MOSCOW, February 4. /TASS/. Russia expects UNESCO’s preliminary mission to visit Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent area of Azerbaijan in the near future, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said during Thursday’s briefing.
“As far as I know, right now, talks are underway on organizing a preliminary UNESCO mission’s visit to Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts of Azerbaijan,” she said. “We hope that this visit will take place in the near future and that it will facilitate and strengthen mutual trust in the region.”
Azerbaijan’s Acting Minister of Culture Anar Kerimov said on November 30 that Baku plans to involve UNESCO specialists to recover Karabakh’s cultural heritage.
The #PeaceForArmenians cleats that broke NFL records have made the news again as the winning bidders on Jan. 6 were revealed to be Michele Kolligian and Bob Khederian.
Kolligian and Khederian were on a mission to acquire these cleats, not for themselves, but to support the Armenia Fund and to bring awareness that another genocide is taking place in Artsakh. POWs remain imprisoned by Azerbaijan and innocent Armenian civilians are being tortured and killed and displaced from their homeland, and these atrocities have not been widely reported in the news, according to the Armenian Museum of America in Watertown.
Kolligian, president of the museum’s board of trustees, and Khederian, its vice president, are donating the cleats to the museum. The duo have devoted their time and effort to keep the museum in the forefront of the Armenian and non-Armenian communities. “Proud and committed to the Armenian Museum’s mission, this recent gesture speaks to their generosity and passion for their Armenian heritage and the legacy left behind by the museum’s founders 50 years ago,” the museum stated.
While the auction was going on, Kolligian and Khederian knew they were up against another determined bidder. At one point they were about to put a pause on their bidding, but with less than three minutes left to go they entered one final bid of $40,300, which sealed the deal.
“It felt like we had just won the Armenian Super Bowl,” said Kolligian and Khederian in tandem. “It was an exciting campaign and a record for the NFL’s charitable campaign.”
“We give credit and our sincere thanks to Berj Najarian and the Patriots family for making this campaign a success in raising awareness about Artsakh,” said Kolligian. “In the end what made us most proud was to support the ongoing humanitarian efforts in Armenia and Artsakh and to be able to give the cleats a permanent and prominent place in the collection of the Armenian Museum.
“The icing on the cake is that the cleats will remain in New England, home to the Patriots. The cleats will be featured in a family case in the Museum and we will be using them in a creative way to raise additional funds for the children of Artsakh whose lives have been drastically impacted by this war.”
The Armenian-themed cleats were created by Armenian-American Berj Najarian, director of football and head coach administration for the New England Patriots. The NFL’s My Cause My Cleats campaign was initiated in 2016 as a way for players to use their voices and their influence to build support for social causes.
“The entire experience went above and beyond my expectations and was incredible and humbling to be a part of this,” said Najarian. “I was just the middleman for the extreme generosity and was thrilled to learn that Michele and Bob were the winners.”
When the war in Artsakh broke out again on Sept. 27, the typically quiet and behind-the-scenes Najarian realized he had to speak up, and he started a campaign using Instagram. One of the first videos he posted was of his boss, Coach Bill Belichick, expressing concern about human rights abuses being committed against Armenians in Artsakh.
Soon thereafter, Najarian announced the auction of the one-of-a-kind cleats — which would close on Armenian Christmas — designed by Massachusetts-based artist Joseph Ventura. The shoes featured a church, khachkar cross-stone, Mount Ararat and the tricolors of the Armenian flag and were worn by Najarian on the field during three Patriots games. The shoes became a cultural phenomenon and broke NFL records for attracting the most bids in the My Cause My Cleats campaign, even surpassing cleats auctioned by all-star quarterback Tom Brady.
The Patriots are a tight-knit team, even described as “a family” by team captain Matthew Slater, who posted words of support for Armenians on social media along with linebacker Chase Winovich, wide receiver Julian Edelman, defensive back Devin McCourty and ex-Patriots star Tom Brady.
While Belichick has supported the Armenians before, notably by wearing an Armenian pin during a visit to the White House in recognition of the centennial of the Armenian genocide, the awareness around Artsakh started when Najarian made a presentation about his heritage and the history of the Armenians as part of the team’s internal social justice campaign. In preparation for this talk and his social media postings, Najarian reached out to the Armenian Museum of America for resources and advice.
“I’m fortunate and thankful to work for the Kraft family and Coach Belichick, and to be around the players,” said Najarian. ” It was a collective effort of rallying around each other.
“It was special. I’m already looking for what’s next. There is a lot more work to be done for Armenia.”
The Armenian Museum issued a statement after the war, along with other organizations such as the Getty Museum and The Met.
“We are concerned about the Armenian monuments, artifacts, and buildings that are now threatened in areas under Azerbaijani control,” noted the statement. “This is a part of Armenia’s heritage, but it is also a part of the world’s rich culture. The Armenian Museum of America has doubled down on its mission to protect, preserve and share Armenia’s heritage so it will forever endure.”
For more information, visit class=”gmail_default” st1yle=”font-family:trebuchet ms,sans-serif;font-size:small”>
Photo: Press Office of Armenia
The first meeting of the expert subgroups of the newly established trilateral group comprised of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia will take place today.
The trilateral group met for the first time on January 31 at a meeting co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of the three countries. There, parties agreed to establish expert subgroups related to railway, auto and intermodal transportation as well as regional regulation concerning security and border control. Today’s meetings come just two months after a Russia-brokered ceasefire ended the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in major territorial losses for Yerevan and damage to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s reputation.
