TURKEY, AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA: ERDOGAN CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO ACT AS TURKISH PREMIER ANYMORE. PART IV
Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
icles/view/96388
March 29, 2009
In four previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia:
Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
( m/articles/view/94901),
"Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be
Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I"
( /view/95492),
"Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be
Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II"
( s/view/96354)
and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be
Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part III"
( es/view/96383), I illustrated
some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically
Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and
diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be
removed by any means and at all costs.
In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass
media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming
dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that
remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely
the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over
the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference"
demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been
allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to
the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the
Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.
Erdogan’s and Gul’s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is
revealed throughout this document, which demonstrates that there are
international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and
ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the
Armenian -Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion
of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are
fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as "Genocide". Nagorno –
Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are
fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.
The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied
the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did
not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of
the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their
demarches step by step. This means that either Erdogan and Gul are20=0
D ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances,
the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted
action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.
Quite contrarily with the colonial powers, Turkey has nothing to win
from the reopening of the Armenian border. Any formal recognition of
Armenia plays in the Freemasonic game, consisting in a step toward the
destruction of Turkey. Those who help the colonial powers in their
Anti-Turkish agenda have no reasonable explanation to provide the
Turkish public with about their paranoid and treacherous acts. They
call their policy "peace" whereas it signals a war at the prejudice
of Turkey.
With the present article, I complete the republication of the critical
document.
The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE
Minsk Conference
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Doc. 10364
29 November 2004
s/doc04/EDOC10364.htm
Mediation efforts in the N-K conflict
Iranian mediation. Iran made a short-lived effort in March – May 1992,
when two meetings took place in Tehran, the second one on presidential
level. In March, the first ever cease-fire between the belligerents
was achieved, but it only lasted days.
According to Iranian analysts, the effort failed for a number of
reasons, one of them being that Tehran was not perceived as impartial
..20 Iran, a traditional rival of Russia and Turkey in the region,
was thought to have an interest that the newly emerging Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia survive as independent "buffer states" between
itself and Russia, while keeping them in balance by pressuring the
stronger side. In the N-K conflict, this would imply constraining
Armenian military advances.
Iran shares the same religion with all neighbouring countries except
Armenia, but has the greatest affinity with the Azerbaijanis who, like
the vast majority of Iranians, are Shiite Muslims (until Azerbaijani
independence, Iran was the only State representing Shiite Muslims). On
the other hand, Armenians are traditionally hostile to Iran´s rival
Turkey, while Iran and Armenia have not had problems in recent history.
Iran has a sizeable Azerbaijani minority – the second largest
in the country. The Azerbaijani Popular Front had a pro-Turkish
orientation. At one point the APF openly appealed to Iranian
Azerbaijanis to secede and join Azerbaijan. While allegations that
Iran provided arms to Armenia were not proven, it is certain that
Yerevan today enjoys very good relations with the Iranian neighbour.
In a little known episode, in September 1993, when Armenians launched
an attack on Nakhichevan, Iranian troops crossed the border, with the
official purpose to guarantee the security of the jointly managed dams
on the Araz river and to establish camps for Azerbaijani refugees
( Iran says it hosts over 4 million refugees from Azerbaijan and
Iraq). After this event, there was no further military action in
Nakhichevan.
Russian mediation. In October 1993, President Yeltsin of Russia
proposed to his counterparts from the three South Caucasian states
to adopt a declaration calling for the unblocking of lines of
communication, joint protection of the borders of Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan with Turkey and Iran and .setting up of Russian military
bases for this purpose. Presidents Ter-Petrosian and Shevardnadze
agreed, but President Aliyev maintained that a declaration of this
type could not be adopted until the Armenian forces had withdrawn
from the occupied Azeri territories.
Earlier, in September 1991, President Yeltsin and President Nazarbayev
of Kazakhstan visited Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan. Following the
visit, the first direct negotiations took place in Zheleznovodsk,
Russia, with the participation of the Presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan as well as the N-K leadership.
