Category: 2021

– Alina Nahapetyan 

After the 2018 Velvet Revolution the Armenian media landscape has become more polarised than ever. With a growing level of disinformation and fake news, it seems that the Armenian media is currently far from practicing what may be called responsible journalism. In the latest World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Armenia’s position has fallen slightly from 61st to 63rd place.

The latest report released by the RSF stated that “Media diversity has blossomed but the government that emerged from Armenia’s ‘Velvet revolution’ in the spring of 2018 has failed to reduce the media’s polarization.”

When Nikol Pashinyan took over as prime minister in 2018 Armenia was ranked 80th in these media rankings. As a result, the country’s media environment is certainly improving. Professionals have noted that ever since Pashinyan came to power there have been no direct orders from the administration as there were before. Under previous regimes, there were even some black lists that included politicians, media experts and artists that could not appear on broadcast media due to their political views. The main topics of the news agenda were largely dictated by the government.      

Hidden ownership versus regulations   

Broadcast media remains the main source of information for the country’s population of three million. According to a 2019 study of media consumption by the Caucasus Research Resource Center–Armenia, 72 per cent of Armenians watch national television channels on a daily basis.  They also more frequently rely on television for information. Before the Velvet Revolution broadcast media was almost entirely controlled by pro-government political circles. As the government has changed, the situation in the country’s media landscape has changed and remained the same in equal measure. Now, the Armenian broadcast media is divided. Despite this, a large amount of the country’s media is still controlled by the allies of the previous regime. This highly polarised environment has only contributed to the country’s societal divisions.  

Revealing the true owners of these media outlets in Armenia is now one of the main challenges for the field. Many media organisations are now trying to push for transparency with regards to these issues.

While Armenia considers itself a small country and Armenian society largely believes that the identities of these figures are obvious, there is still little official information with regards to these matters. During a January 2019 stream on Facebook Live, Prime Minister Pashinyan declared without evidence that 90 per cent of the Armenian media belongs to former government officials or opposition figures. A politically divided media that serves different political forces and closely follows certain agendas only damages the population’s ability to access objective information. Indeed, this situation amounts to an abuse of the public’s basic rights to unbiased and trustworthy information. As a result of fake news and media manipulations, it is not so easy for the average Armenian reader to understand what is truth and what is not.      

Armenia’s current government is trying to overcome these challenges in the media landscape by introducing various new regulations. Of course, some media outlets have claimed that these changes are a form of censorship against those groups that criticise Pashinyan’s government. Various media organisations are subsequently trying to promote proposals that the body responsible for controlling the financial sources and ownership of the media should not be governed by the political elite. Instead, they believe that a more public organisation should be in charge of these matters.

In 2007, the non-governmental organisation Yerevan Press Club jointly initiated with the media community an attempt to develop a professional code of ethics. The Code of Conduct of Media Representatives and the Declaration on Election and Referendum Coverage Principles were the result of this ambitious initiative. As of today, the country’s new code of ethics has been signed by 63 Armenian media outlets. The initiative is also supported by eight journalistic associations. Despite this, many media outlets in the country still have not signed up to the code.

Judicial proceedings against journalists and media are increasing in Armenia. In particular, the number of lawsuits alleging defamation or insult has grown dramatically. For example, Armenia’s justice department reported 74 cases in 2019 compared to 24 in 2016. The lawsuits against journalists and media outlets are usually organised by politicians or businessmen. Sometimes even other media groups are responsible for these cases. Damages can involve fines as high as two million Armenian drams (4,000 euros). The Committee to Protect Freedom of _expression_’s annual report in 2020 stated that there had been 74 new court cases involving media outlets and journalists․ The vast majority (61 of these cases) are related to insult and defamation, whilst the thirteen others are mostly related to labour issues.      

Freedom of speech is under threat

Like many countries, Armenia registered its first case of COVID-19 in March 2020. Two weeks later, the government declared a state of emergency and extended it several times. Rules under the national emergency imposed fines on groups and individuals who posted information related to the virus that “does not reflect reports from official sources”. Although civil society representatives and journalists voiced their concerns over these restrictions, several media outlets have been forced to remove or edit their stories under the threat of fines.

Armenian media also faced numerous restrictions during the latest war in Nagorno-Karabakh. A decree adopted on October 8th 2020 banned the publication of information critical of the government, civil servants and local administrations. This exposed media to the possibility of heavy fines, the freezing of assets and the deletion of online content.

Tough changes affecting the functioning of Armenian media have continued into 2021. Pashinyan’s political team in parliament, especially the body’s Vice President Alen Simonyan, recently proposed the legislation “On Amendments to the Civil Code of Armenia”. As a result, the maximum fine for damages awarded in the case of insult will increase from one million to three million drams. In the case of defamation, it will now be possible to claim six million drams instead of two million.

Civil society in Armenia criticised the bill on the grounds that it could easily be used by politicians as a means of pressuring independent media organisations. However, on October 5th the country’s constitutional court announced that the law was compatible with the constitution.

As a result, the country’s media has experienced numerous challenges, including a pandemic, post-war uncertainty and numerous government restrictions. Despite this,  the Armenian press is still home to various media outlets and journalists that continue to help citizens access unbiased and objective information.