Expect today’s meetings to focus on efforts to fulfill commitments by Armenia to provide Azerbaijan with a safe transport link through its territory to the exclave of Nakhchivan. If successful, the opening of cross-border transport links is likely to improve the economic outlook and normalise trade within the region. Additionally, the March 1 deadline for unblocking the transport corridor is expected to further cooperation and concessions, likely from Pashinyan. For now, several political challenges remain, with Pashinyan facing heavy criticism domestically, including demands for his resignation. Expect a call from the premier for snap elections later this year in an attempt to diffuse the situation.
VOA By John Xie February 04, 2021 As the Biden administration contemplates a return to Obama-era policies in the Middle East – from the Iran nuclear deal to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations -- it is finding those policies complicated by China’s rising role as an influential political player throughout the region. China became the largest trading partner of Arab countries in the first half of 2020 with two-way trade of more than $115 billion. It has established strategic partnerships or a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with 12 Arab nations. A recent survey conducted in the region found China is viewed more favorably than the United States. Arab Barometer, a research network based at Princeton University, polled citizens in six countries in the Middle East -- Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia -- to gauge their attitudes toward China and the U.S. "The survey results make clear that Arab publics prefer China," the organization said. China’s government has made its “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative a key part of its regional outreach. Although the U.S. still criticizes the plan for extending loans that some countries may struggle to repay, 18 nations have joined including Israel, Washington’s closest ally in the region. Through this trillion-dollar initiative, China has invested throughout Asia, Europe and Africa. "To connect all these places, China is very active in building or helping to build or helping to finance ports and military bases and just striking up strong economic and strategic partnerships with the countries of the greater Middle East," Robert D. Kaplan, chair in geopolitics at the Pennsylvania-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, told VOA in a telephone interview. By linking Europe with East Asia through the Middle East, China could dominate Afro-Eurasia trading routes —what the great British geographer Halford Mackinder labeled the “World-Island,” said Kaplan. The U.S. regional withdrawal The last two decades have seen Washington escalating and then winding down its presence in the Middle East and southwest Asia. After years of grinding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, support for foreign military engagements in the region has dropped among members of both U.S. political parties. Former President Barack Obama once described the region as beset by conflicts going back millennia, while Donald Trump repeatedly advocated that the U.S. should leave behind the "forever wars." "I think that the Americans have been complaining and Americans in the national security community have been complaining for two or three decades now that the Middle East is a distraction from the things that we really need to commit to it," said Robert Farley, a senior lecturer at the University of Kentucky, in a telephone interview with VOA. Patterson is with the university’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. Analysts say the fierce competition between China and the U.S. has reinforced Washington's desire to reduce the strategic importance of the Middle East, which some have been pushing for since the Obama administration’s "Pivot to Asia" 10 years ago. Kaplan argued that as Beijing fills the Middle East vacuum, it will eventually pose a threat to the U.S. "It's a threat because most of the talk in Washington over the past few years is that we need to withdraw from the Middle East, because we've been engaged there in the so-called endless wars. And if we truly withdraw, or even partially withdraw from the Middle East, that will open up a vast avenue of opportunity for the Chinese," Kaplan told VOA. Iran - China's foothold While China is happy to work with both foes and friends of Washington in the region, its tie to Iran holds particular significance for both countries. Burdened by sanctions and deepening isolation on the world stage, Tehran has turned to China for economic and military support while Beijing looks for cheaper energy resources. After a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the two countries established a so-called Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016, giving China a foothold in a region that has been a strategic preoccupation of the United States for decades. Wojciech Michnik is an assistant professor of international relations and security studies at Poland’s Jagiellonian University. He said among the influential powers in the Middle East, Iran is China's natural partner. “Iran is quite an important power, especially after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fallout of the Saddam Hussein, Iran gained in terms of the relative power in the region. It has been using its proxies from Syria to Yemen," Michnik told VOA. China is currently Iran’s largest trading partner and oil buyer, as well as Iran’s largest export market for non-oil products and an important source of foreign investment. Bilateral trade was only about $400 million in 1994 but increased to $2.48 billion in 2000. By 2019, according to data release by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the value reached more than $23 billion, an increase of nearly 10 times. With the change in the U.S. administration and Washington's policy on the Iran nuclear agreement, the two governments have recently recommitted to strengthening their relationship. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is the speaker of Iran’s hardliner-dominated parliament. Last month, he told Li Zhanshu of China's National People's Congress that "ties between Tehran and Beijing are not and will not be affected by the international conditions” and will continue to deepen. Engagement redefined While experts doubt the United States will be disengaging in any substantial way from the Middle East, Washington’s interests are likely shifting from a focus on terrorism to China’s growing regional influence. "Yes, we do need to confront China, but now we need to pay attention to the Middle East, not because of terrorism, but rather because of China's growing influence in Iran, of China's developing relationship with Saudi Arabia, and so forth,” said Farley, who was also a visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania. He said that shift in thinking is reflected in other parts of the U.S. national security community, where analysts have begun to redefine what American engagement means in the context of China’s robust foreign diplomacy.