Negotiating mechanisms
The UN Security Council adopted, in 1993, four resolutions on the
N-K conflict9. They called for cessation of military activities and
hostile acts, withdrawal of forces and resumption of negotiations,
condemned the violation of the then established cease-fire and the
excessive use of force in response thereto. The UN Security Council
also referred to the forces that overtook the Kelbajar district
of Azerbaijan as " l ocal Armenian forces" and urged the Armenian
government "to exert its influence" on the Armenians of N-K.
The Minsk process goes back to March 1992, when the CSCE Helsinki
Meeting requested the Chairman-in-Office to convene a conference in
Minsk on N-K peaceful settlement. The meeting named eleven States to
participate in the conference. The conference never took place, but
the name of the Belarusian capital remained attached to the process
and the would-be participants became known as the Minsk Group. N-K was
to be invited to the conference as an interested party. The formula
"elected and other representatives of N-K" refers to the de facto
authorities and the Azerbaijani refugees.
In 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit "strongly endorsed the mediation
efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group and expressed appreciation for the
crucial contribution of the Russian Federation and the efforts by other
individual members of the Minsk Group". In order to harmonize these
into a single co-ordinated effort, a Co-Chairmanship for the process
was established – Russia and Finland. In 1997, the Co-Chairmanship
was revised to its current composition: the United States, Russian
Federation and France.
The Minsk Group receives assistance from the Personal Representative of
the Chairman-in-Office, who resides in the region and a High-Level
Planning Group made up of military experts seconded by OSCE
participating States. The latter is a dormant body, w hich would come
into action if and when the multinational OSCE peacekeeping force
recommended by the Budapest Summit is established.
The Minsk Group has put forward several peace plans, which have been
rejected as they were not seen to deal acceptably with major concerns
of one or another party to the conflict,
Direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest
level go back to the Zheleznovodsk meeting mentioned above. President
Aliyev and Kocharyan have met nearly 20 times, with no breakthrough
or decisive step forward in sight.
In December 2002, the OSCE Porto Ministerial meeting "welcomed the
continuing meetings of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and
of their Special Representatives" and "encouraged the parties to
continue their efforts, with the active support of the Co-Chairmen,
aimed at reaching a just and enduring settlement".
Positions of the sides
Comment: the viewpoints of the parties to the conflict remain opposed
as to the causes of the conflict, the way in which it should be
resolved and which problems should be addressed first.
The key elements of the positions can be summarized as follows:
Pictures Flag 1 – Azerbaijan
Occupied territories must be liberated as a precondition for serious
negotiations;
â-~O with territories occupied, there can be no regional co-operation
or "business as usual";
â-~O the return of the refugees must be addressed a t an early stage
of the negotiations;
â-~O Azerbaijan is prepared to grant N-K "the highest level of autonomy
known in the world", or "in concrete terms – the status of Tatarstan
in the Russian Federation";
â-~O as the conflict is settled, Azerbaijan will re-establish normal
relations with Armenia – (In Armenian terms – will lift the blockade).
Pictures Flag 2 – Armenia
â-~O the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey is illegal and
must be lifted;
â-~O Armenia has no territorial claims to Azerbaijan;
â-~O N-K must be recognised as a party to the conflict and of the
negotiating process;
â-~O The occupied territories will be returned to Azerbaijan once
the conflict is settled;
â-~O The Lachin corridor must remain under Armenian sovereignty but
will be compensated to Azerbaijan by equal territory from other parts
of N-K;
â-~O Armenia stands ready to develop regional co-operation and
confidence-building measures.
Pictures Flag 3 – Nagorno Karabakh
N-K has already covered its part of the road to compromise by
renouncing the claim to union with Armenia and agreeing to be
independent;
â-~O N-K sovereign existence does not depend on international
recognition, because N-K has (1) a territory and (2) population as
well as (3) elected, organized and functioning authorities and is
(4) capable of assuming and fulfilling intern=0 D ational obligations.
Settlement options
The content of the proposals for settlement officially remains
a secret.
