Category: 2020

Breaking Defense
By Arie Egozi
TEL AVIV: While Israel anxiously awaits a Biden Administration, it has
made operational a new command focused entirely on Iran.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Naetanyahu is repeating — again and
again — his intention to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear
capability: “Israel will not allow Iran to have the bomb.”
The IDF says that the new Iran Command is needed to accumulate
intelligence and operational options in one place, to understand how
new weapon systems like the F-35 can be used efficiently should
hostilities with Iran break out, and how new relations with some Gulf
states might change those scenarios.
[Diagram: The map is old but the concepts haven’t changed much.]
The new command will be directly responsible for preparing strike
plans against Iran. In recent years Israel has invested roughly $3
billion in what is dubbed as “getting ready for a war with Iran.”
Details of this investment are highly classified.
The UAE and Bahrain met with Israelis recently and expressed their
concerns about the potential of Iranian aggression, especially is it
develops a military nuclear capability.
The Israeli defense establishment expects that within weeks they will
begin a series of talks with Biden’s inner circle to stop the guessing
and really understand the elected president’s policies relevant to
Jerusalem.
Earlier this month, Iran unveiled a new missile launch system capable
of consecutively launching multiple, long-range ballistic missiles.
Teheran claims the automated launcher was locally developed and
manufactured. With Iran continuing to heavily invest in new weapons,
Israel is getting ready to act.
 

Asia Times
Outgoing US president could yet orchestrate a conflict with the aim of
retaining power after losing at the polls
By Kaveh Afrasiabi 
US President Donald Trump’s abrupt decision to fire his Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper and replace him with hawkish yes-man Christopher
Miller, who headed the National Counterterrorism Office and before
that the Pentagon’s “special operations” program, has sparked fear in
the US media as well as in Iran that Trump might be plotting to
trigger a war with Iran before his scheduled departure from the White
House on January 20.
Various US media outlets including the New York Times published
headlines like “Trump fires Esper, the Defense Secretary Who Opposed
the Use of Troops in the Streets.”
That’s true, but given the distinct possibility that Trump’s real
motive was oriented more against foreign adversaries like Iran, such
accent on Esper’s difference with the president on domestic matters
may turn out to be journalistic myopia. Perhaps a more fitting
headline would be: “Trump fires Esper, who opposed war with Iran.”
“The United States is not seeking a war with Iran…We are seeking a
diplomatic solution,” Esper told the media in early January 2020. One
step further, he even openly contradicted Trump’s claim that
US-assassinated Iranian General Ghasem Soleimani was plotting attacks
on four US embassies around the world.
Esper also stood up to Trump, who threatened to wipe out Iran’s
cultural centers, by flatly stating that the Pentagon had no such
bombing plans.
With Esper gone and replaced with a new acting defense secretary in
the waning months of Trump’s presidency, the stage could be set for a
US-Iran war in light of the related news from the US State Department
that it plans a “flood” of new Iran sanctions in the coming days.
[Photo: US President Donald Trump shakes hands with then-US Secretary
of Defense Dr. Mark Esper in the Cabinet Room of the White House in
Washington, DC on Monday, October 7, 2019. Credit: Ron Sachs / Pool
via CNP]
The outgoing Trump administration could thus be in the process of
implementing a one-two punch, whereby the onslaught of new sanctions
and other related pressures on Iran would be followed by “triggering
events” such as anti-US acts of terror attributed to Iran and its
proxies in Iraq and elsewhere, culminating in an all-out war.
In this vein, some foresee a delayed “October surprise” in light of
the disputed US presidential elections, with the incumbent president
desperately exploring legal avenues to overturn Biden’s victory and
secure a backdoor second term in office.
The problem, however, is that there is scant evidence of voter fraud
and most US pundits agree there is little or no chance of US courts
intervening to change the election result in Trump’s favor absent any
significant evidence of a “stolen election”, as falsely claimed by
Trump.
But Trump’s hand might be strengthened if the US suddenly finds itself
in a state of war in the coming weeks, creating an emergency situation
that Trump would leverage to his advantage as a “wartime president”
and then somehow use that stature to avoid being evicted from the
White House.
Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives,
has warned among others that Trump’s ominous decision to suddenly sack
Esper and replace him – not with Esper’s deputy, as is the norm – but
rather with a loyal hawk from another department has the potential to
rupture a “transition of power” to Biden now widely being taken for
granted by the Democrats.