PRESS RELEASE: Armenian Communities Department of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Avenida de: Berna 45-A, 1067-001 Lisboa, Portugal Contact: Vera Cunha Telephone: (351) 21 782 3658 Web: gulbenkian.pt: Zartsant 2.0, the magical power of Western Armenian, online Is it possible to imagine a language aimed at children and young people? a program that is only online and yet offers the opportunity to truly in the "Suzuelu" language. Advent Külpenkean Foundation against the request Yandiman was found when he was forced to delete the Amazing 2020 due to the epidemic as a result. After a moment's hesitation, the answer was: "Yes, we should try." And that in order to make the decision a reality, he entered an uncontroversial area. Thus, the summer language "camp" that until now is 10 to 24 years old He inspired children and young people to learn and create in Western Armenian, was transferred to the digital world. To be together, to get closer, The feeling of working together, devoting a group to a task is needed now that world would be transferred without losing the focus on the language. New the initiative was called "Zartsants 2.0", borrowing "Zar" from "Zarmanazan" and Keeping the "grid" to remind the new program of the character. Of course, "2.0" is symbolized both the difficulties of the alarming number 2020 and Zarmanazan the main connection. In March 2020, ideas between companions and organizers The online meetings that provoked the exchange started when it became clear that it should not be possible to gather physically. There were many challenges attractive. find the right balance in front of the poster and away from the poster between periods, online workshops requiring participation to prepare, for the duration of the program: cheerful presence and regular contribution to ensure, to take into account the age differences of workplaces, countries to create a schedule that respects the time differences between them, and it is unnecessary to say, to be sure that Western Armenian will flourish "naturally" prepared in that way in an atmosphere. It was also important for the participants from the first moment involve impressions and opinions, ensuring their commitment to new regarding the format and necessary parental privileges. One of the important points was to make an accessible platform, Zartsants 2.0 according to the requirements. Between that platform, the participants could carry themselves clarify preferences, gather information about different workshops, to be recorded, having their own timeline in front of them. Everyone the participants had to be registered for at least three workshops per day (though very often, their choice was more than three). The workshops took place Through Zoom, each with a duration of 40 seconds. According to the content: they were either age-specific or open to all it can be the inter-age interaction between the participants. Workshops Only the participants were open, but outside, a block was created for the parents for informational purposes. All workshops were specially prepared for Zartants 2.0 and every week changed. You can remember the order of the proposed materials and workshops the following: music, painting, cooking, with movements expression, eoka, origami, photography, scientific experiments, of writing and reading Western Armenian (as well as literature and (philosophy) workshops, subject theater, performing arts, "Zarmanatun" preparation of the newspaper, programs of the "Zarmansokh" radio station. There was until a workshop dealing with the vocabulary of teaching in the Armenian language, five volunteers with participants. The day of Zartsant 2.0 was started by the participants with different content every day prepared with a video of "Good Light" and ended with a live stream "Pytotsaran" with an interactive program (on YouTube) that included games, concerts speeches and online "camp" about everyday experiences stories. Since the online platform operated entirely and only in Armenian, soon in Armenian A digital dictionary was compiled and made available to everyone. Participants learned the "word of the day" and the online dictionary grew daily with words such as "download", "download", "charge", and many others. The dictionary became so rich that it eventually contained 100 words. Moreover, 600 related words were translated, the Zartantsi system was completely Armenian making In this way, a Zartants area was created, in which the Armenian language is spoken was completely involved in the digital sphere. 50 teenagers and young people participated in Zartsants 2.0. There are 33 of them belonged to the group of 10 to 17 years old, and 17 to the group of 18 to 24 years old. The programmers developed and conducted 22 guides, mostly on vocational issues a small group of practicing specialists. The participants "came" from various countries. Argentina, Armenia, Pelchika, Ghana, France, Greece, Lebanon, Portugal, Turkey, Great Britain and the United States. From July 12 to August 7 during four weeks, 1200 images and 250 videos were produced, 96 workshops were opened via Zoom through 670 meetings, totaling 64,000 for a moment. On the online platform, 300 pages were prepared and presented, and block 25 pages were written for parents, of which 70 were used regularly. the platform. Zartsants 2.0 caused young people and their parents to speak Armenian every day. Around the globe, many families together, scattered in a direct stream they enjoyed the events, read the plot or watched the "Bari Lois" videos they watched. It is true that there was no physical contact and presence, but there was family strong feelings of unity were circulated from one corner of the world to another. "Internet 2.0 for creating, having fun and using the Armenian language was based on the phenomena of feeling committed to", said Razmik Panosian. The director of the Armenian department. "He gave us a completely new point of view and an experience with online jobs as well as learning a language direction. His success will be an encouragement to us. we will try in the future to stand up to similar initiatives". Zartsant 2.0 took place completely online from July 12 to August 7. Participation was reserved for those who had already registered Amazing in 2020. The organizer was the Thousand and One World Association (France), with the help of Galust Culpenkean Foundation and its close in partnership. For more information and to watch the "Zartsants 2.0" video visit /website. -- Zartsants 2.0. Western Armenian Language Immersion, Online! Can a language immersion program for children and young adults take place? exclusively online: This was the question the Armenian Communities Department of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation had to grapple with when Zarmanazan 2020 had to be cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. After some hesitation, it answered “yes, we must try!” It thus entered some uncharted territory to make it happen. The physical gathering of an educational summer “camp” that inspired children and young adults (10 to 24 years old) to learn and create in Western Armenian had to be adapted to the digital domain. Special care had to be taken to transport online the sense of familiarity, creativity and constant engagement, while keeping the language at the heart of