Category: 2020

The wars that changed the South Caucasus

Emil Lazarian
Open Democracy
Dec 7 2020



Vicken Cheterian
7 December 2020



The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the first ethno-territorial conflict to emerge in the Soviet Union. Coming at the height of Gorbachev’s reforms, this war in the South Caucasus symbolises the rapid disintegration of what was once a military superpower and the world’s second largest economy. Karabakh and similar conflicts in the early 1990s were the result of state collapse – the state being the USSR.

The recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, now known as the Second Karabakh War, is a clash between two newly established nation-states, and has a number of similarities with the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. Indeed, comparing the Second Karabakh War and the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia could help us draw conclusions on some of the consequences and identify broader trends in the Caucasus, a major theatre of instability that emerged in the debris of Soviet collapse.

Both Georgia in 2008 and Armenia in 2020 were post-revolution societies. The political leadership that emerged from Georgia’s revolution in 2003 and Armenia’s in 2018 enjoyed total hegemony over political institutions. Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004 with 96% of the vote, while Nikol Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance party won the December 2018 parliamentary elections with 88 out of 132 seats. Both leaders came to power under slogans of democratisation and fighting corruption. How then did they fall into the trap of ethno-territorial conflicts? Moreover, how might the influence of the 2008 war on Georgia’s internal developments help us conceptualise possible developments in Armenia?

First, it is necessary to bear in mind certain differences between Georgia and Armenia. Georgia faced two counts of ethnic separatism – in two provinces that enjoyed autonomous status in Soviet times. Tbilisi also faced the challenge of central control over the peripheries, including the rich province of Ajaria, as well as mountainous districts controlled by armed groups such as Kodori Valley or Pankisi. Armenia, on the other hand, faced the problem of securing its co-ethnics in Nagorno Karabakh, which were engaged in a struggle for autonomy against the central authorities of Azerbaijan. Therefore, while Tbilisi supported the principle of territorial integrity of states, Armenia backed self-determination.

Another important difference between the two is that Georgia in 2008 was actively seeking to join NATO, and Saakashvili chose close association with Washington. Armenia had no such ambitions, and was part of Russia’s military alliance. Georgia in 2008 and Armenia in 2020 had essentially opposing security vectors. Finally, while it was the Georgian leadership that took the military initiative by sending its forces into battle to capture Tskhinvali, Armenia was not the side that started the Second Karabakh War. It was the Azerbaijani leadership that was consistently in favour of military solution of the conflict, and it was Baku that started the military aggression on 27 September. While Saakashvili aimed to change the status quo, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan wished to preserve it.

The timing of both wars was well chosen, with both the 2008 and 2020 conflicts started under cover of double international events.

Both started prior to American presidential elections, but for different reasons. Saakashvili was worried that an eventual defeat of the US Republican Party would lead to losing the support of Washington. Therefore, the months before the US presidential elections of 2008 was a final window of opportunity to launch a military challenge while hoping for US military backing. For Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, the US presidential elections, as well as the global Covid-19 pandemic, were diversions that could keep international actors away from the Karabakh war – and the global media busy. The 2008 war, which started with the Georgian military operation towards the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on 7 August, coincided with another global event that was to serve as a smokescreen: the opening of the Beijing Olympics on 8 August.

One of the most important elements to retain is that neither of the “protectors” came to the rescue of their protégés by effectively stopping the war. The 2008 war coincided with the end of joint US-Georgian military manoeuvres; US military personnel were still in Georgia as the war erupted. Yet the US administration, even led by neo-conservatives, was not going to risk a war with Russia, a nuclear power.

In 2020, Russia had all the means to decisively intervene and stop the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish attack against its ally, Armenia. The Azerbaijani attack started one day after Russia had ended a major war games exercise in the North Caucasus, Kavkaz-2020, in which some 80,000 troops took part. Russia was evidently annoyed to see Turkish military intervention in the South Caucasus, and the presence of several thousand Syrian mercenaries in the conflict zone. But Russia still made cost-benefit calculations and chose not to intervene.

The West did not choose to help Nikol Pashinyan after the 2018 revolution, and does not seem to be changing course after the destructive war. Nor is Moscow very keen to save the political career of Pashinyan, who came to power on a wave of popular protests

Eventually, both the West – the US and France, which acted as mediator in 2008 – and Russia intervened to stop the wars and save their protégés from total defeat. In 2008, this was done after less than five days of war. In 2020, it was done after 44 days of war, and after Armenia was forced to sign a humiliating agreement. This document saw Armenia lose the remaining Azerbaijani territories still under its control (it did not receive Karabakh Armenian localities under Azeri control in return), and no promises on the final status of Karabakh – the essence of the conflict.

The fact that the 2008 war lasted only five days meant that it was less destructive, with relatively low casualties as Georgian military losses were less than 200. The Georgian authorities also followed a policy of censoring anti-Russian xenophobia– for example, censoring a song considered to be anti-Russian from being aired on local TV channels. On the other hand, the Second Karabakh War was much more deadly, not so much among civilians – who were evacuated from war zones– but the military. The war also led to the emergence of a new wave of inter-ethnic hatred, as images of war propaganda invaded screens of both sides.

Stepanakert and other Armenian localities came under intense bombardment throughout the war, while the Azerbaijani towns of Barda and Ganja came under missile attacks. Large number of videos filmed by Azerbaijani elite soldiers torturing and murdering Armenian prisoners of war circulated on social media, suggesting a systematic policy. Similar videos of abuse of Azerbaijani POWs also emerged on the Armenian side, although with much lower numbers. The Azerbaijani public’s support for war was unconditional, and the pro-war demonstrations of July this year are probably one of the triggers of the Second Karabakh War.

Following the 2008 war, the EU established an “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia”, headed by experienced Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. A similar independent fact-finding mission is necessary to clarify the responsibility for the Second Karabakh War and the crimes committed during the 44 days. In fact, it is necessary to establish a second historical commission that goes back to the emergence of the conflict in 1988 and investigates a number of taboos that continue to fuel antagonism, including Sumgait and a chain of other anti-Armenian pogroms in Soviet Azerbaijan, ethnic cleansing in Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan, Khojalu and other massacres during the first Karabakh War, among others. Without an independent truth commission and clarification, polarised narratives will continue to fuel hatred. This kind of commission might help the parties to finally distinguish crimes from justice, and take a different future course.

The 2008 war was a turning point in international politics. After nearly two decades of Russian military retreat, 2008 marked a radical shift in Russian policies. Moscow not only stopped the Georgian challenge to oust its forces from South Ossetia, but also put an end to Georgian ambitions to join NATO. In 2020, this trend was re-confirmed: Russia’s last-minute intervention not only saved what remains of Karabakh from the risk of being annihilated by Azerbaijani forces, but also imposed its peacekeepers inside Azerbaijan – something that successive leaders in Baku had rejected in the past. Now Moscow has a foothold inside Azerbaijan that it could use against any challenges defying its influence in the Karabakh conflict zone. Russia also succeeded in marginalising Turkey from both the 9 November ceasefire agreement, and the military dimensions of peacekeeping. In the end, Russia came out winning in a conflict where it had invested little.

The trend of decreasing Western influence over the South Caucasus, which started in 2008, has been confirmed once again in 2020. The OSCE Minsk Group – a structure created to manage the Karabakh conflict, but not necessarily to resolve it – has been marginalised by Moscow. In the future, Russia might be interested to see a certain role of France or the US in the Karabakh area, as long as this new role does not cross the limits of the new Russian influence there – namely, its military domination.

Mikheil Saakashvili managed to stay in power to continue his second presidential mandate after the 2008 defeat, only thanks to massive European and American financial aid of up to $4 billion USD. The West did not choose to help Pashinyan after the 2018 revolution, and does not seem to be changing course after the destructive war. Nor is Moscow very keen to save the political career of Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power on a wave of popular protests – something the Russian elite has dreaded since the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. It is difficult to imagine what force could save Pashinyan now.

This does not mean that Armenia will go back to the old days. True, Georgia could not continue its political transformation following 2008, but it did not return to its pre-2003 conditions of a weak state and chaotic reality. Most important, the United National Movement, the political party founded by Saakasvhili, survived Georgia’s next elections, constituting a parliamentary opposition. The best that could happen to Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance is to survive its inevitable fall from power and become a real opposition.



