain in a refugee-like situation1 in the ten regions of the country² and Yerevan. IARP partners have therefore updated their operational approach based on the remaining refugee-like population as well as their newly identified needs and are enhancing the multisectoral response required to provide the necessary assistance to the estimated remaining 37,000 individuals in refugee-like situation as well as the host community in Armenia. With this updated interagency plan, which covers the period from July to December 2021, a total of 15 IARP partners are appealing for US$ 20,233,689.

Situation Update

While the ceasefire agreement is still holding, concerns have emerged in recent months following reports of sporadic incidents of intimidation or violence that have prompted questions around security conditions in areas of origin, impacting the willingness or capacity of some people to return.

According to the protection needs assessments³ conducted by UNHCR and its partners in July-August 2021, 94 per cent of respondents declared that they preferred to remain in Armenia or were unsure about their prospects for return. These intentions had already been captured by other Protection Needs assessments conducted earlier during the year and also confirmed by the Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) carried out in March-April, in which 94 per cent of interviewees confirmed their intention not to move or were undecided.

Since the onset of the emergency in the fall of 2020, the Government of Armenia, at both the national and local levels, has provided critical support to the new arrivals, including space in communal shelters and 18 different cash assistance programmes.

Host communities also played a critical role in welcoming the refugee-like population, sharing their housing, food and other resources. However, the conflict severely impacted the displaced and host community populations in Armenia, with a notable increase in reported physical, social and mental trauma, as well as financial challenges. In this context, the Government and civil society faced increasing difficulties in coordinating, financing and addressing essential needs.

Acute protection risks were identified, especially among the most vulnerable individuals, those with specific needs, such as older persons without support, persons with disabilities and pregnant women, who require special attention and assistance. Key findings of the monitoring exercises also indicated the need for continuous awarenessraising among the refugee-like population about their access to rights, public services and other assistance programmes.

Access to information remains vital as people need to know how to apply for and where to access services, including health care, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), documentation, and other social protection services.⁴ The refugee-like population continued to report lack of information among the main reasons for not approaching the authorities to report missing documents or not accessing appropriate health care.⁵ MHPSS also remains one of the gaps highlighted by the protection needs assessments: 72 per cent of persons in a refugee-like situation reported a relative showing signs of stress and 52 per cent noticed that their children showed signs of stress and behavioural change. Interviewees referred to their inability to return home, loss of property, and loss of hope for the future as the top three sources of anxiety.

Shelter support remains the top priority cited by the refugee-like population, according to the most recent humanitarian needs assessments.⁶ Lack of space, inadequate water or bathroom facilities, and lack of heating were the top three shelter-related concerns raised by the refugee-like population; whereas host families raised issues around lack of privacy/dignity and the need to address deteriorating infrastructure and support to cover utility costs.⁷ Compared to December 2020, the proportion of persons in a refugee-like situation paying rent increased, reaching 95 per cent by August 2021, while 2 per cent of the refugee-like population continues to be hosted in collective shelters, suggesting a need for further shelter support.⁸ Non-food items (NFIs), especially clothing and household items such as bedding and cooking utensils, will also still be required in the coming months, as well as additional support to address specific winter-related needs.

Access to education has stabilized since the onset of the emergency: formal education is now available to 80 per cent of the refugee-like population close to their places of residence.
Around 94 per cent of households in a refugeelike situation have school-aged children attending formal education programmes.10 Both refugee-like and host communities have similar levels of access to education, mostly thanks to the integration of all children living in a refugee-like situation in public preschool, secondary and higher education.
However, IARP partners need to continue supporting the capacity of the education sector and ensuring continuity of education by providing relevant assistance. This will enable all children to attend school during their displacement and provide a sense of stability, structure and hope for the future.

Following a ground-breaking decision by the Government, primary health services are provided free of charge to all citizens of Armenia, including the refugee-like population. This decision enabled them to access primary health facilities in their area of temporary residence and immediate medical care without special registration procedures. Multiple health partners provided significant quantities of medication and supplies during the first nine months of the response, which helped adequately meet health-related needs. Yet, it remains essential to ensure, in coordination with the Government and IARP partners, that medical supplies are efficiently distributed at primary health centres (PHCs), and that overall access and quality of services, especially in rural PHCs, are improved.