[Photo: Then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Christopher
Miller testifies before a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on
September 17, 2020, in Washington, DC. Photo: AFP/Pool/Chip
Somodevilla]
In this war scenario, Israel, which dreads the departure of Trump and
the prospect of an Obama-like detente with Iran under a new Biden
administration, can play its part by staging a “false flag” operation
targeting US forces in Iran’s vicinity, yielding the desired result in
the form of a massive US military retaliation including a possible
high-stakes attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Some Israeli officials have already gone on record in media reports
warning that Biden’s victory would mean a war with Iran. Saudi
Arabia’s rulers, who are likewise petrified by the possibility of a
new, conciliatory US approach towards Iran under Biden could also
potentially lend assistance to such a shadow plot.
For Iran’s part, President Hassan Rouhani has reacted to Biden’s
victory by sending a conciliatory message that emphasizes Iran’s
determination to have a constructive rapport with the international
community, while simultaneously calling on the US to honor its
international obligations by returning to the Iran nuclear agreement,
which Trump confrontationally abandoned.
Faced with the imminent prospect of a reversal of his landmark
confrontational policies towards Iran, Trump could seek to frustrate
Biden’s sanguine prediction that “the grim era of demonization” of
Iran will end come January 20 with his inauguration as president.
[Photo: Anti-war activist protests in front of the White House in
Washington, DC, on January 4, 2020. Photo: AFP/Andrew
Caballero-Reynolds]
There are other ominous signs of a dark plot. Mitch McConnell, the
ranking Republican Senator, has decided to back Trump’s accusation of
systematic election fraud, thus giving Trump a major boost in his
stubborn battle to deny the will of a majority of American voters.
McConnell and other Trump loyalists inside and outside of the US
government would, of course, rush to defend him in any potential
confrontation with Iran, which will almost certainly not come as a
result of any Iranian provocation amid the transition from Trump to
Biden.
No matter the official justification for a war with Iran, there would
be a huge public outcry and widespread suspicions of foul play that
aimed ultimately at keeping Trump in power. Yet it is far from clear
that Trump and his lackeys are beyond orchestrating such a nightmarish
scenario for their own political ends.
 

Associated Press
Nov. 11, 2020
ANKARA, Turkey (AP) — Turkey took offense at a U.S. statement that
said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo would promote religious freedom
during an upcoming visit to Istanbul and called Wednesday on
Washington to focus on racism and hate crimes in the United States
instead.
The State Department said in a statement Tuesday that Pompeo would
travel to Istanbul to meet with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I,
the spiritual leader of the world’s Greek Orthodox Christians. The top
U.S. diplomat plans to discuss religious issues in Turkey and to
promote “our strong stance on religious freedom around the world,” the
statement read.
Turkey’s Foreign Ministry rebuked the statement “as extremely
inappropriate,” insisting that the country protects the rights of
citizens of various faiths to freely practice their religions.
“It would be more advisable for the United States to look in the
mirror first and to show the necessary sensitivity to human rights
violations such as racism, Islamophobia and hate crimes in its own
country,” the Turkish ministry said in a statement.
“Our reaction on this matter was conveyed to the U.S. side, and it was
suggested that (Washington) focus on increasing cooperation between
our countries on regional and global issues,” the Foreign Ministry
said.
In July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan converted Istanbul’s
landmark Haghia Sophia into a mosque, ignoring calls for the former
cathedral to be kept as a museum in recognition of the city’s
multicultural past. The move led to accusations that the Turkish
leader was trying to erase Orthodox Christians’ cultural heritage.
The structure, a United Nations world heritage site, served as one of
Christendom’s most important cathedrals before being turned into a
mosque with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and then into a
museum 86 years ago.
Erdogan later also announced a decision to transform the Church of the
Holy Saviour in Chora, another Byzantine-era church in Istanbul, into
a mosque as well.
Turkey is also under pressure to reopen a Greek Orthodox theological
school that was shut down in 1971.
Pompeo was not scheduled to meet with Turkish officials during a tour
that will also take him to France, Georgia, Israel, the United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia during Nov. 13 – 23.
 

Asia Times
Moscow's plan to end Azerbaijan-Armenia war in Nagorno-Karabakh puts
Russia firmly in the strategic region's driver's seat
By Richard Giragosian 
YEREVAN – After 40 days and 40 nights of often intense fighting, the
latest war for Nagorno-Karabakh halted with an abrupt midnight posting
early on November 10 on Facebook.
Couched in a confession of an “unspeakably painful” acceptance,
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced his acceptance of a
new agreement that effectively ceded territory to Azerbaijan.
The agreement to halt the war, which salvaged the remnants of
Armenian-held Karabakh and saved the Armenian population from
advancing Azerbaijani forces, raises only more questions about the
status and security of the enclave.
The Russian-crafted plan, signed by Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev,
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan, is multi-faceted.