The Minsk Group: Karabakh War’s Diplomatic Casualty (Part One)

Chmshkian Vicken
Jamestown Foundation
Dec 7 2020

November 25, 2020 04:09 PM Age: 2 weeks

The 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan (September 27–November 9) has resulted in an Azerbaijani national triumph, a Russian geopolitical and diplomatic victory over the West, and a conclusive discrediting of multilateral diplomacy as an instrument for conflict-resolution in and around the post-Soviet space (see EDM, November 12, 13, 17). The discrediting is conclusive simply because this instrument has run out of places in which to fail in former Soviet and nearby territories where Russia is involved. The West has tried multilateral diplomacy only to be defeated at its own game in Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Syria, and now in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Karabakh.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group was instituted in 1992 and activated in 1994, with a mandate to promote a peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict through negotiation and mediation (Osce.org, accessed November 23). (The Group was supposed to convene and act in Minsk but never did so, regardless of which it kept that official name ever since.)

Its structure includes the Minsk Conference (from 1992 onward), comprised of about a dozen OSCE states with a purely symbolic role; and (from 1997 onward) the triple co-chairmanship comprised of Russia, the United States and France (the latter acting in a national capacity to keep the European Union out—a point in Moscow’s favor). Turkey has all along been excluded from the co-chairmanship and relegated to the irrelevant Conference (another point in Moscow’s favor).

The triple co-chairmanship has been the Minsk Group’s sole initiating and operating agent all along. It has mediated between Armenia and Azerbaijan, acting by internal consensus among the three co-chairs. However, Russia has been the most active co-chair by far from 2010 to date. The Barack Obama administration decided, as a matter of its Russia policy, to defer to Moscow on this issue; and Moscow upgraded the level of its involvement, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Kremlin itself. Owing to US disengagement and French irrelevance to this region, Russia has practically monopolized the mediator’s role between Armenia and Azerbaijan, nominally through the Minsk Group but often bypassing it in practice, throughout this past decade.

Exceptionally, the period 2006–2009 became the most fruitful on the Minsk Group’s record, with the US co-chair’s committed and creative engagement. This period produced the Minsk Group’s legacy in the form of the “Basic Principles” for a settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Karabakh. Presented to the parties by the triple co-chairmanship at the OSCE’s 2007 annual conference in Madrid (hence also the “Madrid principles”) in preliminary form and updated for public presentation at the G8 summit in L’Aquila in 2009, the Basic Principles comprise (Osce.org, July 10, 2009):

– Return of the territories surrounding “Nagorno” (Upper) Karabakh to Azerbaijani control [reference to the seven inner-Azerbaijani districts adjacent to Upper Karabakh];

– A corridor linking Armenia to Upper Karabakh (reference to the Lachin corridor);

– An interim status for Upper Karabakh, providing guarantees for security and self-governance;

– Future determination of the final legal status of Upper Karabakh through a legally binding _expression_ of will;

– The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence;

– International security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

An accompanying joint statement by the US, Russian, and French presidents, representing the Minsk Group’s co-chairing countries, endorsed these updated Basic Principles, and called on the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to “finalize their agreement on these Basic Principles, which will outline a comprehensive settlement” (Osce.org, July 10, 2009).

The Basic Principles did, at that stage, and could still constitute a viable and appropriate basis for a mediated political settlement of this conflict. Post-2010 developments, however, frustrated any further advances and, in due course, eroded the Basic Principles themselves. Those developments included: declining US interest, Russia’s takeover of the driver’s seat in the negotiations (see above), Moscow’s tilt in favor Armenia, Azerbaijan’s consequent loss of trust in the Minsk process, and Armenia’s “velvet revolution” which resulted in Yerevan’s outright repudiation of the Basic Principles from 2018 onward and paved the way to war (see accompanying article).

Even before the war’s outbreak (September 27), Russia had practically appropriated what had been the OSCE Minsk multilateral process. Following the outbreak of war, the U.S. and French co-chairs found themselves excluded from Moscow’s unilateral mediation between Baku and Yerevan. The U.S. and French co-chairs were reduced to telephoning Moscow for information. Yet Moscow has not killed the Minsk Group; it may still need it for a multilateral cover on Moscow’s own decisions down the road. Moscow has therefore kept the Minsk Group’s formal co-chairmanship barely alive during the 44-day war through meaningless “for the record” statements.

The armistice agreement, signed on November 9, 2020, by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, consecrates Russia’s monopolization of the mediator’s role (see EDM, November 12, 13). Although the agreement does contain some of the Basic Principles, it makes no reference to them, nor to their collective author, the Minsk Group. It thereby conveys a message that multilateral diplomacy is over and Russia is now in charge. The armistice agreement departs from the Basic Principles in four respects:

– it omits any reference to Upper Karabakh’s legal or political status, current or future, although it does not prejudice that either;

– it places approximately one third of Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh’s territory de facto under Azerbaijan’s direct administration, apparently but not necessarily excluding this part of Upper Karabakh from the purview of self-governance and status that the Minsk process had envisaged for “Nagorno” Karabakh;

– it adds, as an entirely new provision, the opening of a corridor between western Azerbaijan and the latter’s exclave of Nakhchivan, across Armenian territory and under Russian border troops’ supervision; and

– it inserts Russian “peacekeeping” troops in Upper Karabakh, in a dual role: to supervise the ceasefire and to protect the Armenian population of rump Upper Karabakh. This move contravenes the understanding that all parties to the Minsk process had achieved from the outset (OSCE’s 1994 annual conference) and had maintained until now: namely, that any future peacekeeping mission would exclude troops from the three Minsk Group co-chairing countries (Russia, US, France) or from neighboring countries (such as Russia or Turkey).

These changes to the Basic Principles introduce significant elements of ambiguity; which, combined with Russia’s military presence on the ground, enable Russia henceforth to manipulate or block the negotiations toward a final settlement. Armenia has now fallen into full dependence on Russia; whereas Azerbaijan can rely on Turkey, the new entrant and game-changer in the region, to protect Azerbaijan’s interests to some extent though not fully yet.


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The Minsk Group: Karabakh War’s Diplomatic Casualty (Part Three)

Baghdasarian Karlen
Jamestown Foundation
Dec  3 2020

December 3, 2020 05:03 PM Age: 4 days

Irrespective of the rights and wrongs of the issue at stake, mediators are expected to be impartial between two parties to a conflict. Yet the Minsk Group’s co-chairing Western governments—those of the United States and France—clearly tilted toward the Armenian side in the just-concluded Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Karabakh (see Parts One and Two in EDM, November 25, December 1).

French President Emmanuel Macron sided with Armenia against Azerbaijan and Turkey even before the war’s outbreak. Already on August 30 Macron condemned Turkey’s “warlike rhetoric” for encouraging Azerbaijan’s “dangerous” territorial claims on Armenia (EurActiv, August 31). Following the war’s outbreak, Macron used the opportunity of a European Union summit in Brussels to attack Turkey again for its “reckless and dangerous” statements backing Azerbaijan. And he heated up his own rhetoric by claiming that Turkey had funneled hundreds of Syrian jihadi fighters to join Azerbaijan’s forces (see EDM, October 13). Macron telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin to share his alleged concern (EurActiv, October 2). The French leader persisted with this poorly substantiated claim throughout the war and repeatedly communicated it to Putin.

Further undermining the Minsk Group’s triple co-chairmanship, Macron suggested by telephone to Putin that Russian and French mediation efforts should continue both within and outside the Minsk Group (TASS, Elysee.fr, November 7), thus implying that Paris and Moscow could act together to bypass the US side of the triple co-chairmanship.

Following the Kremlin-brokered armistice, the Elysée Palace weighed in again on one side, advocating that “any lasting agreement must take into consideration the interests of Armenians,” while Turkey should “end its provocations in the region” (www.Elysee.fr, November 10). Speaking in the French National Assembly, Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned Azerbaijan to “strictly respect its obligations” and warned Turkey to respect the armistice or else it would face European sanctions. At the same time, “France reconfirms its full friendship with the Armenian people in view of our close human, cultural and historical ties. We are on Armenia’s side in this dramatic context,” he boldly proclaimed (EurActiv, Arminfo, November 10, 11).