Regarding food security, only 1 per cent of the refugee-like population is still severely food insecure, while 15 per cent is moderately food insecure, according to the latest assessments.
Food ranks fifth among priority needs identified in the July-August Protection Needs Assessments. As the price of a basic food basket continues to rise, and given the challenging economic context, food insecure persons in a refugee-like situation and those at risk of food insecurity still need support, especially individuals with specific nutritional needs, including women of childbearing age and infants.11 Specific nutrition support must also be provided to prevent micro-nutritional deficiencies, which would otherwise negatively impact development and health.

The socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 and the aftermath of conflict have affected economic activity in several communities.12 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in damage to infrastructure, disruption of markets, lack of access to farmland, loss of assets and displacement, which have collectively impacted the lives of both the displaced population and host community. The socioeconomic situation in Armenia was already fragile prior to the conflict and continues to be so nine months after the arrival of the refugee-like population, compounded by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Available resources have been further stretched, as have livelihood and employment opportunities in the cities and towns where the displaced population has settled.

Of high concern is also the increasing debt burden observed between December 2020 and March/ April 2021, which is impacting local communities’ ability to host the refugee-like population. According to the second round of the MSNA, 59 per cent of host households reported having debts averaging AMD 1 million (approximately US$ 1,920). Similarly, the Protection Needs Assessments indicated that in March-April 2021, 32 per cent of refugee-like households reported having generated debts, compared to 8 per cent in December 2020.

Protection Needs Assessments findings also indicate that 76 per cent of respondents in a refugee-like situation were unemployed during the previous six months. Targeted early recovery and livelihood interventions that promote long-term selfreliance are therefore essential to gradually phaseout the humanitarian response and mainstream development assistance to the refugee-like population likely to remain in Armenia.

It is crucial to further support and protect the income-generating assets of the refugee-like population, including their livestock and poultry, for them to reduce reliance on food assistance and humanitarian aid, curb the recent trend of increasing debt, generate income and develop a buffer against potential future shocks.

According to the April vulnerability assessment, more than 50 per cent of the refugee-like population used crisis coping mechanisms to overcome shocks from the effects of displacement and the COVID-19 pandemic by reducing their expenses on health and education, selling productive assets, and becoming dependent on support from aid agencies or neighbours.

In particular, livelihood/income generating interventions are needed for the refugee-like population, especially those who are severely or moderately food insecure or those at risk of food insecurity, to reduce their dependence on food assistance and develop a buffer against additional shocks.

ECHR announces its decision on Armenian citizens vs Azerbaijan cases

Emil Lazarian

Oct 28 2021



    BakuJAMnews

The European Court of Human Rights announced 4 decisions on 51 claims against Azerbaijan and fined the country’s government in the total amount of 239,450 euros [approximately $ 277,800]. Two decisions were made in cases of violation of citizens’ electoral rights. In the coming days, the ECHR will announce its decisions on two claims of Armenian citizens against Azerbaijan.

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On October 28, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its four decisions on 51 claims from Azerbaijan. t

Two decisions relate to cases of violation of the electoral rights of citizens in Azerbaijan. In the course of two such trials, the parties came to an agreement; in the other two, the court took into account the unilateral petitions from the government.

The Azerbaijani government was fined for a total of 239,450 euros [approximately $ 277,800] in four decisions on 51 plaintiffs.

According to the Arzu Samadbeyli and Others v. Azerbaijan case, the plaintiffs nominated themselves from opposition parties in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Some of the voters’ signatures were invalidated and their candidacies were not registered.

The plaintiffs argued that there was an interference with their electoral rights but the Central Election Commission and local courts did not satisfy their complaints.

At the communication stage, the government acknowledged the violations pointed out in the claims. Although the majority of the plaintiffs rejected the offer to receive compensation, the ECHR took the government’s request into account. According to the court’s decision, each of the 37 plaintiffs will be paid compensation in the amount of 4,750 euros [$ 5,510], 3 plaintiffs will receive 5,000 euros [$ 5,800], and the government will pay 4,500 euros [$ 5,220] to another plaintiff.

The Mubariz Rahimli and Others v. Azerbaijan, also addressed the issue of excluding plaintiffs from the 2015 parliamentary elections and the 2016 rerun parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. The CEC refused to register candidates due to the invalidity of some of the voters’ signatures. Local courts and the Central Election Commission ignored the plaintiffs’ complaints.

During the communication stage, the plaintiffs entered into a friendly agreement with the government of the country. According to the decision of the European Court, 4 plaintiffs will receive compensation from the government in the amount of 4,750 euros [$ 5,510], and two plaintiffs – 5,000 euros [$ 5,800].