According to the agreement’s terms, a roughly 2,000-strong Russian
peacekeeping force was immediately deployed to Karabakh, establishing
a perimeter to protect and defend the vital Lachin Corridor, a
lifeline connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Armenia is to
withdraw its forces from districts of Azerbaijan beyond the borders of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In a staged withdrawal, this initial disengagement is to be followed
with a return of the two districts of Kelbajar and Aghdam by November
20, with a further Armenian pullback from the Lachin district by
December 1. By that time, Russian peacekeepers are to ensure the
Armenian use and control of a five-kilometer-wide corridor through
Lachin.
In a seeming attempt at parity, a similar but much more vague
“corridor” is also stipulated to connect Azerbaijan to its exclave
Nakhichevan, which borders Armenia, Iran and Turkey.
The agreement’s last point is one of the most potentially significant
outcomes, as the nature of such an Azerbaijani connection through
Armenian territory remains unclear and undefined, raising potentially
dangerous questions over sovereignty, legal standing and policing.
[Map. Image: Facebook/TRTWorld]
An additional concern stems from what is not stipulated or stressed in
the agreement. For example, there is no clarity for the “status” of
the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, with a disregard for earlier
negotiations. And there is an obvious need for direct negotiations and
further agreements on several other implications and issues.
Such diplomacy to come should also include and incorporate all parties
to the conflict, including the democratically elected representatives
from Nagorno-Karabakh. Otherwise, any further exclusion of Karabakh
would only undermine the durability and sustaining power of this
agreement.
Agreement under duress
Although all sides seem to have accepted the Russia-crafted agreement
under differing degrees of duress or discomfort, for the
democratically-elected leaders of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh there
was little choice and no alternative.
The Azerbaijani capture of the strategic city of Shushi, the
second-largest in Karabakh, was a pivotal tipping point. As the
Karabakh Armenians lost the city, the magnitude of the disaster became
clear.
Retreating to the Karabakh capital Stepanakert, leaders in both
Karabakh and Armenia came to the painful realization that in order to
save the remaining civilians and salvage what remained of Karabakh,
there was little alternative but to accept the terms of the agreement
imposed and demanded by Moscow.
Most armed conflicts and nearly every war eventually follow their own
tempo, falling into a cycle of sustained force and suspended fighting.
And like a wildfire, such clashes dictate their own intensity and
determine their own pace before eventually burning out.
The ongoing war for Nagorno-Karabakh is no different and now seems
poised to reach a final exhaustive end.
[Photo: A man stands among the debris of a destroyed house hit by a
rocket strike during the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in a residential area of
Ganja, Azerbaijan, October 21, 2020. Photo: AFP/Tofik Banayev]
Since the launch of a massive military offensive by Azerbaijan on
September 27, the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted
into a sudden and kinetic war. With daily combat driven by a sweeping
advance of attacking Azerbaijani forces, Armenian defenders were
largely overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the onslaught.
Empowered with direct Turkish military assistance and operational
support, the Azerbaijani offensive quickly expanded into an all-out
war that quickly achieved substantial gains in territory. Militarily,
this war was significantly different than the intermittent clashes of
the past three decades, with an offensive that was decisive in several
ways.
First, Turkey’s military support and direct engagement empowered and
emboldened Azerbaijani forces, helping to seize a vast swath of
territory to the south and a lesser area to the north and east of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the same time, Karabakh Armenian forces suffered staggering losses
of equipment, mainly as a result of precise targeting by Turkish and
Israeli military drones, or UAVs, that overwhelmed their outdated air
defense network.
Beyond the unexpected pressure from Turkish engagement, a second
equally significant factor that made this war so decisive was Russia’s
response.
Russia reasserts dominance
After a rather embarrassing public failure by Russia to conclude a
basic and temporary cessation of hostilities that fell short of a full
ceasefire, the sudden announcement of a Russia-backed “peace deal” for
Nagorno-Karabakh represents a real win for Moscow for several reasons.
First, the terms of this new agreement grant Russia the most important
of Moscow’s objectives: a dominant military presence on the ground.
The prior lack of any direct military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh was
one of the most distinctive aspects of the Karabakh conflict, standing
in stark contrast to every other such conflict within the former
Soviet Union.
That absence was a long-standing irritant for Moscow, reflecting the
limits of Russia’s capacity for effective power projection and
influence. But with this elusive goal now met, Russian peacekeepers
are now central to the credibility and sustainability of the new peace
deal, thereby granting Moscow an even more decisive role in the
region.
A second dividend for Russia stems from its enhanced leverage over the
Armenian government. Despite an uncharacteristically passive response
to Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” in 2018, Moscow seems to have bided
its time and now has seized an opportunity to maximize pressure on
Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and his government.
[Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister
Nikol Pashinyan arrive at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic
Council in St Petersburg, Russia in a file photo. Image: Sergey
Guneev/Sputnik via AFP]
Enhanced Russian leverage will not only keep Armenia well within
Moscow’s orbit but will also greatly limit Armenia’s options and
orientation in seeking closer relations with the West.
