Turan Information Agency, Azerbaijani Opposition Press
Monday
What has caused V.Putin's visit to Azerbaijan?
by ASTNA.biz
***
Of course, the interregional forum is a large-scale event. So, in the
work of the previous seventh Russian-Azerbaijani interregional forum
in Baku (November 2017), officials, representatives of parliaments and
executive bodies of the two countries, entrepreneurs from such spheres
of economy as industry, tourism, agriculture, construction, trade,
consulting, logistics, pharmaceuticals, ICT, finance, etc.,
representatives of the media. The forum was attended by approximately
600 delegates - more than 250 people from 9 subjects of the Russian
Federation and about 300 representatives of Azerbaijan. An agreement
on trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation was
signed with 17 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, and
Intergovernmental commissions were established with four constituent
entities of the Russian Federation. In general, the Republic of
Azerbaijan maintains trade and economic relations with 78 subjects of
the Russian Federation.
However, there is another reason: from September 25 to September 27,
the 3rd Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition ADEX 2018 will be
held in Baku. This year the exhibition will bring together more than
200 companies from 32 countries. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, Israel,
the Republic of Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine, Pakistan, France and other
countries will be represented at the national pavilions at the ADEX
2018. Turkey has booked a pavilion for an area of 30% more than in
2016. Among the participants are the leading companies of the defense
sector from Italy, Bulgaria, China, the Netherlands, Lithuania and
other countries.
They prefer not to talk about this event in connection with Putin's
visit. Meanwhile, it seems that this event, together with the possible
steps of the two sides that accompany it, is the main reason for the
visit.
And here our article acquires the character of certain assumptions,
possible scenarios. Thus, it is assumed that the presidents will sign
new agreements on the supply of Russian arms to Azerbaijan, and this,
taking into account the recent US sanctions against China that bought
planes in Russia, may have consequences for Baku. So why does Baku,
which still has a colossal arsenal of armaments (on January 19, 2018,
a new batch of Russian-made military equipment and ammunition arrived
in Baku), expects to continue to supply arms without fear of
Washington's reaction? It is clear that it is important for Moscow to
demonstrate to its overseas "partners" that sanctions do not cause
significant harm, at least in the leading positions (energy carriers
and armament) of Russian exports, that not only such a self-sufficient
country-giant as China, but other states ignore US sanctions. But what
about Baku itself, whose relations with Western countries evolve from
bad to worse? And here it is possible to put forward a new assumption
that, along with the agreement on the acquisition of Russian weapons,
Baku made certain proposals that strengthened Azerbaijan's
determination to take risks. There is only one problem that can move
Baku to such a step - and this is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
stretched for decades. It is no coincidence that a very informed
Rosbalt agency notes: "In 2018, Armenia will face the danger of a war
with Azerbaijan without the "back" of Russia."
Of course, it is too naïve to assume that Moscow promised Baku full
control over all the occupied territories, not only Russia, but all
the countries involved in the affairs of the region will never give up
their leverage over Baku, unless they receive an equivalent instrument
of influence and maintenance in return inviolability of their
interests. But after all, talks about the transfer of several regions
occupied by Armenia to Azerbaijan have been going on for a long time,
and this plan was and is included in virtually all models for the
settlement of the conflict. So why not let Baku make this plan a
reality by force of arms, then with a harsh stop by Azerbaijan's
excessive claims, as it was in April 2016? Why not repeat the scenario
used at the time of "friend" of Serge, against Nikol "suspicious in
pro-Western sentiments"? However, Azerbaijan should not be deluded,
how many times the most iridescent promises turned into elementary
speculations that could not even be appealed.
Of course, bargaining will not be limited to a large-scale, but still
local conflict. And here, for the time, one can move from assumptions
to cautious forecasts. With the beginning of a new stage of US
sanctions against Iran, the South Caucasus region again began to gain
geopolitical weight. It is the position of Azerbaijan that determines
which bridgehead the South Caucasus will become in case of the
transition of the American-Iranian clashes from the "cold" to the
"hot" phase. And Russia understands this well, as is the role of Baku
in the Syrian conflict, in which the "tripartite union" is constantly
threatened with cracking due to Turkey's "special" position. And in
this issue, Baku can become a moderator of the Russian-Turkish
dialogue. We by no means exaggerate, the policy of all the years of
independence demonstrates that Baku has a much greater influence on
Ankara than on Moscow. It is enough to recall the events connected
with the Armenian-Turkish protocols. In any case, Azerbaijan can not
only bring certain wishes of Russia to Turkey, but also within
reasonable limits to lobby them.