Relentlessly, the Elysée and Quai d’Orsay pursued the themes of protecting the interests of one side (the Armenian), ejecting phantomatic “Syrian mercenaries” from Azerbaijan and stopping Turkey from “fueling tensions,” as Macron and Le Drian framed those issues in public statements and telephone call readouts (Agence France Presse, November 19, 23).

Behind Macron’s theatrical posture lurks a multi-pronged domestic and international agenda: securing the significant French-Armenian vote in the upcoming presidential election; conveniently targeting “Islamist” Turkey to compensate for the French establishment’s failure to deal with Arab-Islamist terrorism in France; and undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by forming a French-led bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean against Turkey (Tablet, November 30). All those issues are far removed from the Karabakh conflict itself; yet Azerbaijan’s legitimate interests as well as the Minsk Group co-chairmanship’s credibility have become collateral targets of Macron’s outsized agenda.

Washington also aligned itself indirectly or directly with the Armenian side, abandoning the mediator’s equidistance. From the outset of the Barack Obama administration to the end of the Donald Trump administration, Washington allowed the Kremlin to replace the Minsk Group’s co-chairs as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Disengaged, inattentive, and consumed with multiple external and internal issues (merely topped by the 2020 presidential election campaign), Washington was caught unawares by the Karabakh war’s outbreak and poorly prepared to react. The question as to another possible intelligence malfunction (akin, mutatis mutandis, to Georgia 2008 or Crimea 2014) seems to go unaddressed. Trump administration senior officials, on short-term tenures of office and no previous involvement with the South Caucasus, seemed to improvise their reactions. And their reactions seemed mainly inspired (akin to Macron’s) by vote-counting as well as by Washington’s unsettled relations with Turkey, rather than the merits of the issue at stake. Joseph Biden’s presidential campaign expressed itself in the same vein as the incumbent officials (see below).

The main themes running through the Secretary of State’s and National Security Advisor’s public statements during the 44-day war and afterward included: calling for an immediate ceasefire; asking Turkey (by name or by inference as “outside actor”) to stop supporting Azerbaijan; resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act; and resuming negotiations mediated by the Minsk Group’s co-chairs at the ambassadorial level.

Secretary of State Michael Pompeo told a press conference on October 14, “We ask that there be a ceasefire, as a beginning of a solution to the conflict. We have watched Turkey begin to reinforce Azerbaijan. We have asked every international player to stay out of the region” (The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, October 14).

National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien publicized his remarks to Azerbaijan’s visiting minister of foreign affairs, Jeyhun Bayramov: “I pressed [sic] for an immediate ceasefire, then a return to Minsk Group-facilitated negotiations with Armenia, and rejection of outside actors further destabilizing the situation. There is no military solution” (Twitter, October 23).

Meeting separately with Bayramov and with Armenian counterpart Zohrab Mnatsakanian in Washington, on October 23, Pompeo “emphasized the need to end the violence and protect civilians,” resume negotiations under the Minsk co-chairs, and resolve the conflict “based on the Helsinki Final Act” (State.gov, October 23).

In Paris on November 16, Pompeo concurred with Macron that “Turkey’s recent actions have been very aggressive (Agence France Presse, November 16). And on the next day, in Istanbul (avoiding meetings with the government in Ankara), Pompeo welcomed the cessation of hostilities, urging the parties to resume Minsk co-chairs–mediated negotiations toward a “political solution based on the Helsinki Final Act” (State.gov, November 17). Finally, in his last appearance to a NATO ministerial meeting, on December 1, Pompeo condemned Turkey’s actions across the board, including its support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh war (Hurriyet Daily News, December 3).

Along similar lines, as presidential candidate, Biden called for “stopping the advance of Azerbaijani troops into Karabakh,” denounced Turkey for supplying weapons and (allegedly) mercenaries to the conflict area, and warned that the United States under his presidency could impose sanctions on Azerbaijan under section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act (Arminfo, October 29).

Almost all of those public statements showed a mediating power tilting toward one of the sides. Thus, an unconditional ceasefire could only have stopped the Azerbaijani forces’ momentum. Washington’s calls ignored Azerbaijan’s repeated offers of a ceasefire conditional on Armenian forces’ withdrawal from the seven inner-Azerbaijani districts adjacent to Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh—in which case, Azerbaijan would commit not to pursue Armenian forces into Upper Karabakh. The hostilities were, after all, strictly confined to Azerbaijan’s own, internationally recognized territory.


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Nagorno-Karabakh refugees are beginning to return home, but many are still displaced

Hambik Zargarian
The PRI.org
Dec 7 2020

Although rebuilding has started here, for some, too much has been lost.

 

· 1:45 PM EST

By Andrew Connelly

Larisa Melkumyan used to be a music teacher in Shusha — or Shushi, as it’s known by Armenians — a mountaintop city in Nagorno-Karabakh. But as fighting broke out in the contested region this past fall, her family was forced to leave.

“We stayed in the basement for four days and then fled at night as the road was being bombed.”

Larisa Melkumyan, Armenian

“We stayed in the basement for four days and then fled at night as the road was being bombed.” Melkumyan pointed to her feet. “These are lucky shoes!”

Related: Armenians say goodbye to Kelbajar region given to Azeris

The battle for Shusha was one of the six-week war’s bloodiest — and pieces of missile and shreds of military uniform still litter the roadside by the turnoff to the city. Shusha was captured by Azerbaijan last month, and now, Melkumyan and other Armenians are unable to return to the city.

For now, Melkumyan’s family is being hosted for free in a modest wooden house outside of Yerevan, but they aren’t sure for how long the owner’s generosity can last. And after that, it’s hard to say where they might land.

Although thousands of displaced people have started returning to the contested region of Nagorno-Karabakh since an armistice was signed on Nov. 10, many are stuck where they — mostly in Yerevan and some parts of Armenia.

That’s because of the ongoing disruption to education, health care and other services in the region, according to Grigor Yeritsyan, president of the Armenian Progressive Youth, a nongovernmental organization that is helping provide food and supplies to displaced people now in the Armenian capital of Yerevan.

Related: Armenians mobilize to support troops in Karabakh war, as ceasefires fail

Although rebuilding has started here, for some, too much has been lost.

“We also had instances when kids are facing some psychological problems and also have some panic attacks related to constant fear, so I don’t think these families would think to go back in the near future because of all the trauma they have been exposed to.”

Grigor Yeritsyan, Armenian Progressive Youth

“We also had instances when kids are facing some psychological problems and also have some panic attacks related to constant fear, so I don’t think these families would think to go back in the near future because of all the trauma they have been exposed to,” Yeritsyan said.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan lost more than 2,500 soldiers in just 44 days of fighting, the government says. Azerbaijan was the clear military winner but people living here will now have to rely on Russia to keep the peace for years to come.

According to the Russia-brokered peace agreement, Moscow will deploy its troops in Nagorno-Karabakh to prevent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenian troops were ordered to leave several regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh by the end of December.

Now, the enclave’s sole connection to Armenia is a long dusty road that weaves through mountains and plunging gorges.

Until a new one is built, Armenians and Azerbaijanis will have to share this road under the watchful eye of Russian peacekeepers who have set up numerous checkpoints here.

In Stepanakert, the de facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, there are already some signs of life starting to get back to normal.

Stepanakert was shelled on a daily basis throughout the war — electricity and gas supplies are still interrupted but most of the city is intact.

Related: Nagorno-Karabakh fighting rages as US hosts talks

On an early November morning in the city, chickens rattled their cages, a butcher laid out cows’ heads on a table, and crates of pomegranates, peppers and potatoes lined the street. During the war, a rocket attack destroyed a clothes stall here. It’s little more than a burned shell with shards of glass and wood and ripped fabric spilling out into the street.

Next door, Rima Arushanyan, 58, was doing a brisk trade in fresh eggs and homemade vodka. She says that several hundred people are returning to the city every day, and business is picking up.

“Thank God nobody was here at the time when the missile hit. The owner is still on the front line, and now his business is gone but at least nobody died. Everything that is destroyed can be rebuilt.”

Rima Arushanyan, market vendor, Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh 

“Thank God nobody was here at the time when the missile hit. The owner is still on the front line, and now his business is gone but at least nobody died,” Arushanyan explained. “Everything that is destroyed can be rebuilt.”

But in frontline towns like Martuni, it’s a different story.