According to the materials of the Emil Mehdiyev and Vahid Abilov v. Azerbaijan case, the plaintiffs are members of the religious society of Jehovah’s Witnesses. They refused to undergo compulsory military service because of their religious beliefs, but were prosecuted for this. They were imprisoned for one year.

The plaintiffs challenged in the European court the interference with their freedom of religion.

At the stage of communication, the government admitted that it had violated the rights of the plaintiffs. The ECHR took into account the unilateral petition of the Azerbaijani authorities and awarded each of the two plaintiffs 3,500 euros [$ 4,060] in compensation.

On November 4, the European Court of Human Rights will announce two more decisions on the cases filed against Azerbaijan. Both decisions relate to the claims filed by the citizens of Armenia.

According to Khojoyan and Others v. Azerbaijan, the plaintiffs are Hasmik Khojyan, Yeghine Vardazaryan and Haykaz Khojyan (deceased). They are citizens of Armenia and were born in 1964, 1967 and 1959, respectively.

The court case is related to the allegations of the complainants of the detention and bad treatment of their father at the beginning of 2014 on the territory of Azerbaijan. The plaintiffs’ father left his home, located in Armenia and close to the border with Azerbaijan, in the morning hours of January 28, 2014. Two days later, reports spread about his detention in Azerbaijan. He was handed over to Armenia on March 4, 2014. The man passed away 10 weeks later.

The Diary of the European Court writes that, according to the plaintiffs, paragraphs 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty and security), 13 (right to an effective legal remedy) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination ) European convention were violated.

According to the materials of the Petrosyan v. Azerbaijan case, the plaintiff Artush Petrosyan is an Armenian citizen, born in 1957 and residing in Chinari (Armenia).

The plaintiff’s son, born in 1981, crossed the border with Azerbaijan on August 7, 2014. He was detained by Azerbaijani servicemen and died in the territory of Azerbaijan.

The plaintiff disputes the violation of paragraphs 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 13 (right to an effective legal remedy) and 14 ( prohibition of discrimination) of the European convention.


Armenian denies withdrawing from border region

Lilit Nahapetian
Iran Front Page
Oct 28 2021
By

 IFP Editorial Staff

 –

October 28, 2021

Armenia’s prime minister denies media reports that the country has withdrawn forces from Syunik a province bordering Iran. Nikol Pashinian was responding to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s claim about the so-called Zangezur corridor before parliament.

Pashinian said there has been no change in the posture of the Armenian troops in Syunik province.

He added, “Our border guards have been serving in the posts since December 2020”. The denial from Pashnian comes after repeated claims by Azerbaijani officials about the Zangezur corridor near the Iranian border.

Aliyev has threatened to capture the corridor by force and in violation of the UN Charter. Azeri officials stand accused of causing tension over “Zangezur” through resorting to propaganda after the country signed a truce with Armenian in November 2020, ending their 44-day bloody war.

They claim that during the ceasefire talks, Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia agreed on carving out a swath of land linking Nakhjavan to Azerbaijan.

This is while the 9-point agreement does not make any reference to the issue. Only Article 9 says Armenia has agreed to open closed routes for transportation between Azerbaijan’s west and Nakhjavan.

The wording does not say anything about the creation of a corridor which would eliminate the border and deprive Iran of access to Armenia’s transit route.

Obviously, Baku is making an effort to insinuate its own narrative and interpretation of Article 9 of the truce deal through resorting to propaganda.

Tensions with Azerbaijan reveal Iran’s loss of influence in Caucasus

Baghdasarian Karlen
The Arab Weekly
Oct 28 2021
Iran lost influence as a result of last year’s conflict, while its arch enemy Israel and rival power Turkey strengthened their positions.
Thursday 28/10/2021

One year after the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, another conflict in the Caucasus is brewing. This time tensions have risen between Iran and Azerbaijan, following Baku’s arrest of Iranian truck drivers and its joint military drills with Turkey and Pakistan. While a full-scale confrontation between the two nations remains unlikely, the flare-up demonstrates the deep underlying tensions in the region. Iran lost influence as a result of last year’s conflict, while its arch enemy Israel and rival power Turkey strengthened their positions. The complex ethnic make-up, abundance of energy resources and an intersection of expanding global trade routes means the scramble to hold sway in the Caucasus will continue.

