Category: 2017

The Russian president Putin met with Aliyev on Friday. There is nothing strange when Aliyev and Putin meet. Russia and Azerbaijan are declared strategic partners and a meeting of their presidents is not something strange. The question is what specific goals this meeting has, whether it is one in a series or an extraordinary meeting, that is an urgent need to meet has occurred. And who has had the urgent need? Putin and Aliyev may have different reasons to meet. From the point of view of Armenia, attention immediately goes on to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the issue of Artsakh. And it seems, at least to many, that only this issue would bring Putin and Aliyev to a meeting. However, the vectors of the Russian-Azerbaijani partnership vary and it is possible that at least one Putin-Aliyev meeting is not intended to discuss the Artsakh issue. At the same time, it is beyond doubt that whatever the reason to meet, the issue of Artsakh will be mentioned in the discussions. So, a question or concern occurs what place it will have and what influence it will undergo. In this sense, the relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan is more complicated now than before April 2016. In April the sides had to respond silently that at the end of the day the purpose of strategic partnership was to let each other down. Azerbaijan became convinced that Moscow’s purpose was to achieve military presence in Artsakh, letting Azerbaijan take several positions or heights at best and Moscow clearly saw that Baku’s goal was to get the right to war through Eurasian promises and take as much as it can through a blitzkrieg. And this mutual unmasking was basically ensured by the Armenian army, resisting, perhaps unexpectedly for both Russia and Azerbaijan, and pushing back aggression though being much less armed than Baku armed with Russia’s help. However, despite the “masquerade” revealed mutually in April, Moscow and Baku cannot do without partnership, everyone has their reason but they end up into a mutual necessity. Simply the lack of mutual confidence has made it rather complicated to come to terms. Turkey could be helpful to Russia unintentionally. Or rather, Turkey’s complicated issues with the West which have almost led to breaking relations with Germany. What developments will follow, will there be an escalation or a standstill? Time will show. However, one thing is clear that Turkey has serious issues with the West, which is also an issue for Azerbaijan. What should Baku do as it has to account to the West for its “big brother”? The situation is complicated for Aliyev indeed – he has to support Turkey morally and politically. This means being rejected by the West. Meanwhile, Aliyev is already half-rejected by the West. Not to support Turkey means to betray the elder brother. At the same time, Turkey will ask support for support. The situation is complicated indeed, and Aliyev may increasingly need Putin’s help who seems to be a relatively neutral option between the West and Turkey. Apparently with this in mind, the Azerbaijani president asked for a meeting with Putin in Sochi or Putin seized the moment and invited Aliyev. The question is how and in what direction Russia will guide Aliyev. Technically, Turkey is “handing” Aliyev to Putin for custody. It’s not clear if he expects to get him back or not.

Former NKR Foreign Minister, independent analyst Arman Melikyan in an interview with ArmInfo comments on the behavioral line of official Baku aimed at strengthening anti-Armenian propaganda at  international platforms

 

 

It is pretty long time that Azerbaijan has  appealed and keeps on appealing  to various international structures with requests and even demands to close the Armenian nuclear power plant in Metsamor.  Will this lead to the emergence of raising   another resolution on the type of “Sarsang”, for example, in the PACE and what steps should you take in the direction of preventing such a scenario?

 

 

Official Baku will consistently continue its activities, oriented  to inflict maximum political, economic and military damage to Armenia. Metsamor NPP is very convenient to attack  from this point of view. It is quite obvious that, with  the given current military and political situation in the region, Armenia’s refusal to use nuclear energy is absolutely impossible. Only in case of establishment of guaranteed long-term peace in the zone of the Azerbaijan-Artsakh conflict and complete eradication of the causes of interethnic hostility, and a serious conversation held can be a way  to start developing alternative energy, with a gradual abandonment of nuclear energy. At the moment there is no progress in this direction and it can not be. Metsamor NPP operates in accordance with all IAEA standards, in close cooperation with this authoritative international profile organization, and at this point it is possible to put an end to this. For Armenia, it is important to continue the operation of the unit, which is being modernized, and to prolong its operation. And then we have to start building a new, modern nuclear power unit, and –  here it is impossible  for the acting Armenian authorities to show inadmissible inertia.

 

 

Various, Azerbaijani experts close to the authorities repeatedly voiced the threat of missile strikes on the Armenian nuclear power plant as a response to the bombing of Azerbaijani territories. Is it possible to exclude such madness completely, if the big war becomes a reality and the regime in Baku faces the threat of losing power?

 

 

To exclude the fact that such an idiotic thought can come to someone in Baku is impossible. In any case, the leakage of radioactive substances into the atmosphere can cause irreparable damage to the environment of the region, to its entire population. It’s just that those who today are vigorously discussing this issue should keep in mind that a number of local climatic features indicate that radioactive emissions into the atmosphere are likely to be swept towards Nakhchivan and further along the Araks River channel towards the Caspian Sea. But who knows, maybe Baku authorities for some reason liked spitting  against the wind.

 

 

In Armenia and Artsakh, it is customary to assess Azerbaijani propaganda as a provocative laugh and directed solely at domestic consumption. Meanwhile, serious experts in their assessments, say about its rather noticeable external influence. First of all, on international structures. What kind of assessment will you give to  the “caviar”, “clumsy” and real Azerbaijani diplomacy-propaganda?

In my opinion, Baku has achieved certain successes, and a disdainful attitude towards the efforts it makes is a sign of limitation and groundless bravado. You can scornfully call their diplomacy “caviar” or “clumsy”, but it sometimes works. But  – a la guerre comme  a la guerre,  and if the means they use work, it is already an indicator of efficiency. As an example, I would like to recall the story of the murder of our officer Gurgen Margaryan in Hungary – for today the killer Safarov is walking loose and is the hero of Azerbaijan, we have lost our officer and quarreled with Hungary, we broke diplomatic relations with this country-member of the EU. The situation can be quickly rectified, if you seriously take the case.

 

At a meeting in Baku, Azerbaijani and Turkish Foreign Ministers Elmar Mammadyarov and Mevlut Cavusoglu noted “Armenia’s aggression towards Azerbaijan and the continuation of its occupation” as a serious threat to regional peace and security and assessed the Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation as a stabilizing factor. What at,  according to your estimates, is regional and not only Baku-Ankara cooperation aimed  in reality, what are its prospects?

 

The Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic cooperation, advertised at such a high level in the South Caucasus, is not limited to military, political and economic pressure on Armenia. In fact, one can confidently say that official Ankara and Baku quite cleverly disguise their joint economic and ethno-cultural expansion in the region by the need to counteract the Armenian military threat. Turkey and Azerbaijan together successfully promote their interests in Georgia, and the territory of the latter at the moment is no longer just a transit corridor for these countries, but also a kind of potential military bridgehead. Turkish private business is well established and rooted throughout the Black Sea coast of Georgia, as well as along the main transport corridors leading from the Turkish-Georgian border to the Georgian-Azerbaijani border. At the same time our neighbors and accomplices try to curtail the possibilities of the Armenian-Georgian political, economic, cultural and military cooperation in every possible way. It is noteworthy that simultaneously the Turkish side is increasing the level of trade and economic penetration into Abkhazia. I believe that the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem sets itself a wide range of tasks and the neutralization or liquidation of the Armenian factor in the South Caucasus can only be a part of much more ambitious plans.