Levitan Danielyan, 68, plucked some juicy persimmons from the trees in his garden and washed them under the tap. They still have a layer of dust from when a missile exploded outside the pensioner’s house — the same night the peace agreement was signed.

“They hit us with everything they had,” Danielyan said. “All night long, they shelled the whole neighborhood but thankfully everyone on this street is OK.”

It wasn’t always this way. Under the Soviet Union, Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived right alongside each other but Danielyan says it wasn’t perfect, even then.

“The Soviet government didn’t let anyone do anything nationalistic,” he said. “Thanks to that, we lived together. But not really as friends, more like dogs and cats.”

Azerbaijan shelled his house in the ’90s.

“When the war ended in 1994, I asked the Armenian government for some assistance. Years later, they finally decided to give me some building supplies and they arrived on Sept. 26, the day before the second war.”

The region has a lot of healing to do — but Melkumyan, the music teacher who fled Shusha, says she’s determined not to dwell on painful memories.

“But the past is for forgetting and we should live in the future,” she said. “We miss our Shushi, but we can’t get it back.” 

The Minsk Group: Karabakh War’s Diplomatic Casualty (Part Four)

Ophelia Vardapetian
Jamestown Foundation

Dec 7 2020

December 7, 2020 05:01 PM Age: 46 mins

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, Moscow, April 2019 (Source: Azerbaijan MFA)

 

Over the past two decades, the main international mechanism for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group—has shown itself incapable of achieving its underlying objective. During the most recent bout of fierce fighting in the region (September 27–November 9, 2020), the format’s two Western co-chairs, the United States and France, effectively sided with Armenia (see Parts One, Two and Three in EDM, November 25, December 1, 3). And while criticizing, instead of welcoming, their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally Turkey’s newfound role in the South Caucasus amidst that war to balance Russia, the US and French statements voiced no objection to (third Minsk Group co-chair) Russia’s instigation and manipulation of the various protracted conflicts in this region, including that over Karabakh.

Calling for a solution based on the Helsinki Final Act is a formulation that implies withdrawing from the Minsk Group co-chairs’ previously agreed Basic Principles to resolve the Karabakh conflict. The co-chairs had proceeded from the Helsinki Final Act’s general norms to, in 2009, develop the specific Basic Principles tailored to the Karabakh conflict. Yerevan, however, has overtly repudiated the Basic Principles since Nikol Pashinian became prime minister (see EDM, November 25), to no censure from Moscow, Washington or Paris. Recommending simply a return to the Helsinki Final Act clearly implies stepping back from the Basic Principles, thus accommodating Yerevan.

Resuming Minsk Group–mediated negotiations (with or without the Basic Principles) looks like a pious hope at this stage. While wishing this to happen, US officials stopped short of promising in their statements a more active US engagement in the Minsk Group after a decade of passive involvement at the ambassadorial level, far outranked by Russia’s presidential- and ministerial-level involvement.

Nevertheless, the war’s surprising outbreak this autumn prompted Washington and Paris to attempt reactivating the institution of the Minsk Group’s co-chairs, in the hopes of recouping at least some degree of their lost influence. However, the US and French co-chairs were reduced to telephoning Moscow for information on ongoing faits accomplis in the war, assembling from time to time as a trio with the Russian co-chair (including an October 25 meeting in Washington), and issuing “for the record” public statements by tripartite consensus.

The themes running through these statements included an immediate ceasefire without preconditions (i.e., Azerbaijan’s preconditions); “no alternative to a peaceful, negotiated solution” (i.e., not seriously challenging Armenia’s earlier conquest of Azerbaijani territory); resuming negotiations toward a solution to the conflict (a worthy but belated attempt by Washington and Paris to work themselves back into a process that Moscow had already taken away from them); a number of humanitarian considerations; and, tentatively, to consider the possibility of working out some ceasefire-monitoring proposals by the three co-chairs (Osce.org/minsk-group, Osce.org/chairmanship, September 27, 29, October 2, 13, 25, 30).

Notably, the co-chairs’ multiple statements (with one possible exception) avoided any reference to the Minsk Group’s own Basic Principles (authored by the co-chairs themselves) for solving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The reasons behind this omission seem obvious: Yerevan had repudiated the Basic Principles as unacceptable (see above); and the Kremlin was itself, during this war, developing the armistice agreement that was to depart from the Basic Principles (see Parts One and Two in EDM, November 25, December 1).

A joint presidential statement by Presidents Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron along with a joint ministerial statement by foreign ministry heads Sergei Lavrov, Michael Pompeo and Jean-Yves Le Drian were issued early in the war, on October 1 and 5, respectively, pro forma and without follow up (Osce.org/minsk-group, October 1, 5).

The fact that top-level US and French officials deemed it necessary to intervene signified, at least, their desire to raise the intensity of Washington’s and Paris’s involvement from the merely ambassadorial level. The Minsk Group’s co-chairs had been operating through their ambassadors since the format’s inception, in 1992, to date. From 2010 onward, however, Russia also became involved at the presidential and ministerial levels and on a permanent basis; while the US and French participation remained ambassadorial, bureaucratized, unpurposeful and ultimately dormant. This mismatch alone predetermined the Kremlin’s unilateral takeover of what had been an attempt at concert-of-powers mediation. That, in turn, carried a multilateral cover in the form of an OSCE mandate; but the OSCE cannot counter Russia’s monopolization of the process and, therefore, keeps silent about it (see below).

The Kremlin has firmly monopolized the mediator’s role between Armenia and Azerbaijan, brokered the November 10 armistice agreement, and unilaterally deployed “peacekeeping” troops to oversee the agreement’s implementation in the years ahead (see EDM, November 12, 13). Moscow will, nevertheless, keep the Minsk Group’s co-chairmanship alive, to the extent to which Washington and Paris are willing to provide a multilateral cover for Russia-driven decisions down the road. When the Minsk Group’s US and French co-chairs (Ambassadors Andrew Schofer and Stéphane Visconti, respectively) visited Moscow after the Karabakh armistice, to be briefed on the fait accompli, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov chided Washington and Paris for begrudging Russia’s own success and made clear that the co-chairmanship would continue operating on Russian-defined terms. These are acceptance (political endorsement) of the Russian-brokered armistice terms as well as support for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Karabakh (TASS, November 19), points that Lavrov reiterated on his victory-lap visit to Yerevan and Baku (TASS, November 21).

Moscow has no wish to exclude Washington and Paris from the process. On the contrary, it welcomes their involvement, but only through the Minsk Group, not in their own right, and within the framework set by the Russian-brokered armistice. Accordingly, Moscow uses the courtesy talking point that the armistice draws on some of the Minsk co-chairs’ 2009 recommendations (dormant ever since—see Part Two in EDM, December 1). This compliment is partly fact-based but obscures Russia’s drastic departure from those recommendations with the deployment of its troops in Karabakh.

For their part, the United States and France regard the Minsk Group’s co-chairmanship as a means to work their way back into the process: for Washington to recoup some of its lost influence, and for Paris to seek a degree of influence where France heretofore had none. But this is a route to nowhere because the co-chairmanship is trilateral, Russian-US-French, and can only speak and act by internal consensus among its parties—a mirror image of the dysfunctional OSCE, which created the Minsk Group. Meanwhile, Russia is working bilaterally with Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively. Given Moscow’s faits accomplis on the ground, its political conditions (see above), and the co-chairmanship’s own structure, the only way for the US and France to operate in the Minsk Group is as travel companions to Russia-driven policies.

Part 1: st1yle=”margin:0px;padding:0px;line-height:1.333″>Part 2: st1yle=”margin:0px;padding:0px;line-height:1.333″>Part 3: st1yle=”margin:0px;padding:0px;line-height:1.333″>Part 4:


Russian and Armenian Foreign Ministers Hold Press Conference After Talks in Moscow

Emil Lazarian
Sputnik
Dec 7 2020
Russian Foreign Ministry
World

11:36 GMT 07.12.2020Get short URL

Top diplomats from Russia and Armenia held talks earlier in the day, having focused on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and the implementation of the Moscow-brokered ceasefire, which entered into force on 10 November.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Larvov and his Armenian counterpart Ara Aivazyan, who is on a two-day working visit to Moscow, are holding a press conference after talks on regional matters, including the implementation of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire.