In this context, Moscow may push for more Armenian compliance, whereby
Yerevan is in danger of mortgaging its independence and ceding
sovereignty to Russia.
And third, the Nagorno-Karabakh agreement was very much an individual
Russian initiative, meaning it was not pursued through the framework
or cover of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is co-chaired by the United
States, France and Russia.
This suggests that the Minsk Group’s format and structure is imperiled
by these latest Russia-led developments. Although the military phase
of the Karabakh conflict has ended, the diplomatic contest is only
just beginning.
 

Politico
The EU risks becoming irrelevant in conflicts in its wider neighborhood.
By Nicu Popescu
After six weeks of fighting over the disputed region of
Nagorno-Karabakh — and several failed cease-fires — Russia has
mediated a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that appears likely to
hold.
With the conflict now officially re-frozen, the situation has yielded
two clear winners: Russia and Turkey, who flexed their muscle in the
region while the European Union sat on the sidelines, appearing
increasingly irrelevant in its own neighborhood.
Unless the EU rethinks its strategy in the region, it seems relegated
to observing as others take charge.
The Russia-brokered deal bears striking resemblance to what Armenia,
Azerbaijan and the international community agreed would be a
reasonable compromise, under the so-called Madrid Principles a decade
ago.
The main difference is that it is being implement by military force,
not diplomats or politicians.
As part of the deal, Russia will deploy some 2,000 peacekeepers,
ensuring that Nagorno-Karabakh will have a Russian-protected land
connection to Armenia, and that Azerbaijan will have Russian-protected
communication lines and transport links through Armenia to the Azeri
exclave of Nakhchivan.
But if Azerbaijan might seem the victor and Armenia the loser, the
situation is more complicated for both.
For Baku, this is more of a Faustian bargain than a victory.
Azerbaijan acquired seven territories around Nagorno-Karabakh,
previously occupied by Armenia, and will get to keep the territorial
gains it made in the enclave, but will have to accept constraints on
its future foreign policy and security.
With Russian military presence on what is internationally recognized
as Azerbaijan’s territory, and Russian security personnel ensuring
Azerbaijani access to its exclave in Nakhchivan, Moscow suddenly
acquires much more security leverage in the country.
Nagorno-Karabakh will now look more like Georgia’s secessionist
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia before 2008. Georgia’s two
separatist regions have long been geopolitically convenient conflict
zones that allowed Russia to raise or lower the security temperature
to influence domestic politics and the security situation in Georgia.
Azerbaijan has joined the club now. In the short term, this will lead
to an Azeri-Russian honeymoon but could become a source of future
instability and acrimony in Moscow-Baku relations.
Armenia, meanwhile, retains de facto control of part of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the
ground makes the country less vulnerable to future conflagrations.
As a result, however, Armenia finds itself in the much more difficult
situation of having dramatically increased its already high dependence
on Moscow, with what remains of Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh
now indefensible without Russia. Yerevan now faces the possibility
that Russia will push it even harder into making painful concessions
in domestic or foreign policy.
The real winners of the latest flare-up over Nagorno-Karabakh,
ultimately, are Turkey and Russia. Moscow has tightened the screws of
its control of Armenia and the country’s domestic and foreign
policies. It also has much more military and security leverage on
future developments in Azerbaijan.
Turkey also has cause for celebration. Its ally Azerbaijan re-acquired
its seven districts and part of Nagorno-Karabakh thanks in large part
to Turkish support. The Turkish military and Turkish-made drones got
good publicity, as did Turkey’s credibility as a power that truly
supports its allies (unlike Russia). And despite Turkey’s bold
military maneuvering, Ankara and Moscow’s capacity to remain on good
terms remained unshaken.
None of the above bodes well for the EU’s own foreign policy and
international profile.
Foreign policymaking in the EU’s wider neighborhood has become
increasingly militarized. The key players in the region are not EU
countries; instead Turkey, Russia and now Azerbaijan increasingly see
bold military action as an efficient and sure way to success, from the
South Caucasus to Syria and Libya.
As long as the EU continues to focus almost exclusively on diplomatic
and economic means to exercise its power in its neighborhood, this
trend will continue.
There is no quick way out of this irrelevance for the EU. Still, short
of sending military troops and inserting itself into every military
imbroglio on its periphery, there is another possible way forward.
The EU must start developing military, intelligence and cybersecurity
partnerships with several countries around its eastern and southern
flanks. It needs to become a power that can exert influence in the
security realm, in addition to its political and economic clout. Only
then, with time, will the EU’s voice be better heard where it matters
most.
*
Nicu Popescu is director of the Wider Europe programme at the European
Council of Foreign Relations.
*