Alina Nahapetyan is an Armenian journalist. She graduated from Yerevan State University and currently a student at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw, Poland. She has been working as a journalist for the various Armenian television channels and media outlets since 2014 mainly covering human rights issues, domestic violence, politics, and EU-Armenia relations.

This article is part of a project titled “Freedom of speech under duress – today’s experiences and their consequences“ co-financed by the Warsaw office of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

By Geopolitical Monitor

By Robert M Cutler*

While no one is watching, the social and economic geography in the South Caucasus is continuing swiftly to evolve. Signal among these developments, indeed its driving force, is the rebuilding of the Karabakh region following the expulsion of occupying military forces from the Republic of Armenia, or under its direct control, which had been there for 30 years. The development has deep implications for the geopolitics of the broader region.

Danger still exists from Armenian irregular forces that continue to operate from the Azerbaijani territories where Russian peacekeeping troops are located. At the same time, there are periodic attempts to infiltrate special-operations teams from the body of Armenia proper into the newly liberated lands.

So far the headline story, but far from the only one, in the redevelopment of the Karabakh region is the opening of a new international airport in Fuzuli, a city that became a ghost town after its Azerbaijani population was driven out following its capture in August 1993 by Armenian forces who destroyed its civilian infrastructure.

It happens that the Azerbaijani army was able to retake important areas of Fuzuli district in 1994, although not the city itself. The development of non-occupied Fuzuli distinct since 1994 is an indicator of what to expect not only for Fuzuli city but for the whole of the de-occupied territories, once they are de-mined from the vast amounts of ordnance implanted by Armenian forces. This procedure is complicated by Yerevan’s general refusal to turn the requisite maps over to Baku. In one case where they did so, for the city of Aghdam, it was determined by inspection that these maps were only about 25 percent accurate.

In 1979, the city of Fuzuli had a population of 13,091. The whole of the Fuzuli district had population of 76,013, of which almost 97 percent was ethnic Azerbaijani. By 1989, the population of Fuzuli city had reached 17,090, an increase of 23 percent. Applying this rate of growth and ethnic apportionment to Fuzuli district would give it a population of 93,450, of which over 90,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis. This would be the number ethnically cleansed by Armenian forces from Fuzuli district alone during the First Karabakh War.

Making a very rough calculation based on Azerbaijan’s population growth of 42 percent over three decades, from 7.02 million in 1989 to 9.98 million in 2019, these figures indicate that proportionally the old Fuzuli district should be able to support almost 128,000 Azerbaijanis, or indeed more, given the now-planned economic development there.

It is estimated that in the mid-1990s 40,000 Azerbaijanis had returned already to those areas of Fuzuli district not under Armenian military control, where they have thrived. This established demographic and economic base, an advantage that most of the de-occupied administrative districts do not enjoy, will facilitate the further development of Fuzuli city and the rest of Fuzuli district.

Azerbaijan is building two more airports in the formerly occupied territories, in Zangilan and Lachin districts. Construction of Zangilan International Airport began in May 2021 and will be completed next year. These three airports will go far to re-integrate the region economically back into Azerbaijan. It is planned to create industrial zones adjacent to the airports. Private Turkish companies have already started to construct an agropark in Zangilan district.

Thus, it is planned that the new airports will also become foci for modern logistics and transportation centres. The airports and their associated infrastructure will strengthen the region’s own security and connectivity by linking important new highways there, already under construction. New highways have already been finished that link major Karabakh cities, in the mountains, to the country’s eastern plain.

The catastrophe of the contamination of the de-occupied territories by land mines is becoming more widely recognized. Estimates made in 1998 supposed about 100,000 mines in the occupied territories. However. the mine maps provided for the city of Aghdam alone on 12 June 2021 showed no fewer than 97,000 mines. Official Baku believes that the occupying Armenian forces sowed no fewer than a million mines throughout the territories over the course of 30 years.

The United Kingdom has provided US$677,000 to Azerbaijan for de-mining activities via the United Nations Development program. France has donated US$473,000 directly to Azerbaijan for the same purpose. The United States has recently pledged US$500,000. Other countries have stepped up by providing trained personnel as well as funding.

Unfortunately Canada has not been among them, despite its having once vaunted itself with pride for having promoted and motivated the 1997 signature of the so-called “Ottawa Treaty” (full title: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Land Mines and Their Destruction), which entered into force in 1999.

Azerbaijan’s deputy foreign minister Elnur Mammadov has told the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that Armenian forces continue to lay landmines in a “campaign of ethnic cleansing and incitement to violence against Azerbaijanis [that] is ongoing” and which have killed or injured “at least” 106 Azerbaijanis, including 65 civilians as of the middle of last month. Azerbaijan has applied to the ICJ for an order to Armenia to hand over maps showing the location of land mines in the liberated territories.

Even if it takes a decade to clear the mines, the economic development of the liberated territories is not being delayed. Baku is dedicating already in 2021 $1.5 billion dollars for the restoration of these territories. Similar figures may be foreseen for the future. This sum is not a great burden on the country’s state budget, which estimated an oil price of $45 per barrel; this price has risen to over $80 lately, with further increases likely.

The results of these investments will not only transform the territories themselves. The broad rebuilding of the infrastructure, including international links, will equally transform the geostrategic map of the whole South Caucasus region and beyond.

*Robert M. Cutler is a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com