In particular, the ministers addressed the issues of humanitarian assistance, rebuilding infrastructure and unblocking transport corridors in the region.

In addition to the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, the top diplomats were expected to discuss bilateral relations and cooperation within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union and other multilateral organisations.

Last month, Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders Vladimir Putin, Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on the complete cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh following weeks of intense fighting in the Armenian-majority region, which declared independence from Baku in the 1990s but is still internationally recognised as a part of Azerbaijan.

In line with the statement, Armenia and Azerbaijan were supposed to stop at occupied positions, a number of Karabakh regions came under Baku’s control, the sides were set to exchange prisoners, and nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed along the line of contact and within the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia for at least five years.

Sports: Mkhitaryan after Sassuolo clash: ‘Everyone saw what happened’

Jirair Kafian
Panorama, Armenia
Dec 7 2020

‘Angry’ Henrikh Mkhitaryan didn’t want to speak about the referee after Roma-Sassuolo: ‘Everyone saw what happened.’

The Giallorossi were held to a 0-0 draw at the Olimpico by Sassuolo but had Pedro sent off in the first half while the former Manchester United and Arsenal man had a goal disallowed, Football Italia reported. 

“We played well even if we were down to ten men, we had several goal scoring opportunities,” the Armenian told Sky Sport.

“I am not going to talk about the referee, everyone saw what happened. It’s enough to just look at the images.”

Paulo Fonseca was also sent off before the half-time break and said after the game he ‘didn’t understand’ the referee.

“We are angry for what happened,” Mkhitaryan continued.

“I am angry because I’ve had a goal disallowed for the second time, I am angry because Pedro was sent off even if the second yellow card was fair. We are going to focus on the next games.”

Can Roma be title contenders?

“It’s still too early to say that, there is balance up there. It’s going to be a long season, we’ll give our best to get a Champions League placement.”


ANN/Armenian News – Week in Review – 12/06/2020

Emil Lazarian

Armenian News Network / Armenian News

Armenian News: Week in Review

ANN/Armenian News

December 6, 2020

Guests

  • Varuzhan Geghamyan

  • Asbed Kotchikian

  • Hovik Manucharyan

  • Asbed Bedrossian

Hello, and welcome to the Armenian News Network, Armenian News, Week in Review for Sunday December 6, 2020. Today we’ll be talking to our guests about the following major topics:

  • Turkey and Azerbaijan Connecting

  • Armenia’s Political Opposition Uniting

  • Support from Russia

  • Robert Kocharyan Interview

To talk about these issues, we have with us:

Varuzhan Geghamyan, who is an assistant professor at Yerevan State University and teaches on Turkey’s modern history and the history of Azerbaijan.

and

Asbed Kotchikian, a senior lecturer of political science and international relations at Bentley University in Massachusetts where he teaches courses on the Middle East and former Soviet space.

This episode was recorded on Sunday, December 6.

In The Statement of November 10, it looked like Point 9 was a late addition which Turkey and Azerbaijan decided that, in a moment when Armenia was at a gunpoint and out of options, they would throw in everything and the kitchen sink in the agreement. It reads:

  • All economic activity and transport links in the region are to be unrestricted. The Republic of Armenia guarantees the safety of transport links between western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to organize the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions. Transport control is carried out by the bodies of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia. By agreement of the Parties, the construction of new infrastructure linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with regions of Azerbaijan is to take place.

What are the goals of this point?

Since the signing of The Statement which ended hostilities in Artsakh on November 9, the political environment in Yerevan has been in turmoil.

A hodge-podge of 17+ political parties, calling itself “The Salvation of Motherland Movement”, has called for PM Pashinyan’s resignation and has put forward the veteran politician Vazgen Manukyan as its candidate for interim PM. On Saturday, December 5, this alliance held its largest protest yet in 4 weeks numbering about 20 thousand people. 

Meanwhile Edmond Marukyan of the Bright Armenia party also announced his own candidacy for the same position. 

The position however is not vacant. Pashinyan has refused to comply with the calls for resignation and the government has only made cosmetic changes by reshuffling the cabinet, and advisors.

Where do we see these developments heading? What are some of the key points in the statements made by the opposition representatives including Vazgen Manukyan

On December 2, Russian president Putin chaired a virtual summit of the CSTO. Announcing that Armenia’s leader had to make “painful but necessary concessions” Putin said that it was up to CSTO leaders to “support the prime minister as well as his team in their efforts to establish peace, achieve the implementation of all of the decisions made, and assist people who found themselves in very difficult life situations.”

At the same time there were reports of wealthy Russian diasporans calling for his resignation, including Ruben Vardanyan and Samvel Karapetyan.

Can this statement be viewed as an endorsement of Pashinyan by Moscow? What are the implications of such an announcement on Armenia’s internal political scene and the continuation of Pashinyan as PM?

Meanwhile former President Robert Kocharyan gave an expensive interview on Friday. What are some of the key points that stood out in that interview?

  • The interview of the 2nd President of the Republic of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan` “Channel 5» (video)

Some points from the interview:

  • SU-30 purchase decision explicitly made by PM, despite counter-recommendations from the military. The PM thought they were “more impressive” than the TOR systems. Also, the SU-30’s did not come with the required missiles for engagement because the missiles were not exportable by Russia.

  • There were multiple occasions during the war – from the 4th day on until the end – when Putin said there was an opportunity to end the war, and the PM missed it.

  • Vitaly Balasanyan requested to take over the leadership of the southern front, but was denied.

  • Mentioning Saddam Hussein as the only modern leader who hung on to power after losing a war, and then going on to being hung after his capture.

  • Mentioned deeper integration with Russia, particularly in the area of defense.

  • Mentioned that the July fighting was provoked by Armenia.

  • In the context of Armenian-Russian relations, RK mentioned that several months before the war a new head of national security was appointed whose task was to flush out the pro-Russian elements from Armenia’s government. (He was most likely referring to Argishti Kyaramyan, who was appointed to that position in June 2020. –Armenian News note)

  • He promised to be involved in rebuilding of Armenia saying: “I will definitely not be left out.” What do you think this means?

That concludes our program for This week’s Armenian News Week in Review. We hope it has helped you understand some of the current issues. We look forward to your feedback, and even your suggestions for issues to cover in greater depth. Contact us on our website, at Armenian News.org, or on our Facebook Page “ANN – Armenian News”, or in our Facebook Group “Armenian News – Armenian News  Network”.

Special thanks to Laura Osborn for providing the music for our podcast. I’m Hovik Manucharyan, and on behalf of everyone in this episode, I wish you a good week. Thank you for listening and we’ll talk to you next week.

YouTube           Apple            Google         Spotify       Facebook

Armenia, Karabakh, Artsakh, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Putin, Varuzhan Geghamyan

Additional: Asbed Kotchikian, Russia, Ceasefire, Aliyev, Pashinyan, Robert Kocharyan, Goble Plan, SU-30, Artsakh War, Karabakh War, Transportation Corridors, Meghri, Syunik, Sotk, Berdzor, Stepanakert, Salvation of Motherland Movement, Edmon Marukyan, Bright Armenia, Vazgen Manukyan, Resignation, Martial Law,

The California Courier Online, December 10, 2020

Chakhmakhchian Vatche

1 –        Pashinyan’s Six-Month Roadmap:
            What’s Included and What is Left Out?
            By Harut Sassounian
            Publisher, The California Courier
            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

2-         Thousands Protest in Yerevan Demanding Pashinyan’s Resignation

3 –        Armenia continues to fight COVID-19 pandemic

4-         Opposition Parties Choose Vazgen Manukyan as Prime Minister Candidate

5-         AAF Delivers $15 Million of Aid To Armenia, Artsakh

6-         Sarkissian Requests Report on Spending of Funds
            Raised by Hayastan All-Armenian Fund

 7-      Commentary: Serj Tankian, Kool-Aid and a Suicidal Revolution
            for the Armenian Nation
            By Sarig Armenian
            For The California Courier

*****************************************

******************************************

1 –        Pashinyan’s Six-Month Roadmap:

            What’s Included and What is Left Out?

            By Harut Sassounian

            Publisher, The California Courier

            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan presented on his Facebook
page on Nov. 18, 2020 his six-month roadmap of actions he plans to
take after the devastating defeat Armenia suffered against Azerbaijan,
Turkey and imported mercenary terrorists.