On Oct. 1, Iran conduced massive military exercises on its northern border with Azerbaijan. Thousands of troops, dozens of tanks, artillery guns and helicopters were deployed in the largest drills since the 1990s. Azerbaijan responded by flexing its military muscles together with its ally Turkey. The Caucasus nation has also deployed anti-aircraft systems near the capital Baku, which is not surprising given that Mohammad Bagheri, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military commander and Iran’s chief of staff, said that in case the conflict escalates, “IRGC will attack Azerbaijan with 4,000 missiles, which will completely destroy Baku.” Moreover, the head of the forces of the IRGC in Tabriz, Col. Hossein Pursmail said that “the repetition of Israel’s threats against Iran through the mouth of the Republic of Azerbaijan is not only not in the interests of Baku, but is also a threat to its very existence.”

Indeed, Israel played a very important role during the war in Nagorno-Karabah in 2020 by supplying Azerbaijan with sophisticated weapons, including so-called kamikaze drones. However, the Jewish state and the energy-rich former Soviet republic have been strategic partners for many years. Tehran now accuses Baku of also hosting Turkey-backed Syrian fighters on its territory, although some reports suggest they were already there during the 44-day war. But why did Iran remain silent for more than a year about these concerns?

After last year’s war, the Islamic Republic lost much of its influence in the Caucasus, and Turkey significantly improved its positions. Even Pakistan managed to increase its standing in the region. In September, troops from Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan held military drills near Baku, despite protests from Tehran. More importantly, as a result of the 2020 conflict, Azerbaijan captured most of Nagorno-Karbakh and surrounding regions, which means that transport routes from Iran to Armenia now go through Azerbaijan, and not through the territory that was controlled by ethnic Armenians for more than two decades. In other words, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Caucasus, and Iran has many reasons to be worried.

That, however, does not mean that the Islamic Republic is ready to launch an attack on its northern neighbour. After the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey, Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, signed the Shusha Declaration in June, the two countries became close military allies. According to the document, the parties pledged to jointly act in response to military threats. Iranian leaders are quite aware that Baku is not on its own. A war against Azerbaijan would also mean a war against Turkey, and it is almost certain that Pakistan and Israel would provide military assistance to the Caucasus nation. Thus, Tehran is unlikely to choose to get involved in such a risky adventure.

Although there were rumours that the Islamic Republic could deploy its troops to Armenia to prevent Turkey and Azerbaijan from capturing southern parts of the country, such an option does not seem very probable. Armenia is a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and is heavily dependent on Moscow. Russia’s peacekeeping troops have been stationed in Nagorno-Karbakh since November 2020, and the last thing the Kremlin needs is another conflict in its zone of influence.

For Iran, however, the southern Armenian province of Syunik, which the Azerbaijanis call Zangezur, is a weak point. This strategically important region separates the main territory of Azerbaijan from its isolated exclave – the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Given that Baku and Yerevan have gradually started to normalise their relations, it is a matter of time before the two nations build a land corridor that will connect Baku not only with Nakhchivan, but also with Turkey. The Nakhchivan corridor would become part of a global trade route from China to Europe through the Caspian Sea, and would bypass Iran. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic partially funded the construction of an international transport corridor, known as the North-South project, that goes from Russia to Iran through Azerbaijan and connects by sea with India. If there was a serious confrontation with Baku, the very construction of the corridor would be jeopardised.

Iran’s options are, therefore, rather limited. Hypothetically, Tehran could take a chance and fight a war against Azerbaijan, but in that case millions of Azerbaijanis living in Iran could support a guerrilla war against the Islamic Republic. Azerbaijan’s victory in the 44-day war against Armenia resulted in the growth of national pride among Iranian Azerbaijanis, which means that Tehran will have to think twice before engaging in confrontation against its northern neighbour.

Indeed, there have been signs of a de-escalation with the arrested Iranian truck drivers now free and the countries’ foreign ministers pledging to resolve differences through dialogue.

One thing is for sure. A potential war in the energy-rich Caucasus region would result in even higher gas prices in the global market.

Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and “pipeline politics.”

Syndication Bureau 

Written ByNikola Mikovic

    Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and “pipeline politics.”

    ​Consulate General of Armenia in Los Angeles hosts reception in honor of Artsakh’s State Minister

    Hambik Zargarian
    Public Radio of Armenia
    Oct 30 2021

    Consulate General of Armenia in Los Angeles hosts reception in honor of Artsakh’s State Minister

     , 22:06 

    A reception was held at the Consulate General of Armenia in Los Angeles in honor of the State Minister of the Republic of Artsakh Artak Beglaryan. The reception was attended by leaders of ecclesiastical, political, cultural, business, and benevolent organizations of the Armenian community of California as well as community members.