Nevertheless it is not difficult to see that any solution has to be
one of or a mix of elements from the following main options:
(1) restitution of the status quo ante;
(2) self-rule of N-K within Azerbaijan;
(3) "common state" or a confederal/federal set-up (this option remains
very unclear);
(4) independence or merging with Armenia for N-K with either
(5) a swap of territories or
(6) exchange of corridors in order to ensure continuity between Armenia
and N-K on one side and Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan on
the other side.
In 1996, the OSCE Lisbon summit elaborated three principles for
settling the N-K conflict:
â-~O territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan;
â-~O N-K legal status to be based on self-determination and highest
degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;
â-~O guaranteed security for N-K and its whole population.
The above principles could not be adopted by consensus due to Armenian
disagreement.
According to Azerbaijani sources, in 1997, on the margins of the Second
Council of Europe Summit, Presidents Aliyev and Kocharyan reached an
understanding based on a swap of territories. Subsequently Armenia
allegedly rejected the arrangement, which had also become known as the
Sadarak agreement. The Armenian view is that a swap of territorie=0
D s is not possible as it would cut Armenia off its border with Iran.
In April 2001, further to their travel to Strasbourg on the occasion
of the joint accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council
of Europe, the two presidents met in Paris upon the invitation of
President Chirac of France.
Reportedly, an agreement was reached, referred to as the Paris
principles.
Subsequently, in a weeklong negotiation in a proximity format10 in Key
West, US, the Paris agreement was put on paper. The bargaining seems
to be about exchange of corridors, the Lachin corridor linking Armenia
with N-K and the Meghri corridor linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.
Photocopy and Map
In October 2002, there were vague press reports about new Azerbaijani
proposals – notably, to divide contested lands with international
mediation, with some localities choosing by referendum whether they
belong to Armenia or to Azerbaijan. The same reports indicated that
Baku had reiterated it would never accept that N-K become a new
sovereign state.
Problems of Conflict Settlement
Comment: the following summary is based on writings by experts in
conflict-prevention and negotiation.
The extent of historical mistrust between Azerbaijanis and Armenians
is difficult to evaluate. Whereas both sides may be exaggerating at
present, serious violent episodes date back at least to the end of
the 19th century.
At the same time, as recently as 1990, far m=0 D ore Armenians lived in
Baku than in N-K. During the N-K war, Armenians maintained life-saving
relations with Iranian Azerbaijanis.
Some experts argue that, generally speaking, in the South Caucasus
the definition of ethnicity as well as the link between ethnicity
and territory may be not so strong as in other regions where
nation-building took place earlier and in different circumstances.
Armenians are mistrustful of all Turkic-speaking Muslims, whom they
tend to view as a single people ("Turks"). Most Azerbaijanis and
Armenians seem to believe that the N-K conflict is not simply between
Governments or the military, but between their two peoples.
The internally displaced persons, in particular in Azerbaijan and
especially those from N-K are known to be a bitter and intensely
radicalised force, and have been responsible for attacks on Armenians
in Baku. Here again, the problem may be exaggerated. Some observers
believe that Baku is not doing enough to help refugees integrate –
as integration would mean accepting the Armenian war gains.
Security problems.
Azerbaijan cannot feel secure while Armenians occupy seven of its
provinces.
However, if Baku forces were to re-establish control of Azerbaijani
territories, the Armenian perception about the south-eastern part of
their country would be one of vulnerability. In addition, Yerevan has
particular worries about its long border with Turkey. Last October,
Armenian Defence Minister20S arkisian told the press that the newly
created joint Russian- Armenian military unit is to serve, inter
alia as a deterrent against a possible Turkish incursion. Generally,
security perceptions are a particular concern for Armenia and represent
one of the main stumbling blocks in the attempts to find a settlement.
The state of democratic reform. Ethnic Armenians find it difficult to
trust a government in Baku that they may perceive as authoritarian,
corrupt, and intolerant of minorities; Azerbaijanis, for their part,
cannot bring themselves to trust the government of a state they believe
is constructed on a strictly ethnic basis – a state that acts as if
it believes Armenia is for ethnic Armenians alone.
Domestic politics.
