Eurasia Daily Monitor
April 2, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 64
KOSOVO: RUSSIA’S FIFTH FROZEN CONFLICT?
by Vladimir Socor
To continue freezing the resolution of the four post-Soviet
secessionist conflicts, Russia needs a fifth frozen conflict in Kosovo and a
linkage to make resolution of one dependent on resolution of the others. At
the same time, Moscow hopes that a linkage policy could lead to
breakthroughs by means of tradeoffs, whereby Russia could sacrifice its
clients in one conflict for a free hand in settling another on its own
terms.
On a parallel agenda, Russia hopes to retain and expand a foothold of
strategic influence in the Balkans by resuscitating Greater-Serbian
nationalism in Belgrade over Kosovo. Moscow hopes to close off Serbia’s
prospects of partnership and association with the European Union, drawing
that country toward closer reliance on Russia.
The international negotiations on the status of Kosovo are now moving
into the endgame phase, with the EU and NATO on the cusp of a solution that
could guarantee stability and Europeanization in Kosovo and the Western
Balkans. At this juncture, Russia’s top priority is simply to stall the
negotiating process, without prejudging its ultimate outcome, and not ruling
out any type of solution on Kosovo’s status.
On March 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin told U.S. President
George W. Bush by telephone that any solution on Kosovo’s status must be
accepted by Belgrade as well as Pristina and approved by the UN Security
Council (UNSC) (Interfax, March 28). In practice, this means awarding Serbia
a veto regarding the further course of negotiations (or indeed their
continuation as such) and holding any solution hostage to Russian approval
in the UNSC. To all intents and purposes, Moscow is delegating its veto
power to Belgrade in the UN-mediated negotiations while threatening to
exercise its own veto in the UNSC on Serbia’s behalf.
To string out the process, Moscow has joined Belgrade in rejecting UN
Mediator Martti Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s status. The document
recommends a status very close to independence with international
recognition, time-limited international supervision, and clear prospects for
full-fledged independence and close relations with the EU. For its part,
Russia calls for the start of new negotiations under another UN mediator.
The United States and European Union have endorsed the Ahtisaari plan,
as has UN Secretary-General Ba Ki Moon. Western support enabled Ahtisaari to
up the ante against Moscow on March 26, announcing, `The potential for
negotiations has been exhausted,’ and using for the first time the word
`independence’ to define Kosovo’s status under his Western-approved plan
(Ahtisaari’s initial report had stopped short of using the word
`independence,’ but was rejected by Russia regardless) (Interfax, March 26,
27).
Moscow certainly calculates that blocking the process might trigger
potentially violent protests by some Albanian groups against UN and EU
authorities in Kosovo and possibly also riots targeting minority Serbs,
which may require locally stationed NATO troops to intervene for maintaining
order. Any such turbulence would then enable Russia to argue — and win some
support from certain wavering European governments for this argument — that
Kosovo does not meet the standards for recognition of its independence and
that the process must again be postponed. This, too, could become a
prescription for freezing the Kosovo conflict resolution — or perhaps a
prelude for Moscow to seek equivalent compensation for thawing the Kosovo
freeze.
The EU is well advanced in its preparations to take over from the UN
the exercise of international authority in Kosovo, with NATO retaining
responsibility for security. The Ahtisaari report as well as EU planning
envisage a 120-day transition from UN protectorate to independent state
under EU supervision, then two or three years of `supervised independence’
post-recognition, with the EU mentoring Kosovo’s institutions of governance.
Anticipating the risks of unrest in the event that Russia and Serbia force a
postponement of the solution, the EU is prepared to enlarge its
responsibility for policing and the judiciary in Kosovo.
Under an internal report just circulated under the imprint of High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, the EU is about to embark on its
largest-ever civilian crisis-management mission, with up to 1,500 personnel
for at least two years in Kosovo. Meanwhile, NATO will continue providing
the hard security in Kosovo, with troops mostly from European member
countries of the alliance as well as the U.S. base in Kosovo at Camp
Bondsteel. NATO takes the position that its Kosovo presence is an open-ended
one.
For its part, Russia threatens to veto any kind of solution on Kosovo’
s status at this time. Instead, it aims for stalemate and lumping settlement
in Kosovo with settlement of the post-Soviet conflicts. Such linkage would
enable Moscow to use one negotiating process to obstruct or manipulate the
other negotiating processes, either prolonging all of them indefinitely or
offering concessions in one theater to obtain satisfaction in other
theaters.
The United States and the European Union reject any such linkage as
baseless. Russia, however, seeks to convert several EU and NATO member
countries to the linkage thesis by exploiting variously their fears or
ambitions. Discomfiting its post-Soviet secessionist clients, Moscow tilts
clearly ar this stage toward a Kosovo settlement ostensibly based on the
principle of territorial integrity of states, "under international law."
Moscow’s top priority now is to win over Serbia as a strategic ally while
consolidating Russia’s gains already achieved in the post-Soviet conflicts
through military conquest and ethnic cleansing within other states’
territories against international law.
–Vladimir Socor