the programme. The new initiative was called “Zartsants 2.0,” taking the “zar” from Zarmanazan and “tsants” from the Armenian word ցանց, meaning network or web. The “2.0” symbolised both the difficult year of 2020 and the fact that Zartsants was building on Zarmanazan. Intensive online brainstorming meetings between the facilitators and the organisers started in March 2020, once it became clear that the physical gathering was not going to take place. There were many challenges that needed to be overcome: finding the right balance between screen time and off-screen time, designing participative activities online, ensuring ongoing engagement over a period of several weeks, mixing workshop groups virtually, time zones differences, and, needless to say, making sure that Western Armenian would “naturally” flourish in the environment being created. It was important from the start to get feedback from the participants to ensure their commitment to the new format and to obtain parental approval. It was essential to design a user-friendly personalised online platform specifically for Zartsants 2.0. Participants could update through the platform their profiles, gather multimedia information regarding the various workshops, register for activities and consult their personalised timetables. All participants had to take part in at least three workshops per day (although most of the time they wanted to take part in more). The workshops were held via Zoom with an average duration of 40 minutes. Depending on the content, they were either for a specific age group or were mixed-aged to allow for cross-age interaction and learning. While the workshops were for participants only, a blog was created to inform and involve parents. All workshops were exclusively created for Zartsants 2.0 and changed every week. Activities included, among others, cooking, music and singing, movement expression, yoga, origami, crafts, drawing and painting, photography, science experiments, writing and reading in Western Armenian (including literature and philosophy), theatre with small objects, film making, an in-house newspaper (“Zarmanadoon”) and radio show (“Zarmanatsayn”). There was even a workshop, with five regular participants, on mathematical vocabulary in Armenian! The day in Zartsants 2.0 would start with a daily surprise, a “Good Morning” video created by selected participants, and it would end with an exciting interactive live stream show on YouTube that included games, in-house concerts and stories of daily experiences at the virtual “camp.” Since the online platform functioned completely in Armenian, a range of digital Armenian vocabulary was made available. Everyday participants learned “the word of the day” adding to the searchable online dictionary with words such as “download” (ներբեռնել), “link” (յղում) and “to charge” (լիցքաւորել). The dictionary grew to 100 words. In addition, 600 related terms were translated to make the Zartsants interface fully Armenian. In short, Zartsants created a space in which the Armenian language was fully integrated into the digital sphere. Zartsants 2.0 had 50 participants. Of these, 33 were in the 10 to 17 age group, and 17 were in the 18 to 24 age group. The programme was animated by 22 facilitators and supported by a very small team of technical experts. Participants “came” from the following countries: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Lebanon, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. In a period of four weeks (12 July to 7 August), 1200 images and 250 videos were produced, 96 workshops were held via 670 zoom gatherings for a total of 64,000 minutes. 300 pages were designed on the online platform and 25 blog posts were written for the parents, 70 of whom used the platform on a daily basis (in addition to all the participants and facilitators). Zartsants 2.0 motivated youth and parents to speak Western Armenian daily. Many families around the world came together to enjoy the live stream events, read the blog, or watch the “Good Morning” videos. Despite the lack of a physical gathering, a strong feeling of familiarity and empathy was created through vast distances and multiple time zones. “Zartsants 2.0 relied on creativity, fun and motivation as propellers of the Armenian language,” said Razmik Panossian, the Director of the Armenian Communities Department. “It gave us a whole new perspective and experience regarding engaging online activities for language learning, day in and day out. We will certainly look at its success, and explore the possibilities of supporting similar initiatives in the future,” he concluded. Zartsants 2.0 took place completely online from 12 July to 7 August. Its participation was limited to those who had already registered for Zarmanazan 2020. Zartsants 2.0 was organized by L’association Mille et un Mondes (France), with the support of and in close collaboration with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. For more information and to view the Zartsants 2.0 video visit: / -- Zartsants 2.0: Linguistic immersion in Western Armenian, online! Is a language immersion program for children and youth adults can take place only online? This is the question that the Department of Armenian Communities of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation was forced to ask questions when Zarmanazan 2020 had to be canceled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. After hesitating a little, she replied: “Yes, we have to try” and at the same time she entered into a territory previously unexplored. The real gathering within a language camp, thanks to which so many children and so many young people (between 10 and 24 years old) had established a relationship so enriching with Western Armenian, now had to be replaced and adapted to the new conditions, specific to the digital era. He had to ensure that being together, creativity, commitment were preserved, while maintaining the language at the heart of the program. The news initiative was called “Zartsants 2.0”, where “zar” was borrowed from Zarmanazan and “tsants” is the Armenian word for “network”. Obviously, “2.0” was emblematic of the year 2020 and at the same time symbolized time the fact that Zartsants was an emanation of Zarmanazan. Intense reflection therefore began in March 2020 between the facilitators and organizers, when it became clear that the camp was not could not be held in face-to-face mode. There were many challenges to overcome : find a satisfactory balance between time spent in front of the screen and off-screen time, design interactive online activities, ensure that participants remain focused over a period of four weeks, juggling virtual workshops, differences between time zones, and of course ensure that Western Armenian flourishes “naturally” in the environment thus created. It was important to have from the start the feedback from participants to make sure they were part involved in this new business, without forgetting parental consent. We needed to design a personalized online platform that was easy to handle, especially for Zartsants 2.0. The participants went like this able to update their profile from the platform, they would have access to a series of multimedia information concerning the various workshops offered, register for the activities of their choice, and consult