ARMENIA-GEORGIA. A NEW SITUATION OPENS NEW PERSPECTIVES
by Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkharh
Oct 1 2008
Armenia
President Serzh Sargsyan’s visit to Georgia, which started yesterday
[30 September], has been one of the noteworthy and important events in
the two countries and the whole South Caucasus region over the past
weeks. It is known that Armenia’s interstate relations faced in a
difficult ordeal during the Russian-Georgian war. On the one hand,
being Russia’s strategic ally, and on the other hand, Georgia’s
immediate neighbour, in the long run, Armenia, by preserving
neutrality, managed not to harm the interests of the either of the
conflicting sides.
After Russia recognized Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence,
although Armenia joined, being a member of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, a common statement which condemned the Georgian
government’s actions, however, it refused to recognize the independence
of the two new states, which separated from Georgia. Of course such
balanced and reserved behaviour of the Armenian government raised
questions among all sides of the confrontation, however these are
fully justified from the point of view of Armenia’s own national
interests. A country, which is blockaded by Azerbaijan and Turkey
and which has communications routes passing through Georgia and an
Armenian community there, could not have acted another way.
New shifts, which occurred in one-and-a-half months after the
Russian-Georgian war, proved that Armenia’s balanced and reserved
policy is both the only winning way out of the force majeure situation
and a necessary precondition for freeing its hands during the later
developments. This is proved by the following three truths.
The first one: The Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan transpiration and
communication axis, which was being shaped in the South Caucasus under
Western protection and with the active participation of Turkey, started
to gradually but consistently weaken in the post-war period. This
is evidenced by the suspension of Azerbaijani oil import via the
Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as the Turkish government’s current
hesitations over the viability of the Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku
railway. The second one: Georgia, which has lost South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, is twisting its fortune with the perspective to
integrate into Western entities, while Armenia’s two, so to say
"hostile enemies" – Turkey and Azerbaijan – are attempting to start a
strategic dialogue with Russia, the only full-fledged strategic partner
of our country. The third one: As a result of these two concurrent
geopolitical processes, Russia and Georgia, which have become "hostile
enemies", and Russia, which is expressing its intention of becoming
a "hostile friend" on the one hand, and Turkey and Azerbaijan, on
the other hand, have shaped such a "chess board" around Armenia,
that in order to play on it without mistakes, Armenia feels the
necessity to strengthen its former cooperation and mutual trust with
Georgia. Georgia is a defeated and weakened neighbour for Armenia on
the one hand, on the other hand, it is a country that has the role
of the USA’s and Europe’s "regional outpost".
The mechanical move of the "acute angles" of the West-Russia
confrontation, which emerged as a result of the Russian-Georgian
hostilities, to the South Caucasus is not at all in Armenia’s national
interests. The value and importance of Turkey and, consequently,
of Azerbaijan in the region is growing in the eyes of the West,
and especially of Russia, as a result of any confrontation like
this. At the same time, Armenia’s opportunities to pursue a policy
of complementarity are diminishing. Therefore, preserving a "window"
to the West that opens via Georgia is a guarantee of ensuring the
continuity of its policy; and under these circumstances, the value
and the weight of our country is increasing significantly in the eyes
of all the players in the region. Under these circumstances, neither
Turkey nor Azerbaijan can view Armenia as a small member in their
"hostile friendship" with Russia, and Russian political experts will
stop saying that "anyway Armenia has nowhere to escape". This means
that in the new situation Armenia and Georgia can find options to solve
key issues in bilateral relations more quickly and rationally. Those
concern both transport and communication issues and the state of
ethnic Armenians in [the Armenian-populated] Javakheti Region of
Georgia and other Georgian regions.
It is no secret that Javakheti has turned out to be in an ambiguous
situation after the Russian-Georgian war. On the one hand, Javakheti
is devalued as a Turkish-Georgian-Azerbaijani communication joint,
on the other hand, serious forces interested in the region are
increasingly tempted to make this Armenian-populated region one of
the "subjects" of the Georgian federalization programmes. The state
of ethnic Armenians living in other regions of Georgia has noticeably
changed as well, because as a result of the Russian-Georgian war this
country has hosted Georgian and Svan refugees which fled its former
autonomies. At the same time, the state of Armenians of Georgia,
who used to work in Russia, has become very complicated, as they have
found themselves "between the hammer and the anvil".
There still remain the issues of return of Armenian churches, which
were expropriated in Tbilisi and other cities of Georgia, supplying
books and teachers to Armenian schools and many other culture and
education-related issues. In the new regional realities a thorough
discussion of all these issues and mutual readiness to find appropriate
solutions can undoubtedly create a positive atmosphere for the further
development of Armenian-Georgian dialogue and cooperation.