Government offering various theories of incidents in Ganca
[Dubnov] The crisis in Ganca is still continuing despite the fact that its acute phase seems to have ended. Anyway, what can now be said about the developments unfolding there?
[Aliyeva] These are really remarkable developments first and foremost because all this fits into classical theories of political science. The stronger the authoritarian regime is the more radical methods are used in response to it. However, if you ask me, the reaction, which the developments were met with on the government’s and the population’s part, was much more interesting. As for the remarkable thing on the population’s part, this was the fact that effectively no-one failed to sympathise with the person, who attempted on the life of the head of the executive branch of the Ganca government. This can certainly be interpreted as accumulated dissatisfaction, as even this step by a young man arouses sympathy and compassion.
Second, information was disseminated about who this was and how this happened. Interestingly, the fact that the information was disseminated immediately caused absolutely unanimous distrust. As far as I know, there were several scenarios: At first, this was [said to be] some personal insult and revenge. Then, a video appeared all of a sudden, allegedly showing the wife of the man, who had made the attempt, which gave a religious colouring to all this. Then, official information was released, in which contradictory [pieces of information] were threaded together, [saying] as if he had studied in Qom in Iran and then joined the ISIS. In other words, these were completely contradictory versions. Incidentally, if we follow social networks, [we will see that] this was so apparent and obvious that even those not very well aware of the developments would understand that a whole lot of things in them corresponded to reality.
For me, the attempt to give a radical religious shape to the developments seems to be particularly interesting. However, at present, it is extremely difficult to say what was behind this. However, I should say that in the given Azerbaijani context, any antagonism of the kind looks quite natural, no matter what shape this might have. The authorities are trying to bring discredit to any possible protest, which might be currently staged in Azerbaijan. They can bring discredit to it, taking advantage of the developments to first and foremost show that they have not been caused by some objective internal conditions, but from outside. In the given case, they held Iran responsible, if I am not mistaken. This is an attempt to justify strong-arm methods of suppressing protests.
Islamists not ‘organised force’ in Azerbaijan
[Dubnov] Some observers in Azerbaijan emphasise that the only organised force, which is really capable of staging a more or less organised protest against the authorities now, is mosques and Islamic radicalism. How does this combine with what you said about this being met with deep sympathy on society’s part?
[Aliyeva] But it is a fact that no-one believed that he was a religious radical. Second, it is not true that this was an organised force. The thing is that even though there are religious forces in the country, these are different denominations with Turkish, Iranian, and Arab influence. In other words, depending on the geographical zone they come from, they are not connected to each other as a rule. There is no serious interdependence between them and I would say the opposite: This is the least organised force, particularly as very many of their leaders are currently absent, being in prison. I do not think that Islam is the only organised force, particularly as in contrast to religiousness in general, the population in Azerbaijan is not very religious, particularly as compared with neighbouring Georgia and Armenia.
Risks in case of ‘absolutely inevitable’ protests
[Dubnov] If so, what risks is the (Ilham) Aliyev leadership facing? Where can the most risky protest boil up?
[Aliyeva] In actual fact, the main risk is that in the case of possible social protests, a lot of things will depend on the government’s reaction and readiness to allow protests. For example, the peaceful nature of the process depends first and foremost on how ready the authorities are to give room for expressing this protest. If the authorities resort to violence in response, this might have a harmful effect. Thus, this is a serious signal for the authorities.
[Dubnov] In this context, how telling and disturbing is it for the Azerbaijani authorities that developments in Armenia [reference to the Armenian Velvet Revolution] unfolded in a peaceful manner? Are the Azerbaijani authorities trying out a possibility of the kind in their case?
[Aliyeva] In my opinion, this interpretation of the developments is effectively aimed to legitimise possible violent reaction to the protests, which might be staged in Azerbaijan, say, similar to Armenia. Therefore, I am going to say straightaway that what matters most about these developments is how they are interpreted and presented, and this is bringing discredit first and foremost to any possible protest, which might be staged afterwards and which, broadly speaking, is absolutely inevitable, given the situation in the country. This example has shown very well how the authorities are going to behave in a situation, when there are protests.
Government seeking to have no ‘deterrents’ against protests
[Dubnov] When it comes to discrediting a protest, there arises a need in concrete [social] layers and forces to make them lose trust in all this. In this context, who can the authorities count on, which social forces or structures?
[Aliyeva] There is a group of people, which is advantageous for the authorities, of course. This is a small layer of the population and apparently, a small group in law enforcement structures and oligarchs. However, there are discrepancies inside the oligarchic group. One of the interpretations of the developments that followed was as follows: There is a serious intra-clannish struggle and from all appearances, the fact that these two [police] colonels were killed [in Ganca on 10 July] is also considered as intra-clannish fighting. However, it is important that in the given case, the incumbent authorities have no deterrents. In other words, the authorities are effectively trying to earn a green light for reaction of the kind to possible protests, [aiming to] legitimise their possible response, and proving and showing that all these [people] are radicals and all this has been organised from abroad. Therefore, in this context, the authorities have no fear of concrete sanctions or something of the kind to be imposed on them if they suppress protests.
[Dubnov] In this context, how effective is the traditional propaganda factor: The Armenian or the Karabakh [factor]?
[Aliyeva] Well, it is not for nothing that they never forget the problem. This serves as a kind of background for everything happening in the country. Therefore, the problem is sure to always surface and emerge until it becomes resolved. At present, this is just changes taking place in Armenia. This is in the limelight, as everyone is keeping an eye on whether their attitude to Karabakh will change with the new Armenian leadership’s coming to power. Thus, there is increased interest in the issue.