their employment personalized time. All participants were required to take part in at least three workshops every day (in reality, they often wanted to participate in many only three workshops left). The workshops took place online via Zoom and lasted on average 40 minutes. Depending on their content, they were planned either for a specific age group, or on the contrary for participation mixed in terms of ages, in order to allow interaction and learning in common. The workshops were reserved for registered participants, but parents were kept informed thanks to a blog created especially for them. All the workshops were designed and created exclusively for Zartsants 2.0, and they changed from week to week. The activities included between others: cooking, music, singing, body expression, yoga, origami, professions textbooks, drawing, painting, photography, science experiments, reading and writing in Western Armenian (literature and philosophy included), theater objects, cinema, publication of a newspaper (“Zarmanadoune”), preparation of a radio show (“Zarmanatsaine”). There was even a workshop, with five regular and enthusiastic participants, on mathematical vocabulary in Armenian! The Zartsants 2.0 day began with an original video, a “Hello”, prepared by some of the participants, and it ended with a broadcast in live, interactive, broadcast from YouTube, which included games, internal concerts and stories about the experiences lived during this “ virtual camp. Since the online platform operated only in Armenian, it was necessary to make Armenian vocabulary available to all participants regarding the digital world. Each day, participants learned “the word of the day", which was added to the dictionary available online, which was therefore enriched with words such as “download” (ներբեռնել), “link” (յղում) or “ load” (լիցքաւորել). Ultimately, the dictionary included a hundred words. In addition, nearly 600 different terms have been translated in order to to have a Zartsants interface entirely in Armenian. In short, Zartsants has managed to create a space in which the Armenian language was fully integrated into the digital sphere. Zartsants 2.0 had 50 participants. 33 of them were in the group aged 10 to 17, and the remaining 17 in the 18 to 24 age group. The program was led by 22 facilitators and benefited from the help of a small team of technology experts. The participants “came” from following countries: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Lebanon, Portugal, Türkiye, United Kingdom and United States. Over a period of four weeks (from July 12 to August 7), 1200 images and 250 videos were produced, 95 workshops opened their doors, with 670 Zoom meetings, for a total of 64,000 minutes. 300 pages were designed on the online platform and 25 blog pages were written for parents, read by 70 of them, who used the platform regularly (in addition to all participants and facilitators). Zartsants 2.0 served as motivation to encourage young people and their parents to speak Armenian daily. Many families across the mode are thus brought together to follow the events live, to read the blog, or to watch morning videos. Despite the absence of physical contact, a strong sense of community and empathy was created over long distances and at across multiple time zones. “Zartsants 2.0 was based on creativity, fun and motivation, as incentives to use Armenian," Razmik Panossian, director of the Department of Armenian Communities. “This allowed us to acquire a completely new perspective and valuable experience regarding online activities for language learning, day by day. We we will certainly witness its expansion in the months and years that come, and we will therefore explore the possibilities of coming in helps with this type of initiative,” he concluded. Zartsants 2.0 took place online from July 12 to August 7. Participation was limited to those who were already registered for Zarmanazan 2020. Zartsants 2.0 was organized by the Mille et un Mondes association (France), in close collaboration with the Calouste Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. For more information and to watch the “Zartsants 2.0” video visit the website:
A Turkey analyst reported that Turkey claims to be ready to reconcile with Armenia if Yerevan is willing to “take a step,” but is that likely?
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
Feb 4, 2021
In her recent Global Opinions column for The Washington Post, prominent Turkish analyst Asli Aydintasbas cited a senior adviser to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as having told her that Turkey “is ready to normalize relations with Armenia” after helping its regional ally Azerbaijan defeat the country in a short and bloody war last November to wrest back control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. “The official now says they could engage with their historic foe and even open the border crossing,” she noted. The unnamed official told her, “The problem for us has always been Armenian occupation of Azeri territory. That’s now resolved. If Armenia is willing to take a step, we are ready.”
The assertion chimes with Turkey’s long-held policy that it would not establish diplomatic relations with its eastern neighbor nor reopen borders with it until it withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh. The borders were sealed in 1993 to show solidarity with Azerbaijan over Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-majority enclave that was bestowed by Joseph Stalin to Baku to keep the satellites divided and firmly under Soviet grip.
Critics say Turkey’s apparent magnanimity smacks more of its recent efforts to fix its battered ties with Washington without making the concessions that are actually being demanded of it, namely to get rid of its Russian S-400 missiles immediately. While Aydintasbas agrees that Turkey may be driven by expediency she argues that this is irrelevant. “Sometimes self-serving positions end up producing positive outcomes. This is the first time Turkish officials are formulating a very clear proposal to normalize relations with Armenia,” Aydintasbas told Al-Monitor. “I hope the international community can encourage this.”
The United States and Switzerland were burned once already in 2009, when Turkey signed what was then hailed as historic set of accords they had helped broker with Armenia to forge diplomatic ties and reopen their common borders only to have Erdogan cave to Azerbaijani pressure and walk away.
Aydintasbas insists, however, that Azerbaijan no longer poses a hurdle. “Turkish officials underline that they have spoken to [President Ilham] Aliyev and have his consent,” she said. Cavid Aga, an Ankara-based Azerbaijani analyst and blogger, believes, however, that Azerbaijan would object to any border opening that preceded the opening of a proposed corridor connecting Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani enclave on the Turkish border, with Azerbaijan proper. “We can’t go to Nakhichevan like in Soviet times. We either have to take a flight, which doesn’t happen due to [COVID-19 related] quarantine, or pass through rugged Iranian territory. So, if Turkey opens borders with Armenia this would seem unjust to us,” he said.
Setting aside such considerations, what of Armenia? Is it willing “to take a step?”