    Elected U.S. officials also came to meet with the Artsakh State Minister. Among them were California State Senators Anthony Portantino and María Elena Durazo, California State Assemblymembers Adrin Nazarian and Laura Friedman, Los Angeles City Councilmember Paul Krekorian, and representatives of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

    Consul General of Armenia in Los Angeles Ambassador Armen Baibourtian invited H.E. Archbishop Pargev Martirosyan for a prayer to begin the reception with an invocation and deliver remarks.

    Welcoming the guests, Ambassador Baibourtian stressed the importance of the visit of Artsakh State Minister Artak Beglaryan and noted that it is a good opportunity to get acquainted with the current situation in Artsakh, its future programs, and to outline the important role of the Armenian community of California in these programs.

    The State Minister presented to the Armenian-American community the five main pillars to build the future of Artsakh: stable security, improved demography, sustainable economic development, high-quality education, and effective governance. State Minister Beglaryan spoke about the plans in the framework of those five pillars and the role of the Armenian Diaspora in it.

    Speeches were also delivered by the Executive Director/CEO of the Armenian Missionary Association of America (AMAA) Zaven Khanjian, who was also the co-host of the reception along with the Consul General. Further speeches were delivered by Senior Advisor to the State Minister David Akopyan as well as elected state and local officials present at the event. They presented certificates of recognition to the State Minister of the Republic of Artsakh and assured their continued support and commitment to stand by the people of Artsakh.

    At the end of the reception, Ambassador Baibourtian presented a Certificate of Appreciation to Executive Director of the Armenian National Committee of America -Western Region (ANCA-WR) Armen Sahakyan for his many years of dedicated service, professionalism, and effective cooperation with the Consulate General of Armenia as well as on the occasion of completing his mission in California and decision to move to Armenia.

    Armenia mandates masks outdoors

    Chmshkian Vicken
    Public Radio of Armenia
    Oct 30 2021


    , 12:34

     1 minute read

    Armenia will mandate wearing of masks outdoors from November 1 o reduce the risk of spreading the coronavirus disease. A relevant decision has been signed by Minister of Health Anahit Avanesyan.

    Masks will not be mandatory for children under 5 and people with chronic respiratory diseases: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema or bronchitis, severe respiratory failure, chronic heart failure (stages C and D) provided that the mentioned persons have a document proving the relevant medical condition.

    Direct participants and speakers at events hosted by the President of the Republic of Armenia, the Catholicos of All Armenians, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the President of the Constitutional Court and the President of the Supreme Judicial Council will also be exempt from wearing masks. The rule does not apply to journalists and service staff.

    Wearing of masks will not be mandatory during exercising or cycling, as well as in specially designated areas for outdoor recreation and beaches, mountains, forests, but not in city parks, botanical gardens and zoos, historical and cultural sites.

    TV hosts can also choose not to wear masks, given they are alone in the studio. People with hearing and speaking disorders, mental and behavioral disorders, cognitive disorders are also exempt from wearing masks.

    Hampig Sassounian arrives in Armenia

    Lilit Nahapetian
    Panorama, Armenia
    Oct 30 2021

    In a message to the Armenian people, Hampig Sassounian announced on Friday that he is in Armenia, Asbarez reported.

    “With the utmost happiness I am writing to you from Armenia. After almost 40 years, I have the honor to be on Armenia’s soil, drink Armenia’s water, breathe its air and feel in a familial environment,” he said.

    “The support you have shown throughout the years has always encouraged me and has had a positive impact during my most difficult days.

    “I want to express my deepest gratitude to all those who wrote to me, visited me and have always kept me in their hearts. Finally, I am home,” reads the message.

    Sassounian has been serving a life sentence when he was convicted in 1984 for the 1982 murder of Turkish Consul General to Los Angeles Kemal Arikan. In 2002 a federal appeals court overturned a special circumstances finding in his sentence, making Sassounian eligible for parole after serving a minimum of 25 years.

    On December 27, 2019, the Board of Parole Hearings found Sassounian suitable for release on parole. However, on May 25, 2020, Governor Newsom rejected the Board’s decision based on the prisoner’s crime, “outsized political import,” and that his insight was “relatively new.”

    The Los Angeles County Superior Court on February 24 reversed a decision by Governor Newson who rejected the parole eligibility and application of Hampig Sassounian.

    LA County Superior Court Judge William C. Ryan vacated Newsom’s decision to reject Sassounian’s parole and reinstated the California Parole Board’s decision to grant Sassounian parole.