These are the steps Pashinyan intends to take, assuming he stays in
power. He has rejected persistent popular demands for his resignation.
These are his 15-point plans:

Pashinyan began by stating that “it is time to talk about the ways,
methods and programs to overcome the current situation.” He admitted
that he is “the main responsible for the current situation” and
“responsible for overcoming the situation and establishing stability
and security in the country.”

The Prime Minister stated that that his first priority is the
“resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process in the format of the
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, emphasizing the status of Artsakh and the
priority of the return of the people of Artsakh to their places of
residence.” By negotiating the ending of the Artsakh War with Russia,
Pashinyan had left out the two other members of the Minsk Group of
negotiators, France and the United States.

In his second point, Pashinyan repeated the importance of the return
of the people of Artsakh to their homes. He added that their damaged
houses, apartments and infrastructure should be restored. Thousands of
refugees from Artsakh have already returned to their homes not
occupied by Azerbaijan. The Armenian Government has paid a negligible
amount of compensation to the returnees.

The third point: the “provision of social guarantees for the families
of killed servicemen and citizens.”

The fourth point: “restoration of residential and public structures
and infrastructure damaged during the war in the territory of the
Republic of Armenia.”

The fifth point: “providing social guarantees, prosthetics and
professional training for servicemen with disabilities.”

The sixth point: “soonest return of captured soldiers and civilians.
Provision of social guarantees for their families. Quick clarification
of the fate of the missing and provision of social guarantees for
their families.” This should have been priority number one.

The seventh point: “formation of a system of psychological
rehabilitation of the individuals who took part in the war and society
in general.”

The eighth point: “approval of the Armed Forces Reform Program and
launch of reforms.” I hope this includes the modernization of the
military by providing it with the latest drones and missiles and
establishing an “air shield” or “Iron Dome” over Armenia and Artsakh
to protect them from Israeli and Turkish advanced drones acquired by
Azerbaijan.

The ninth point: “overcoming the coronavirus pandemic and eliminating
its consequences.”

The tenth point: “restoration of the environment for economic activity.”

The eleventh point: “revitalization of programs for solving
demographic problems.” This probably refers to a plan to provide
incentives for the growth of the population, something Armenia
desperately needs, particularly after the sacrifice of thousands of
its young men.

The twelfth point: “amendments to the Electoral Code and adoption of a
new law on [political] parties.”

The thirteenth point: “introduction of the institute of professional
judges as the first step in establishing an anti-corruption court.
Implementation of the law on confiscation of illegal property.” This
step has already been initiated.

The fourteenth point: “holding regular thematic consultations with
representatives of the Armenian political community and civil
society.” This step is desperately needed to unify the nation.

The fifteenth point: “conducting regular thematic consultations with
Armenian organizations and individuals of the Diaspora. Involvement of
Diaspora individuals and structures in the above-mentioned processes.”
Regrettably, the Diaspora has been ignored for far too long except
when it comes to fundraising. Besides consulting with the Diaspora,
there is a need to establish an institutional structure to deal with
the Diaspora in a comprehensive and inclusive manner.

In addition, Pashinyan mentioned that he will make changes in the
structure of his government. Indeed, several Ministers have either
quit or have been removed since this announcement. It is not likely
that their removal is going to satisfy those who have been calling for
Pashinyan’s resignation.

In conclusion, Pashinyan stated that in six months, until June 2021,
he will report to the nation about the implementation of these 15
points and “make a decision on what to do next, taking into account
public opinion and reaction.” This could mean that Pashinyan is trying
to buy himself time to stay in power and calm the public’s grief and
frustration. It remains to be seen whether he lasts that long and what
the results of his plans will be.

I would like to mention now several important points that Pashinyan
left out of his roadmap.

The first immediate priority should be the clarification of the vague
provisions of the “Statement” that Pashinyan signed with Aliyev and
Putin. This should be an opportunity to minimize the losses and
eliminate some of the harshest concessions, such as permitting a road
through Armenia’s South to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.

The second priority should be to take all necessary steps to protect
the independent status of Artsakh. Otherwise, we risk losing the
remainder of Artsakh.

The third priority is the establishment of an investigative committee
to review everything that went wrong in the war and to identify those
responsible for the grave errors. There have been a lot of accusations
of treason or desertion by Armenia’s political and military leaders.
However, not a single individual has been charged with any wrongdoing.
It is important than this committee or tribunal be composed of
non-partisan and highly respected individuals to avoid any cover-up by
the government. Due to national security secrets, it may not possible
to invite impartial foreign investigators.

The fourth missing point is the elimination of the regrettable
division of Armenians into “blacks” and “whites,” meaning pro-regime
and opposition factions. The prevailing atmosphere of hatred and
acrimony is tearing the Armenian society apart. All sides should
condemn the use of hostile and vulgar language to describe fellow
Armenians who disagree with them.

Finally, a provisional government of technocrats should be established
to oversee some of the outlined points and others to return Armenian
society to normalcy. Plans should also be made to disband the
Parliament and schedule new parliamentary elections in six to 12
months. Before the election, however, a new constitution should be
prepared and a referendum held to adopt its amended provisions which
may include electing the President rather than appointing him by
Parliament.

All of these steps should be undertaken in an atmosphere of peace and
tolerance, regardless of our individual differences, respecting the
rule of law and excluding the commitment of violence.

************************************************************************************************************************************************

2-         Thousands Protest in Yerevan Demanding Pashinyan’s Resignation

On Saturday, December 5, Armenia’s opposition forces saw the largest
turnout since street protests started on November 10, with thousands
gathering at Armenia’s Freedom Square on Saturday to demand Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s resignation for signing the November 9
agreement that ended the Karabakh war, but forced concessions of large
swaths of territory in Artsakh to Azerbaijan.

Following speeches by opposition representatives who now call
themselves the “National Accord Council,” including Vazgen Manukyan,
who on December 3 was named as the council’s candidate for prime
minister of National Accord government, the crowd marched toward the
prime minister’s headquarters at 26 Baghramyan Avenue.

There, Armenian Revolutionary Federation Supreme Council of Armenia
chairman Ishkhan Sagatelyan read the opposition’s ultimatum saying,
“Nikol must go. Period. If he does not go by noon Tuesday, we will
remove him. Together we must resolve this issue this week and put an
end to it once and for all,” Saghatelyan said, warning that the
opposition will will launch a nationwide campaign of “civil
disobedience.”

Pashinyan has ignored the opposition’s calls for his resignation,
which would pave the way for the establishment of a national accord
government that will organize snap parliamentary elections. These
sentiments have also been expressed on two occasions by President
Armen Sarkisian, who said last month that the overwhelming majority of
the political forces, public figures and Diaspora organizational
representatives he had consulted believed fresh parliamentary
elections would begin to resolve the national crisis.

Instead, hours before the scheduled opposition rally, Pashinyan
addressed the nation in a Facebook Live broadcast, accusing the
opposition of trying to seize power illegally.

In his remarks Saturday, Pashinyan stressed that Armenia’s last
parliamentary elections, held in December 2018, when his My Step bloc
won a clear majority, were widely recognized as democratic.

Sarkissian was quick to respond by issuing his own appeal to the
public, in which he said that Armenia is in a “deep post-war crisis,”
and adding that the government could not act within the 2018 public
mindset since “today’s reality is completely different.”

In his first speech as the opposition’s office candidate for prime
minister, Manukyan said, “We could have prevented the war. We could
have won the war. We could have ended the war earlier and with minor
losses.”

He emphasized, however, that his “national accord” administration
would would not walk away from the November 9 agreement, but rather it
would seek to ensure that the agreement’s ambiguous provisions are
interpreted in Armenia’s favor. Manukyan also warned that there are
forces in Armenia that are operating under the “foreign influence.” He
said we must rid Armenia of those elements.

************************************************************************************************************************************************

3 –        Armenia continues to fight COVID-19 pandemic

The Armenian government has commissioned 600,000 doses of coronavirus
vaccines from World Health Organization-backed COVAX; medical and
social workers, seniors and people suffering from chronic diseases
will be the first to get vaccine shots free of charge, and according
to Gayane Sahakian, the deputy director of the National Center for
Disease Control and Prevention,

COVAX is a global partnership which aims to finance COVID-19 vaccines
to be distributed fairly to more than 180 countries that have joined
it. The Armenian government’s supply contract with COVAX is worth $6
million. The first vaccine which COVAX will make available to the
participating countries is the one produced by the British company
AstraZeneca. It is expected that the manufacturer will deliver it to
COVAX in February or March.