Not any time in the near future, asserted a senior Armenian diplomat speaking on condition that he not be identified by name. The diplomat contended that the Turkish overtures were linked to President Joe Biden’s vows to join a growing number of nations that have formally recognized the mass murder of more than a million Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as a genocide. Turkey has for decades spent tens of millions of dollars on lobbying to avert such recognition and blames the deaths on exposure to the elements, hunger and disease in the midst of conflict. Most credible historians agree that it was a genocide.
“Turkey’s open support to Azerbaijan’s war of aggression in the form of its top military expertise, consultants, weapons as well as recruitment and transportation of Islamic mercenaries [from Syria] resuscitated century-old held Armenian fears of genocide,” the diplomat said. “It is shocking that a country may stick to genocidal intent for a century, without feeling an inch of guilt for what it its predecessors did, [rather than] acknowledge and repent for the crime,” he added.
Such sentiments are widespread. Reconciliation with Turkey would likely deliver a fatal blow to beleaguered Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who faces popular calls for his resignation over his handling of the war. Jake Hanrahan, creator of the independent conflict journalism platform Popular Front who recently traveled to Nagorno-Karabakh, reckons the Armenian people would be “absolutely disgusted” by any rapprochement with Turkey. “There are literally Turkish flags visible from [the Armenian-held town] Stepanakert [in Nagorno-Karabakh] right now hanging from [Azerbaijan-held] Shushi, a place where Armenians had their heads cut off on camera by Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces,” he told Al-Monitor. “If the Armenian government decides to do this now, they will lose what scraps of faith they had from the people of Karabakh,” Hanrahan added.
Hanrahan was referring to several gruesome videos that circulated on social media as the war raged on showing Azerbaijani forces decapitating two men believed to be Armenians. They stake the head of one on a pig’s carcass, saying, “This is how we get revenge — by cutting heads.” Amnesty International said footage of the beheadings was authentic. It accused both sides of committing war crimes.
Laurence Broers, Caucasus program director at Chatham House, concurs that amid such bitterness Turkish-Armenian dialogue is hard. “A humiliating defeat in which Turkey played a key role is of course not an enabling context for normalization. Any such process should be just that — a process, built up over time and realized across multiple dimensions — societal, cultural, ideational — not just as a geopolitical tradeoff,” he said.
It was just the sort of process he describes, aimed at healing the wounds of the Armenian genocide, that the globally acclaimed Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala was determinedly promoting before he was jailed on bogus terrorism charges in October 2017. He is due to appear in court again on Feb. 5. Freeing him would bring Turkey into compliance with the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled that Kavala’s detention is unlawful. It would also add credence to claims that Turkey is sincere about reaching out to Armenia.
Kavala’s fate is unlikely to sway Armenia even though reconciliation with Turkey would serve it economically — it would help the landlocked nation reduce its dependence on Russia. But Richard Giragossian, director of the Regional Studies Center, a think tank in Yerevan, believes that Armenia may not have much agency in the matter. “Armenia’s now entrenched reluctance may become less of an obstacle and more of a minor inconvenience,” Giragossian said, citing two reasons: “First Turkey may initiate a unilateral effort to reopen the border, threatening to isolate Armenian leaders by forcing them into a self-defeating refusal.”
His second reason, that normalization may come from an agreement between Russia and Turkey that is forced on Armenia, sounds counterintuitive. But Giragossian argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin would view it as an important way to bolster the Eurasian Economic Union by extending its borders to Turkey. “Russian border guards control that border and the Russian-owned Armenian railway network will benefit. For Moscow it’s a further way to isolate Georgia,” he said.
Broers counters that the hard-power approach may deliver swift results but is no guarantee of stability. With Russia’s previous monopoly in the South Caucasus challenged by Ankara’s decisive intervention on the side of Azerbaijan and now largely “contained in the security sphere,” Turkey will need to decide whether it wants to exercise its influence as another hegemon over Armenia or to have a different kind of relationship rooted in soft and economic power. Turkey’s aggressive stance in Syria, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean suggest that it will likely plump for the former. “The whole dynamic of regionalization suggests Turkey is looking for ‘near-abroad theaters in which to project hegemony. Hegemonic power gets you a long way in the South Caucasus, but ultimately also falls victim to regional fracture,” Broers concluded.
The issue is only complicated if one reads about centuries of endless battles between Azerbaijan and Armenia giving rise to a frozen conflict. The conflict centered on the Armenian-majority Azerbaijani enclave known as Nagorno-Karabakh, and the nearby Southern Caucasus.
Augmenting the critical territorial issues, are fundamental cultural, language, and ethnic differences.
Ultimately the regional conflict evolved into a proxy war between Russia and Turkey.
Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdoğan’s objective was to use this conflict as leverage for membership in the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group spearheads the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) efforts to find a peaceful solution to the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and shares influence in the South Caucasus. The Minsk Group consists of France, Russia, and the United States. If successful, Erdoğan would assume a greater role in regional geopolitics.
Russian President Vladimir Putin had his own agenda: increasing Russia’s military presence on its Southern Caucasus borders.
The Caucuses Natural Border
Russia proactively protects the natural border and buffer zone created by the Southern Caucuses. 90% of the Georgian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Azerbaijani borders run along the Caucasian Mountain ridge thereby creating a natural barrier separating Russia from Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Libya. It prevents terrorists and returning Chechnyan fighters from Syria from entering Russia. Russia has historically cooperated with Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian troops to patrol this region.
Russia is also concerned that the limited Iranian border between Azerbaijan and Turkey remains open. Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has drifted away from democratic principles into a more traditional Shiite Muslim nation, promoting increasingly radical Muslim ideals. Since the early days of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has allowed terrorists and mercenaries to traverse freely between Europe and Syria.