There is another sore point for Russia in the South Caucasus region,
in which another progress is being made - the European Union - which
Moscow, with certain reasons, sees as a downside to the progress of
the US and NATO.
The policy of promoting the European Union to the borders of the
post-Soviet space is so obvious that it cannot but cause a nervous
reaction not only from Moscow, but also from Tehran, which once again
found itself in the ring of sanctions, which, despite all objections,
was nevertheless accepted by the EU countries.
In order to achieve the goals, set by Russia and Iran, it is vitally
important to minimize the influence of the US and EU in the South
Caucasus region. It is extremely difficult to do this without
Azerbaijan. Suffice it to recall that the deterioration of Baku's
relations with the West made it possible to strengthen Russia's
influence in the region by involving Azerbaijan in new communication
projects ("North-South") and Baku's insistent proposals to reconsider
its positions with regard to the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic
Community. The three most important mechanisms of Moscow's influence
(apart from the conflict) on Baku's decisions are the numerous
Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan,
which, as events have shown, are strongly influenced by Moscow,
Russia's leading positions in Azerbaijan's imports. It's also worth
pondering over this.
It should be noted that Azerbaijan's promising foreign policy depends
to a significant extent on Turkey's positions, which are increasingly
involved in strategic relations with Russia and Iran. So, on September
23, Russia and Turkey managed to overcome the latest disagreements
around Idlib - a city and a region in the north-west of Syria, where
the last opposition forces are concentrated along with the armed
formations.
Meanwhile, at the 3rd Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition ADEX
2018, Turkish defense companies will display their products at 40
booths, among them: modern armored vehicles, naval vessels, air
defense control systems, military equipment simulators, ballistic
defense systems, automatic land vehicles, underwater remote control
vehicles, ROKETSAN missiles, UAVs, airplanes, helicopters, etc.
After the publication of the Belarusian opposition source "Belarusian
Prauda" (based in Poland) Yuri Baranevich's material: "Deliveries of
Russian weapons to Azerbaijan cause discontent in Baku and indignation
in Armenia," which notes the low quality of Russian weapons supplied
to Azerbaijan, there was another reason to turn attention to others,
including Turkish, arms suppliers. The article notes that Russian
export contracts to other countries are either not partially
fulfilled, or are broken by the deadline for implementation, and the
quality of their implementation raises many questions. Thus, according
to Y. Baranevich: "The Azerbaijani side noted that the rockets for the
Smerch MRLS do not explode when firing, ammunition to the BTR-82A
machine guns does not reach the target at all, and the Mi-35
helicopters permanently fix thermocouple breakages that do not give
the opportunity to start the engine. As well as failures in the
operation of on-board equipment, the automatic fire and firing systems
of the Ataka-M and Sturm-B missiles do not work properly ... according
to experts, in the case of Azerbaijan, such problems may have an
intentional character that determines the need for the leadership of
Russia to balance between obtaining foreign exchange financial profits
from export contracts with Baku, which, as a rule, are signed at very
inflated prices, and restraining the latter's military potential in
the confrontation with Armenia, which paradise is formally an ally of
Moscow in the Caucasus, and is in a state of armed confrontation with
Azerbaijan. "
The article says that unlike poor Armenia, Azerbaijan is an excellent
solvent customer, that's why Russia does not want to leave this market
and give it to its Turkish competitors who could easily cover the
lion's share of Azerbaijan's requests without problems. The author
believes that at
The article says that unlike poor Armenia, Azerbaijan is an excellent
solvent customer, that's why Russia does not want to leave this market
and give it to its Turkish competitors who could easily cover the
lion's share of Azerbaijani requests without any problems. The author
believes that at the same time Baku will stop listening to Russia, and
therefore in this issue, rather Baku is turning Moscow, than vice
versa.
Despite the refutations (referring to Azerbaijani officials) in the
Russian press, it is obvious that there are complex problems with the
supply of Russian weapons to Azerbaijan. And this is another
indication that arms contracts are of a political nature. The
forthcoming visit of V. Putin to Azerbaijan can clarify this issue.