They will be enough to vaccinate 300,000 people (roughly 10 percent of
Armenia’s population). According to the Ministry of Health, there were
22,351 active coronavirus cases in Armenia as of December 7. Armenia
has recorded 142,344 coronavirus cases and 2,344 deaths; 117,649 have
recovered.

**********************************************************************************************************************************************

4-         Opposition Parties Choose Vazgen Manukyan as Prime Minister Candidate

The 17 opposition parties in Armenia, which have been staging protests
demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, announced
on Thursday, December 3 that Vazgen Manukyan, Armenia’s first prime
minister, is their candidate to lead a proposed “national accord”
government.

The opposition parties, which have come together as the “Homeland
Salvation Movement,” have formed a council chaired by Manukyan,
announced Armenian Revolutionary Federation Supreme Council of Armenia
Chairman Ishkhan Saghatelyan on Thursday after the council met.

In addition to serving as Armenia’s first prime minister, Manukyan was
also defense minister and for many years served as the chairman of the
Public Council, an office established during Serzh Sargsyan’s
presidency, which advocated for the interests of the public.

While Manukyan will serve as the chair of the newly-formed council,
Saghatelyan was named as it coordinator.

The Homeland Salvation Council also discussed a roadmap, a transition
plan and programs to contain the current crisis, Saghatelyan said.

The Homeland Salvation Council is comprised of representatives of 17
opposition political parties that opposed the November 9 announcement
that ended the war, as well as 15 intellectuals and public figures who
enjoy the public’s trust.

The 74-year-old Manukyan has had a storied career since being one of
the founding members of the Karabakh Committee in 1988. On December 10
of that year, he along with other members of the Karabakh committee
were arrested and spent six months in Moscow’s Matroskaya Tishina
prison.

He was the first chairman of the co-founding board of the Armenian
National Movement party. From 1990 to 1995 he was a deputy of the
Supreme Council of Armenia, and from 1995 to 2007 he was a member of
Armenia’s National Assembly.

Manukyan was Armenia’s first prime minister before independence from
1990 to 1991. Days after the independence he resigned from the
position and along with other activists formed the National Democratic
Union Party.

In September 1992, he was named Armenia’s State Minister, later
assuming the title of defense minister when the ministry was
established. In this capacity he was instrumental in forming Armenia’s
Armed Forces and charting a new course for the Karabakh war, leading
it to victory. In 1996, Manukyan ran for president against Levon Ter
Petrosian. After he emerged as the clear victor in that race, Ter
Petrosian ordered the army into the streets of Yerevan blockading
Manukyan in the parliament complex. He conceded the election and
continued to serve in the National Assembly.

From March 2009 to December 2019 he was the Chairman of the Public
Council of the Republic of Armenia.

************************************************************************************************************************************************

5-         AAF Delivers $15 Million of Aid To Armenia, Artsakh

GLENDALE—The Armenia Artsakh Fund (AAF) delivered $15 million of
humanitarian assistance to Armenia and Artsakh during the last five
challenging months.  Of this amount, the AAF collected $14.9 million
of medicines and other supplies donated by Americares ($7.1 million);
Direct Relief ($4.3 million) and MAP International ($3.4 million).

Other organizations which contributed valuable goods during this
period were Armenian Missionary Association of America ($330,000);
Project Agape ($65,000); The Howard Karagheusian Comm. Corp. ($57,000)
and Dr. Albert Phillips of CA ($9,500).

The medicines, medical supplies and hygiene products donated during
this period were sent to the AGBU Claudia Nazarian Medical Center for
Syrian Armenian Refugees in Yerevan, Aleppo Compatriotic Charity
Organization, Arabkir United Children’s Foundation,  Armenian
Missionary Association of America, Avak Medical Center, Fund for
Armenian Relief, Metsn Nerces Charitable Organization, Muratsan
Children’s Endocrinology Center, National Hematology Center, St.
Grigor Lusavorich Medical Center, and the health ministries of Armenia
and Artsakh.

During the eleven months of 2020 AAF delivered much needed medicines
and medical supplies for treatment of COVID-19 patients as well as
emergency medicines and supplies to treat war injuries.  In the past
31 years, including the shipments under its predecessor, the United
Armenian Fund, the AAF has delivered to Armenia and Artsakh a grand
total of $913 million worth of relief supplies on board 158 airlifts
and 2,486 sea containers.

 The AAF shipments from June – November included much needed medicines
for treatment of COVID-19 patients, war injuries, mental disorders,
oncology, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal cases.

“The Armenia Artsakh Fund is regularly offered free of charge millions
of dollars of life-saving medicines and medical supplies. All we have
to do is pay for the shipping expenses. We welcome your generous
donations to be able to continue delivering this valuable assistance
to all medical centers in Armenia and Artsakh,” said AAF president
Harut Sassounian.

[email protected].

***********************************************************************************************************************************************

6-         Sarkissian Requests Report on Spending of Funds

            Raised by Hayastan All-Armenian Fund

The total amount raised by the Hayastan All Armenian Fund (HAAF) and
the Los Angeles-based Armenia Fund, Inc., thus far has been $175
million worldwide.

During the difficult days of the war, most of the funds raised by the
Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, 52,703,113,395 AMD (approximately
$104,000,000), were donated to a separate treasury account of the
Government of the Republic of Armenia at the request of the Government
to finance infrastructure, social and health expenditures.

Taking into account the growing public interest in the issue,
President Armen Sarkissian—who serves as HAAF Chairman of the Board of
Trustees—addressed a letter to the director of the foundation Haykak
Arshamyan on November 26 with a request to provide clarifications.

“As Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Hayastan All-Armenian
Fund, I am deeply concerned that due to the transfer of the money
donated to the fund by our compatriots and friends to the government,
there has been some distrust and dissatisfaction with the fund’s
activities. Our compatriots have raised the issue in the press, as
well. This fact has also become a source of speculation, donors have
suspicions that their trust might have been abused. As a result, the
reputation of the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, as well as fundraising
and donations for future programs, may be jeopardized,” the President
said.

Sarkissian stressed that the current situation requires urgent steps
to be taken so that the trust in the government and the foundation is
not completely lost. Therefore, according to the President, the
government should submit a clear, detailed, transparent report on the
expenditures made with the funds transferred by the fund, and this
should be done as publicly as possible.

At the same time, an urgent international audit should be conducted to
provide the public, “especially our Diaspora compatriots, as the main
and loyal donors of the foundation,” with comprehensive information on
the funds raised by the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund and their targeted
management.

In case of a negative conclusion of the international audit or if the
results of the audit are not satisfactory to the trustees or donors,
the amount of AMD 52,703,113,395 transferred to the government should
be restated as a loan, subject to subsequent return to the Hayastan
All-Armenian Fund.

“Aware of the existing difficult situation of the country, I still
consider it unacceptable to add to the various crises the crisis of
confidence around the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund,” the President said.
He added that the return of the funds transferred to the government to
the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund can change the situation and become a
guarantee of restoring trust in the fund.

“The refund to the fund’s budget will allow the Board of Trustees to
decide on spending directions themselves, taking into account the
views and suggestions of the trustees, donors, and, if necessary,
cooperating with the Artsakh leadership and the Government of the
Republic of Armenia,” said President Sarkissian, anticipating the
opinion of the members of the Board of Trustees of the Hayastan
All-Armenian Fund on the issue.

The President believes the fund must be an absolutely apolitical
structure, free from even the slightest doubts.

“Armenia Fund, Inc. Corporate and Executive Boards sincerely
appreciate your recent statement regarding the status of the funds
raised by the global Armenian community to address the humanitarian
crisis that unfolded as a result of the Azeri attack on the civilian
population of Artsakh.At the onset of the war, the Armenian-American
communities designated Armenia Fund as the main organization for the
collection and transfer of the majority of the funds raised in the US.
Starting on October 1, 2020 until the ceasefire on November 10, we
transferred a total of $61 million to Hayastan All-Armenian Fund
(HAAF) along with specific instructions for the use of the funds—to
provide relief to the impacted and displaced civilians,” said Armenia
Fund, Inc., Chairperson Maria Mehranian, in a letter sent to
Sarkissian on December 4.