Russia and Turkey’s Rapidly Evolving Relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia
Azerbaijan’s land borders are extensive, and it shares maritime borders with Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia via the resource-rich Caspian Sea.
Smaller and landlocked Armenia is surrounded in the north by Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Southern Caucasus. Its southeast and western neighbours are, respectively, Iran and Turkey.
Azerbaijan and Turkey
Turkey and Azerbaijani are both Turkic countries. The 140 million Turkic people living in several countries share a common language and ethnic heritage but not religion. For instance, Turks are predominantly Sunni and Azerbaijani’s Shia.
Russian soldiers patrolling Nagorno-Karabakh.
After the Second World War, Turkey was the first country to diplomatically and economically engage with Azerbaijan. In 2012, their presidents issued a joint statement calling them “one nation, with two states.”
While Russia is Turkey’s largest energy and military source, Azerbaijan has gas and oil reserves, especially in the Caspian Sea. Its capital, Baku, has the largest Caspian seaport.
Azerbaijan and Russia
A former USSR satellite state, Azerbaijan has maintained close ties with Russia. Azerbaijan protects its Shia and Russian Orthodox population, granting citizens of Russian descent equal rights and the right to enjoy their culture and traditions.
While it closed in 2012, the Russian Gabala Radar Station existed in Azerbaijan. It was an early warning system for missile attacks on Russia’s southern periphery, as well as the other Caucuses states.
Russia attempted to maintain the status quo by offering to train Azerbaijan’s troops and to teach them how to repair military equipment in Russia. Azerbaijan, which has always felt threatened by Russia’s Armenian relationship, rejected the offer, stating that after the USSR’s dissolution, the Gabala Radar Installation became its sovereign property.
Azerbaijan then approached NATO about training its military. While not a NATO member, since 1991, Azerbaijan has belonged to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO offered to have neighboring Turkey assist in training Azerbaijan‘s military personnel.
A related concern for Russia is Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Iranian borders. Although Azerbaijan and Iran are both predominantly Shia, and their religious ideologies are world’s apart, and together with Turkey, they share strong economic ties.
For Russia, expanding access to ports to transport oil and weapons, and to engage in military operations has been a priority. Azerbaijan offers Russia access to three major ports. Azerbaijan transports its energy resources via the Russian pipeline to Novorossiysk.
Armenia and Turkey
Turkey and Armenia have a fraught history. Armenia still harbors resentment for the Armenian genocide when up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed.
In 2008, Ankara unsuccessfully pursued diplomatic efforts with Armenia. The failure motivated Turkey to pour military resources into Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Russia
Since the days of the Soviet Union, Moscow has provided Armenia with military support, and maintained a military base in Armenia. Since 2000, Russia’s military presence has increased.
(Al Jazeera)
In 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a friendship treaty calling for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat to either party and allowed Russia’s military to patrol Armenia’s Turkish and Iranian borders.
Russia is always interested in exploring other countries’ natural resources. In Armenia, there is a long list of valuable natural resources found in its mountainous region, including gold, iron, silver, copper, molybdenum, zinc, lead, aluminum, and other precious metals.
The Disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
The dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh is centuries old; with both countries believing they have a legitimate claim to the territory.
Until 1989, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the USSR; during which time Armenia and Azerbaijan unhappily coexisted. After dissolution, Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally accepted as belonging to Azerbaijan, without Armenia relinquishing its claim.
Nagorno-Karabakh has existed as a semiautonomous de facto state despite international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijan’s. Devoid of an economy or border controls, it is beleaguered by drugs and human trafficking.
Until this proxy war, Nagorno-Karabakh consisted of 10 regions; 70% Armenian controlled and 30% Azerbaijani.
More Recent History
Having long wanted an official say in the Southern Caucuses, as early as 2008, Turkey unsuccessfully proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact, that would have included Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Russia.
In 2018, the European Parliament’s peace program offered “…full support to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the United Nations in their efforts to solve the regional frozen conflicts; to commit the European Union to act as a mediator in the search for peaceful solutions.”
Related to the current conflict is Russia’s Dagestan border situated at its southern-most point. It abuts Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia’s stronghold was unsuccessfully challenged in 1999 by the Chechnya-based Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, in the War of Dagestan in August of 1999.
Azerbaijan claimed that the fighting was a security threat.
After the War of Dagestan, in October 2000, Russia transferred weapons from Georgia to its Armenian military near Nagorno-Karabakh.
Russian officials denied transferring weapons to the Armenian military, countering that the weapons in Armenia were under Russian control at a Russian military base located in Gyumri, a city in northeast Armenia.
Between 2012-14 Azerbaijan amassed approximately $12 billion in armaments primarily from Turkey. This led to a significant military relationship developing between Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Azerbaijan and Israel share a common enemy in Iran. As early as 2016, Israel sold Azerbaijan $7 billion in weapons. The sales included drones and Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile and rocket system. Mossad gained an Azerbaijan station for monitoring Iran and was allowed the use of Azerbaijan’s airfields. Israeli fighter jets have been observed in Azerbaijan.
In 2020, unconfirmed Azerbaijani sources alleged Russia transferred to Armenia an additional 20 tanks, 60 infantry cars, 25 armored vehicles, 25 Shilka’s, which is a radar-guided anti-aircraft weapon system, 250 antitank launchers, 250 submachine guns, and 25 other military vehicles. The allegations did not address if the armaments were delivered to Russia’s military base or to the Armenian military.