The way the N-K conflict has interlocked the actors in internal
political life both in Yerevan and Baku may be the single biggest
obstacle to solution. President Kocharyan, himself native of N-K, came
to power after his predecessor Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign by
N-K hardliners opposing his moves towards settlement. Some analysts
note that, against the background of economic difficulties, Yerevan
has little to deliver for the time being, except a war that was won
and a national dream. In Azerbaijan, the predecessors of President
Aliyev are seen to have lost the war. Partly for this reason, the
present-day political opposition in Baku often takes a harder line
on the conflict than the Gov
ernment. President Aliyev, a native of the Azerbaijani exclave of
Nakhichevan, can hardly afford to be seen to give in to Yerevan.
Once, a high-ranking official from the region put the political
problem in a nutshell: both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, N-K is both
a source of power and a threat to power.
Guarantees.
N-K is very sensitive to the question of guarantees. N-K recalls the
British guarantees of 1918-1920, which did not prevent the application
of force by the first Azerbaijani Republic, and the "guarantees"
of the Soviet Union, which permitted what Stepanakert sees as the
de-Armenianization of Nakhichevan.
Regional issues.
Several analysts indicate that the conflict is unlikely to find a
lasting settlement before the regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran
– adapt to geo-political changes. In the post – 11 September world,
these geo-political shifts are not necessarily a zero sum game where
gain by one side is another side´s loss.
Common interest in settlement.
>From 1988 to 1994, the GDP of Azerbaijan fell 73%. Azerbaijan needs to
have the N-K conflict solved to gain stability for development based
on oil wealth. According to experts, Azerbaijan has enough energy
deposits to finance two generations of economic growth. There would
be the immediate economic gain of a large segment of the population –
the refugees and IDPs – returning to regular economic activity.
Experts also caution that oil-based development is only guaranteed
in a country with stable democratic institutions ("will Azerbaijan
develop like Norway or like Nigeria").
>From 1988 to 1994 Armenia saw its GDP fall by 60%. Particularly in
Armenia, the economic situation was further aggravated by the 1999
Russian financial system crisis. For Armenia, not having diplomatic
relations with two out of four neighbours is clearly an abnormal
situation. Restoring regular relations with the outside world would
not only bring transport costs back to normal but would also enable
Armenia´s longer-term comparative advantages – the Diaspora support
with its networking and lobbying power and capability to raise
investment. There are expert calculations suggesting that Armenia
could experience a short term increase of up to 40% of GDP.
Some analysts broadly compare the Armenian "Diaspora factor" to the
Azerbaijani "oil factor". In this context, the "Norway vs. Nigeria
dilemma" is also valid for Yerevan.
The Council of Europe position
Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe simultaneously on
25 January 2001. For the first time in its history, the Organisation
invited two new members with a bitter unresolved conflict between
them. This was made possible by the prevailing understanding, both
in the Parliamentary Assembly and in member States´ Governments that
the accession of Azerbaijan and Armenia could help to establish20the=2
0 climate of trust needed for a solution to the N-K conflict.
Picture
The Political Affairs Committee held hearings on the N-K in 1998
and 1999.
While voting positively on their accession demands, the Parliamentary
Assembly asked Armenia and Azerbaijan to commit themselves, with
regard to the N-K conflict:
â-~O to continue efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means only;
â-~O to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means
and according to the principles of international law (an obligation
incumbent on all Council of Europe member states), resolutely rejecting
any threatened use of force against its neighbours;
â-~O (for Armenia) to use its considerable influence over the Armenians
in N-K to foster a solution to the conflict;
The Presidents, Speakers of parliaments, Prime Ministers and the
chairmen of the political parties represented in Parliaments of
Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed these commitments in writing.
The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan wrote separately to reiterate
their countries´ commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement of the
N-K on the basis of a compromise acceptable to all concerned. President
Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan´s accession to the Council of Europe
would be a major contribution to the negotiations process and stability
in the region.
Comment: the commitments regarding N-K are spelled out in less detail
compared to domestic law and h uman rights obligations. Nevertheless,
the Organisation regards them as seriously as any other
commitments. They are subject to monitoring procedures.