Mehranian noted that since mid-November, Armenia Fund, Inc. has made
multiple requests to HAAF to present a detailed accounting and
supporting documentation for the expenditure of the funds so that “we
may fulfill our accountability to our donors and the larger community,
as well as to satisfy our obligations vis-à vis various domestic
compliance stipulations. We have been told repeatedly by HAAF that
this accounting is in progress and a detailed report is being prepared
and would be provided in short order. We have not received that report
as of the time of this letter.”

“We share the concerns enumerated in your statement, and are grateful
for your leadership to ensure that HAAF acts expeditiously and with
full transparency in providing the requisite accounting of the funds
which our communities have raised with great effort and utmost
dedication. As you have identified in your statement, the first order
of business is to provide the full and complete report on the
expenditure of funds,” wrote Mehranian.

As the diasporan organization that has raised the highest amount for
the relief effort, and serving one of the largest and most active
constituencies outside of the homeland, Armenia Fund is taking the
brunt of negative commentary, misinformation and speculation due to
the conflicting official and non-official statements circulating in
the media. If not addressed promptly, this will tarnish our reputation
and diminish the public trust which we have worked so hard to build
over our 25-year service. Therefore, we respectfully ask you and the
Board of Trustees of HAAF to establish an expedited deadline for the
completion and publication of the detailed and accurate accounting
report so that we may inform our community of the work accomplished to
help our brothers and sisters in Artsakh and Armenia,” concluded
Mehranian.

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7-         Commentary: Serj Tankian, Kool-Aid and a Suicidal Revolution

            for the Armenian Nation

            By Sarig Armenian

            For The California Courier

Serj Tankian is a talented musician, the son of the Armenian-American
community, and a person with good intentions, but he has been drawn
into a misguided web of deception and propaganda.

This is not a personal attack on Serj, but it is a call for him to
“wake-up.” His unequivocal support for Prime Minister Pashinyan, the
My Step political party, and the My Step Foundation indicates an
incomprehensible failure and weakness. Let me tell you why.

In 2018, with a mixture of Hollywood slick videos and
infomercial-worthy appeals, Serj Tankian sold the Armenian nation on
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his now-failed “Velvet Revolution.”
As popular protests swelled, Tankian flew to the rescue of Pashinyan
and joined the rally held in Yerevan’s Republic Square in May 2018,
giving an impassioned speech in support of his candidate. He then went
on to promote the now very forgettable movie about Pashinyan’s
campaign.

Shortly after Pashinyan ascended to the role of prime minister,
Tankian deepened his relationship with the Pashinyans by joining the
My Step Foundation board of directors, a slush fund organization for
the prime minister and his spouse, Anna Hakobyan. In April of this
year, Tankian again doubled down on his support for Pashinyan by
writing a song and dedicating all of its proceeds in support of the My
Step Foundation. While many early Pashinyan supporters have critically
reevaluated their support for the questionable and incompetent
leadership of the My Step party leader, Serj Tankian just can’t seem
to put down his pom-poms.

On November 9, 2020, hours prior to announcement of surrender and
capitulation, Tankian posted a statement calling for national unity in
support of Pashinyan’s leadership, stating “we’re with you Nikol
Pashinyan.” This commited support for a failing leader speaks to
Tankian’s inability to soundly judge a leader’s character and
comprehend the complexities of the geopolitical challenges facing our
collective Armenia nation.

Over the years, Tankian has given numerous interviews to mainstream
media outlets raising awareness about Armenia, Artsakh and the
Armenian Genocide and for that, we are thankful. However, in a recent
interview with Rolling Stone magazine, Tankian was quoted as saying “I
don’t believe in war or ultimately borders,” when discussing Artsakh.
This statement, too, indicates Tankian’s naiveté, and demonstrates how
easily he has become a tool for covert powers seeking to effectively
divide Armenia internally and externally and prop up the semblance of
a democracy at the cost of its national security.

Let’s flashback to November 1978 for a moment. A delusional cult
leader named Jim Jones of the Peoples Temple successfully led 900
people to commit suicide in the jungles of Guyana. According to
forensic reports, the mass suicide was achieved by lacing Kool-Aid
with cyanide and to this day remains one of the largest mass murder
events in history. The reason I highlight this tragedy is that prior
to his and 900 of his followers’ deaths—Jim Jones described the event
on an audio tape as a “revolutionary suicide.”

Looking back at Pashinyan’s rise, his entourage of amateurs and
incompetent assets, his single-minded obedience to covert Western
powers, his utter failure at international diplomacy, and his
ultimately suicidal confrontation with Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Turkey—it is clear that the revolution orchestrated for Pashinyan was
a “revolutionary suicide” for the Armenian nation.

Thousands of dead soldiers—an entire generation of 18, 19 and 20 year
olds—are the victims of Pashinyan’s “revolutionary suicide.”

Tens of thousands of refugees from hundreds of villages across
Artsakh—are the victims of Pashinyan’s “revolutionary suicide.”

The martyrs of the first Artsakh war—Monte Melkonian, Shahen Meghryan,
Tatul Krpeyan and so many more—they too are now victims of Pashinyan’s
“revolutionary suicide.”

One significant difference between Jim Jones in 1978 and Nikol
Pashinyan in 2020 is that Jim Jones actually drank his own Kool-Aid.
Yet today, we still have a faltering, weak and failing Nikol Pashinyan
(bolstered by misguided celebrities of all stripes like Serj Tankian),
serving as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia.

As we watch Nikol Pashinyan and his My Step coalition shirk their
constitutional responsibilities and drive the Armenian nation to the
brink of statelessness, it is time for Serj Tankian, the political
amateur, to stand down. It is time for Serj Tankian to stop pouring
the suicidal Kool-aid through thinly-veiled calls for silence and
unity during a national crisis. It is time for Serj Tankian—who today
is sitting comfortably in his home in Malibu or New Zealand—to stop
the incessant cheerleading for an incompetent, divisive, and visibly
unstable leader. The people of our greater Armenian nation, of Artsakh
and Armenia, have had enough of this “revolutionary suicide.”

Sarig Armenian is an attorney and life-long political activist
currently based in Los Angeles, California. She has served in both the
legislative and judicial branches of the United States government.

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AZERBAIJANI press: Azerbaijan’s investment in Turkish economy to reach $20B – MP

Emil Lazarian
ECONOMY8 December 2020 00:28 (UTC+04:00)

BAKU, Azerbaijan, Dec. 8

By Elchin Mehdiyev – Trend:

Further expansion of the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey at a new stage is one of the main priorities, Azerbaijani MP Vugar Bayramov told Trend on Dec. 7.

“The trade turnover between the two countries amounted to $4.4 billion in 2019,” Bayramov added. “In general, there has been an upward trend in trade relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey recently.”

The MP stressed that the trade turnover between the two countries increased by 33 percent in 2019 compared to 2018 and by 73 percent compared to 2017.

“So, the total trade turnover amounted to $3.4 billion in 2018, $2.7 billion in 2017,” Bayramov said. “There has always been a positive balance in bilateral trade since 2017.”

“It rose to a record figure of $1.2 billion in 2019,” the MP said. “Azerbaijan has become one of the first countries which invested most of all in the Turkish economy recently. Azerbaijan invested more than $15 billion while Turkey has invested $12.5 billion in the Azerbaijani economy.”

“Taking into account the signed agreements, Azerbaijan’s investments in the Turkish economy will grow up to $20 billion soon,” Bayramov said.

Bayramov considers it expedient if in accordance with the “Preferential Trade Agreement” the list of goods for which the quota and duty were reduced to zero to be expanded. The latest agreement covers 15 commodity groups.

“In general, it would be more expedient if the countries in mutual foreign trade gradually reduce quotas and duties on all goods to zero,” the MP said. “It would also be expedient to create a joint special economic zone with Turkey in the territories liberated from the Armenian occupation.”

“If we take into account that there will be a corridor between the main part of Azerbaijan’s territory and Nakhchivan, it can create an opportunity for bigger attraction of investments to this region,” the MP said.