Azerbaijan’s Minister of Defense General Abiyev responded that the “Russian-Armenian military cooperation became a real jeopardy for the entire Caucasus.”
At the same time, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev claimed that “There are 5,000 Russian troops at the base in Gyumri and according to the information we have, the base maintains regular arms supply to Armenian armed forces.”
Russia’s weapons sat like a festering wound, but until 2020, Azerbaijan lacked the military prowess to challenge Russia.
Turkey’s Responsibility for Starting the Proxy War
This opened the door for Turkey to expand its role in the region. Turkey pledged to Azerbaijan unconditional military support.
Turkey provided military leadership and personnel, along with armaments to Azerbaijan’s military. This included the sale of two dozen armed Turkish drones to Azerbaijan. While the drones have a limited range of 150 km, they can hover for up to 24 hours.
Over 600 Turkish troops were sent to Azerbaijan. Turkey also deployed a special forces regiment specialized in mountain warfare to help Azerbaijan fight in mountainous terrain.
Azerbaijan now had military superiority over Armenia. With Turkey’s military prowess behind it, Azerbaijan implemented tighter security measures along the Dagestan border and invaded Nagorno-Karabakh.
In July 2020, Azerbaijan initiated combat north of Nagorno-Karabakh and in close proximity to Russian gas pipelines.
This was the beginning of a proxy war.
It became a full-blown conflict on September 27th when Armenia attacked several Azerbaijani civilians and troops.
Russia and France claimed that Turkey used its Libyan strategy by deploying Syrian mercenaries to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The war quickly shifted in Azerbaijan’s favor due to the drones acquired from Turkey, which were “…responsible for the destruction of hundreds of armoured vehicles and even air defence systems,” according to UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace.
Unverified video evidence suggested the drones also killed civilians.
Chris Coles, director of Drone Wars UK, a reliable source opined that “Civil society groups have been warning for some time that because drones lower the cost of warfare, they are likely to fuel this type of bitter, lethal conflict between neighbouring states.”
In response, in October, Canada suspended exports to Turkey of targeting gear made in Ontario after they were found in a downed Turkish drone.
Violating an international ban, on October 28, Armenian forces either fired or supplied cluster munitions and at least one type of long-range rocket used in an attack on Barda city, several hundred miles west of Baku.
The OSCE’s Minsk Group brokered an October 2020 peace settlement.
Concurrently, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “This conflict did not begin as a conflict just between two governments over a territory, it began with inter-ethnic confrontations. Sadly, this is a fact, when first in Sumgait and then in Nagorno-Karabakh brutal crimes were committed against the Armenian people.”
That agreement rapidly deteriorated perhaps in part as Turkey was not a party. Over 5,000 troops and civilians were killed.
On November 9, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov brokered a second ceasefire.
Armenia sustained several territorial losses. The three Armenian controlled districts in Nagorno-Karabakh went to Azerbaijan. Over 7,000 Armenians occupying Nagorno-Karabakh were to return to Armenia. In a minor concession, the agreement left Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, under Armenian control.
Armenia agreed to open a transport corridor for Azerbaijan through Armenia to the Azerbaijani region of Nakhichevan. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that “the main thing is to prevent bloodshed.”
The November 2020 peace agreement included a memorandum of understanding signed by Turkey and Russia to jointly monitor the peace deal, which can be renewed every five years.
Afterward, 135 Turkish Armed Forces Special Mine Detection and Clearance specialists have supported Azerbaijan troops to disarm and dispose of unexploded ordnance in Nagorno-Karabakh liberated from Armenia’s occupation and outside of Baku.
The November peace agreement did not address Nagorno-Karabakh’s legal and political status.
Armenian’s have protested the agreement. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan defended the deal as a painful but necessary move to prevent further territorial losses.
Dmitri Trenin, a political analyst for the Moscow Carnegie Center, said that the “…peacekeeping function is Moscow’s advantage in its competitive relationship with Ankara.”
At least 2,000 Russian troops will guard the “Lachin corridor” linking the Karabakh capital, Stepanakert, to Armenia. Russia sent 5,000 peacekeeping troops just north of the Iranian border. Ninety armoured personnel carriers were simultaneously deployed.
Now having some oversight responsibilities, “Under President Erdoğan, Turkey has gained a very important foothold in the region,” concluded Deutsche Welle political commentator Konstantin von Eggert.
Both sides have been accused of violating the cease-fire agreement by engaging in isolated skirmishes.
On December 13, the situation escalated after the Armenian army violated the cease-fire, precipitating Azerbaijan’s military seizing territory in the Armenian Caucasus as Armenians torched their homes before fleeing.
In late December, the UK’s military implemented a state of the art armed drone program to counter Azerbaijan’s controversial and indiscriminate use of drones. The UK did not comment on suspending two other British drone components, a fuel pump and a bomb rack missile release system sold to Turkey’s military despite a 1992 arms embargo relating to all weapons that could be used in Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the December agreement’s inception, Lavrov unequivocally stated that “…attempts to question this agreement both domestically and internationally are unacceptable.”
This position underscored a January 13 summit hosted by the Kremlin with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, with Turkey notably absent, to discuss further implementation of the November truce, including the role of regional Russian peacekeepers, demarcation lines, and humanitarian issues. The meeting was permeated by deep-seated distrust and hatred.
The future of other Turkic countries is uncertain as Turkey may consider proxy war the necessary impetus for advancing into other post-Soviet Turkic countries, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.