In September 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolutions
1304 and 1305(2002) on the honouring of obligations by Armenia and
Azerbaijan, where it:
â-~O recognized that Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained regular
high-level contacts with a view to reach a suitable and peaceful
solution to the conflict,
â-~O acknowledged in particular the positive influence of Armenia on
the Armenians in N-K,
â-~O voiced concern with the prevailing frustration in Azeri society
at the deadlocked negotiations on the conflict, which is more and
more frequently expressed,
â-~O expressed hope that the negotiation process – including a recent
meeting of the Presidents would soon lead to an acceptable settlement
of the territorial conflict in line with the principles of the Council
of Europe and international law,
The Assembly has appointed Mr. Terry Davis (UK, Soc) Rapporteur on N-K.
The Committee of Ministers monitoring Group, also known as "GT-Suivi
Ago" follows regularly N-K conflict settlement efforts. It asks
questions in writing, urges Yerevan and Baku to build confidence and,
generally, impresses on the two countries the position of the member
States´ Governments.
In April 2002, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, further
to a visit to the South Cau 0Acasus region, reported, "the most
difficult challenge the member States face are their unresolved
conflicts. Indeed, the conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia
undermine the European efforts to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia and threaten to effectively put limits on the process of
democratisation".
In January 2003, the Enlarged Bureau of the Committee of Ministers´
Deputies held an exchange of views with the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk
Group and the Special Representatives of the two Presidents.
Within the framework of its assistance activities, the Council
of Europe can bring to the sides in the conflict the European
experience of post-conflict reconciliation and "work on the past". It
can also promote regional co-operation as one of the means of
post-conflict rehabilitation, and it can apply the Organisation
know-how in working with the civil society for awareness raising
and confidence-building. If a solution requires legal expertise, the
Council of Europe, through the Venice Commission, remains prepared
to help the Minsk Group work out the legal aspects of N-K status and
protection of minorities.
Comment: In the end, Nagorno-Karabakh is part of the shared history
and common suffering of the Armenian and Azerbaijani people. A common
solution must be found for a better future.
Note
Picture: The existing and the prospect pipelines highlight the
geo-strategic importance of the entire Caucasus region.
Dr. M 0Auhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Orientalist, Historian, Political Scientist, Dr. Megalommatis, 52,
is the author of 12 books, dozens of scholarly articles, hundreds of
encyclopedia entries, and thousands of articles. He speaks, reads and
writes more than 15, modern and ancient, languages. He refuted Greek
nationalism, supported Martin Bernal´s Black Athena, and rejected the
Greco-Romano-centric version of History. He pleaded for the European
History by J. B. Duroselle, and defended the rights of the Turkish,
Pomak, Macedonian, Vlachian, Arvanitic, Latin Catholic, and Jewish
minorities of Greece.
Born Christian Orthodox, he adhered to Islam when 36, devoted to
ideas of Muhyieldin Ibn al Arabi. Greek citizen of Turkish origin,
Prof. Megalommatis studied and/or worked in Turkey, Greece, France,
England, Belgium, Germany, Syria, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and
Russia, and carried out research trips throughout the Middle East,
Northeastern Africa and Central Asia. His career extended from Research
& Education, Journalism, Publications, Photography, and Translation
to Website Development, Human Rights Advocacy, Marketing, Sales &
Brokerage. He traveled in more than 80 countries in 5 continents.
He defends the Human and Civil Rights of Yazidis, Aramaeans, Turkmen,
Oromos, Ogadenis, Sidamas, Berbers, Afars, Anuak, Furis (Darfur),
Bejas, Balochs, Tibetans, and their Right to National Independence,
demands international recognition for Kosovo, Abkhazia, South
Ossetia,0D the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Transnistria,
calls for National Unity in Somalia, and denounces Islamic Terrorism.
Freedom and National Independence for Catalonia, Scotland, Corsica,
Euskadi (Bask Land), and (illegally French) Polynesia!
Break Down the Persian Tyranny of the Ayatullahs of Iran!
Freedom for 25 million Azeris in Southern Azerbaijan!
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